This article offers a translation of the hymn De Crucifixione 4 by Ephrem, the Syrian theologian, which forms part of his cycle of hymns for the celebration of Easter. The symbolic interpretation of particularly the tearing of the temple veil in this hymn – together with the cosmic signs which occurred at the death of Jesus – is investigated. An attempt is made to correlate Ephrem’s fierce anti-Jewish polemics with the intentions of the authors of the Synoptic Gospels and with (...) Ephrem’s circumstances at the probable time of composition of the hymn. (shrink)

Since the time of Mowinckel, the verb בקר in Psalm 27:4 was often interpreted as referring to a priest’s function of examining an offering. The parallel part of the verse and other intratextual and intertextual considerations render this interpretation of the verb improbable. The context of the psalm and the cluster of Psalms 25–34, as well as parallels Psalm 27 has with Psalm 23, suggest that the verb בקר refers to reflection on the privilege of being in YHWH’s presence. The (...) enjoyment of such communion with YHWH, which includes the study of his Torah, is portrayed as the culmination of the journey of life in Psalms 25–34. The author argues that this is also hinted at in Psalm 27.Contribution: The contribution of this article towards the focus of HTS as “Historical Thought and Source Interpretation” centered around its use of the literary context of a psalm to question the notion of a reconstructed cultic setting as the only possible hermeneutical key to interpret Psalm 27. (shrink)

Since the time of Mowinckel, the verb בקר in Psalm 27:4 was often interpreted as referring to a priest’s function of examining an offering. The parallel part of the verse and other intratextual and intertextual considerations render this interpretation of the verb improbable. The context of the psalm and the cluster of Psalms 25–34, as well as parallels Psalm 27 has with Psalm 23, suggest that the verb בקר refers to reflection on the privilege of being in YHWH’s presence. The (...) enjoyment of such communion with YHWH, which includes the study of his Torah, is portrayed as the culmination of the journey of life in Psalms 25–34. The author argues that this is also hinted at in Psalm 27.Contribution: The contribution of this article towards the focus of HTS as “Historical Thought and Source Interpretation” centered around its use of the literary context of a psalm to question the notion of a reconstructed cultic setting as the only possible hermeneutical key to interpret Psalm 27. (shrink)

This article investigates the form and purpose of Psalm 101 from two perspectives: As a unique composition from the late Persian or early Hellenistic period, and in terms of its function within the context of Book IV of the Psalter. It is suggested that it was designed by exponents of wisdom and Torah piety to serve as a 'royal psalm' at exactly this location in the Psalter. It was meant to offer support to faithful Yahwists by criticising the apostate Judean (...) aristocracy of its time of origin and serve as a prayer with which Yahweh could be beseeched to establish his righteous rule by judging evildoers and thus vindicating the faithful. (shrink)

Psalm 5 is often described as an example of a prayer of someone who has been falsely accused of wrongdoing. Based on the contents of the middle part of the psalm, its wisdom features and especially the parallels it forms with Psalm 1, it is argued in this article that the editors of the Psalter attempted to present the psalm as a prayer of David at the time of his flight from Absalom. In this prayer of the endangered king, he (...) pronounced judgement on the actions and attitudes of his opponents and respectfully entrusted himself to the care of Yahweh. In its literary context, the psalm was therefore probably meant to censure arrogant and irreligious compatriots of the editors, because they exploited fellow Jews, and also to provide hope and encouragement to those exploited members of the in-group. (shrink)

This paper attempts to quantify the development of the key monetary values and changes in monetary trust that occurred during Roman times under ever-increasing prices. To track those developments, the paper introduces a minimal-parameter model that builds on available numismatic data relating to the Roman landmark coinages and on papyrological findings. The modelling produces a series of graphs which clearly signal the occurrence of a later crisis of confidence. It is argued that the monetary measures typically taken by the Roman (...) authorities actually fostered a crisis of confidence, and even made it inevitable. (shrink)

