Reflecting on some distinctive contributions of the tradition of Reformed theology to our understanding of the nature and prospects of humans qua creatures within the economy of salvation, this article looks to draw out key themes which may serve to orient contemporary Christian engagements with the discourse of transhumanism.

Presents general information about meteorology, weather, and climate and includes more than thirty activities to help study these topics, including making a ...

Bibliographic records published by the British Education Index (BEI) between 1957 and 2000 are analysed in the context of a history of the BEI's changing presentation of information about the field. The value of frequency counts for BEI subject terms is discussed, in relation to their potential for revealing trends in the fields of educational studies and information management.

De verkenning van God als vreeswekkende rechter is diep verankerd in het werk van Wittgenstein. Hiermee wil hij de grenzen van het menselijk denken aftasten.

Limitations of Dienes & Perner's (D&P's) theory are traced to the assumption that the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness is true. D&P claim that 18-month-old children are capable of explicitly representing factuality, from which it follows (on D&P's theory) that they are capable of explicitly representing content, attitude, and self. D&P then attempt to explain 3-year-olds' failures on tests of voluntary control such as the dimensional change card sort by suggesting that at this age children cannot represent content and (...) attitude explicitly. We provide a better levels-of-consciousness account for age-related abulic dissociations between knowledge and action. (shrink)

The claims of Mt. 5:17—20 are often taken to provide the interpretive key to the ethical claims of the Sermon on the Mount as a whole. The theological issue at stake here is the determinative relation between Christ's person and work and his teaching. This article explores the vital role played by the identity of Christ as the `fulfiller of the law' and `bringer of the Kingdom' in the exegesis of the Sermon offered by Eduard Thurneysen and Dietrich Bonhoeffer in (...) their respective works Die Bergpredigt (1936) and Nachfolge (1937). Both readings assert that the force and nature of the claims of the Sermon cannot be understood aright apart from constant attention to the difference made by the fact that Christ is the preacher. Out of this shared conviction, both theologians advance a reading of the Sermon as `the gospel itself' in the light of the eschatological identity of Jesus. Such readings of the Sermon, arising amidst the German Kirchenkampf of the 1930s, represent substantial contributions to the `responsible interpretation' of the Barmen Declaration (1934) whose second article states that, `As Jesus Christ is God's assurance of the forgiveness of all our sins, so in the same way and with the same seriousness is he also God's mighty claim upon our whole life.'. (shrink)

Introductory Chapter to the _Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition_ (CUP, 2009).

This paper explores principles governing the rational balance among an agent's beliefs, goals, actions, and intentions. Such principles provide specifications for artificial agents, and approximate a theory of human action (as philosophers use the term). By making explicit the conditions under which an agent can drop his goals, i.e., by specifying how the agent is committed to his goals, the formalism captures a number of important properties of intention. Specifically, the formalism provides analyses for Bratman's three characteristic functional roles played (...) by intentions [7, 9], and shows how agents can avoid intending all the foreseen side-effects of what they actually intend. Finally, the analysis shows how intentions can be adopted relative to a background of relevant beliefs and other intentions or goals. By relativizing one agent's intentions in terms of beliefs about another agent's intentions (or beliefs'), we derive a preliminary account of interpersonal commitments. (shrink)

Von einem Roman erwarten wir, dass sich seine Handlung zielstrebig auf ein Ende hin bewegt. Bis ins 19. Jh. wurden auch Vorgänge in einer von Gott eingerichteten Wirklichkeit auf diese Weise verstanden. Romane konnten daher beanspruchen, in ihrer Zielstrebigkeit die Wirklichkeit abzubilden. Durch Charles Darwin geriet diese Weltsicht in eine Krise. Die Studie zeigt, wie sich das Erzählen in einer als ziellos und zufällig aufgefassten Wirklichkeit veränderte. Wie können Romane die so verstandene Wirklichkeit abbilden? Diese Frage wird beispielhaft an literarischen (...) und ästhetischen Texten von Friedrich Theodor Vischer und Gottfried Keller erörtert. (shrink)

Over twenty years of research have examined the cognitive consequences of positive affect states, and suggested that positive affect leads to a broadening of cognition (see review by Fredrickson, 2001). However, this research has primarily examined positive affect that is low in approach motivational intensity (e.g., contentment). More recently, we have systematically examined positive affect that varies in approach motivational intensity, and found that positive affect high in approach motivation (e.g., desire) narrows cognition, whereas positive affect low in approach motivation (...) broadens cognition (e.g., Gable & Harmon-Jones, Citation2008a; Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2009). In this article we will review past models and present a motivational dimension model of affect that expands understanding of how affective states influence attentional and cognitive breadth. We then review research that has varied the motivational intensity of positive and negative affect and found that affect of low motivational intensity broadens cognitive processes, whereas affect of high motivational intensity narrows cognitive processes. (shrink)

