In conventional generalization of the main results of classical measure theory to Stone algebra valued measures, the values that measures and functions can take are Booleanized, while the classical notion of a σ-field is retained. The main purpose of this paper is to show by abundace of illustrations that if we agree to Booleanize the notion of a σ-field as well, then all the glorious legacy of classical measure theory is preserved completely.

We develop a general framework for measure theory and integration theory that is compatible with o-minimality. Therefore the following natural definitions are introduced. Given are an o-minimal structure M and a Borel measure μ on some Rn. We say that μ is M-compatible if there is an o-minimal expansion of M such that for every parameterized family of subsets of Rn that is definable in M the corresponding family of μ-measures is definable in this o-minimal expansion. We say that μ (...) is M-tame if there is an o-minimal expansion of M such that for every parameterized family of functions on Rn that is definable in M the corresponding family of integrals with respect to μ is definable in this o-minimal expansion. We substantiate these definitions with existing and many new examples. We investigate the Lebesgue measure in their light. We prove definable versions of fundamental results such as the theorem of Radon–Nikodym, the Lebesgue decomposition theorem and the Riesz representation theorem. They allow us to describe explicitly compatible and tame measures and to classify them in dimension one. (shrink)

O presente tem como finalidade analisar a terapia do reencontro mediado como resgate da cidadania e cultura da paz. Modelo esse proposto por Luiz Alberto Warat. em uma concepção transformadora da mediação, construída para fomentar a autonomia e emancipação dos sujeitos numa relação conflitiva, como um novo paradigma de autoconhecimento. A metodologia utilizada será o hipotético dedutivo e como técnica de pesquisa indireta em doutrinas. A discussão e aprofundamento se dá pelos conceitos da teoria do reencontro mediado proposto com o (...) resgate da cidadania e da cultura de paz. O tema é de abrangente e se justifica pelo debate em torno da mediação na teoria do reencontro mediado. (shrink)

BackgroundDecisions about limitations of life sustaining treatments are made for end-of-life patients in intensive care units. The aim of this research was to explore the professional and ethical attitudes and experiences of medical professionals on treatment of end-of-life patients in ICUs in the Republic of Croatia.MethodsA cross-sectional study was conducted among physicians and nurses working in surgical, medical, neurological, and multidisciplinary ICUs in the total of 9 hospitals throughout Croatia using a questionnaire with closed and open type questions. Exploratory factor (...) analysis was conducted to reduce data to a smaller set of summary variables. Mann–Whitney U test was used to analyse the differences between two groups and Kruskal–Wallis tests were used to analyse the differences between more than two groups.ResultsLess than third of participants stated they were included in the decision-making process, and physicians are much more included than nurses. Sixty two percent of participants stated that the decision-making process took place between physicians. Eighteen percent of participants stated that ‘do-not-attempt cardiopulmonary resuscitations’ orders were frequently made in their ICUs. A decision to withdraw inotropes and antibiotics was frequently made as stated by 22.4% and 19.9% of participants, respectively. Withholding/withdrawing of LST were ethically acceptable to 64.2% of participants. Thirty seven percent of participants thought there was a significant difference between withholding and withdrawing LST from an ethical standpoint. Seventy-nine percent of participants stated that a verbal or written decision made by a capable patient should be respected. Physicians were more inclined to respect patient’s wishes then nurses with high school education. Nurses were more included in the decision-making process in neurological than in surgical, medical, or multidisciplinary ICUs. Male participants in comparison to female, and physicians in comparison to nurses with high school and college education displayed more liberal attitudes about LST limitation.ConclusionsDNACPR orders are not commonly made in Croatian ICUs, even though limitations of LST were found ethically acceptable by most of the participants. Attitudes of paternalistic and conservative nature were expected considering Croatia’s geographical location in Southern Europe. (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce introduced in the late 19th century the notion of abduction as inference from effects to causes, or from observational data to explanatory theories. Abductive reasoning has become a major theme in contemporary logic, philosophy of science, and artificial intelligence. This paper argues that the new growing branch of applied mathematics called inverse problems deals successfully with various kinds of abductive inference within a variety of scientific disciplines. The fundamental theorem about the inverse reconstruction of plane functions from (...) their line integrals was proved by Johann Radon already in 1917. The practical applications of Radon’s theorem and its generalizations include computerized tomography which became a routine imaging technique of diagnostic medicine in the 1970s.Keywords: Abduction; Inference to the best explanation; Inverse problems; Peirce; Radon’s theorem; Tomography. (shrink)

In set theory without the axiom of choice math formula, three-space type results for the Hahn-Banach property are provided. We deduce that for every Hausdorff compact scattered space K, the Banach space C of real continuous functions on K satisfies the continuous Hahn-Banach property in math formula. We also prove in math formula Rudin's theorem: “Radon measures on Hausdorff compact scattered spaces are discrete”.

