This chapter argues that from a particularly weak recombination principle and plausible assumptions about the nature of parthood and location, it follows that it is possible that the mereological structure of the material world and that of space-time fail to correspond to one another in very radical ways. The chapter suggests, moreover, that rejecting the possibility of such failures of correspondence leaves us with a choice of no less unappealing alternatives. It also discusses a few ways in which their possibility (...) is relevant to various important debates in metaphysics. (shrink)

I argue that from a very weak recombination principle and plausible assumptions about the nature of parthood and location it follows that it's possible that the mereological structure of the material world and that of spacetime fail to correspond to one another in very radical ways. I defend, moreover, that rejecting the possibility of such failures of correspondence leaves us with a choice of equally radical alternatives. I also discuss a few ways in which their possibility is relevant to various (...) debates in metaphysics. (shrink)

We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions of an agent fit to be held morally responsible, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. We employ Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility to argue that even if robots were to have all the capacities required of moral agency, their history would deprive them from autonomy in a responsibility-undermining way. (...) We will also study whether humans and technological artifacts like robots can form hybrid collective agents that could be morally responsible for their actions and give an argument against such a possibility. (shrink)

I give shape to a neglected debate in metaphysics, the debate over the ontological priority between individuality and collectivity. I distinguish the debate from more familiar ones in the recent literature and articulate what I call ontological collectivism, the view that collectivity is prior to individuality. I defend the in-principle intelligibility of the view from forceful general objections and argue that not only is it coherent but also of significant interest to the literature: it allows for overlooked alternatives on a (...) variety of central discussions. (shrink)

Page 1. Economics and Philosophy, 26 291--320 Copyright C Cambridge University Press doi: 10.1017 / S0266267110000386 TWO KINDS OF WE-REASONING RAUL HAKLI, KAARLO MILLER AND RAIMO TUOMELA University of Helsinki.

Various sources in the literature claim that the deduction theorem does not hold for normal modal or epistemic logic, whereas others present versions of the deduction theorem for several normal modal systems. It is shown here that the apparent problem arises from an objectionable notion of derivability from assumptions in an axiomatic system. When a traditional Hilbert-type system of axiomatic logic is generalized into a system for derivations from assumptions, the necessitation rule has to be modified in a way that (...) restricts its use to cases in which the premiss does not depend on assumptions. This restriction is entirely analogous to the restriction of the rule of universal generalization of first-order logic. A necessitation rule with this restriction permits a proof of the deduction theorem in its usual formulation. Other suggestions presented in the literature to deal with the problem are reviewed, and the present solution is argued to be preferable to the other alternatives. A contraction-and cut-free sequent calculus equivalent to the Hubert system for basic modal logic shows the standard failure argument untenable by proving the underivability of DA from A. (shrink)

The Greek word mētis (μῆτις) traditionally refers to a particular form of wily intelligence associated with the arts of deception (dolos) and the knowledge of tricks (kerdē), subterfuges, and traps. Mētis evokes innovative and ground-breaking solutions, based on the capability to understand, anticipate, and possibly violate the others’ expectations. Most importantly, mētis presupposes practical wisdom, or prudence (phrόnesis), a dispositional quality that underpins all the virtues that deserve to be cultivated by sportspersons and that is pivotal to perfect sportspersons’ moral (...) character. Not only is prudence required to apply mētis profitably for winning a game, but it is also indispensable to perform consistently with the game’s norms—cognizant of sport values. This analysis of mētis is key to illuminate the embodied dimension of tactical and moral reasoning in contemporary sport practice. In this paper, we first argue that the strategic effectiveness of mētis proves that not only sensorimotor control but also higher forms of intelligence, like strategic reasoning, are embodied and inform skilful performance; second, we argue that relying on mētis is necessary not only to interpret the rules of the game in one’s own favor but also to respect the shared values that these rules uphold in the sport practice. (shrink)

