Abstract:The term stoic pragmatism was coined by John Lachs for a theory and practice of the good life in individual, social, and cultural contexts. My intention is not only to promote this interesting idea but also to develop it at some points. In the first instance, I propose something that we may call digital-culture public intellectual as a way for stoic pragmatists to be more visible with their teachings nowadays. Indirectly, and at least to some degree, stoic pragmatists may contribute (...) to the task of the humanization of cyberspace despite its massive algorithmizing according to the Big Tech business models. (shrink)

While agreeing with the main conclusion of Dominic Wilkinson and colleagues (Wilkinson, Butcherine, and Savulescu 2019), namely, that there is no moral difference between treatment withholding and withdrawal as such, we wish to criticize their approach on the basis that it treats the widespread acceptance of withdrawal aversion (WA) as a cognitive bias. Wilkinson and colleagues understand WA as “a nonrational preference for withholding (WH) treatment over withdrawal (WD) of treatment” (22). They treat WA as a manifestation of loss aversion (...) and refer to Kahneman and colleagues (1991), which defined this effect as follows: “the disutility of giving up an object is greater that the utility associated with acquiring it” (194). In a previous work, Wilkinson and Savulescu understood nonequivalence between treatment withholding and withdrawal as a reflection of slightly different, although related, phenomena: status quo bias or omission bias (Wilkinson and Savulescu 2012, 130–131). In neither of these two papers do they describe precisely the relation between these well-known psychological effects and WA, nor do they explain why they treat these effects as examples of nonrational preferences, despite the fact that these issues have been the subject of wide-ranging discussions on the intersection of psychology, economy, and philosophy. (shrink)

Given the adage “older and wiser,” it seems justified to assume that older people may be stereotyped as more moral than younger people. We aimed to study whether assessments of a person’s morality differ depending on their age. We asked 661 individuals from seven societies (Australians, Britons, Burusho of Pakistan, Canadians, Dani of Papua, New Zealanders, and Poles) whether younger (~20-year-old), middle-aged (~40-year-old), or older (~60-year-old) people were more likely to behave morally and have a sense of right and wrong. (...) We observed that older people were perceived as more moral than younger people. The effect was particularly salient when comparing 20-year-olds to either 40- or 60-year-olds and was culturally universal, as we found it in both WEIRD (i.e. Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) and non-WEIRD societies. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to address the possibility of explaining the nature of moral cognition as being rooted in an agent’s involvement in a social practice. Seen along such lines, not only does the recognition of the extent of moral standards show up as based in the agent’s experience that has been gathered in the process of education and developing their capacities for acting autonomously, but it is also thanks to the engagement in the set of such social (...) practices that the agent is able to define the moral aspect, which exceeds the practical aims of a certain area of life. Hence, I argue that in order to redefine the borders of shared morality, a practical experience is necessary to link the various practices that enable ethical reflection based on the moral resources that are obtained in this way. (shrink)

(2001). Associo‐deliberative democracy and qualitative participation. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 4, Associative Democracy: The Real Third Way, pp. 71-84. doi: 10.1080/13698230108403338.

Cognitive semiotics is often characterized as the study of meaning- making. This brief statement is at best a bit unclear and requires an elaboration. First, some interpretation of the extremely ambiguous term “meaning.

W Deklaracji o przerywaniu ciąży z 1974, Kościół Katolicki argumentuje, że zygota jest człowiekiem ponieważ posiada ludzki genotyp. Artykuł przedstawia logiczną analizę tej argumentacji. Pokazuje, że argumentacja ta jest w dużym stopniu wadliwa. Tomizm pełni tu funkcję uprawo-mocnienia. Entymematyczne założenia tomistyczne są niezbędne, by w ogóle możliwe było przejście od przesłanek do wniosku. Okazuje się ponadto, że argumentacja ta zakłada tomistyczną interpretację pojęć biologicznych, która jest niezgodna ze współczesną wiedzą biologiczną. Twierdzenie zawarte w Deklaracji nie zostało więc skutecznie uargumentowane na (...) gruncie biologii, a wręcz wydaje się, że biologia je wyklucza. Jest ono możliwe jedynie jako twierdzenie metafizyczne i wyłącznie na gruncie pewnych metafizyk. (shrink)