Jury theorems are mathematical theorems about the ability of collectives to make correct decisions. Several jury theorems carry the optimistic message that, in suitable circumstances, ‘crowds are wise’: many individuals together (using, for instance, majority voting) tend to make good decisions, outperforming fewer or just one individual. Jury theorems form the technical core of epistemic arguments for democracy, and provide probabilistic tools for reasoning about the epistemic quality of collective decisions. The popularity of jury theorems (...) spans across various disciplines such as economics, political science, philosophy, and computer science. This entry reviews and critically assesses a variety of jury theorems. It first discusses Condorcet's initial jury theorem, and then progressively introduces jury theorems with more appropriate premises and conclusions. It explains the philosophical foundations, and relates jury theorems to diversity, deliberation, shared evidence, shared perspectives, and other phenomena. It finally connects jury theorems to their historical background and to democratic theory, social epistemology, and social choice theory. (shrink)

Representation theorems are often taken to provide the foundations for decision theory. First, they are taken to characterize degrees of belief and utilities. Second, they are taken to justify two fundamental rules of rationality: that we should have probabilistic degrees of belief and that we should act as expected utility maximizers. We argue that representation theorems cannot serve either of these foundational purposes, and that recent attempts to defend the foundational importance of representation theorems are unsuccessful. As (...) a result, we should reject these claims, and lay the foundations of decision theory on firmer ground. (shrink)

In this short survey article, I discuss Bell’s theorem and some strategies that attempt to avoid the conclusion of non-locality. I focus on two that intersect with the philosophy of probability: (1) quantum probabilities and (2) superdeterminism. The issues they raised not only apply to a wide class of no-go theorems about quantum mechanics but are also of general philosophical interest.

Peer review is often taken to be the main form of quality control on academic research. Usually journals carry this out. However, parts of maths and physics appear to have a parallel, crowd-sourced model of peer review, where papers are posted on the arXiv to be publicly discussed. In this paper we argue that crowd-sourced peer review is likely to do better than journal-solicited peer review at sorting papers by quality. Our argument rests on two key claims. First, crowd-sourced peer (...) review will lead on average to more reviewers per paper than journal-solicited peer review. Second, due to the wisdom of the crowds, more reviewers will tend to make better judgments than fewer. We make the second claim precise by looking at the Condorcet Jury Theorem as well as two related jury theorems developed specifically to apply to peer review. (shrink)

This paper introduces Agreement Theorems to dynamic-epistemic logic. We show first that common belief of posteriors is sufficient for agreement in epistemic-plausibility models, under common and well-founded priors. We do not restrict ourselves to the finite case, showing that in countable structures the results hold if and only if the underlying plausibility ordering is well-founded. We then show that neither well-foundedness nor common priors are expressible in the language commonly used to describe and reason about epistemic-plausibility models. The static (...) agreement result is, however, finitely derivable in an extended modal logic. We provide the full derivation. We finally consider dynamic agreement results. We show they have a counterpart in epistemic-plausibility models, and provide a new form of agreements via public announcements. (shrink)

We give a review and critique of jury theorems from a social-epistemology perspective, covering Condorcet’s (1785) classic theorem and several later refinements and departures. We assess the plausibility of the conclusions and premises featuring in jury theorems and evaluate the potential of such theorems to serve as formal arguments for the ‘wisdom of crowds’. In particular, we argue (i) that there is a fundamental tension between voters’ independence and voters’ competence, hence between the two premises of most (...) jury theorems; (ii) that the (asymptotic) conclusion that ‘huge groups are infallible’, reached by many jury theorems, is an artifact of unjustified premises; and (iii) that the (nonasymptotic) conclusion that ‘larger groups are more reliable’, also reached by many jury theorems, is not an artifact and should be regarded as the more adequate formal rendition of the ‘wisdom of crowds’. (shrink)

The book begins with an overview that introduces the Theorem and the issues surrounding it, and explores how the essays that follow contribute to our understanding of those issues.