Mit der Erfindung des Buchdrucks war die Zeit handschriftlicher Überlieferung von Texten noch lange nicht vorbei. Trotz der rapiden Verbreitung des neuen Druckmediums stand der Zugang zu ihm nur wenigen offen. Schriften anerkannter Autoritäten wurden im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert postum gedruckt, auch solche einflußreicher Multiplikatoren, vielfältig auch die Kunst der Holzschneider und Kupferstecher. Die Schriften derer, die weniger Anerkennung gefunden hatten, auf Skepsis gestoßen oder verurteilt worden waren, hatten verständlicherweise kaum eine Chance, gedruckt zu werden. Dennoch wäre es ganz (...) falsch, in allen Fällen handschriftlicher Textüberlieferung des 16., 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts auf eine geringere Bedeutung des nach traditioneller Art tradierten Autors zu schließen. Auch Schriften anerkannter, gar ‘kanonisierter' Autoren, deren Werke in einer Edition oder in mehreren Ausgaben bereits gedruckt vorlagen, wurden noch handschriftlich aus Manuskripten, aber auch aus Drucken kopiert. Nach Beispielen dafür braucht man nicht lange zu suchen. Beispiele aus der Cusanus-Überlieferung habe ich früher schon verzeichnet. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 35, Issue 1, pp 158 - 167 This paper deals with the influence of De veritate on Van Limborch’s Amica collatio cum erudito Judaeo, which is often considered as an early example of interfaith dialogue in a tolerant atmosphere. The first section introduces the Remonstrant theologian Van Limborch, with special attention to his relation to Grotius. The second section focuses on the Collatio. Van Limborch’s discussion partner Orobio de Castro is introduced. The way in which the dialogue (...) develops is sketched: it starts in a reasonable mode, but towards the end Van Limborch’s tone can hardly be called ‘friendly’ anymore. He cannot accept that a reasonable man does not see the superiority of Jesus, and tries to convert his discussion partner. The third section summarizes the influence of Grotius on the Collatio. Van Limborch learned from him not to argue about dogmatic constructions, but to start from the Bible and its unquestionable revelations. He follows the logic of De veritate, Book II and III, arguing that the truth about Jesus can only be proven from the New Testament, which contains reliable testimonies to him and his miracles. He follows the tenor of Book v as well, arguing that the Jews should look upon the miracles of Jesus as sufficiently attested and greater than those of Moses, and therefore should convert themselves. On closer analysis the Collatio can hardly be considered as an example of interfaith tolerance, neither can Grotius’ De veritate. (shrink)

Robert Grosseteste’s utilization of Greek and Arabic Aristotelian commentators represents an intriguing aspect of his approach to Aristotle. This study centres on Grosseteste’s quotations from John Philoponus’ Commentary on Posterior Analytics, which Grosseteste employed to complement his own commentary on this Aristotelian work. After revisiting the debated medieval circulation of segments of Philoponus in connection with James of Venice’s Aristotelian translations, the article delves into the Renaissance Latin versions of Philoponus’ commentary. This includes the previously overlooked translation by Maurizio Zamberti (...) (1516, unpublished) and the initial Venetian editions (1534, 1539, 1542). The Venetian prints were derived from an anonymous and unfamiliar Latin version that followed James of Venice’s translation and terminology. This distinctive feature, along with the marginalia referencing Lincolniensis (i.e., Grosseteste) in Philippus Theodosius’ revised text (Venice 1542), allows for a comparison of passages from Grosseteste and Philoponus to validate their correspondences. The final segment of this study investigates Grosseteste’s sparse and elusive references to Aristotle’s On the Soul in light of the possibility that they may stem from fragments of Philoponus’ commentary accompanying James of Venice’s translation of that Aristotelian work. (shrink)

У статті на основі фактичного матеріалу висвітлюються зв’язки відомого італійського гуманіста Філіппо Буонаккорсі Каллімаха (Philippus Callimachus Experiens; 1437–1496), який входив до складу так званої Платонівської Академії в Римі, з Григорієм Саноцьким (1406–1477) – архієпископом львівським, професором Краківської академії, ренесансним гуманістом, критиком схоластики i поетом. Саноцький був засновником першого гуманістичного гуртка в Україні, куди входив і Каллімах, який після втечі з Італії жив у домі Львівського архієпископа. Він залишив спогади про спілкування з Григорієм Саноцьким.