Stoicism is coming back in a big way. Seen as a remedy for the craziness of the times we live in, it is experiencing a great surge in academic and cultural interest. Yet, can one live stoically and be a creative artist at the same time? Delving into its underlying tenets, obscure restrictions and limits of applicability, Stankiewicz critically explores Stoicism and its complex association with artistic creativity. Stoicism and artistic creativity are two great displays of the human spirit. Yet, (...) there are multiple reasons to suspect that they are at odds with each other. Popular culture encapsulates this problem in the figure of the rational, yet emotionally remote Stoic, who achieves serenity through withdrawal, and the contrasting figure of the “cursed poet,” “tormented artist,” or simply a rock star, who lives in a whirl of creative energy, yet falls short of quietude. Is this contrast valid? Other disciplines, including psychology, have explored this problem. But it has never been done philosophically. Pioneering in its philosophical approach, this book discusses how artistic creativity and its problems of identity, expression and self-creation serve as a great testing ground for Stoicism, as well as its theoretical challenges and practical limits. Stankiewicz presents a detailed investigation into the stereotypes of Stoic life that seeks to explain the cause of Stoicism’s modern revival. This book is an essential read for anyone captivated by Stoicism’s complex allure. (shrink)

This two-volume collection showcases a wide range of modern approaches to the philosophical study of language. Contributions illustrate how these strands of research are interconnected and show the importance of such a broad outlook. The aim is to throw light upon some of the key questions in language and communication and also to inspire, inform, and integrate a community of researchers in philosophical linguistics. Volume one concentrates on fundamental theoretical topics. This means considering vital questions about what languages are and (...) how they relate to reality, and describing some of the key areas of thought in linguistics and the philosophy of language. Contributors also discuss how philosophy influences related fields such as translation, pragmatics, and argumentation. (shrink)

Participants of polemics connected with the psychotherapeutic aspect of psychoanalysis, discuss the most often about technique. Controversies considerable relating to psychological theory and philosophy, lying at bases of this technique, are treated as secondary. This approach creates conflicting directives of therapeutic technique, forges its ethical dimension and description of psychical life of individual, introduces in the area of culture notions and phenomena not dependent on the social control. Threats resulting from these should be counteracted by psychotherapist's theoretical and philosophical reflection.

Development of notion of energy resulted in appearing different interpretations in fields of physics and psychology. To psychology this concept was introduced by Mesmer. He believed that an influence of a physically perceptible fluid is the essence of therapeutic action. It was Freud who reformulated Mesmer's theory explaining that this influence should be understood as a transference. At the same time, the 19th century disputes between vitalism and mechanistic school of physiology brought a widespread consensus about the unity of all (...) types of energy. This consensus led later to a gradual elimination of the concept of energy from psychology. In the 20th century interpretation of notion libido caused that idea of a specific vital energy returned in Reich's pieces. It is important that Reich was one of the most prominent psychotherapists of the 20th century. He created contemporary Bioenergetic Therapy. Representatives of this kind of therapy claim today that a notion of energy announces a rise of a new paradigm in science. Actually this notion creates a danger of introducing activities independent of any rational valuation into a field of healing procedures. (shrink)

The high point of the falsification of physical theories in a standard view of the philosophy of science is the so-called crucial experiment. This experiment is a kind of manipulated empirical test, which provides the criterion for distinguishing between two rival hypotheses, where one is an acceptable theory due to passing the test, and the other turns out to be an unacceptable theory as it does not pass the test. The crucial experiment was supposed to play a significant role because, (...) in virtue of an empirical disconfirmation of one theory, the experiment was assumed to confirm the other as true. However, in 1906, in La théorie physique, son object et la structure (hereafter quoted in English translation as The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (1906/1954)), Pierre Duhem famously argued against this view and stated that crucial experiments in physics are impossible as they are necessarily ambiguous and logically incomplete. His contention rested on the claim that, “[a] physical theory is not an explanation [of true reality in itself in virtue of some broad metaphysical ramification of physics]. It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to represent as simply, as completely, and as accurately as possible a set of experimental laws” (ibid., p. 19). Furthermore, different theories could be equally suitable to represent a given group of experimental laws. And, assuming holism, no hypothesis could be tested in isolation, but merely as a part of a set of an entire scientific theory. The problem which Duhem identified in 1906 was slightly overshadowed and neglected in mainstream philosophy of science until the appearance of a challenging paper by Willard Van Orman Quine published in 1951 and entitled “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. Quine’s paper caused a revival of interest in Duhem’s original formulation and gave a new impulse towards the problem in the form of the so-called Duhem-Quine thesis. The aim of this paper is to reconsider whether Duhem was right to argue that there are no crucial experiments in physics. In order to assess the validity of the thesis, first, this paper makes an exposition of Duhem’s arguments in their favour, and analyses the major criticisms of this position offered in the subject-literature of Adolf Grünbaum, who explicitly attacked the arguments for the thesis as inconclusive and false. Then, this paper presents possible modes of defence of the Duhem-Quine thesis and argues that the original formulation of the thesis is well qualified and plausible. Finally, this paper offers a pragmatic interpretation of the theory choice. (shrink)

