Daniel Sperling discusses the legal status of posthumous interests and their possible defeat by actions performed following the death of a person. The author first explores the following questions: Do the dead have interests and/or rights, the defeat of which may constitute harm? What does posthumous harm consist of and when does it occur, if at all? This is followed by a more detailed analysis of three categories of posthumous interests arising in the medico-legal (...) context: the proprietary interest in the body of the deceased, the testamentary interest in determining the disposal of one's body after death and the interest in post-mortem medical confidentiality. Sperling concludes that if we acknowledge the interest in one's symbolic existence and legally protect it, not only do some interests survive a person's death but we should also enjoy a peremptory legal power to shape in advance our symbolic existence after death. (shrink)

The question of whether individuals retain interests or can be harmed after death is highly contentious, particularly within the context of deceased organ retrieval, retention and use. This paper argues that posthumous interests and/or harms can and do exist in the Konkomba traditional setting through the concept of ancestorship, a reputational concept of immense cultural and existential significance in this setting. I adopt Joel Feinberg’s account of harms as a setback to interests. The paper argues that (...) a socio-culturally sensitive regulatory framework does not necessarily exclude the donation of human biomaterials for transplant and science research. Indeed, when customary values are explored with open-mindedness and sensitivity it may be shown that such donation can form part of the important customs of some communities in this jurisdiction. Accordingly, a context-appropriate governance framework could utilise the cultural value of ancestorship as an incentive to encourage organ donation in the Ghanaian traditional setting. (shrink)

A rich literature in bioethics argues against the use of anonymous gamete donation in the name of the ‘interest in knowing one’s genetic origins’. This interest stems from medical as well as psychosocial and identity reasons. The term ‘genealogical bewilderment’ has been coined to express the predicament of those deprived of access to information about their origins. Another rich body of literature in bioethics discusses arguments for and against posthumous-assisted reproduction (PAR), with a recent focus on PAR that is (...) initiated by the parents of a deceased man (rather than his partner). This paper revisits arguments against PAR, in light of arguments regarding the interest in knowing one’s genetic origins. Limiting the discussion to the specific context of parent-initiated PAR (PIPAR), we argue that the use of cryopreserved sperm from a deceased identifiable man in the context of PIPAR may be ethically preferable when compared with the use of anonymous donor sperm, since it allowsgenealogical certainty, that is, giving the prospective child access to information about the identity, life story and ancestry of the genetic progenitor as well asgenealogical embeddedness, that is, close relationship with extended family members. (shrink)

In recent years, progress in cancer treatment has greatly increased the chances of recovery. Yet, treatment may have irreversible effects on patients’ fertility. In order to protect future fertility, preservation of ovarian tissue may be offered today even to very young girls, involving a surgical procedure that may be performed by minimally invasive laparoscopy, under general anesthesia. However, in the tragic event of a girl’s death, questions may arise regarding the possible use of the preserved ovarian tissue by her parents. (...) Should posthumous reproductive use of ovarian tissue without the girl’s prior consent (due to her young age) be considered a violation of her rights? On the other hand, can it be argued that it is in the interest of a child who died young to leave a genetic trace through posthumous reproduction, because genetic continuity is in the interest of every human being? After presenting the relevant clinical facts, we explore the ethical dimensions of this possible practice through an analysis of the interests of the deceased, her parents, and the child that may be born posthumously. (shrink)

Can events that take place after an individual’s death affect that person’s weIl-being? Aristotle apparently thought that they could, but Mark Overvold disagrees. Like other contemporary moral theorists, Overvold analyzes the notion of a person’s utility or welfare in terms of the fulfillment of the individual’s desires, but he adds the important qualification that the desites must be for states-of-affairs in which the agent is an essential constituent. The clear implication of such a view is that our welfare cannot be (...) affected by the post-mortem satisfaction of any of the interests which we had while alive.I shall defend Overvold against his critics who insist that at least some posthumous satisfactions can contribute to a person’s welfare. I shall also argue against Brad Hooker’s proposal that we revise Overvold’s theory in order to account for such cases. (shrink)