Philippus van Limborch was a friend and correspondent of Locke’s for twenty years. The aspect of their correspondence that interests us here unfolds across 1700–1702 on the topic of human freedom. In Section 1, I outline Limborch’s view of freedom, which is one of indifference. In Section 2, I describe why, despite Limborch’s insistence that their positions were similar, Locke could not agree with Limborch’s view and even modified his account to make the difference more apparent. I conclude in (...) Section 3 by noting that Locke and Limborch have radically opposing views about what kind of freedom is worthy of the name. (shrink)

Philippus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim, or Paracelsus, was a renowned physician and naturalist, reformer of Galenic medicine, and violent opponent of scholasticism. His writings and teachings were contemporaneous with the Lutheran reformation and the northern Renaissance humanism of Cornelius Agrippa and Erasmus. Paracelsus’s rejection of ancient wisdom and the classicist philology of his day as viable avenues of knowledge, however, contradicts the Renaissance humanist epithet sometimes associated with him. Though traditionally painted as a “lonely genius” and a “martyr (...) of natural science” for his fractious relations with the medical establishments of his day, and thereby crowned as an agent of progress and a precursor of modern science, Paracelsian natural philosophy owes far more to mystical intuition than to any experimental scientific method currently understood. In this respect he was as much an influence on German mystics such as Jacob Boehme and later German Romanticism as he was on J. B. von Helmont, the seventeenth century Paracelsian chemist who first articulated the concept of ‘gas’. However, Paracelsian thought does not readily conform either to the Reformation or to Renaissance humanism, the two landmarks convenient to a general appreciation of the intellectual landscape in his day. Of course, such historical labels are the products of hindsight, and held little or no meaning among thinkers of the day: any attempt to define Paracelsus’ thought according to such a continuum is moot. He is best appreciated as an iconoclast: an eclectic non-partisan. As the author of the present study claims, Paracelsus was “an errant star in the firmament of sixteenth century aspirations” ; later in the work he emerges as “an idiosyncratic creature of the early Reformation”. (shrink)

Philippus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim, or Paracelsus, was a renowned physician and naturalist, reformer of Galenic medicine, and violent opponent of scholasticism. His writings and teachings were contemporaneous with the Lutheran reformation and the northern Renaissance humanism of Cornelius Agrippa and Erasmus. Paracelsus’s rejection of ancient wisdom and the classicist philology of his day as viable avenues of knowledge, however, contradicts the Renaissance humanist epithet sometimes associated with him. Though traditionally painted as a “lonely genius” and a “martyr (...) of natural science” for his fractious relations with the medical establishments of his day, and thereby crowned as an agent of progress and a precursor of modern science, Paracelsian natural philosophy owes far more to mystical intuition than to any experimental scientific method currently understood. In this respect he was as much an influence on German mystics such as Jacob Boehme and later German Romanticism as he was on J. B. von Helmont, the seventeenth century Paracelsian chemist who first articulated the concept of ‘gas’. However, Paracelsian thought does not readily conform either to the Reformation or to Renaissance humanism, the two landmarks convenient to a general appreciation of the intellectual landscape in his day. Of course, such historical labels are the products of hindsight, and held little or no meaning among thinkers of the day: any attempt to define Paracelsus’ thought according to such a continuum is moot. He is best appreciated as an iconoclast: an eclectic non-partisan. As the author of the present study claims, Paracelsus was “an errant star in the firmament of sixteenth century aspirations” ; later in the work he emerges as “an idiosyncratic creature of the early Reformation”. (shrink)

The social virtues are not discussed thematically in the Socratic writings of Plato and Xenophon, but they are on display everywhere. Taking Aristotle's accounts of these virtues as a touchstone, this paper explores the portrait of Socrates as a model of good humour in Xenophon's Symposium. While Xenophon is addressing the same issues as Aristotle, and shares some of his red lines, his conception of the ideal humourist and of virtue in general differs from Aristotle's not only in detail but (...) also in general conception. While he never actually violates the rules Aristotle sets down for eutrapelia, Xenophon's Socrates strives not to avoid opposites but to combine them. It is the careful combining of the spoudaion and the geloion that redeems Xenophon's otherwise outrageous portrait of Socratic humour. This suggests a broader paradigm in which virtuous behaviour is a combination of opposites rather than a middle path. (shrink)

