Lyle Zynda [5]Lyle David Zynda [1]
  1. Representation theorems and realism about degrees of belief.Lyle Zynda - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):45-69.
    The representation theorems of expected utility theory show that having certain types of preferences is both necessary and sufficient for being representable as having subjective probabilities. However, unless the expected utility framework is simply assumed, such preferences are also consistent with being representable as having degrees of belief that do not obey the laws of probability. This fact shows that being representable as having subjective probabilities is not necessarily the same as having subjective probabilities. Probabilism can be defended on the (...)
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  2. Coherence as an ideal of rationality.Lyle Zynda - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):175 - 216.
    Probabilistic coherence is not an absolute requirement of rationality; nevertheless, it is an ideal of rationality with substantive normative import. An idealized rational agent who avoided making implicit logical errors in forming his preferences would be coherent. In response to the challenge, recently made by epistemologists such as Foley and Plantinga, that appeals to ideal rationality render probabilism either irrelevant or implausible, I argue that idealized requirements can be normatively relevant even when the ideals are unattainable, so long as they (...)
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    Old evidence and new theories.Lyle Zynda - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):67 - 95.
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    Radical Probabilism Revisited.Lyle Zynda - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):969-980.
    In this essay, I analyze and critique Richard Jeffrey's radical probabilism. The basic theses defining it are examined, particularly the idea that probabilistic coherence involves a kind of "consistency." The main challenges to Jeffrey's view are (1) that there is an inconsistency between regarding probabilities as subjective and some probabilistic judgments as better than others, and (2) that decision theory so conceived has no normative import. I argue that both of these challenges can be met.
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    Should we reject supervenience analyses of laws, chance, and causation?Lyle Zynda - 1996 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (4):587-592.
    Essay review of John Carroll's book, _Laws of Nature_.
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