Can events that take place after an individual’s death affect that person’s weIl-being? Aristotle apparently thought that they could, but Mark Overvold disagrees. Like other contemporary moral theorists, Overvold analyzes the notion of a person’s utility or welfare in terms of the fulfillment of the individual’s desires, but he adds the important qualification that the desites must be for states-of-affairs in which the agent is an essential constituent. The clear implication of such a view is that our welfare cannot be (...) affected by the post-mortem satisfaction of any of the interests which we had while alive.I shall defend Overvold against his critics who insist that at least some posthumous satisfactions can contribute to a person’s welfare. I shall also argue against Brad Hooker’s proposal that we revise Overvold’s theory in order to account for such cases. (shrink)

Six people were interviewed about the possibility of becoming posthumous body donors. Interview transcripts were analyzed using interpretative phenomenological analysis. Individual-level analysis suggested a common interest in Personhood Concerns and a common commitment to Enlightenment Values. Investigations of these possible themes across participants resulted in identification of two sample-level themes, each with two subthemes: Autonomy, with subthemes of agency and consent, and Rationality, with subthemes of knowledge/epistemology and materialism/ontology. This paper concentrates on the former. Consent for posthumous body (...) donation was felt to sometimes fall short of adequately identifying donors’ preferences about what happened after consent was given, even with respect to actions for which consent established permission. In turn, paucity of information about donors’ preferences limited others’ ability to act as proxy agents to facilitate donors’ posthumous autonomy. Thus, while consent may curtail violations of people’s autonomy by authorizing actions for which permission has been established, it may fall short of facilitating their autonomy in ways that might be possible with greater knowledge of those people’s desires. Alternative methods of establishing consent are explored that might better-determine people’s desires and thereby improve others’ ability to act as proxy agents for them to facilitate their subsequent (even posthumous) autonomy. (shrink)

This book takes an interdisciplinary, transnational and cross-cultural approach to reflect on, critically examine, and challenge the surprisingly robust practice of making art after death in an artist's name, through the lenses of scholars from the fields of art history, economics and law, as well as practicing artists. Works of art conceived as multiples, such as sculptures, etchings, prints, photographs and conceptual art, can be - and often are - remade from original models and plans long after the artist has (...) passed. Recent sales have suggested a growing market embrace of posthumous works, contemporaneous with questioning on the part of art history. Legal norms seem unready for this surge in posthumous production and are beset by conflict across jurisdictions. Non-Western approaches to posthumous art, from Chinese emulations of non-living artists to Native American performances, take into account rituals of generational passage and emotional aspects foreign to Western ideas. The book will be of interest to scholars working in art history, the art market, art law, art management, museum studies, and economics. (shrink)

A number of prominent nonconsequentialists support the thesis that we can wrong the dead by violating their moral claims. In contrast, this study suggests that the arguments offered by Thomson, Scanlon, Dworkin, Feinberg and others do not warrant posthumous rights because having claim-grounding interests requires an entity to have the capacity to experience significance. If dead people don't have this capacity, there is no reason to attribute claims to them. Raising doubts about prominent hypothetical examples of ‘no-effect injury’, (...) the study concludes that nonconsequentialists should consider adopting an error theory regarding posthumous claims, and suggests two alternative explanations of the relevant moral domains. (shrink)

