The present commentary on it greatly contributes to the understanding of thisvery important work. In fact, it is a good expositary commentary, lucidly explaning the knotty points. It evinces deep study and understanding of Navya-Nyaya and its methodology.yhus, the sukhabodhika Tippanika represents a positive and distinctive contribution to the vast commercial literature on the Tattvacimtamani.

The author has in this work clearly marked the principal stages of Indian logic in the vast period of about two thousand years beginning from 640 and has traced how from Anviksiki the science of debate Indian logic developed into the science of knowledge Pramanasastra and then into the science of dialectics Prakarana of Tarkasastra.The treatment of the subject is both historical and critical. The author has traced some Greek influence on indian logic. For instance he has shown how the (...) five membered syllogism of Aristotle found its way through Alexandria Syria and other countries into Taxila and got amalgamated with the Nyaya doctrine of inference.The book is one of the pioneer works on the subjects. It has drawn on original sources exhaustively. Besides the preface introduction, foreword and table of contents the work contains several appendices and indexes. (shrink)

Biography of Swami Dayananda Sarasvati, 1824-1883, founder of the Arya Samaj.

Chidambaram Ramalingam (1823 – 1874) was a nineteenth century Indian-Tamilian poet, mystic, and visionary moral thinker well-known for his seminal contributions to Tamil religious and moral literature. He initiated a new moral and spiritual community and movement, Suddha Sanmargam, or “The Pure Path to True Harmony”, in the nineteenth century in the province of Tamilnadu in Southern India. One of Ramalingam’s texts which laid the philosophical foundation for this community and movement is his great unfinished essay “The Ethic of Compassion (...) for Sentient Beings”. In this talk, I will attempt a systematic presentation of the moral vision and ethical system in his essay. Among Ramalingam’s central claims are the following: a) Compassion involves understanding or discernment of the ultimate metaphysical truth pertaining to sentient beings, b) Compassion is the foundation of all other moral virtues, c) Compassion provides the standard of the moral worth of actions, d) Compassion is the basis of morality itself, and e) Compassion is an essential condition of attaining spiritual liberation or enlightenment. In my talk, I will clarify, develop, and critically examine these five theses on compassion and consider relevant views and objections in the Western and Asian philosophical traditions. (shrink)

This paper will present an alternative to the mainstream Western approach to human development. The mainstream Western approach to human development does not countenance contemplative interiority as a means of cognitive inquiry and a domain of cognitive value. Hence, its conception of human development is narrowly confined to the domain of formal-operational thinking and its application to material exteriority. The alternative I will present is the work of the twentieth Indian philosopher Aurobindo (1872–1950) whose integral theory of human of development (...) inclusively countenances as realms of cognitive inquiry and value both contemplative interiority and formal-operational thinking and its application to material exteriority. The structure of Aurobindo’s integral theory of humandevelopment will be clarified and some of its implications for educational practice will be explored. (shrink)

