El artículo presenta el análisis de las implicaciones de evaluar la comprensión de lectura y la redacción en pruebas de ingreso a la educación superior, como una consideración necesaria para el desarrollo de una política de competencia comunicativa. Se describe el diseño de un instrumento, partiendo de la concepción sociosemiótica de la lengua, del enfoque metodológico de la comprensión por niveles intra, inter y extratextual, ligado a procesos cognitivos, y la escritura como tecnología. Se incluye, además, un concepto de evaluación (...) enmarcado en el desarrollo de competencia, es decir, los resultados de la prueba se utilizan, por fuera de concepciones deterministas excluyentes, para mostrar un estado de la competencia y las acciones posibles de mejoramiento de la misma. La competencia comunicativa se demuestra como saber transversal, inter y transdisciplinario. (shrink)

Theories related to cognitive sciences, Human-in-the-loop Cyber-physical systems, data analysis for decision-making, and computational ethics make clear the need to create transdisciplinary learning, research, and application strategies to bring coherence to the paradigm of a truly human-oriented technology. Autonomous objects assume more responsibilities for individual and collective phenomena, they have gradually filtered into routines and require the incorporation of ethical practice into the professions related to the development, modeling, and design of algorithms. To make this possible, it is pertinent and (...) urgent to bring them closer to the problems and approaches of the humanities. Increasingly transdisciplinary research must be part of the construction of systems that provide developers and scientists with the necessary bases to understand the ethical debate and therefore their commitment to society. This article considers two theories as articulating axes: Blumenberg’s, coming from the field of philosophy, for whom the process of technification and especially the implementation of mathematical models in their algorithmic form leads to an emptying of meaning and therefore makes programmers who implement their functions to be alien to the concerns that gave them origin; Daston’s, belonging to the field of the history of science and according to which the division of labor in the processes of technification of the calculation implies a kind of subordination in which those who implement the inventions of a small group of privileged mathematicians ignore the procedures that put them into operation. Given these two theories, the black box models prevalent in AI development, and the urgency of establishing explanatory frameworks for the development of computational ethics, this article exposes the need to give a voice to the cultural history of consciousness for promoting the discussions around the implementation of mathematical algorithms. The paper takes as a reference the different points of view that have emerged around the study of technological ethics, its applicability, management, and design. It criticizes the current state of studies from a humanistic perspective and explains how the historical perspective allows promoting the training of software engineers, developers and creators so that they assume intuitions and moral values in the development of their work. Specifically, it aims to expose how cultural history, applied to the study of consciousness and its phenomena, makes those involved in this technological revolution aware of the effect that they, through their algorithms, have on society in general and on human beings in particular. (shrink)

Introduction. Observing the production and consumer area of modern cinematography makes it possible to draw conclusions about the value dominants of modern society, to conduct its sociocultural analysis. Cinema, both auteur and mass, is a way of reflecting and modeling the society spiritual state and its analysis makes it possible to draw quite serious and justified philosophical and social conclusions. The film in a philosophical sense is ontologized by the dominant intention of the era. Such a dominant intention of modernity (...) is hedonism. Pleasure, enjoyment, happiness, according to the humanities, is the basic values of the 21st century society. Cinema is the most comprehensive reaction to the needs of hedonism, since hedonistic prerequisites are to some degree laid down in its technical (movement, photographic phenomenology) and social nature (art and entertainment). In this regard, it seems relevant to conduct a philosophical analysis of the ontological level of modern cinema. The aim of the study is to conduct a philosophical analysis of the ontological level of modern cinema; identify ontological models, variations and combinations of which provide its artistic diversity. Methods: the authors use the general scientific methods of analysis and synthesis, the phenomenological method, since they identify the sensory intentions that underlie modern cinema. The authors also use the hermeneutic method, since they reveal the hidden meanings of the film, determined by the time and conditions of its creation, as well as the semiotic approach, which makes it possible to analyze the structural-semiotic whole of the film. The scientific novelty of the study lies in the fact that the authors analyze films from philosophical aspects, and not just cultural studies, as is customary. In modern cinema, the authors look for a reflection of the “social soul”, identify those intentions that underlie modern cinema, both auteur and mass. This makes it possible to deduce a typology of film models that have not previously been applied to the analysis of the film process. Results. During the analysis, the authors developed a hedonistic-ontological typology of cinematic models, identified five generative models of cinema, four of which have a hedonistic orientation: an alimentary model that pleases the recipient by intensively stimulating his perceptual sphere; a parkour model that gives pleasure to light and unhindered movement, minimizing the severity and resistance of the environment; an arcade model that provides the viewer the pleasure of victory through virtual immersion in the ups and downs of the “action film”; a detective model that gives the viewer pleasure through the removal of cognitive uncertainty. The fifth model, tentatively called existential, should lead the viewer into a complex philosophical state of being-with-self-self, an experience of one’s own fulfillment, associated with the experience of suffering. However, due to the hedonistic orientations of modern culture, this model is not relevant in the first decades of the 21st century. Conclusions. Philosophical analysis of modern cinema has revealed that at the ontological level it is based on the philosophy of hedonism. Modern cinema delivers the following types of pleasures to the recipient: enjoyment of the flesh of the world, enjoyment of bodily freedom in motion, enjoyment of peace, cognitive enjoyment. (shrink)