The cultural turn has yet to fully reconfigure ‘class’ as a set of fictions, tropes, discourses and enduring culture-structures. Existing Durkheimian approaches have stalled at his middle period morphological reductionism. This paper constructs a more radical understanding in the late-Durkheimian idiom. It shows how class operates as a signifier in a language game of purity and pollution, virtue and vice. Taking a lead from studies of the ‘unruly’ working class, the paper opens up the more subtle pollution that attends to (...) the mythical ‘bourgeoisie’ and its associated and imagined ‘bourgeois’ culture. As a sign system this class location is deemed inauthentic, sybaritic, and as strangely deadening to cultural vitality. Although commonly found in contexts of gentrification and commodification that involve class conflict, this critical discourse is also applied within the bourgeois milieu. Such needless auto-critique suggests a relative autonomy from determination by class struggle. The possibilities for this approach are illustrated at length with reference to a paradigm case: the highly bourgeois milieu of the composer Richard Wagner and his Bayreuth Festival. (shrink)

Moral philosophy and education, by H. D. Aiken.--The moral sense and contributory values, by C. I. Lewis.--Realms of value, by P. W. Taylor.--The role of value theory in education, by J. D. Butler.--Does ethics make a difference? By K. Price.--Educational value statements, by C. Beck.--Educational values and goals, by W. K. Frankena.--Conflicts in values, by H. S. Broudy.--Levels of valuational discourse in education, by J. F. Perry and P. G. Smith.--Education and some moves toward a value methodology, by A. S. (...) Clayton.--You can't pray a lie, by M. Twain.--Men, machines, and morality, by J. F. Soltis.--Teaching and telling, by I. Scheffler.--Reason and habit, by R. S. Peters.--The two moralists of the child, by J. Piaget.--Causes and morality, by R. S. Peters.--On education and morals, by R. W. Sleeper.--Moral autonomy and reasonableness, by T. D. Perry. (shrink)

With their charming Irish brogues, the members of the Real IRA bring a rich and sometimes sinister history to the drama of Sons of Anarchy. By discriminating among their targets and practicing military‐like discipline, the Irish Kings gain the status of freedom fighters. Admittedly, their tactics are violent, but groups like the Real IRA resort to violence only because they have no other option for effectively fighting for their political cause. On Sons of Anarchy we usually see the Belfast police (...) who are on Jimmy O's payroll—the ones who harass SAMCRO—but there is evidence that other members of the police force actively support the Crown and have used violence against the Real IRA. Some philosophers have concluded that violence may be legitimate for groups opposing an oppressive regime, but only so long as it does not directly target the civilian population. (shrink)

Conversions occur in legal theory about as often as they do in religion, which is to say rarely—so rarely that they fascinate as much for the fact that they happen at all as for the reasons they happen. It should not surprise, then, that the Postscript to H.L.A. Hart's famous work on jurisprudence reveals “the outstanding English philosopher of law of the twentieth century” reaffirming, rather than revising in any significant way, the two central tenets that distinguish his theory from (...) that of both classical natural law theorists and modern “new naturalists” like Ronald Dworkin: There is no necessary connection between law and morality; and judges inevitably confront cases where the decision is “not dictated by the law” and the judge “must act as a conscientious legislator would by deciding according to his own beliefs and values”. (shrink)