According to the Navya Naiyāyikas, inference is the knowledge, which is produced out of consideration. But what is to be understood by the term ‘consideration’ or ‘parāmarśa’? According to them, parāmarśa or consideration is the factor through the operation of which the inferential conclusion can be attained. Parāmarśa has been defined as the knowledge of the existence of the hetu or reason in the pakṣa or subject, which reason is characterized by its being concomitant with the sādhya, the knowledge in (...) the form of parāmarśa is actually caused by the knowledge of invariable concomitance of probans (hetu) with the probandum (sādhya) and the knowledge of the existence of the hetu in the subject (pakṣa). It has been said by Viśvanātha that the cognition of the existence of probans or hetu in the subject of inference along with the cognition of the prabans or hetu as pervaded by sādhya is called parāmarśa (pakṣasya vyāpyavṛttitvadhīḥ parāmarśa ucyate). The invariable co-existence in the form ‘where there is smoke, there is fire’ is known as vyāpti or invariable concomitance. Here the invariable coexistence (avyabhicārī sāhacarya) between the probans and probandum (i.e., smoke and fire) is the definition of vyāpti. The term ‘co-existence’ means remaining in the same locus of the probans with the probandum, which is not the counter positive of the absolute negation existing in the locus of the hetu. To Gangeśa, the knowledge of the co-existence of the probans and probandum along with the absence of the knowledge of deviation of the probans is the cause of ascertaining vyāpti. Repeated observations, of course, sometimes act as a promoter (prayojaka) in ascertaining vyāpti by removing the doubt of deviation. The doubt of deviation can be removed sometimes by Tarka or sometimes by the absence of the collocation of causes of doubt, which is called svataḥsiddhaḥ. Gangeśa admits sāmānyalakṣaṇā as a pratyāsatti in ascertaining vyāpti between smoke-in-general and fire-in-general. To him, the super-normal connection through universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti) has got a prominent role in ascertaining vyāpti. If somebody challenges about the validity of the syllogistic argument in the form “The mountain is fiery as it possesses smoke” (parvato vahnimān dhūmāt), the philosophers of Nyāya and Navya-nyāya persuasion will justify the same with the help of five constituents (avayava-s). The process is called parāthānumāna (syllogistic argument for making others understand). The constituents of a syllogism are proposition (pratijňā), reason (hetu), example (udāharaṇa), application (upanaya), and conclusion (nigamana). (shrink)

The present paper shows whether there is cognition without any content. Generally, “cognition” means “cognition of something.” But in the Advaita Vedanta system of philosophy there is pure knowledge having no content called contentless cognition leading to certain philosophical problems.

Comprehensive study on the new approach of the education policy of the Government of India, in comparison with the integral education of Aurobindo Ghose, 1872-1950.

This Book Is The Result Of Intensive And Critical Study Of The Different Aspects Of Indian Epistemology Viz. The Nyaya Theory Of Perception, Some Problems Of Meaning In Purva-Mimamsa And Vedanta, Problem Of Vyapti According To Jaina-Logicians And Vallabhacarya Etc.

Study of Śivapurāṇa, Hindu mythological text.

Papers presented at the National Seminar on Language, Interpretation and Understanding: Hermeneutics from East-West Perspective, held in 2005 at the University of North Bengal in India.

Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava thinkers adapted rasa theory to a context of devotion to the god Kṛṣṇa. In doing so, bhayānaka-rasa, the aestheticized experience of horror, presents interesting complexities. This paper examines the conceptualizations of bhayānaka-rasa by four Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava authors: Rūpa Gosvāmin, Jīva Gosvāmin, Kavi Karṇapūra, and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa. Between them, they discuss three distinct modes of bhayānaka-rasa in a devotional context: a devotee’s fear after committing an offense against Kṛṣṇa, fear of some dreadful being who the devotee thinks might hurt (...) Kṛṣṇa, and fear of Kṛṣṇa’s display of his cosmic form. This paper also briefly examines the Rūpa’s explicit rejection of the fear felt by Kaṃsa as a case of devotional bhayānaka-rasa. A central concern for the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava authors is whether fear, a typically unpleasant emotion, can attain the status of a rasa and how it is subordinated to more direct forms of devotion. This paper argues that these thinkers make an important contribution to reconceptualizing bhayānaka-rasa, particularly highlighting Jīva’s Gosvāmin’s argument that the real object of bhayānaka-rasa is not the person who serves as the source of fear, but is Kṛṣṇa, out of love for whom such fear is felt. (shrink)

The article deals with four original scripts for Munda languages, invented in the 20th century by the native speakers of Munda. These are as follows: Ol Chiki, invented by Raghunath Murmu for Santali language; Sorang Sompeng, invented by Mangei Gomango for Sora; Warang Citi, invented by Lako Bodra for Ho; Bani Hisir, invented by Rohidas Singh for Mundari. The author analyzes the structures of the character sets and makes assumptions regarding the origins of the characters. In some cases, the (...) author proposes alternative versions of the origins of the Warang Citi script, which was widely examined by Heinz-Jürgen Pinnow. Certain characters of Sorang Sompeng might bear resemblance to the Latin script and some Indian scripts, while Bani Hisir seems to have been influenced by Ol Chiki and partly by Warang Citi. (shrink)