Can events that take place after an individual’s death affect that person’s weIl-being? Aristotle apparently thought that they could, but Mark Overvold disagrees. Like other contemporary moral theorists, Overvold analyzes the notion of a person’s utility or welfare in terms of the fulfillment of the individual’s desires, but he adds the important qualification that the desites must be for states-of-affairs in which the agent is an essential constituent. The clear implication of such a view is that our welfare cannot be (...) affected by the post-mortem satisfaction of any of the interests which we had while alive.I shall defend Overvold against his critics who insist that at least some posthumous satisfactions can contribute to a person’s welfare. I shall also argue against Brad Hooker’s proposal that we revise Overvold’s theory in order to account for such cases. (shrink)

abstract A number of prominent nonconsequentialists support the thesis that we can wrong the dead by violating their moral claims. In contrast, this study suggests that the arguments offered by Thomson, Scanlon, Dworkin, Feinberg and others do not warrant posthumous rights because having claim‐grounding interests requires an entity to have the capacity to experience significance. If dead people don't have this capacity, there is no reason to attribute claims to them. Raising doubts about prominent hypothetical examples of ‘no‐effect (...) injury’, the study concludes that nonconsequentialists should consider adopting an error theory regarding posthumous claims, and suggests two alternative explanations of the relevant moral domains. (shrink)

We have argued that it is rational to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous non-existence insofar as this asymmetry is a special case of a more general (and arguably rational) asymmetry in our attitudes toward past and future pleasures. Here we respond to an interesting critique of our view by Jens Johansson. We contend that his critique involves a crucial and illicit switch in temporal perspectives in the process of considering modal claims (sending us to other possible worlds).

WHEN ONE ASSUMES, as I will, that death marks the irrevocable end to one’s existence, it is difficult to make sense of the idea that a person could be harmed or benefited by events that take place after her death. How could a posthumous event either enhance or diminish the welfare of the deceased, who no longer exists? Yet we find that many people have a prudential (i.e., self-interested) concern for what’s going to happen after their deaths.1 People are, (...) for instance, concerned that their reputations not be slandered, that their achievements not be undermined, and that their contributions not be forgotten, not even after their deaths. Of course, many philosophers would insist that such a concern for what’s going to happen after one’s death must be based on, or a remnant of, a false belief in an afterlife. I, however, will argue that even if death marks the unequivocal and permanent end to one’s existence, people have good reason to be prudentially concerned with what’s going to happen after their deaths, for, as I will show, a person’s welfare can indeed be affected by posthumous events. (shrink)

Novotný is the Czech philologist who between 1915 and 1961 translated the entire corpus platonicum into Czech and who in 1948-49 wrote a "systematic study" in three volumes on Plato’s life, writings and philosophy. Its fourth volume on the influence of Plato upon subsequent eras appeared in 1964 and is now translated into English. The Posthumous Life of Plato can be best, although somewhat irreverently, described as a successful "Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Plato But Were Afraid (...) to Ask." It objectively traces in detail and with extensive references to relevant primary and secondary literature the reactions to Plato in antiquity, in medieval eras, and in the "new age". (shrink)

In defending what he calls ‘full-blooded Epicureanism’, James Stacey Taylor argues that the dead cannot be harmed or wronged.1 This has implications for a range of bioethical issues pertaining to death, including posthumous organ procurement. Taylor claims that respecting the autonomy of persons requires that their desires regarding the treatment of their postmortem bodies be given due consideration while these persons are alive. It is not obvious what this means in practical terms, though Taylor says that respect for autonomy (...) requires that these wishes be recorded with the intention that they be followed. Yet if respect for autonomy only applies to the wishes of premortem persons, and if there are no posthumous harms or wrongs, then it is not clear why it would matter morally whether one's wishes about what to do with one's organs were fulfilled or thwarted after one's death.Most of us have an interest in what happens to our bodies not just during our lives but also after our deaths. Personal sovereignty and autonomy give persons a right to control what happens to their bodies, and since the body …. (shrink)

This article discusses the French reception of Lefebvre since his death in 1991. It initially discusses two books that he had worked on shortly before, but which appeared post-humously. The main focus of the piece is the programme of reeditions of Lefebvre’s writings that have appeared over the last five or so years. Treating these thematically the article provides an overview of Lefebvre’s career, showing what his contemporary relevance is, while pointing out important concerns that have been neglected in the (...) recent renewal of interest. The article concludes by discussing some of the secondary literature on Lefebvre, particularly the work of Rémi Hess and Michel Trebitsch, and suggesting avenues for future research. (shrink)