Drawing on many areas of expertise, from paleontology to psychology, Tomasello offers a plausible, evolutionary story abouthow our ancestors are likely to have developed cooperative behaviors and collaborative lifeways in order to survive and thrive.He also claims that this narrative explains why they would have begun to think in characteristically cooperative and moral ways,developing a “we is greater than me” [we>me] psychological orientation. Do the arguments offered support this extra claim? Thisarticle suggests that they do not. It seeks to alleviate (...) this shortcoming by drawing upon some conceptual resources offered bySartre’s Theory of Practical Ensembles. The centerpiece of the article consists of a detailed analysis of Sartre’s account of the genesisof the “group-in-fusion,” seeking to show that the genesis of a we-way of thinking in a group made up of many requires themediation of what Sartre calls a “third party” (le tiers). After closely examining Sartre’s treatment of the “third party” in theapocalyptic genesis of the “group-in-fusion,” I evaluate the success of this notion in resolving those questions that Tomasello’saccount raises while, at the same time, addressing the ontological question concerning the nature of the individual-grouprelation, in a way that suggests new and significant alternatives to standard dilemmas in contemporary social philosophy. (shrink)

Critical Realism and the Objective Value of Sustainability contributes to the growing discussion surrounding the concept of sustainability, using a critical realist approach within a transdisciplinary theoretical framework to examine how sustainability objectively occurs in the natural world and in society. The book develops an ethical theory of sustainability as an objective value, rooted not in humans' subjective preferences but in the holistic web of relationships, interdependencies, and obligations existing among living things on Earth, a web believed to have maintained (...) life on Earth over the last 3.7 billion years. It proposes three pillars of sustainability ethics: contentment for the human existence given to us; justice (beyond distributive justice); and meaningful freedom (within ecological and moral limits). Using abductive reasoning, the book infers that there is an out-of-this-world Sustainer behind the Earth's sustainability acting as a metaphysical source of all being and value. It argues that sustainability value, accepted as a shared understanding of the common good, must guide individual decisions and socio-economic development efforts as a matter of deliberate choice, as well as be built on the awareness that there are non-negotiable, pre-established conditions for our planet's sustainability. This book will be of interest to students and scholars across fields of inquiry, including sustainability, sustainable development, environmental philosophy and ethics, philosophy of science, ecological economics, and to whoever may wonder why seasons exists and why humans have creative minds. (shrink)

The intentionality of improvisation represents surely one of the most pressing and controversial issues in contemporary action theory: how do we find the way to characterize the proper intentionality of improvisation, which is an unplanned yet intentional action? This article will address this question bringing together Merleau-Ponty’s motor intentionality and Bergson’s conception of duration. My argument will unfold in three main stages. First, I will briefly describe the traditional scheme that is used to think of intentional action in contemporary action (...) theory and discuss how the phenomenon of improvisation casts doubts on it. Second, I will outline an initial, and provisional account of improvisation by crossing the descriptions of musical improvisation provided by Jankélévitch with the testimonials of two improvisatory composers—Enrico Pieranunzi and Keith Jarrett—and reports from Charles Rosen, an American pianist and Roger Sessions, an American composer. Finally, I will refine the basic concepts and lay out a phenomenological account of improvisation, by extending and applying the phenomenological notion of motor intentionality to the examples and testimonials gathered from the observation of a specific kind of improvisatory activity—musical composition. This methodology is intended to contrast both with more standard philosophical approaches based on hypothetical examples, and with more standard laboratory-based methodologies in cognitive sciences, psychology, and experimental philosophy. Overall, this approach is intended to redress the balance of action theory—one-sided directed towards planning, as a key aspect of human agency—with an analysis of the bodily and responsive aspect of intentionality. (shrink)

The article presents a study of gift-giving practices in the context of the development of modern biomedicine and shows their relationship to the realization of epistemic virtues. In biomedicine, the gain and production of knowledge (the gift of knowledge) is often grounded in bodily gift (sacrifice) and donor practices. The latter are associated with a number of mishaps in the history of biomedicine, reflecting the violation of moral norms in the process of obtaining scientific data and demonstrating the need for (...) a clear differentiation of intellectual and moral virtues. An important factor in the formation of the epistemic norms of modern biomedicine has been the transformation of the values of scientific knowledge from practices of coercion to giving. As a result, the involuntary sacrifice of biomaterials to science was replaced by voluntary practices of somatic giving and informational exchange that determine the process of mutual recognition in science. It is shown that gift-giving in science is closely associated with intellectual virtues, with intellectual generosity characterizing the idea of openness in science and scientists’ intention for production and constant growth of knowledge, and can also be related to the idea of altruistic service to science, involving the exchange of received scientific data and access to free information in the network space. A number of examples of the modern digital gift ethos and the implementation of the principles of openness of knowledge and knowledge exchange in the context of the creation of biomedical expert digital platforms, the formation of social scientific networks – platforms with open access to scientific information, the development of the phenomenon of “garage” science and other “zones of exchange” experience are considered. (shrink)