Diversas investigaciones han mostrado que la tematización de la autoconciencia no es un exclusiva de la filosofía moderna. Plotino es tal vez el primero en haber reflexionado sobre las cuestiones fundamentales de una teoría de la autoconciencia y, ello, en confrontación con el escepticismo de Sexto Empírico. La autoconciencia es propia de la hipóstasis del nous como unidad diferenciada de Inteligencia, Inteligible e Intelección que, sin embargo, se constituye a sí misma en su vano intento de aprehender la Unidad absolutamente (...) simple del Uno. El artículo examina una reciente objeción a Plotino según la cual él se limitaría a describir en qué medida se puede reconstruir la Inteligencia como anterior a la relación, pero no resuelve la paradoja sobre la posibilidad de que de una relación resulte una identidad. (shrink)

En base a una confrontación estrictamente racional con la tradición filosófica, Plotino establece un principio transcendente al ser y al pensamiento y que, sin embargo, funge como principio creador, constitutivo y diferenciador de todo lo existente: el Uno o la Unidad absolutamente simple. En sí mismo inaccesible, se manifiesta ya sea por revelación (la cual sólo es una hipótesis para Plotino) o por sus efectos. Por eso, el discurso filosófico sobre el Uno sólo es posible desde la perspectiva de la (...) multiplicidad y, por tanto, tiene un carácter aproximativo. La forma que este discurso asume es necesariamente la de las vías analogiae, eminentiae y negationis. De este modo, la razón misma nos remite por primera vez a un principio que le antecede y que, a la vez la funda, dándose así inicio a una segunda época en la historia de la filosofía. (shrink)

Endorsing the idea of group knowledge seems to entail the possibility of group belief as well, because it is usually held that knowledge entails belief. It is here studied whether it would be possible to grant that groups can have knowledge without being committed to the controversial view that groups can have beliefs. The answer is positive on the assumption that knowledge can be based on acceptance as well as belief. The distinction between belief and acceptance can be seen as (...) a refinement of the ordinary language concept of belief, and it may be useful in understanding the nature of epistemic justification and classifying various types of epistemic subjects. (shrink)

Epistemic justification of non-summative group beliefs is studied in this paper. Such group beliefs are understood to be voluntary acceptances, the justification of which differs from that of involuntary beliefs. It is argued that whereas epistemic evaluation of involuntary beliefs can be seen not to require reasons, justification of voluntary acceptance of a proposition as true requires that the agent, a group or an individual, can provide reasons for the accepted view. This basic idea is studied in relation to theories (...) of dialectical justification in which justification is taken to require ability to justify. Since the reasons offered can in principle always be challenged, there is no ultimate end to the dialectical chain of justification. This makes justification of acceptance, and thus group belief, social and, in a way, contextual, but this does not seem to entail strong forms of epistemic relativism. (shrink)

One of the key problems the field of Machine Consciousness is currently facing is the need to accurately assess the potential level of consciousness that an artificial agent might develop. This paper presents a novel artificial consciousness scale designed to provide a pragmatic and intuitive reference in the evaluation of MC implementations. The version of ConsScale described in this work provides a comprehensive evaluation mechanism which enables the estimation of the potential degree of consciousness of most of the existing artificial (...) implementations. This scale offers both well defined levels of artificial consciousness and a method to calculate an orientative numerical score . A set of architectural and cognitive criteria is considered for each level of the scale. This permits the definition of a cognitive framework in which MC implementations can be ranked according to their potential capability to reproduce functional synergies associated with consciousness. The probability of the implementations having any phenomenal states related to the assessed functional synergy is not specifically addressed in this paper; nevertheless, it could be thoughtfully discussed elsewhere. (shrink)

GIS has captured planning practice to an unprecedented degree, and this article on how it reconfigures and is configured by institutional context. The author inquires into GIS as a technology for incorporating knowledge into institutional use and includes five propositions: GIS's efficiencies in data processing allows it unprecedented facility and scope of analysis, its use increases alienation, its mimetic language furthers its role in planning, its logic appears rational—purposive, but it conceals an underlying normative logic, and its most profound effect (...) is on the mapper, and the alienating and normative character of GIS necessitate new modes of “social ground-truthing.” The author studies the southeast Los Angeles initiatives to demonstrate these propositions. This article compares two studies: one GIS-based, and the other based on participatory action research and discusses how GIS might be recontextualized into a technology for liberating democratizing processes. (shrink)