This article discusses the French reception of Lefebvre since his death in 1991. It initially discusses two books that he had worked on shortly before, but which appeared post-humously. The main focus of the piece is the programme of reeditions of Lefebvre’s writings that have appeared over the last five or so years. Treating these thematically the article provides an overview of Lefebvre’s career, showing what his contemporary relevance is, while pointing out important concerns that have been neglected in the (...) recent renewal of interest. The article concludes by discussing some of the secondary literature on Lefebvre, particularly the work of Rémi Hess and Michel Trebitsch, and suggesting avenues for future research. (shrink)

With the advanced methods of analysing old biological material, it is pressing to discuss what should be allowed to be done with human remains, particularly for well documented historical individuals. We argue that Queen Christina of Sweden, who challenged the traditional gender roles, has an interest in maintaining her privacy when there are continued attempts to reveal her ‘true’ gender. In the long-running philosophical debate on posthumous wronging, the fundamental question is: Who is wronged? Our aim is to find (...) this ‘missing subject’ using narrative theory.Narrative identity emphasises the fact that no person is alone in knowing or telling their life story. People’s lives are entangled and parts of the life story of a deceased person can remain in the living realm. Since the narrative identity of a person does not necessarily end upon their death, and this narrative continues to relate directly to the person who once existed, it is the narrative subject that can continue to be posthumously wronged. Queen Christina can no longer maintain her own identity, but we maintain it by our research into her life. We propose three duties relevant for posthumous wronging: the duty of truthfulness, the duty of recognition and the duty to respect privacy. (shrink)

Orr and Siegler have recently defended a restrictive view concerning posthumous sperm retrieval and conception, which would limit insemination to those cases where the deceased man has provided explicit consent for such a procedure. The restrictive view dominates current law and practice. A permissible view, in contrast, would allow insemination and conception in all but those cases where the posthumous procedure has been explicitly refused, or where there is no reasonable evidence that the deceased person desired children. I (...) describe a phenomenology of procreative desires which supports the permissible view, and which is compatible with requirements concerning the interests of the decedent, concepts of medical infertility, and the welfare of the future child. The account illustrates how our current obsession with individual rights and autonomy can be self-defeating and repressive. (shrink)

The problem of accounting for the cognitively relevant relation between experience and thought is among the defining problems of modern philosophy. I suggest that addressing this problem provides an important motive for the “genealogy of logic” that Husserl outlines in his posthumously published Experience and Judgment. Arguing that the notions of “interest” and “pregivenness” are crucial to this approach, I seek to assess it through a detailed analysis of the use to which these notions are put in its most decisive (...) part, the account of the origin of “simple predication”. I conclude that there is reason to think that the notions cannot play the roles that Husserl assigns to them, and hence that his approach fails. (shrink)

This paper examines questions concerning elective ventilation, contextualised within English law and policy. It presents the general debate with reference both to the Exeter Protocol on elective ventilation, and the considerable developments in legal principle since the time that that protocol was declared to be unlawful. I distinguish different aspects of what might be labelled elective ventilation policies under the following four headings: ‘basic elective ventilation’; ‘epistemically complex elective ventilation’; ‘practically complex elective ventilation’; and ‘epistemically and practically complex elective ventilation’. (...) I give a legal analysis of each. In concluding remarks on their potential practical viability, I emphasise the importance not just of ascertaining the legal and ethical acceptability of these and other forms of elective ventilation, but also of assessing their professional and political acceptability. This importance relates both to the successful implementation of the individual practices, and to guarding against possible harmful effects in the wider efforts to increase the rates of posthumous organ donation. (shrink)