The representation theorems of expected utility theory show that having certain types of preferences is both necessary and sufficient for being representable as having subjective probabilities. However, unless the expected utility framework is simply assumed, such preferences are also consistent with being representable as having degrees of belief that do not obey the laws of probability. This fact shows that being representable as having subjective probabilities is not necessarily the same as having subjective probabilities. Probabilism can be defended on (...) the basis of the representation theorems only if attributions of degrees of belief are understood either antirealistically or purely qualitatively, or if the representation theorems are supplemented by arguments based on other considerations (simplicity, consilience, and so on) that single out the representation of a person as having subjective probabilities as the only true representation of the mental state of any person whose preferences conform to the axioms of expected utility theory. (shrink)

Any intermediate propositional logic can be extended to a calculus with epsilon- and tau-operators and critical formulas. For classical logic, this results in Hilbert’s $\varepsilon $ -calculus. The first and second $\varepsilon $ -theorems for classical logic establish conservativity of the $\varepsilon $ -calculus over its classical base logic. It is well known that the second $\varepsilon $ -theorem fails for the intuitionistic $\varepsilon $ -calculus, as prenexation is impossible. The paper investigates the effect of adding critical $\varepsilon $ (...) - and $\tau $ -formulas and using the translation of quantifiers into $\varepsilon $ - and $\tau $ -terms to intermediate logics. It is shown that conservativity over the propositional base logic also holds for such intermediate ${\varepsilon \tau }$ -calculi. The “extended” first $\varepsilon $ -theorem holds if the base logic is finite-valued Gödel–Dummett logic, and fails otherwise, but holds for certain provable formulas in infinite-valued Gödel logic. The second $\varepsilon $ -theorem also holds for finite-valued first-order Gödel logics. The methods used to prove the extended first $\varepsilon $ -theorem for infinite-valued Gödel logic suggest applications to theories of arithmetic. (shrink)

According to a recent paper by Tim Maudlin, Bell’s theorem has nothing to tell us about realism or the descriptive completeness of quantum mechanics. What it shows is that quantum mechanics is non-local, no more and no less. What I intend to do in this paper is to challenge Maudlin’s assertion about the import of Bell’s proof. There is much that I agree with in the paper; in particular, it does us the valuable service of demonstrating that Einstein’s objections to (...) quantum mechanics have nothing to do with its indeterminism. But I do think that Maudlin’s conclusion is overly cut-and-dried. Quantum mechanics is far from a unified edifice, and what Bell’s theorem shows depends on what version of quantum mechanics you look at. In particular, I’ll try to make the case that there’s an interesting, if ultimately uncompelling anti-realist construal of the import of Bell’s theorem. And I also want to suggest that locality isn’t quite as decisively defeated as Maudlin claims. (shrink)

This book contains an introduction to symbolic logic and a thorough discussion of mechanical theorem proving and its applications. The book consists of three major parts. Chapters 2 and 3 constitute an introduction to symbolic logic. Chapters 4–9 introduce several techniques in mechanical theorem proving, and Chapters 10 an 11 show how theorem proving can be applied to various areas such as question answering, problem solving, program analysis, and program synthesis.

Indoor radon is a natural radioactive gas that enters homes through cracks in the foundations. It is one of the leading causes of lung cancer. Although radon can be detected with an indoor radon test and can be mitigated by means of either ventilation or professional measures, testing and mitigating rates of the at-risk population remain insufficient. The objective of this study is to systematically review the current level of evidence regarding the design and effectiveness of mass media campaigns to (...) address the health risks of indoor radon to homeowners. The results show that informative tone of voices prevailed, other components, such as emotional or social components, were often not included. Furthermore, the focus was mostly on intention and less on behavior itself, and on testing instead of mitigation. Further research is needed to test effective and innovative communication strategies to increase protective behavior concerning indoor radon. (shrink)

