Aristotle's theory of truth, which has been the most influential account of the concept of truth from Antiquity onwards, spans several areas of philosophy: philosophy of language, logic, ontology and epistemology. In this 2004 book, Paolo Crivelli discusses all the main aspects of Aristotle's views on truth and falsehood. He analyses in detail the main relevant passages, addresses some well-known problems of Aristotelian semantics, and assesses Aristotle's theory from the point of view of modern analytic philosophy. (...) In the process he discusses most of the literature on Aristotle's semantic theory to have appeared in the last two centuries. His book vindicates and clarifies the often repeated claim that Aristotle's is a correspondence theory of truth. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers working in both ancient philosophy and modern philosophy of language. (shrink)

It has often been claimed that (i) Aristotle's expression 'protasis' means 'premiss' in syllogistic contexts and (ii) cannot refer to the conclusion of a syllogism in the Prior Analytics. In this essay we produce and defend a counter-example to these two claims. We argue that (i) the basic meaning of the expression is 'proposition' and (ii) while it is often used to refer to the premisses of a syllogism, in Prior Analytics 1.29, 45b4-8 it is used to refer to (...) the conclusion of a syllogism. In our view, the best explanation of Aristotle's use of the expression 'protasis' is that it means proposition throughout but is frequently used without change of meaning (in certain specific contexts) to refer to the premisses from which a conclusion follows. In Prior Analytics 1.29, 45b4-8 he uses 'protasis' to refer to the conclusion when he needs a single expression to refer to both the conclusion and one of the premisses of the syllogism that constitutes the core of a syllogism through the impossible. If we are correct, we have shown that the view that the expression 'the final protasis' in EN 7.3, 1147b9ff must mean 'the final premiss' and so cannot refer to the conclusion of the relevant syllogism is mistaken. (shrink)

Aristotle created logic and developed it to a level of great sophistication. There was nothing there before; and it took more than two millennia for something better to come around. The astonishment experienced by readers of the Prior Analytics, the most important of Aristotle's works that present the discipline, is comparable to that of an explorer discovering a cathedral in a desert. This article explains and evaluates some of Aristotle's views about propositions and syllogisms. The most important (...) omission is the difficult subject of syllogisms involving modalities. Aristotle distinguishes two relations of opposition that can obtain between propositions with the same subject- and predicate-expressions: contrariety and contradiction. In every canonical syllogism, one term is common to the two premises: it is called “middle term,” or simply “middle.” The remaining two terms of the premises are the only ones occurring in the conclusion: they are called “extreme terms,” or simply “extremes.”. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Signification Truth Note Further Reading.

It has often been claimed that Aristotle’s expression ‘protasis’ means ‘premiss’ in syllogistic contexts and cannot refer to the conclusion of a syllogism in the Prior Analytics. In this essay we produce and defend a counter-example to these two claims. We argue that the basic meaning of the expression is ‘proposition’ and while it is often used to refer to the premisses of a syllogism, in Prior Analytics 1.29, 45b4-8 it is used to refer to the conclusion of a (...) syllogism. In our view, the best explanation of Aristotle’s use of the expression ‘protasis’ is that it means proposition throughout but is frequently used without change of meaning to refer to the premisses from which a conclusion follows. In Prior Analytics 1.29, 45b4-8 he uses ‘protasis’ to refer to the conclusion when he needs a single expression to refer to both the conclusion and one of the premisses of the syllogism that constitutes the core of a syllogism through the impossible. If we are correct, we have shown that the view that the expression ‘the final protasis’ in EN 7.3, 1147b9ff must mean ‘the final premiss’ and so cannot refer to the conclusion of the relevant syllogism is mistaken. (shrink)

Revision of the author's thesis (Ph. D.)--Laval University, 1999.