In the long-running debate on the interest of the dead, Joan C. Callahan argues against such interests and although Søren Holm for practical reasons is prepared to consider posthumous interests, he does not see any moral basis to support such interests. He argues that the whole question is irresolvable, yet finds privacy interests where Tutankhamen is concerned. Callahan argues that there can be reasons to hold on to the fiction that there are posthumous (...) class='Hi'>interests, namely if it is comforting for the living and instrumental for society. Thus, despite arguing against the position that the dead have any interests or for any moral basis for such interests, these “interests” are still taken into consideration in the end. This shows the unsatisfactory basis of their positions and indicates the tenacity of the moral intuition that the dead can have moral claims on the living. One example of a posthumous interest is the interest in one’s good name. Here we argue that it is an interest of moral significance. This implies that if individuals restrict use of their sample when they are still alive, those restrictions apply after their death. Further, it implies that one should be concerned with the reputation of historic persons. Research that defeats these interests calls for justification. We have suggested two lines of thinking along which such a discussion could go: investigating the truth-value of the good name and the relevance of bringing it into possible disrepute. (shrink)

During the Third Reich, state‐sponsored violence was linked to scientific research on many levels. Prisoners were used as involuntary subjects for medical experiments, and body parts from victims were used in anatomy and neuropathology on a massive scale. In many cases, such specimens remained in scientific collections and were used until long after the war. International bioethics, for a long time, had little to say on the issue. Since the late 1980s, with a renewed interest in the Holocaust and other (...) Nazi crimes, a consensus has increasingly taken hold that research on human tissues and body parts from the Nazi era is inadmissible, and that such specimens should be removed from scientific collections and buried. The question of what to do with scientific data obtained from these sources has not received adequate attention, however, and remains unsolved. This paper traces the history of debates about the ethical implications of using human tissue or body parts from the Nazi period for scientific purposes, primarily in the fields of anatomy and neuropathology. It also examines how this issue, from after the war until today, influenced the establishment of legal and bioethical norms on the use of human remains from morally tainted sources, with a particular emphasis on Germany and Austria. It is argued that the use of such specimens and of data derived from them is unethical not only because of potential harms to posthumous rights of the victims, but also because such use constitutes a moral harm to society at large. (shrink)

This article responds to criticism by Don Marquis of my previous article, "Harming Someone after His Death." I argue that because the idea of surviving interests in not plausible, the harm-as-loss-theory is not on all fours with the harm-as-invasion-of-interests theory (especially when it comes to the harm of murder), and that the former is preferable.

Most people think it is wrong to take organs from the dead if the potential donors had previously expressed a wish not to donate. Yet people respond differently to a thought experiment that seems analogous in terms of moral relevance to taking organs without consent. We argue that our reaction to the thought experiment is most representative of our deepest moral convictions. We realize not everyone will be convinced by the conclusions we draw from our thought experiment. Therefore, we point (...) out that the state ignores consent in performing mandatory autopsies in some cases. If readers are willing to give up the permissibility of mandatory autopsies, we then offer some metaphysical arguments against posthumous harm. Drawing upon claims about bodies ceasing to exist at death and Epicurean-inspired arguments against posthumous interests, we make a case for an organ conscription policy which respects fundamental liberal principles of autonomy, bodily integrity, and property. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Accepting the claim that the living have some moral duties with regard to dead bodies, this paper explores those duties and how they bear on the popular travelling exhibition Bodyworlds. I argue that the concept of informed consent presupposes substantial duties to the dead, namely duties that reckon with the meaning of the act in question. An attitude of respect and not regarding human remains as mere raw material are non‐alienable substantial duties. I found the ethos of Bodyworlds premature (...) but full of promises such as public attitudes to organ donations. At the practical level I conclude that Bodyworlds should use only willed donations or unclaimed bodies for which dignified funerals are not available. In the case of live donations, Bodyworlds has a duty to participate in the medical care of needy donors. However, secrecy with regard to the sources of cadavers seems to be the most troublesome aspect of Bodyworlds. (shrink)