Theorems of hyperarithmetic analysis occupy an unusual neighborhood in the realms of reverse mathematics and recursion-theoretic complexity. They lie above all the fixed iterations of the Turing jump but below ATR $_{0}$. There is a long history of proof-theoretic principles which are THAs. Until the papers reported on in this communication, there was only one mathematical example. Barnes, Goh, and Shore [1] analyze an array of ubiquity theorems in graph theory descended from Halin’s [9] work on rays in (...) graphs. They seem to be typical applications of ACA $_{0}$ but are actually THAs. These results answer Question 30 of Montalbán’s Open Questions in Reverse Mathematics [19] and supply several other natural principles of different and unusual levels of complexity.This work led in [25] to a new neighborhood of the reverse mathematical zoo: almost theorems of hyperarithmetic analysis. When combined with ACA $_{0}$ they are THAs but on their own are very weak. Denizens both mathematical and logical are provided. Generalizations of several conservativity classes are defined and these ATHAs as well as many other principles are shown to be conservative over RCA $_{0}$ in all these senses and weak in other recursion-theoretic ways as well. These results answer a question raised by Hirschfeldt and reported in [19] by providing a long list of pairs of principles one of which is very weak over RCA $_{0}$ but over ACA $_{0}$ is equivalent to the other which may be strong or very strong going up a standard hierarchy and at the end being stronger than full second-order arithmetic. (shrink)

It is well known that classical propositional logic can be interpreted in intuitionistic propositional logic. In particular Glivenko's theorem states that a formula is provable in the former iff its double negation is provable in the latter. We extend Glivenko's theorem and show that for every involutive substructural logic there exists a minimum substructural logic that contains the first via a double negation interpretation. Our presentation is algebraic and is formulated in the context of residuated lattices. In the last part (...) of the paper, we also discuss some extended forms of the Kolmogorov translation and we compare it to the Glivenko translation. (shrink)

We prove covering theorems for K, where K is the core model below the sharp for a strong cardinal, and give an application to stationary set reflection.

The classesMatr( ) of all matrices (models) for structural finitistic entailments are investigated. The purpose of the paper is to prove three theorems: Theorem I.7, being the counterpart of the main theorem from Czelakowski [3], and Theorems II.2 and III.2 being the entailment counterparts of Bloom's results [1]. Theorem I.7 states that if a classK of matrices is adequate for , thenMatr( ) is the least class of matrices containingK and closed under the formation of ultraproducts, submatrices, strict (...) homomorphisms and strict homomorphic pre-images. Theorem II.2 in Section II gives sufficient and necessary conditions for a structural entailment to be finitistic. Section III contains theorems which characterize finitely based entailments. (shrink)

Linear continuous logic is the fragment of continuous logic obtained by restricting connectives to addition and scalar multiplications. Most results in the full continuous logic have a counterpart in this fragment. In particular a linear form of the compactness theorem holds. We prove this variant and use it to deduce some basic preservation theorems.

Linnebo and Shapiro have recently given an analysis of potential infinity using modal logic. A key technical component of their account is to show that under a suitable translation ◊ of nonmodal language into modal language, nonmodal sentences ϕ 1, …, ϕ n entail ψ just in case ϕ 1 ◊, …, ϕ n ◊ entail ψ ◊ in the modal logic S4.2. Linnebo and Shapiro establish this result in nonfree logic. In this note I argue that their analysis of (...) potential infinity should be carried out in a free logic. I then extend their key theorems to the setting of negative free logic. (shrink)

It might seem that three of Godel’s results - the Completeness and the First and Second Incompleteness Theorems - assume so little that they are reasonably indisputable. A version of the Completeness Theorem, for instance, can be proven in RCA0, which is the weakest system studied extensively in Simpson’s encyclopaedic Subsystems of Second Order Arithmetic. And it often seems that the minimum requirements for a system just to express the Incompleteness Theorems are sufficient to prove them. However, it (...) will be shown that a particular sub-system of Peano Arithmetic is powerful enough to express assertions about syntax, provability, consistency, and models, while being too weak to allow the standard proofs of the theorems to go through. An alternative proof is available for the First Incompleteness Theorem, but is of such a different nature that the import of the theorem changes. And there are no alternative proofs for (certainly) the Completeness and (apparently) the Second Incompleteness Theorems. It is therefore perfectly rational for someone to be skeptical about Godel’s results. (shrink)