In the Posterior Analytics (I 6, 75a18–27) Aristotle discusses a puzzle which endangers the possibility of inferring a non-necessary conclusion. His solution relies on the distinction between the necessity of the conclusion's being the case and the necessity of admitting the conclusion once one has admitted the premisses. The former is a factual necessity, whereas the latter is meant to be a normative or deontic necessity that is independent of the facts stated by the premisses and the conclusion. This (...) paper maintains that Aristotle resorts to this distinction because he thinks that, as long as it is conceived as a factual relation, logical consequence cannot exist independently of the facts expressed by the premisses and the conclusion. As a corollary, the necessity of such a consequence relation always requires the necessity of these facts. Aristotle holds this factual conception of logical consequence responsible for the puzzle, since it cannot account for valid syllogisms with contingent or false premisses. The alternative conception of necessity is then introduced by him in order to make good this deficiency. The distinction between the necessity of being and the necessity of saying was revived by the Oxford logician E. W. B. Joseph, and taken over by Frank Ramsey in his seminal Truth and Probability, but has not received attention from recent interpreters of Aristotle's logic. This paper, however, argues that, in spite of its intrinsic interest, the distinction bore no significant fruit in Aristotle's logical doctrine. (shrink)

The only passage from Aristotle's works that seemsto discuss the paradox of the liar is within chapter 25 of Sophistici Elenchi (180a34–b7). This passage raises several questions: Is it really about the paradox of the liar? If it is, is it addressing a strong version of the paradox or some weak strain of it? If it is addressing a strong version of the paradox, what solution does it propose? The conciseness of the passage does not enable one to answer (...) these questions beyond doubt, and commentators have offered very different replies. However, a reasonable case can be made for claiming, first, that the passage in question is about the paradox of the liar, second, that it addresses a strong version of the paradox, and, third, that it attempts to solve it by assuming that someone uttering 'I am speaking falsely' (or whatever sentence-type the paradox turns on) is neither speaking truly nor speaking falsely absolutely. (shrink)

In Sophistical Refutations 8 Aristotle claims that every sophistical refutation depends on a false belief which is implicitly held by the victim of the fallacy and can normally be elicited from him as an explicit additional premiss. In this case the fallacious argument will be turned into a valid one, albeit with a false premiss. The paper discusses the nature of the FVP and tries to discover how it works when it tacitly causes the false appearance of a fallacious (...) argument. (shrink)

Ce texte examine l’affirmation d’Aristote qui se trouve dans les Seconds Analytiques II 19, que la perception porte sur l’universel. L’examen s’effectuera par le biais du De Anima II 6 et III 6-8 où Aristote décrit les objets de la perception et de l’intellect. L’auteur soutient que selon Aristote, la perception humaine porte toujours sur l’universel contenu dans le particulier parce que l’unité de la substance individuelle est garante de l’unité de l’acte de perception. Par conséquent, l’analyse en termes de (...) trois objets de perception n’est que le résultat de la méthode analytique qu’Aristote emploie afin d’étudier l’acte de perception. (shrink)

Chapter Θ10 of Aristotle's Metaphysics is traditionally taken to be about the truth of intuitions, namely episodes of an immediate and sub-propositional grasp of entities. This exegesis however saddles Aristotle with a broken-backed theory of truth because in other passages of his works he claims that truth and falsehood apply only to items of a propositional nature and denies that sub-propositional items can be true or false. An alternative exegesis is preferable which takes Θ10 to be about the (...) truth of existential statements and judgements concerning simple items. (shrink)