What should happen to a property holding after the death of its owner? One conventional answer to this question is that the owner can legitimately designate the beneficiary of a posthumous transfer through a written will. Yet this aspect of property ownership has received little in the way of philosophical attention or moral justification. Philosophers tend either to accept bequest as a conventional feature of property ownership or reject its legitimacy on egalitarian grounds. Dissatisfied by both approaches, this paper: (...) provides a conceptual individuation of bequest, drawing a distinction between it and other sorts of property transfer, such as inheritance; shows how the canonical, historical accounts of private property ownership have failed to justify bequest; outlines what any plausible justification of bequest will require, which I argue is an account of the posthumous interests such transfers serve; and concludes by briefly sketching the normative relevance of my justificatory account of the power to bequeath. (shrink)

People often have strong views about being the subjects of research after their deaths. Should these views be given any weight and, if so, how much? How could we find out what the views are and what should we do if we cannot? This paper defends the idea of posthumous interests and discusses the significance of those interests for research ethics. It argues that we can be guided by a symmetry between the interests of living and (...) dead people and uses posthumous privacy as an example. It also claims that the weight of those interests might not decline even over long periods of time. The arguments have important implications for the ethics of (amongst others) biomedical, archaeological, anthropological, historical, and sociological research. (shrink)

It is commonly argued that cultural objects ought to be returned to their place of origin in order to remedy injustices committed in the past. In this paper, it is shown that significant challenges attach to this way of arguing. Although there is considerable intuitive appeal in the idea that if somebody wrongs another person then she ought to compensate for that injustice, the principle is difficult to apply to wrongdoings committed many decades or centuries ago. It is not clear (...) that historic injustices can meaningfully be corrected, or compensated for, and there are several arguments why, even in cases where there is a prima facie moral case for compensation, repatriation might not be a legitimate means of remedy. In order to bring analytical clarity to the issue, this paper discusses the various steps of the argument that must be addressed in order to ground a valid repatriation claim based on historic injustices. (shrink)

AN ATTEMPT to understand the role of dignity in human rights is worthwhile and challenging. Popularly referred to as a “constitutional principle”, “moral precept”, or a “supreme virtue”, dignity has allowed legal systems to adopt evolutionary and impactful practices concerning the welfare of human beings. Defined also as the precursor and basis to the various human rights defined and adopted, dignity continues to facilitate the integration of diverse interests and stakeholders within the framework of human rights thought and practice. (...) By embracing several values and interests, dignity has reached out to protect-preserve-provide for the worth of human beings as well those that cease to be or are not human beings. This introduces a student of human rights to expressions like “interspecies dignity”, “intergenerational dignity”, “trans human dignity”, and “posthumous dignity”, which are all opening the door for a new consciousness in the field of human rights. The proliferating interests of the non-human entities in the form of territorial sovereignty for animals, privacy of the deceased, rights for the dead to be found in case of war/conflict etc., have been attached with an undeniable quality as that is readily found in the understanding of dignity of human beings. In the wake of such developments, there appears a strong sense of regeneration of dignity as a foundational principle, leaving the earlier formulations of personhood, sentience, capacity, and worth into disenchantment. (shrink)

Organ shortage constitutes an unsolved problem for every country that offers transplantation as a therapeutic option. Besides the largely implemented donation model and the eventually implemented market model, a theorized automatic organ procurement model has raised a rich debate in the legal, medical and bioethical community, since it could show a higher potential to solve organ shortage. In this paper, we study the main arguments for and against this model. We show how, in the light of empirical data extracted from (...) countries with a universal health care system, its implementation could lead to a positive impact on organ procurement rates. Three factors are envisioned as fundamental in the comprehension and a possible regulation of the automatic organ procurement model: the lack of recognition of the conscientious objection, the preservation of the right to choose end of life conditions, and the need to avoid incentives for families or healthcare professionals. (shrink)