Computer assisted theorem proving is an increasingly important part of mathematical methodology, as well as a long-standing topic in artificial intelligence (AI) research. However, the current generation of theorem proving software have limited functioning in terms of providing new proofs. Importantly, they are not able to discriminate interesting theorems and proofs from trivial ones. In order for computers to develop further in theorem proving, there would need to be a radical change in how the software functions. Recently, machine learning (...) results in solving mathematical tasks have shown early promise that deep artificial neural networks could learn symbolic mathematical processing. In this paper, I analyze the theoretical prospects of such neural networks in proving mathematical theorems. In particular, I focus on the question how such AI systems could be incorporated in practice to theorem proving and what consequences that could have. In the most optimistic scenario, this includes the possibility of autonomous automated theorem provers (AATP). Here I discuss whether such AI systems could, or should, become accepted as active agents in mathematical communities. (shrink)

Along the same line as that in Ono (Ann Pure Appl Logic 161:246–250, 2009), a proof-theoretic approach to Glivenko theorems is developed here for substructural predicate logics relative not only to classical predicate logic but also to arbitrary involutive substructural predicate logics over intuitionistic linear predicate logic without exponentials QFLe. It is shown that there exists the weakest logic over QFLe among substructural predicate logics for which the Glivenko theorem holds. Negative translations of substructural predicate logics are studied by (...) using the same approach. First, a negative translation, called extended Kuroda translation is introduced. Then a translation result of an arbitrary involutive substructural predicate logics over QFLe is shown, and the existence of the weakest logic is proved among such logics for which the extended Kuroda translation works. They are obtained by a slight modification of the proof of the Glivenko theorem. Relations of our extended Kuroda translation with other standard negative translations will be discussed. Lastly, algebraic aspects of these results will be mentioned briefly. In this way, a clear and comprehensive understanding of Glivenko theorems and negative translations will be obtained from a substructural viewpoint. (shrink)

Two characterizations are given of those structural consequence operations on a propositional language which can be defined via proofs from a finite number of polynomial rules.

Bayes' Theorem is a simple mathematical formula used for calculating conditional probabilities. It figures prominently in subjectivist or Bayesian approaches to epistemology, statistics, and inductive logic. Subjectivists, who maintain that rational belief is governed by the laws of probability, lean heavily on conditional probabilities in their theories of evidence and their models of empirical learning. Bayes' Theorem is central to these enterprises both because it simplifies the calculation of conditional probabilities and because it clarifies significant features of subjectivist position. Indeed, (...) the Theorem's central insight — that a hypothesis is confirmed by any body of data that its truth renders probable — is the cornerstone of all subjectivist methodology. (shrink)

Suppose $D \subset M$ is a strongly minimal set definable in M with parameters from C. We say D is locally modular if for all $X, Y \subset D$ , with $X = \operatorname{acl}(X \cup C) \cap D, Y = \operatorname{acl}(Y \cup C) \cap D$ and $X \cap Y \neq \varnothing$ , dim(X ∪ Y) + dim(X ∩ Y) = dim(X) + dim(Y). We prove the following theorems. Theorem 1. Suppose M is stable and $D \subset M$ is strongly (...) minimal. If D is not locally modular then in M eq there is a definable pseudoplane. (For a discussion of M eq see [M, § A].) This is the main part of Theorem 1 of [Z2] and the trichotomy theorem of [Z3]. Theorem 2. Suppose M is stable and $D, D' \subset M$ are strongly minimal and nonorthogonal. Then D is locally modular if and only if D' is locally modular. (shrink)

Two partition-theorems are proved for a particular causal decision theory. One is restricted to a certain kind of partition of circumstances, and analyzes the utility of an option in terms of its utilities in conjunction with circumstances in this partition. The other analyzes an option's utility in terms of its utilities conditional on circumstances and is quite unrestricted. While the first form seems more useful for applications, the second form may be of theoretical importance in foundational exercises. Comparisons are (...) made with theorems of Richard Jeffrey, Brad Armendt, and Peter Fishburn. (shrink)

Glivenko-type theorems for substructural logics are comprehensively studied in the paper [N. Galatos, H. Ono, Glivenko theorems for substructural logics over FL, Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 1353–1384]. Arguments used there are fully algebraic, and based on the fact that all substructural logics are algebraizable 279–308] and also [N. Galatos, P. Jipsen, T. Kowalski, H. Ono, Residuated Lattices: An Algebraic Glimpse at Substructural Logics, in: Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, vol. 151, Elsevier, 2007] for the (...) details). As a complementary work to the algebraic approach developed in [N. Galatos, H. Ono, Glivenko theorems for substructural logics over FL, Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 1353–1384], we present here a concise, proof-theoretic approach to Glivenko theorems for substructural logics. This will show different features of these two approaches. (shrink)