In a Socratic spirit of coming to a better understanding of man who finds himself in the midst of a "crisis about knowledge," this dissertation proposes to examine the human subject as a cognitive animal by turning to the long and rich tradition of Aristotelian philosophy, largely ignored today, to focus on and gain inspiration from one of its principal currents of reflection: nous inasmuch as this refers to the human intellectual operation intuiting the substantial level of reality, which can (...) then anchor scientific knowledge of it. ;The examination of nous is based on the text Posterior Analytics II.19, in which Aristotle briefly presents the "habit of nous" as the culmination of a non-rational-discursive process by which the principles of demonstration are acquired. By looking at each of the stages mentioned in the text, there is offered the opportunity to study in detail the different human cognitive capacities and the cognition they provide. This also allows for a comparison and contrast of the capacities and the relationships that can be established between them, which is helpful in understanding man as a cognitive animal, in general, and in determining, in particular, the place and role of intuition in human cognition. ;Starting with Aristotle's views on logic and science, it is established that the rational-discursive operations of the intellect presuppose other non-rational-discursive operations of the intellect, which opens the door to another intellectual operation that can complement the first-mentioned. This other intellectual operation is seen to be closely related to sense cognition and its powers, the means through which the intellect makes contact with external reality. The most important of the different levels of cognition provided by the senses is its highest level, experience; and since human experience involves the activity of the intellect, induction of the principles of science is seen to be an act of the intellect starting from the intelligibility of sense experience. It is concluded, finally, that this act of the intellect is essentially intuitive, consisting mainly in an intellectual grasp of a substance, an insight into its essence. (shrink)

In contemporary literary theory, Plato is often cited as the original repudiator of literary truth, and Aristotle as he who set down that literature is “imitation,” thus himself involuntarily banning literature from truth. This essay argues that these interpretations adulterate the original arguments of Plato and Aristotle, who both believed in literary truth. We—literary theorists and philosophers of literature—should recognize this and rethink our interpretation of these ancient texts. This will, in turn, lead us to ask better questions (...) about the nature of literary truth and value. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to shed some light on the early Stoics' practice of managing platonic suggestions to construct their epistemology. Instances of such a practice, which scholars have recently focussed on, are the Stoic reassessment of the account of phantasia Plato offers in the Sophist and the image of the wax block as discussed in the Theaetetus. In this work I put forward a comparison between the simile of the soul-book, as presented by Socrates in (...) the Philebus (39a1-c2), and the Stoic image of the soul as a sheet in which conceptions are inscribed. I try to show that a far-reaching investigation of the relationship between Plato and early Stoic epistemology should take such a comparison into due account. In section one, I go into the details of the comparison and argue that Plato's perceptual judgment (this is how I translate the term doxa as it is used in the relevant section of the Philebus) is compatible with Stoic phantasia. In section two, I try to show that the theorisation of assent enable the Stoics to reply to an objection Aristotle made to Plato's definition of phantasia as a mixture of perception and judgment. (shrink)

Scholars of aristotelian political philosophy generally agree that the project of the ideal polis of Politics VII – VIII is strictly linked to Ethics. They disagree however on the nature of the constitution outlined. It is broadly accepted that it is a "polity". In this paper I deal with the topic of aristocracy in aristotelian political thought and I show that, throughout Politics, Aristotle never swerved from the idea of aristocracy as the optimal constitution, where the truly virtuous rule. (...) Finally I argue that the ideal polis of Politics VII – VIII, though it is never explicitly thus termed, is an aristocracy. (shrink)

The paper examines Posterior Analytics II 11, 94a20-36 and makes three points. (1) The confusing formula ‘given what things, is it necessary for this to be’ [τίνων ὄντων ἀνάγκη τοῦτ᾿ εἶναι] at a21-22 introduces material cause, not syllogistic necessity. (2) When biological material necessitation is the only causal factor, Aristotle is reluctant to formalize it in syllogistic terms, and this helps to explain why, in II 11, he turns to geometry in order to illustrate a kind of material cause (...) that can be expressed as the middle term of an explanatory syllogism. (3) If geometrical proof is viewed as a complex construction built on simpler constructions, it can in effect be described as a case of purely material constitution. (shrink)

The paper deals with the art of cross-examination or probe (peirastiké) wich is, according to Aristotle, a part of dialectic and aims at revealing falle pretensions to knowledge. A detailed discussion of the relevant passages from the Sophistical Refutations shows that "peirastic" argumenta were not easily distinguishablc forro the arguments used by the sophists against the scientists in order to undermine their reputation. It is also shows that the difficulty of telling dialectic from sophistry is a theme Aristotle (...) inherits frorn Plato's Sophist. (shrink)

Building on previous scholarly work on the mathematical roots of assertoric syllogistic we submit that for Aristotle, the semantic value of the copula in universal affirmative propositions is the relation of divisibility on positive integers. The adequacy of this interpretation, labeled here ‘arithmetical dictum’, is assessed both theoretically and textually with respect to the existing interpretations, especially the so-called ‘mereological dictum’.