I argue for the possibility of posthumous harm based on an account of the harm of murder. I start with the deep-seated intuition that when someone is murdered he (or she) is harmed (over and above the pain of injury or dying), and argue that Feinberg's account that assumes that harm is an invasion of an interest cannot plausibly accommodate this intuition. I propose a new account of the harm of murder: it is an irreversible loss of functions necessary (...) for worthwhile existence. I suggest a (partial) loss analysis of harm in general, and then go on to apply it to posthumous harm and defend the idea that there can be posthumous losses. (shrink)

We have argued that it is rational to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous non-existence insofar as this asymmetry is a special case of a more general asymmetry in our attitudes toward past and future pleasures. Here we respond to an interesting critique of our view by Jens Johansson. We contend that his critique involves an inappropriate conflation of the time from which the relevant asymmetry emerges and the time of the badness of death.

Published posthumously in 1964, this volume contains a fantastic collection of essays by R. G. Collingwood on the subject of art and it's relationship with philosophy. Robin George Collingwood, FBA (1889 - 1943) was an English historian, philosopher, and archaeologist most famous for his philosophical works including "The Principles of Art" (1938) and the posthumously-published "The Idea of History" (1946). This fascinating volume will appeal to those with an interest in Collingwood's seminal work, and is not to be missed by (...) students of philosophy and art. Contents include: "Ruskin not a Philosophical Writer," "Ruskin's Attitude towards Philosophy," "On the Philosophy of Non-Philosophers," "Logicism and Historicism," "Ruskin as Historicist," "The Anti-Historicism of Ruskin's Contemporaries," "The Unity of the Spirit: Corollaries and Illustrations," "Ruskin and Browning," etc. Many vintage books such as this are increasingly scarce and expensive. It is with this in mind that we are republishing this volume today in an affordable, modern edition complete with a specially-commissioned new biography of the author. (shrink)

To study Judicial determinants of the ordered obstetrical and fertility interventions. Nature, corresponding laws, decisions upon the 37 expounded holdings at the Probate, Trial, District, Appellate, and Supreme Courts are studied in 92 published materials identified through the ACOG, RCOG, SOCG portals, and Legal Scholarship Repository. Hearings are held in the US (83.8 %), Canada (10.8 %) and U.K (5.4 %). Of all the hearings reviewed, 27 % concern mentally impaired, 37.8 %-maternal incompetence, and 21.6 % cases are of criminal (...) nature. The Judicial determinants vary from country to country. In Canada, the ordered medical interventions are effected by the child protection legislation, whereas in the US, by court orders. In majority of cases, orders are obtained by dismissing the patriae petitions for involuntary sterilizations of mentally impaired sui juris adults (57 %); coerced obstetrical interventions (33.3 %), fetal custody (50 %); enforcement of surrogacy contracts (62.5 %) in favor of the Common Humanity Benefit clause; and recognizing the rights to inherit in posthumously conceived children (80 %) pursuant to the Social Security Act, Law of obviousness, Law of inherent anticipation, and Intestacy statute. Current study prioritizes two questions: (1) whether it is justified to override the wishes of a competent patient purportedly in her best interests; and (2) whether the patient’s autonomy and competence is an absolute concept. With the law unsettled as to a woman’s right to assent a treatment and contradict her fetus, parties concerned with fetal rights should consider exercising of screening tools on maternal judgmental fitness jointly developed by medical and legal practitioners. Further, given the advances in gamete conservations, states consider enacting legislation in order to safeguard the orderly administration of estates disrupted by claims from posthumously conceived children. A balance must be struck between the child’s right to inherit, the state’s interest, as well as the interests of prior born children. (shrink)