The relation of Isocrates and Aristotle has mostly been defined by scholars as a competition or rivalry between them in a debate over the ends of rhetorical education. This essay investigates Isocrates-quotations in the Rhetoric of Aristotle and calls for a re-evaluation of the relation of Aristotle to Isocrates and to Demosthenes. Aristotle studied thoroughly the Isocratic speeches (especially Helena, Evagoras, Panegyricus, De pace, Antidosis, Philippus) and Isocrates is the only of the canon of ten Attic orators, who is (...) quoted regularly in the Rhetoric. For textual criticism the quotations of Aristotle should be used with caution, as Aristotle often quoted from memory, but his readings must not be excluded a priori. Aristotle recognizes the leading role of Isocrates as a master of literary prose in the development of rhetoric, particularly the epideictic speech. In Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics Isocrates, who exerts influence on the ethos of the reader, has a prominent position, unlike Demosthenes, who is characterized by his ability to arouse emotions. In this judgement political reasons (promacedonian - antimacedonian) are also visible. (shrink)

La forteresse de Dierum, située sur le sommet d'un contrefort (1.450 m) du Haut-Olympe, faisait partie intégrante du système très élaboré de la défense macédonienne sur les frontières Sud du royaume et, par son emplacement stratégique, permettait le contrôle de toutes les voies d'accès qui, venant du Sud et de l'Ouest, conduisaient vers la plaine côtière. Cette forteresse est mentionnée chez Tite-Live (44, 3, 3) dans son récit sur la marche de l'armée romaine du consul Q. Marcius Philippus lors (...) des événements de la troisième guerre de Macédoine. (shrink)

JohnLocke’s 1700–1702 correspondencewith Dutch Arminian Philippus van Limborch has been taken by commentators as the motivation for modifications to the fifth edition of “Of Power,” the chapter in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding that treats freedom. In this paper, I offer the first systematic and chronological study of their correspondence. I argue that the heart of their disagreement is over how they define “freedom of indifference.” Once the importance of the disagreement over indifference is established, it is clear that (...) when Locke altered parts of “Of Power” as a reaction to Limborch’s questioning, he did so in the interest of further clarifying and solidifying his view, not changing it. Seeing how they disagree over indifference also allows us to see the correspondence as showcasing the conflict between intellectualism, the view that cognitive states determine the will, and voluntarism, the view that the will alone determines action. (shrink)