This paper covers the theme of the death of God considered from a Hegelian standpoint. For Aristotle, the image of God as ‘thought thinking itself’ was an image of the knowledge aspired to in philosophy. With the notion of God becoming man and his insistence on the icon of the Cross, Hegel challenged the Aristotelian goal of philosophy as immutable knowledge of an ‘ultimate’ reality. Hegel viewed the crisis of normativity as strictly linked to the conception of the self. (...) It is Nietzsche who is best known for alluding to the full significance of this image for modern life, but Hegel’s thought on the complex relations of philosophy and religion in the modern world can be regarded as an attempt to think through this same historical phenomenon. In this paper, I focus on the philosophical relevance of Hegel’s notion of the death of God. I argue that unpacking the significance of the ‘truths’ presented symbolically in modern Christianity is crucial in unders.. (shrink)

Aristotle's Organon received sedulous attention throughout late antiquity. This is reflected in the surviving corpus of commentaries written, in different exegetical and didactic styles, by peripatetic and Platonic authors. Does this collection constitute a single tradition? Beatrix Freibert is confident that the answer to this difficult question is yes, and sets out to explain the differences and vindicate the connectedness of what she takes to be a unified intellectual construction. She insists that, despite the many peculiarities, all commentators participate (...) in a progressive effort to discern the purpose of the Organon, and, with its purpose, understand its unity and achieve some fundamental exegetical... (shrink)

The question of how, according to Aristotle, the principles of science are acquired remains contested among scholars. An aspect of this broader topic concerns the role of induction, and whether it is able to provide us with knowledge of natural necessity without the assistance of intuition. In a recent publication in this journal, David Botting argues in favour of the enumerative/empiricist interpretation of induction and criticizes the intuitive/rationalist interpretation of it, a version of which was defended in one of (...) my publications. He thinks that Aristotle is like Hume: both understand the cognitive process of induction similarly; and, both are equally skeptical about acquiring knowledge of natural necessity through induction. My reply argues that reading Aristotle’s induction in Humean terms is problematic in several respects. I argue, in addition, that natural necessity can be known through induction if nous is involved. My explanation of how this is possible relies on thinking of the act of noēsis in terms of an act of recognition. Botting claims, furthermore, that Aristotle only differs from Hume in that the former does have a non-inductive and non-intuitive method by which natural necessity may become known, and which Botting calls “the constructive proof of necessity”. My reply examines this method, showing how certain steps in it rely on cognitive acts that are really acts of intuition merely expressed in Humean terms. Despite the criticisms, I end with suggestions for how Botting’s account might offer original paths of research to Aristotle scholars seeking to answer the question of the acquisition of principles of science, particularly in the early stages of this process. (shrink)

In On Ideas, Aristotle presents and criticizes an argument for ideas referred to as “the One-over-Many.” On the basis of an uncontroversial fact concerning a group (for instance, the fact that each of the many men is a man), the One-over-Many infers that there is something predicated of each of the members of the group (for instance, that there is something predicated of each of the many men). It then tries to show that the thing predicated in common is (...) an idea. Aristotle criticises this argument by claiming that if it were sound it would show that there are ideas of negations, a result which the Platonists should reject. Since Aristotle himself refuses the existence of “common things,” i.e., Aristotelian universals, of negations, he is committed to the view that the One-over-Many fails to prove the existence not only of ideas, but also of “common things.”. (shrink)