Accessing knowledge of a single knowledge source with different client applications often requires the help of mediator systems as middleware components. In the domain of theorem proving large efforts have been made to formalize knowledge for mathematics and verification issues, and to structure it in databases. But these databases are either specialized for a single client, or if the knowledge is stored in a general database, the services this database can provide are usually limited and hard to adjust for a (...) particular theorem prover. Only recently there have been initiatives to flexibly connect existing theorem proving systems into networked environments that contain large knowledge bases. An intermediate layer containing both, search and proving functionality can be used to mediate between the two. In this paper we motivate the need and discuss the requirements for mediators between mathematical knowledge bases and theorem proving systems. We also present an attempt at a concurrent mediator between a knowledge base and a proof planning system. (shrink)

A discussion of the connections and differences between completeness and representation theorems in logic, with examples drawn from classical and modal logic, the logic of friendliness, and nonmonotonic reasoning.

Contemporary decision theory places crucial emphasis on a family of mathematical results called representation theorems, which relate criteria for evaluating the available options to axioms pertaining to the decision-maker’s preferences. Various claims have been made concerning the reasons for the importance of these results. The goal of this article is to assess their semantic role: representation theorems are purported to provide definitions of the decision-theoretic concepts involved in the evaluation criteria. In particular, this claim shall be examined from (...) the perspective of philosophical theories of the meaning of theoretical terms. (shrink)

New Jersey residents who tested their homes for radon and found more than four picocuries per liter were surveyed about their knowledge, emotions, attitudes, and intentions to take remedial action Respondents proved well informed, but radon levels were not highly correlated with any of the response variables. Overoptimism was more common than overreaction. The results suggest that active guidance is needed to ensure appropriate responses to environmental hazards, like radon, that require individual remediation. Simple information dissemination alone seems inadequate.

Gödel's two incompleteness theorems are among the most important results in modern logic, and have deep implications for various issues. They concern the limits of provability in formal axiomatic theories. The first incompleteness theorem states that in any consistent formal system F within which a certain amount of arithmetic can be carried out, there are statements of the language of F which can neither be proved nor disproved in F. According to the second incompleteness theorem, such a formal system (...) cannot prove that the system itself is consistent (assuming it is indeed consistent). These results have had a great impact on the philosophy of mathematics and logic. There have been attempts to apply the results also in other areas of philosophy such as the philosophy of mind, but these attempted applications are more controversial. The present entry surveys the two incompleteness theorems and various issues surrounding them. (shrink)

A fundamental problem in science is how to make logical inferences from scientific data. Mere data does not suffice since additional information is necessary to select a domain of models or hypotheses and thus determine the likelihood of each model or hypothesis. Thomas Bayes’ Theorem relates the data and prior information to posterior probabilities associated with differing models or hypotheses and thus is useful in identifying the roles played by the known data and the assumed prior information when making inferences. (...) Scientists, philosophers, and theologians accumulate knowledge when analyzing different aspects of reality and search for particular hypotheses or models to fit their respective subject matters. Of course, a main goal is then to integrate all kinds of knowledge into an all-encompassing worldview that would describe the whole of reality. A generous description of the whole of reality would span, in the order of complexity, from the purely physical to the supernatural. These two extreme aspects of reality are bridged by a nonphysical realm, which would include elements of life, man, consciousness, rationality, mental and mathematical abstractions, etc. An urgent problem in the theory of knowledge is what science is and what it is not. Albert Einstein’s notion of science in terms of sense perception is refined by defining operationally the data that makes up the subject matter of science. It is shown, for instance, that theological considerations included in the prior information assumed by Isaac Newton is irrelevant in relating the data logically to the model or hypothesis. In addition, the concepts of naturalism, intelligent design, and evolutionary theory are critically analyzed. Finally, Eugene P. Wigner’s suggestions concerning the nature of human consciousness, life, and the success of mathematics in the natural sciences is considered in the context of the creative power endowed in humans by God. (shrink)