Fulfilling the "unmet need for contraceptives" in Latin America is still a contested rallying cry for local activists, policymakers, and physicians. It evokes both the consumerist aspiration to choose birth control methods, as well as implies the existence of health and welfare institutions that ought to guarantee a human right. In the 1940s, however, the "unmet need for contraceptives" was a fledgling notion that a group of experts had only begun to popularize through the use of a crucial population-making technology: (...) the fertility survey. This paper analyzes the role fertility surveyors played in the mid-twentieth century, framing Latin American populations as rapidly growing and likely... (shrink)

This volume offers eleven philosophical investigations into our future relations with social robots--robots that are specially designed to engage and connect with human beings. The contributors present cutting edge research that examines whether, and on which terms, robots can become members of human societies. Can our relations to robots be said to be "social"? Can robots enter into normative relationships with human beings? How will human social relations change when we interact with robots at work and at home? The authors (...) of this volume explore these questions from the perspective of philosophy, cognitive science, psychology, and robotics. The first three chapters offer a taxonomy for the classification of simulated social interactions, investigate whether human social interactions with robots can be genuine, and discuss the significance of social relations for the formation of human individuality. Subsequent chapters clarify whether robots could be said to actually follow social norms, whether they could live up to the social meaning of care in caregiving professions, and how we will need to program robots so that they can negotiate the conventions of human social space and collaborate with humans. Can we perform joint actions with robots, where both sides need to honour commitments, and how will such new commitments and practices change our regional cultures? The authors connect research in social robotics and empirical studies in Human-Robot Interaction to recent debates in social ontology, social cognition, as well as ethics and philosophy of technology. -/- The book is a response to the challenge that social robotics presents for our traditional conceptions of social interaction, which presuppose such essential capacities as consciousness, intentionality, agency, and normative understanding. The authors develop insightful answers along new interdisciplinary pathways in "robophilosophy," a new research area that will help us to shape the "robot revolution," the distinctive technological change of the beginning 21st century. (shrink)

Purpose: To determine the relative value that patients place on consent for procedures in the emergency department (ED) and to define a set of procedures that fall in the realm of implied consent. Methods: A questionnaire was administered to a convenience sample 134 of 174 patients who were seen in the ED of a Midwestern teaching hospital. The questionnaire asked how much time they believed was necessary to give consent for various procedures. Procedures ranged from simple (venipuncture) to complex (procedural (...) sedation). Results: Participants valued a simple blood draw at a low mean of 1.02 minutes of extra time and a lumbar puncture at a high mean of 7.78 minutes. Of all participants 52% and 48% noted a time-value of ?0? time on blood draw and intravenous line starts, respectively, indicating that they desire no additional consent for these procedures. Conclusion: Defining a set of ED procedures covered under implied consent will be difficult because many patients value formal consent for even the simplest procedure. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene por objeto explicar cuándo en el estado de necesidad la distinción entre un mal mayor o menor responde al universo ético consecuencialista y desde qué consideraciones no lo haría; segundo, explicar por qué es posible desde el principio del doble efecto la ponderación de la vida humana, aceptando la objetivización de sus parámetros según los efectos de una acción. Por ello, a continuación trataremos en la primera sección el concepto de mal en clave consecuencialista y, posteriormente, moral (...) absolutista. Se trata de un análisis sobre la materia que reconoce, en la segunda sección, la importancia de la existencia de estos universos en la ponderación de males. Luego, contrastaremos nuestros razonamientos con las soluciones que, para casos semejantes, se proponen desde el doble efecto para algunas situaciones de estado de necesidad. Finalmente, en la tercera sección, entregaremos los criterios de una política criminal para distinguir y no encubrir exigencias deónticas en el estado de necesidad. (shrink)

Se ofrece una interpretación del enfoque estructural, fenomenológico y ontológico del mito a partir de una productividad filosófica abierta en Ricoeur por ciertos elementos tomados de Kant, los cuales explican por qué el mito es analizado por la constitución de su forma, por su intención significativa y por su revelación ontológica.

