Practices, virtues and embedded moral cognition

Filozofia 74 (3):194-208 (2019)
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to address the possibility of explaining the nature of moral cognition as being rooted in an agent’s involvement in a social practice. Seen along such lines, not only does the recognition of the extent of moral standards show up as based in the agent’s experience that has been gathered in the process of education and developing their capacities for acting autonomously, but it is also thanks to the engagement in the set of such social practices that the agent is able to define the moral aspect, which exceeds the practical aims of a certain area of life. Hence, I argue that in order to redefine the borders of shared morality, a practical experience is necessary to link the various practices that enable ethical reflection based on the moral resources that are obtained in this way

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Piotr Machura
University Of Silesia In Katowice

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