Quo usque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra?. The famous incipit—‘And what are you reading, Master Buddenbrook? Ah, Cicero! A difficult text, the work of a great Roman orator. Quousque tandem, Catilina. Huh-uh-hmm, yes, I've not entirely forgotten my Latin, either’— already impressed contemporaries, including some ordinarily not so readily impressed. It rings through Sallust's version of Catiline's shadowy address to his followers, when he asks regarding the injustices they suffer : quae quousque tandem patiemini, o fortissumi uiri?. More playfully, and (...) less well-known, Sallust employed the expression again in a speech by Philippus : uos autem, patres conscripti, quo usque cunctando rem publicam intutam patiemini et uerbis arma temptabitis?. Soon afterwards it served Cicero's son, who, as governor of Asia, put down Hybreas fils for having dared to quote from his father's work in his presence : ‘age’, inquit [sc. Marcus Tullius], ‘non putas me didicisse patris mei: “quousque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra”?’. Just about the same time, Livy recalled it in order to colour Manlius’ exhortation of his followers : quousque tandem ignorabitis uires uestras, quas natura ne beluas quidem ignorare uoluit? … audendum est aliquid uniuersis aut omnia singulis patienda. quousque me circumspectabitis?. Thereafter Quintilian would refer to it twice, when discussing apostrophe and rhetorical questions, just a couple of years before Tacitus has the maladroit Q. Haterius encourage Tiberius to seize the reins—quo usque patieris, Caesar, non adesse caput rei publicae? ; a few decades later still, Apuleius puts it into the mouth of the slave who chastises his master, now in asinine form : ‘quo usque tandem’, inquit, ‘cantherium patiemur istum paulo ante cibariis iumentorum, nunc etiam simulacris deorum infestum?’. He trusted, no doubt, that the famous question would alert his readers more than anything to the many ‘similarities between Catiline and Lucius’, in order to have them appreciate this ‘ludicrous copy of Cicero's arch-enemy’. Some time after, and in a different corner of the Empire altogether, a teacher's bronze statue would carry the inscription:VERBACICRO | NISQVOVSQ | TANDEMABVTE | RECATELINAPA | TIENTIANOS | TRA. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:15 LOCKE, HUME AND THE NATURE OF VOLITIONS 1. The concept of a volition plays a key role in the theories of mind that both Locke and Hume devise. It is central to the views each develops on the nature of action and of explanations of actions, on the character of practical reasoning, on the nature of desire, on the ways in which, most usefully, to categorize the several (...) kinds of mental states and events. Without attending closely to their concepts of volition, one cannot get quite clear about the views of each, and the considerations thought to support those views, on the vexed questions of free action and of responsibility. Whether it be Locke or Hume, then, there is good reason to scrutinize what he says of volitions. Why take them together? The principal reason is that the views of each, when considered closely, throw a quite considerable light on those of the other (or so I hope to show). But there is a philosophical point as well. A theory of volitions more adequate than either proposes must borrow from each. What is amenable to being borrowed, and what ought to be borrowed, are fairly readily seen when the two theories are put face to face. I concentrate on three central issues: the question whether volitions are thoughts; the relationship of volition to practical reasoning; the links between volitions and their effects. Hume's views on these topics are to be found chiefly in the Treatise and the first Enquiry; Locke's, of course, in the Essay. Locke's recently published correspondence with the Dutch theologian Philippus van Limborch is, however, essential reading here, and I have made extensive use of it. 16 2. Locke and Hume agree that volitions are indefinable psychological primitives that must be invoked in an analysis of voluntary action (T 399, EHU 69, E 249). They agree, too, in a number of the things that each says in his efforts to characterize volitions. They differ, however, on a fundamental point, Hume's volitions are 'internal impression[s]' (T 399); Locke's are 'thought[s] of the Mind' (E 235). As internal impressions Humean volitions are feelings akin to, but not 'properly speaking' (T 399) instances of, passions. They are like the 'direct passions' (desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear) in two respects: they are 'immediate effects of pain and pleasure' (T 399); they are 'propense and averse motions of the mind' (T 574), and thus bear a special relation to action. Though they are not thoughts they have causal, thus contingent, links to thoughts, including in particular thoughts whose content specify the so-called 'immediate object of volition' (E 66). As 'distinct impression[s]' (T 625) volitions do not modify the thoughts of their objects in the logically intimate way in which, in Hume's view, the feeling essential to belief 'modiffies] the conception' (T 625) of what is believed. Hume frequently compares volitions to commands (T 623, 629, 632; EHU 48, 64, 65, 67, 68). He also, not surprisingly, denies them truth values: because they are not capable of 'an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact' it is 'impossible... they can be pronounced either true or false' (T 458; compare T 415). Locke's volitions are thoughts, not feelings; and they have their own contents and objects. '[T]he proper and only object of the will', he writes, 'is some action of ours' (E 258); in forming a volition one 17 'wills to number', say, or 'wills to walk' (C 405). Locke never says as much, but his overall theory is best read as requiring volitions to be thoughts without truth values. He contrasts 'Will' or 'the Power of Volition1 with 'Understanding' or 'the Power of Thinking' (E 128). Since 'Volition' is as much a 'Mode... £f thinking' as is 'Reasoning' or 'Judging' (E 227), however, the contrast is most plausibly taken as one between thoughts that do and thoughts that do not purport to represent the way the world is. Locke's distinction, to be examined below, between volitions and 'last judgements of the understanding' suggests the... (shrink)