Art, Beauty and Imitation in Plato's Philosophy -- Art and Imitation in Aristotle -- Horace, Pseudo-Longinus and the Aesthetics of Literature in Hellenism -- Plotinus, Neo-Platonic and Christian Conception of Beauty -- The Middle Ages and Dante Alighieri -- The Heritage of Kantian Philosophy in Romanticism -- Moritz: Beyond the Concept of Imitation -- Theory of Poetry of Early German Romanticism -- Hegel: Art as a Form of the Absolute Spirit -- Schopenhauer: Art as Disinterestedness and Knowledge of Reality (...) -- Nietzsche: Knowledge and Art -- Symbolism and Aestheticism -- Benedetto Croce: Art and intuition -- Linguistics and Criticism -- Antonio Gramsci: The Role of Intellectuals in Culture -- Structuralism -- Martin Heidegger: The Work of Art and Truth -- Hans-Georg Gadamer: Poetry and Interpretation -- Critical Theory: A New Attitude towards Art and Society -- Perspectives of Post-Structuralism -- The Practice of Deconstruction -- Contemporary Schools and Traditions in Literary and Critical Theory -- Postmodern and the New Character of the Literary Work. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Beginning in the 20s of the last century, historical research into Eiximenis's life and writings has thrown into relief his contribution to the language and political ideas of the kingdoms and towns of the Catalan-Aragonese Crown. Of fundamental importance has been the work of medievalists from North America, and in particular that of Canadian scholars during the last decades of the twentieth century.More recently, a number of studies have (...) underlined the decisive contribution of Eiximenis – a representative of a European textual tradition among friars of the Minor Observance that extended from Oxford to Florence – to the establishment of a system of ethical values for the economic sphere and for trading practices that continued to be developed by members of the Franciscan Order throughout the high middle ages and early modern period.As a follow-up to these studies, I believe that a program of textual analysis and systematic investigation of Eximenis's work could provide further information about the range and significance of his political thinking, based as it was on applying, in typically Franciscan fashion, experimental observation to gain an understanding of the nature both of the societas and of the market, the latter being thought of as a defining expression of civic institutions in Western Europe. This same experimental approach can be found in Franciscan thinking from the catalan-aragonese realm not only in the work of Arnau de Vilanova and Ramon Llull, but also in that of Pere Tomas and Anselm Turmeda, two figures fundamental to the preparation and political engagement of the Friar of Girona.1. The concept of contractIn Eiximenian texts, the communitarian dimension is defined as one that is of necessity based on contract. It is expounded in the long opening section of the Dotzè del Crestià, where Eiximenis outlines the political value of the civitas, as well as setting out the elements that constitute civic life.Borrowing from Aristotle's discussion in the First Book of the Politics , the Franciscan friar strongly affirms that one of the principal reasons behind the civitas is the "necessitat de contractes," the need for contracts. Going far beyond the highly qualified analysis of money and coinage set out by the Greek philosopher, Eiximenis here maintains that the aims of the community is the profit that the citizenry realises by means of different forms of exchange, through buying and selling, through contracts, and through trading. Moreover, that the binding nature of trading-contracts is a matter of concern not of the city in the narrow sense, but of each and every kind of human social organization.Even before contract-law, or, better said, conventional or foral procedure, Eiximenis views the idea of the contract as an essential part of the ethical and organizational principles of living as a community, the essence of the civitas. And it is of great significance that when he is discussing the value and function of money, Eiximenis chooses to call the sorts of exchange that to-day we term economic or financial les civils conmutacions, or exchanges between citizens.These lexical hints allow us to capture the strength of meaning and value, the ethical perspective by which the Gerundense defines the inextricable union of the market and civic society. But it is not only an analytical perspective, significant as that is, that unites market and civic ethics; we are presented with a value judgment of contract and economic exchange as elements that determine the very idea of civilitas.The "bona civilitas," an expression that can be roughly translated as "good civic culture," is in fact founded on a concept of economic ethics that has as its distinguishing feature the logic of profitable exchange, of the distribution of that profit, of contractualization, and of the circulation of goods and money. It is characterised by redefining the anti-value of avaritia as a real.. (shrink)