Na sua Fenomenologia da vida religiosa de 1920/21 Heidegger explicita a compreensão originária da temporalidade que encontra na experiência fáctica da vida do cristianismo primitivo tal como aparece nas Cartas de S. Paulo aos Tessalonicenses e Gálatas. Essa explicitação permite a Heidegger reinterpretar a ontologia a partir do horizonte da compreensão temporal da existência humana. Esta reinterpretação apoia-se implicitametne numa nova compreensão do ser de Deus que Heidegger não tematiza, mas que é exigida pela interpretação fenomenológica da existência humana realizada (...) a partir do texto bíblico. O presente artigo pretende ainda mostrar até que ponto a postura heideggeriana da fenomenologia da religião deixa como desafio a reinterpretação do ser de Deus a partir do horizonte de compreensão determinado pela concepção analógica da temporalidade pressuposta pelo texto bíblico como discurso que fala da ordem fenoménica em que Deus se manifesta. /// In his Phenomenology of Religious Life from 1920/21 Heidegger explains the original understanding of temporality he finds in the factical life of primal Christianity as it is referred to in some letters of Saint Paul. This explanation allows Heidegger to put forward a new interpretation of ontology from the horizon of temporal understanding of human being. However, this new ontological interpretation implicitly rests on a new understanding of God's being, which Heidegger does not explicitly address as it is required by his own phenomenological interpretation of human being'obtained from the biblical text. Purpose of the present paper is also to show that Heidegger's phenomenological approach to religion challenges us to develop a new understanding of God's being from the horizon provided by an analogical comprehension of temporality presupposed in the biblical text when it is read as a discourse on the phenomenological realm where God appears. (shrink)

Na sua Fenomenologia da vida religiosa de 1920/21 Heidegger explicita a compreensão originária da temporalidade que encontra na experiência fáctica da vida do cristianismo primitivo tal como aparece nas Cartas de S. Paulo aos Tessalonicenses e Gálatas. Essa explicitação permite a Heidegger reinterpretar a ontologia a partir do horizonte da compreensão temporal da existência humana. Esta reinterpretação apoia-se implicitametne numa nova compreensão do ser de Deus que Heidegger não tematiza, mas que é exigida pela interpretação fenomenológica da existência humana realizada (...) a partir do texto bíblico. O presente artigo pretende ainda mostrar até que ponto a postura heideggeriana da fenomenologia da religião deixa como desafio a reinterpretação do ser de Deus a partir do horizonte de compreensão determinado pela concepção analógica da temporalidade pressuposta pelo texto bíblico como discurso que fala da ordem fenoménica em que Deus se manifesta.In his Phenomenology of Religious Life from 1920/21 Heidegger explains the original understanding of temporality he finds in the factical life of primal Christianity as it is referred to in some letters of Saint Paul. This explanation allows Heidegger to put forward a new interpretation of ontology from the horizon of temporal understanding of human being. However, this new ontological interpretation implicitly rests on a new understanding of God’s being, which Heidegger does not explicitly address as it is required by his own phenomenological interpretation of human being obtained from the biblical text. Purpose of the present paper is also to show that Heidegger’s phenomenological approach to religion challenges us to develop a new understanding of God’s being from the horizon provided by an analogical comprehension of temporality presupposed in the biblical text when it is read as a discourse on the phenomenological realm where God appears. (shrink)

Se trata de analizar la cuestión del estatuto que tiene la existencia de Dios en el pensamiento de Ricoeur. La cuestión se origina en la centralidad de la idea de la lingüisticidad de la experiencia religiosa y de la referencia a Dios en la hermenéutica ricoeuriana. Se examina la posibilidad de afirmar que en Ricoeur Dios tiene una existencia discursiva. Como esta hipótesis debe manejar el supuesto de que no hay lugar para el silencio en el origen de la palabra, (...) porque la existencia de Dios está siempre vinculada con el lenguaje, también se examina este supuesto. Se trata de apoyar la idea de que el silencio siempre se da en y por el lenguaje, por lo cual también se argumenta en favor de la existencia discursiva de Dios en la hermenéutica del discurso religioso de Ricoeur. (shrink)

This paper attempts to present the intellectual structure within which Paul Ricoeur has conceived the possibility of a philosophical interpretation of myth. I propose that Ricoeur's hermeneutics has been able to integrate and harmonize structural analysis, phenomenological description, and ontological-existential analysis of the myth through a group of epistemological and ontological coordinates from the two first Critiques and from Kant's philosophy of religion.