Quid enim? si Daphitae fatum fuit ex equo cadere atque ita perire, ex hocne equo, qui cum equus non esset nomen habebat alienum ? aut Philippus hasne in capulo quadrigulas vitare monebatur? quasi vero capulo sit occisus. Quid autem magnum aut naufragum illum sine nomine in rivo esse lapsum – quamquam huic quidem his scribit in aqua esse pereundum? ne hercule Icadii quidem praedonis video fatum ullum; nihil enim scribit ei praedictum: quid mirum igitur ex spelunca saxum in crura (...) eius incidisse? puto enim, etiam si Icadius tum in spelunca non fuisset, saxum tamen illud casurum fuisse, nam aut nihil est omnino fortuitum aut hoc ipsum potuit evenire fortuna. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:15 LOCKE, HUME AND THE NATURE OF VOLITIONS 1. The concept of a volition plays a key role in the theories of mind that both Locke and Hume devise. It is central to the views each develops on the nature of action and of explanations of actions, on the character of practical reasoning, on the nature of desire, on the ways in which, most usefully, to categorize the several (...) kinds of mental states and events. Without attending closely to their concepts of volition, one cannot get quite clear about the views of each, and the considerations thought to support those views, on the vexed questions of free action and of responsibility. Whether it be Locke or Hume, then, there is good reason to scrutinize what he says of volitions. Why take them together? The principal reason is that the views of each, when considered closely, throw a quite considerable light on those of the other (or so I hope to show). But there is a philosophical point as well. A theory of volitions more adequate than either proposes must borrow from each. What is amenable to being borrowed, and what ought to be borrowed, are fairly readily seen when the two theories are put face to face. I concentrate on three central issues: the question whether volitions are thoughts; the relationship of volition to practical reasoning; the links between volitions and their effects. Hume's views on these topics are to be found chiefly in the Treatise and the first Enquiry; Locke's, of course, in the Essay. Locke's recently published correspondence with the Dutch theologian Philippus van Limborch is, however, essential reading here, and I have made extensive use of it. 16 2. Locke and Hume agree that volitions are indefinable psychological primitives that must be invoked in an analysis of voluntary action (T 399, EHU 69, E 249). They agree, too, in a number of the things that each says in his efforts to characterize volitions. They differ, however, on a fundamental point, Hume's volitions are 'internal impression[s]' (T 399); Locke's are 'thought[s] of the Mind' (E 235). As internal impressions Humean volitions are feelings akin to, but not 'properly speaking' (T 399) instances of, passions. They are like the 'direct passions' (desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear) in two respects: they are 'immediate effects of pain and pleasure' (T 399); they are 'propense and averse motions of the mind' (T 574), and thus bear a special relation to action. Though they are not thoughts they have causal, thus contingent, links to thoughts, including in particular thoughts whose content specify the so-called 'immediate object of volition' (E 66). As 'distinct impression[s]' (T 625) volitions do not modify the thoughts of their objects in the logically intimate way in which, in Hume's view, the feeling essential to belief 'modiffies] the conception' (T 625) of what is believed. Hume frequently compares volitions to commands (T 623, 629, 632; EHU 48, 64, 65, 67, 68). He also, not surprisingly, denies them truth values: because they are not capable of 'an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact' it is 'impossible... they can be pronounced either true or false' (T 458; compare T 415). Locke's volitions are thoughts, not feelings; and they have their own contents and objects. '[T]he proper and only object of the will', he writes, 'is some action of ours' (E 258); in forming a volition one 17 'wills to number', say, or 'wills to walk' (C 405). Locke never says as much, but his overall theory is best read as requiring volitions to be thoughts without truth values. He contrasts 'Will' or 'the Power of Volition1 with 'Understanding' or 'the Power of Thinking' (E 128). Since 'Volition' is as much a 'Mode... £f thinking' as is 'Reasoning' or 'Judging' (E 227), however, the contrast is most plausibly taken as one between thoughts that do and thoughts that do not purport to represent the way the world is. Locke's distinction, to be examined below, between volitions and 'last judgements of the understanding' suggests the... (shrink)

Quid enim? si Daphitae fatum fuit ex equo cadere atque ita perire, ex hocne equo, qui cum equus non esset nomen habebat alienum? aut Philippus hasne in capulo quadrigulas vitare monebatur? quasi vero capulo sit occisus. Quid autem magnum aut naufragum illum sine nomine in rivo esse lapsum – quamquam huic quidem his scribit in aqua esse pereundum? ne hercule Icadii quidem praedonis video fatum ullum; nihil enim scribit ei praedictum: quid mirum igitur ex spelunca saxum in crura eius (...) incidisse? puto enim, etiam si Icadius tum in spelunca non fuisset, saxum tamen illud casurum fuisse, nam aut nihil est omnino fortuitum aut hoc ipsum potuit evenire fortuna. (shrink)

The enigmatic sixteenth-century Swiss physician and natural philosopher Philippus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim, called Paracelsus, is known for the almost superhuman energy with which he produced his innumerable writings, for his remarkable achievements in the development of science, and for his reputation as a visionary and alchemist. Little is known of his biography beyond his legendary achievements, and the details of his life have been filled in over the centuries by his admirers. This richly illustrated anthology presents in (...) modernized language a selection of the moral thought of a man who was not only a self-willed genius charged with the dynamism of an impetuous and turbulent age but also in many ways a humble seeker after truth, who deeply influenced C. G. Jung and his followers. (shrink)