Scholars of Arabic dialects have long noted the occurrence of a morpheme in a widespread number of dialects, realized -ən or -an, frequently suffixed to morphologically indefinite nouns, especially when followed by an adjective. Separately, another morpheme, realized -un or -u, is attested with a slightly different distribution in the dialects of western Yemen. Traditionally, scholars have interpreted both morphemes as reflexes of an etymological case vowel + tanwīn, traditionally labeled “dialectal tanwīn.” In this paper, I offer a new reconstruction (...) of the origin and diachronic development of this morpheme. Throughout I integrate data and insights from comparative Semitics, as well as recently studied pre-Islamic epigraphic and textual materials, in order to break the familiar Classical Arabic / dialectal Arabic dichotomy and reframe the way in which historiography of features in the dialects is conducted. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the encroachment of advocacy in certain disciplines has undermined their credibility, and that this trend is largely due to uncritical acceptance of relativist epistemologies such as social constructivism. Examples are cited from anthropology, educational theory, law, the sociology of science, and women’s studies. It is suggested that practices in the natural and historical sciences, as contrasted to the attributes of pseudoscience, provide guidelines for both university scholarship and the public debate essential to democracy.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.1 (2002) 65-72 [Access article in PDF] Multiple Paths to Delusion Philip Gerrans Response to Phillips JAMES PHILLIPS COMMENTS are summarized in four recommendations. Clarify the Relationship of the Cognitive Model to its Neuroscientific Base The cognitive approach postulates a cognitive entity whose information-processing properties explain a symptom or unify a set of symptoms. The key idea is that we can use a model (...) of normal cognitive functioning to explain a disorder in terms of failure of a component of the model. In the case under discussion, the symptom is the loss of affect, which is part of the clinical profile of both the Capgras and Cotard delusions. The body of neuropsychological data concerning links between recognitional and affective processes extends back at least to Charcot's patient M. X. whose affective responses to familiar situations were lost, together with his visual episodic memory. M. X described his phenomenology this way: A remarkable consequence of this loss of mental ability is, as I have said, the change in my personality and impressions. I am much less affected by sorrow or grief. I can tell you that, after losing one of my relatives with whom I was very close, I experienced a much less intense grief than if I had still been able to image the features of that relative, the stages of the illness he went through, or especially if I had been able to picture to myself [voir interieurement] the outward effect of this untimely death on the members of my family. (Young and van de Wal 1996) (It is interesting to note that M. X. retained insight into his condition and explained it in a lucid, rational way rather than forming a delusional belief. Initial evidence for a two-stage theory, one might have thought).Given convergent evidence that the limbic system is the basis of affective states, the hypothesis that the delusions under discussion are rationalizations of unusual affective experiences consequent on abnormal limbic function or loss of connection between limbic and other functions is an inference to the best explanation. The Young-Ellis model is a cognitive model that describes cognitive function at what Dennett calls the design level, intermediate between what Marr called the computational level and level of representation and algorithm. As such it implies only that the boxes and arrows are implemented neurally, but endorses no hypotheses about the nature of that implementation.It is correct of Phillips to observe that the crucial inference about the link between affective and cognitive function is grounded in a background theory of the relationship between cognitive models, clinical symptoms, and neurobiology. If Phillips' complaint is that the model cannot be sheeted home to a neurobiological substrate, [End Page 65] this is true. Implementation theories are thin on the ground in cognitive science because they would require a theory of biological computation that, despite partisan claims, is elusive. Nonetheless, information-processing models and partial implementation theories for specific functions such as perception, language, face recognition, and the affective systems do exist. The allusion to cognitive structure remains sound as long as it accounts for observable clinical and experimental data and makes verifiable predictions.The fact that the Young-Ellis model of face recognition can account for both normal function and a variety of forms of prosopagnosia together (under assumptions about the relation between belief and experience) with delusions of misidentification counts in its favor (Ellis 1998).Phillips objection to cognitive theories is stronger when we turn to models of belief and rationality. In the case of functions such as face recognition or language, there is a variety of convergent evidence, especially from deficit studies, to support a model of normal cognitive function. For example, we know that face recognition activates schemas concerning orientation, features, emotions, and gender because these components can be selectively damaged (Young 1998). However, we lack a model of normal human reasoning other than "folk theory" of belief-desire psychology. Cognitive theories of belief formation are often forced to use models derived from philosophy such as logic, probability theory, or decision theory, which are amenable to... (shrink)

Since its publication in 1966, The Triumph of the Therapeutic has been hailed as a work of genuine brilliance, one of those books whose insights uncannily anticipate cultural developments and whose richness of argumentation reorients entire fields of inquiry. This special fortieth-anniversary edition of Philip Rieff’s masterpiece, the first volume in ISI Books’ new Background series, includes an introduction by Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn and essays on the text by historians Eugene McCarraher and Wilfred McClay and philosopher Stephen Gardner.

The s, p, d and f blocks of the elements, as delimited by Charles Janet in 1928, can be represented as parallel slices of a regular tetrahedron. They also fit neatly on to the surface of a sphere. The reasons for this are discussed and the possible objections examined. An attempt is made to see whether there are philosophical implications of this unexpected geometrical regularity. A new tetrahedral design in transparent plastic is presented.

Husserl introduces a phenomenological concept called “motivation” early in the First Investigation of his magnum opus, the Logical Investigations. The importance of this concept has been overlooked since Husserl passes over it rather quickly on his way to an analysis of the meaningful nature of expression. I argue, however, that motivation is essential to Husserl’s overall project, even if it is not essen- tial for defining expression in the First Investigation. For Husserl, motivation is a relation between mental acts whereby (...) the content of one act make some fur- ther meaningful content probable. I explicate the nature of this relation in terms of “evidentiary weight” and differentiate it from Husserl’s notion of Evidenz, often translated as “self-evidence”. I elucidate the importance of motivation in Husserl’s overall phenomenological project by focusing on his analyses of thing-perception and empathy. Through these examples, we can better understand the continuity between the Logical Investigations and Husserl’s later work. (shrink)

Delusions are currently characterised as false beliefs produced by incorrect inference about external reality (DSM IV). This inferential conception has proved hard to link to explanations pitched at the level of neurobiology and neuroanatomy. This paper provides that link via a neurocomputational theory, based on evolutionary considerations, of the role of the prefrontal cortex in regulating offline cognition. When pathologically neuromodulated the prefrontal cortex produces hypersalient experiences which monopolise offline cognition. The result is characteristic psychotic experiences and patterns of thought. (...) This bottom-up account uses neural network theory to integrate recent theories of the role of dopamine in delusion with the insights of inferential accounts. It also provides a general model for evolutionary psychiatry which avoids theoretical problems imported from evolutionary psychology. (shrink)

A point of contention in recent discussions of the epistemic condition of moral responsibility is whether culpable ignorance must trace to akratic belief mismanagement. Neil Levy has recently defended an akrasia requirement by arguing that only an akratic agent has the capacity rationally to comply with epistemic expectations the violation of which contributes to her ignorance. In this paper I show that Levy’s argument is unsound. It is possible to have the relevant rational capacity in the absence of akrasia. I (...) also argue that the internalist account of rationality that does much of the work in his argument is problematic. (shrink)