A subset of the Cantor cube is null-additive if its algebraic sum with any null set is null. We construct a set of cardinality continuum such that: all continuous images of the set into the Cantor cube are null-additive, it contains a homeomorphic copy of a set that is not null-additive, and it has the property $\unicode{x3b3} $, a strong combinatorial covering property. We also construct a nontrivial subset of the Cantor cube with the property $\unicode{x3b3} $ that is not (...) null additive. Set-theoretic assumptions used in our constructions are far milder than used earlier by Galvin–Miller and Bartoszyński–Recław, to obtain sets with analogous properties. We also consider products of Sierpiński sets in the context of combinatorial covering properties. (shrink)

In his texts, Józef Tischner referred to significant problems characteristic of the end of the communist regime and the first years of the liberal-democratic system in Poland. He tried to understand, among other things, the sources of Polish society’s disappointment with their regained political and economic freedom. This article discusses the late period of Tischner’s life and work, when his philosophy was heavily influenced by the ideas of Charles Taylor. On the one hand, the author analyzes Tischner’s attitude toward the (...) concept of ordinary life, while on the other, Tischner’s understanding of solidarity combined with the concept of the spirit of capitalism. The article shows numerous similarities and significant differences between the way of thinking of both philosophers. The former concern above all the consentaneous assessment of the disappearance of heroism in liberal-democratic societies, while the latter concern the discrepancies in the assessment of the possibility of fully implementing the idea of solidarity in these societies. (shrink)

The articles in this collection focus on philosophical approaches to proper names. The issues discussed include abstract names, empty names, naming and name-using practices, definite descriptions, individuals, reference, designation, sense and semantics. The contributions show the importance and lasting influence of theories proposed by John Stuart Mill, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Donald Davidson, and Saul Kripke. Individual chapters assess traditional analyses and modern controversies, and contribute to the debate on proper names in contemporary philosophy of language.

There is a long-standing dispute among scholars concerning Berkeley’s supposed commitment to an emotivist theory of meaning as the very first (and an early modern) instance of non-cognitivism. According to this position, the domains of religious and moral language do not refer to facts about the world, but rather express the emotional attitudes of religious or moral language users. Some scholars involved in the dispute argue for taking Berkeley to be an emotivist (non-cognitivist), while others hold that we should not (...) do so. This paper puts forward an interpretation that lends support to the non-cognitivist reading of his stance, but in expressivist rather than emotivist terms. It argues that the label “expressivism” does more justice to the textual evidence concerning his understanding of moral language, as what is distinctive where this philosopher is concerned is his interest in explaining the nature of our practice of employing moral language (i.e. how we come to formulate moral statements as expressions of our non-referential attitudes, and the meta-level considerations pertaining to morality associated with this), rather than whether morality is just a matter of our emotions or feelings (i.e. such first-order considerations about morality as whether moral rightness and wrongness correspond merely to our emotional states). (shrink)

This article aims to analyse Wittgenstein’s 1929–1932 notes concerning Frege’s critique of what is referred to as old formalism in the philosophy of mathematics. Wittgenstein disagreed with Frege’s critique and, in his notes, outlined his own assessment of formalism. First of all, he approvingly foregrounded its mathematics-game comparison and insistence that rules precede the meanings of expressions. In this article, I recount Frege’s critique of formalism and address Wittgenstein’s assessment of it to show that his remarks are not so much (...) a critique of Frege as rather a defence of the formalist anti-metaphysical investment. (shrink)

The paper considers whether virtue ethics should be regarded as excluding duty ethics or any of its essential elements. The argument suggested here consists of two steps: (1) an argument that there are two different versions of virtue ethics (moderate and strong) and that moderate virtue ethics does not exclude the duty ethics; (2) an analysis of various difficulties with the strong version of virtue ethics, which shows that moderate virtue ethics is more plausible because of its capacity to avoid (...) these difficulties. This capacity makes moderate virtue ethics more attractive as an ethical theory because it covers the entire range of moral phenomena described both by strong versions of virtue ethics and by duty ethics without the attendant difficulties. (shrink)

The critique of Robert K. Merton in terms of the criteria relevant for the history of methodology is misdirected. Merton has never been a methodologist, and his influential notion of middle-range theories has been merely a polemical position taken both against pure abstract, conceptual constructs, and narrow fact-finding. It helped sociology to sustain fruitful directions of research, free from abuses of "grand theory" as well as pure empiricism. Merton's true and many "arrivals" (read: contributions to sociology) have been substantive and (...) not meta-theoretical. Because of them he is a classic of twentieth-century sociology. Key Words: middle-range theory • history of methodology • sociological theory. (shrink)