Locke and Leibniz are often classified as proponents of compatibilist theories of human freedom, since both maintain that freedom is consistent with determinism and that the difference between being and not being free turns on how one is determined. However, we will argue in this paper that their versions of compatibilism are essentially different and that they have significantly distinct commitments to compatibilism. To this end, we will first analyze the definitions and examples for freedom and necessity that Locke and (...) Leibniz present in sections 8-13 of chapter 21 of the Essay on Human Understanding and the Nouveaux essais respectively, and then conjecture how Locke and Leibniz would have continued the discussion, if they had had the opportunity to engage in an exchange of opinions. In this way, we believe, one will be in a position to understand why Leibniz thinks that Locke’s discussion of freedom “est un des plus prolixes et des plus subtils de son ouvrage.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:15 LOCKE, HUME AND THE NATURE OF VOLITIONS 1. The concept of a volition plays a key role in the theories of mind that both Locke and Hume devise. It is central to the views each develops on the nature of action and of explanations of actions, on the character of practical reasoning, on the nature of desire, on the ways in which, most usefully, to categorize the several (...) kinds of mental states and events. Without attending closely to their concepts of volition, one cannot get quite clear about the views of each, and the considerations thought to support those views, on the vexed questions of free action and of responsibility. Whether it be Locke or Hume, then, there is good reason to scrutinize what he says of volitions. Why take them together? The principal reason is that the views of each, when considered closely, throw a quite considerable light on those of the other (or so I hope to show). But there is a philosophical point as well. A theory of volitions more adequate than either proposes must borrow from each. What is amenable to being borrowed, and what ought to be borrowed, are fairly readily seen when the two theories are put face to face. I concentrate on three central issues: the question whether volitions are thoughts; the relationship of volition to practical reasoning; the links between volitions and their effects. Hume's views on these topics are to be found chiefly in the Treatise and the first Enquiry; Locke's, of course, in the Essay. Locke's recently published correspondence with the Dutch theologian Philippus van Limborch is, however, essential reading here, and I have made extensive use of it. 16 2. Locke and Hume agree that volitions are indefinable psychological primitives that must be invoked in an analysis of voluntary action (T 399, EHU 69, E 249). They agree, too, in a number of the things that each says in his efforts to characterize volitions. They differ, however, on a fundamental point, Hume's volitions are 'internal impression[s]' (T 399); Locke's are 'thought[s] of the Mind' (E 235). As internal impressions Humean volitions are feelings akin to, but not 'properly speaking' (T 399) instances of, passions. They are like the 'direct passions' (desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear) in two respects: they are 'immediate effects of pain and pleasure' (T 399); they are 'propense and averse motions of the mind' (T 574), and thus bear a special relation to action. Though they are not thoughts they have causal, thus contingent, links to thoughts, including in particular thoughts whose content specify the so-called 'immediate object of volition' (E 66). As 'distinct impression[s]' (T 625) volitions do not modify the thoughts of their objects in the logically intimate way in which, in Hume's view, the feeling essential to belief 'modiffies] the conception' (T 625) of what is believed. Hume frequently compares volitions to commands (T 623, 629, 632; EHU 48, 64, 65, 67, 68). He also, not surprisingly, denies them truth values: because they are not capable of 'an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact' it is 'impossible... they can be pronounced either true or false' (T 458; compare T 415). Locke's volitions are thoughts, not feelings; and they have their own contents and objects. '[T]he proper and only object of the will', he writes, 'is some action of ours' (E 258); in forming a volition one 17 'wills to number', say, or 'wills to walk' (C 405). Locke never says as much, but his overall theory is best read as requiring volitions to be thoughts without truth values. He contrasts 'Will' or 'the Power of Volition1 with 'Understanding' or 'the Power of Thinking' (E 128). Since 'Volition' is as much a 'Mode... £f thinking' as is 'Reasoning' or 'Judging' (E 227), however, the contrast is most plausibly taken as one between thoughts that do and thoughts that do not purport to represent the way the world is. Locke's distinction, to be examined below, between volitions and 'last judgements of the understanding' suggests the... (shrink)