A posthumous edition of Jordan's unrevised and unfinished draft of a metaphysics, with a complete bibliography of works by and about Jordan, and a preface outlining the course of his life and thought. For those who are unacquainted with Jordan's earlier writings this book is difficult to follow and to evaluate. It is extremely polemical and often dogmatic in tone; we are told that... "religion and science are the two forms of scepticism that have posed as the philosophy of (...) the modern period," and Jordan keeps harping on this string without really developing a more complete justification for his assertion that both these enterprises are restricted by their commitment to human interest and utility, and that they can for this reason not attain to an "objective metaphysics." Such an objective metaphysics he aims to develop through a novel theory of categories in which quality, relation and substance stand no longer contrasted, but are shown to be both absolute and relational and "analogically identical."--C. M. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that a person can be harmed by events that occur after her death. The most influential account of how persons can suffer such posthumous harm has been provided by George Pitcher and Joel Feinberg. Yet, despite its influence (or perhaps because of it) the Feinberg-Pitcher account of posthumous harm has been subject to several well-known criticisms. Surprisingly, there has been no attempt to defend this account of posthumous harm against these criticisms, either by (...) philosophers who work on the metaphysics of death or by those who draw upon this account of posthumous harm in their work in other philosophical fields. This paper will rectify this omission, by defending this view against the criticisms it has been subject to—a defense that will both be of intrinsic interest to those who work on the metaphysics of death and that will remedy the lacunae in the wide-ranging philosophical literature that draws upon this account of how posthumous harm is possible. (shrink)

Written in 1948 and posthumously published in 1989, this transitional essay is not, as Arlette Elkaim-Sartre suggested in her brief introduction to it, centered on an existential ethics. Rather, it is an attempt to grapple with the question of truth in relation to the ontology of Being and Nothingness. In part, Sartre wrote this work in response to the appearance of the French translation of Heidegger's "The Essence of Truth." Truth is characterized as the "event" in which there is a (...) temporalizing, progressive disclosure of Being. Although Sartre refers to "truth" as the objectivity of the subjective, his emphasis throughout is on a curious form of unargued-for realism. Knowledge of "Being" presupposes freedom and is fundamentally practical. Sartre continually subjects the questions of truth and knowledge to his distinctive form of psychologism. He views non-truth or ignorance as the background and uncovered, unveiled truth as foreground. In fact, this compact essay has more to say about a wilful ignorance or not-knowing than about coming-to-know. There are already indications of the movement towards praxis in Sartre's thought in that he refers to the continuous verification process in human experience, the problem of scarcity, the way economic crises, slavery, and so forth render certain freedoms impossible. Sartre's proclivity to reformulate in different ways central conceptions generates paradoxes, if not contradictions. When he attributes deliberate ignorance to the innocent child, he undermines his idea of a willful choice of "ignorance." Truth and Existence is an interesting transitional piece in Sartre's development, but one that expresses an undefended ontology and slides past epistemic issues. It is an essay that is interesse or "in between" his two most powerful philosophical works.--G. J. Stack State University of New York at Brockport. (shrink)

It was a strange posthumous fate that awaited the Englishman Robert of Ketton : he was to be both best known and most strenuously criticized for a work that he surely viewed as a sideline to his own interests and career. By trade Robert was a Latin translator of Arabic scientific and mathematical works, one of those remarkable twelfth-century men who, as his contemporary Petrus Alfonsi put it, were willing “to traverse distant provinces and withdraw into remote regions (...) so as to be able to attain fuller knowledge of the astronomical art.” Like other contemporary translators, such as the Italian Gerard of Cremona , Robert had left his birthplace—in his case Rutlandshire—and traveled to Spain in order to have access to the great works of Arabic astronomy and mathematics that could be found in the still very Arab Iberian Peninsula. By 1141 we find him and his close friend Herman of Carinthia studying and translating scientific works together in northeastern Spain, and in later years his astronomical interests and ecclesiastical responsibilities led him to travel widely in Spain and England. As a scientific translator, he is perhaps best known for his Liber algebrae et Almucabola, a Latin version of al-Khwarazmī's great manual of algebra, Al-Kitāb al-mukhtaṣar fī ḥisāb al-jabr wa-al-muqābalah. (shrink)