Does syllogistic logic have the resources to capture mathematical proof? This volume provides the first unified account of the history of attempts to answer this question, the reasoning behind the different positions taken, and their far-reaching implications. Aristotle had claimed that scientific knowledge, which includes mathematics, is provided by syllogisms of a special sort: 'scientific' ('demonstrative') syllogisms. In ancient Greece and in the Middle Ages, the claim that Euclid's theorems could be recast syllogistically was accepted without further scrutiny. Nevertheless, (...) as early as Galen, the importance of relational reasoning for mathematics had already been recognized. Further critical voices emerged in the Renaissance and the question of whether mathematical proofs could be recast syllogistically attracted more sustained attention over the following three centuries. Supported by more detailed analyses of Euclidean theorems, this led to attempts to extend logical theory to include relational reasoning, and to arguments purporting to reduce relational reasoning to a syllogistic form. Philosophical proposals to the effect that mathematical reasoning is heterogenous with respect to logical proofs were famously defended by Kant, and the implications of the debate about the adequacy of syllogistic logic for mathematics are at the very core of Kant's account of synthetic a priori judgments. While it is now widely accepted that syllogistic logic is not sufficient to account for the logic of mathematical proof, the history and the analysis of this debate, running from Aristotle to de Morgan and beyond, is a fascinating and crucial insight into the relationship between philosophy and mathematics. (shrink)

Two chapters of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, E 4 and Θ‎ 10, discuss truth and a use of the verb ‘to be’ associated with it. The relationship between these two chapters is problematic because despite an apparent cross-reference connecting them, they seem to put forward incompatible views. This chapter argues that E 4 fully agrees with Θ 10. One of the assumptions on which the reconciliation relies is that when ‘to be’ is employed in accordance with the use associated with truth, (...) it applies to external things but neither to thoughts nor to sentences. This sheds a novel light on E 4, which turns out to make claims rather different from those which commentators have taken it to defend. In particular, E 4 commits Aristotle to the view that states of affairs are mind-dependent entities. (shrink)

Concealment -- Part of eloquence is to hide eloquence -- The concealed ornament -- Art or nature? -- In the garden -- Iki -- Those who cannot dissimulate cannot rule either -- True eloquence mocks eloquence -- Ready-mades.

This is the latest book of Vittorio Possenti, professor of history of moral philosophy at the University of Venice and one of the major experts on the thought of Jacques Maritain. Possenti deals here with the situation of liberal Western societies from the point of view of classical political philosophy, understood as the tradition of political thought originating in Aristotle and adopted by Aquinas and modern Thomists such as Jacques Maritain.

The essay discusses Michael Thompson's original way of combining Aristotle and Frege in understanding life and, more specifically, biological species. His approach is compared with different styles of thought of hermeneutical or phenomenological leaning.

This Companion provides a comprehensive guide to ancient logic. The first part charts its chronological development, focussing especially on the Greek tradition, and discusses its two main systems: Aristotle's logic of terms and the Stoic logic of propositions. The second part explores the key concepts at the heart of the ancient logical systems: truth, definition, terms, propositions, syllogisms, demonstrations, modality and fallacy. The systematic discussion of these concepts allows the reader to engage with some specific logical and exegetical issues (...) and to appreciate their transformations across different philosophical traditions. The intersections between logic, mathematics and rhetoric are also explored. The third part of the volume discusses the reception and influence of ancient logic in the history of philosophy and its significance for philosophy in our own times. Comprehensive coverage, chapters by leading international scholars and a critical overview of the recent literature in the field will make this volume essential for students and scholars of ancient logic. (shrink)

Mark Richard Wheeler - Aristotle on Truth - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.3 469-470 Paolo Crivelli. Aristotle on Truth. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. xi + 340. Cloth, $85.00. A thorough contemporary study of Aristotle's theory of truth is welcome. Adopting a frankly analytic approach, Professor Crivelli addresses all of the most important Aristotelian texts on truth. He provides close and careful exegesis, attending to philological (...) and interpretive difficulties related to the manuscripts and alternative translations. In the spirit of Hintikka, Łukasiewicz, and Mignucci, the tools of contemporary logical analysis are applied effectively and yield rigorous restatements of Aristotle's.. (shrink)