In the article there has been carried out the retrospective analysis of understanding mentality. The author accentuates the vision of mentality as the expression of the most essential relations of actuality. The term is interpreted from ontological positions. Ontological basics of mentality are given through its functioning as a priori structure which has level character. There has been formulated the definition of mentality. There have been outlined the subjects of mentality. There is proposed the vision of mentality as a philosophical (...) category. There is positioned its use while researching the patterns of culture development with internal processes of self-organisation and external constructive impacts. Mentality is interpreted as a principle of thinking which means the unity of biological, psychological and cultural basics in socio-cultural subjects. There is proposed the idea of using a category "mentality" as a principle of thinking in different sciences such as history, philosophical anthropology, psychology etc. (shrink)

The intentionality of improvisation represents surely one of the most pressing and controversial issues in contemporary action theory: how do we find the way to characterize the proper intentionality of improvisation, which is an unplanned yet intentional action? This article will address this question bringing together Merleau-Ponty’s motor intentionality and Bergson’s conception of duration. My argument will unfold in three main stages. First, I will briefly describe the traditional scheme that is used to think of intentional action in contemporary action (...) theory and discuss how the phenomenon of improvisation casts doubts on it. Second, I will outline an initial, and provisional account of improvisation by crossing the descriptions of musical improvisation provided by Jankélévitch with the testimonials of two improvisatory composers—Enrico Pieranunzi and Keith Jarrett—and reports from Charles Rosen, an American pianist and Roger Sessions, an American composer. Finally, I will refine the basic concepts and lay out a phenomenological account of improvisation, by extending and applying the phenomenological notion of motor intentionality to the examples and testimonials gathered from the observation of a specific kind of improvisatory activity—musical composition. This methodology is intended to contrast both with more standard philosophical approaches based on hypothetical examples, and with more standard laboratory-based methodologies in cognitive sciences, psychology, and experimental philosophy. Overall, this approach is intended to redress the balance of action theory—one-sided directed towards planning, as a key aspect of human agency—with an analysis of the bodily and responsive aspect of intentionality. (shrink)

According to a recent and prominent view, a ‘we-perspective’ arises out of a dyadic I-you relation involving a special form of reciprocity in which I relate to another as a you – as somebody who is also attending and addressing me. As important as this argument might be, one obvious limitation lies in that it typically applies to dyadic forms of ‘we’ which are bound to the here and now of face-to-face interactions between ‘ad hoc pairs of individuals’. Drawing inspiration (...) from Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason and Freud’s Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, I will argue that in order to trace a way out of this impasse, one needs to shift the theoretical focus from dyadic face-to-face (immediate) relations of reciprocity between I and You, self and other to ternary relations of ‘mediated reciprocity’ involving the figure and the functions of a third party (le tiers). (shrink)

This article develops a philosophical hermeneusis of the “Valladolid Debate” centered on the notion of “universality”, highlighting the universalist elements present both in the foundation of a praxis of colonial domination developed by Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda and in the recognition of the cultural diversity held by Bartolomé de las Casas. First, the historical-ideological context of the conquest is presented. Subsequently the article analyzes de Sepulveda’s arguments about barbarism, cultural superiority and the right of domination, which established a “logic of (...) cultural domination”. In this context, de Sepúlveda intended to establish a fracture between “civilized” and “barbaric” cultures, in which the human essence revealed itself deficiently. Finally, the contribution considers the objections to the “colonial fracture” presented by de las Casas, who composes an alternative position resignifying the concept of “universality” that inhabited de Sepúlveda’s differentialist arguments. (shrink)

As one tries to grasp love and its images within José Leonilson's production, a multiplicity of aspects and meanings are seen that also relate to Louise Bourgeois's oeuvre in regard to the interest in human relations. Through a comparative approach to both artists' poetics, an understanding is created that love is not a simplistic action and all the words read in or applied to their visual discourse must be considered within a wide range of love in visual and literary images. (...) Keywords: literature and visual arts / love / creativity / Bourgeois, Louise / Leonilson, José / word and image. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to offer a complete survey of Planudes’s moralising corrections in his epigrammatic anthology, as these can be reconstructed through a comparison between Pl and the other testimonies. On the one hand, this analysis will confirm the inconsistency of the monk in bowdlerising the texts, often remarked by scholars; on the other, it will clarify that corrections intended to make a text morally acceptable are only occasional, and often ex-tempore. The Appendix discusses a further case (...) of possible bowdlerization by Planudes in the Sylloge Laurentiana, composed about twenty years before his major anthology. (shrink)

Through the comparison with famous statues, Lycinus, in Lucian’s „Imagines“, makes a verbal portrait of a beautiful woman he has caught sight of. The portrait of her virtues is preceeded by a section where she appears with a book in her hands, while talking to someone. This paper argues that such a description is modelled on a specific iconographic scheme: after Lycinus’ verbal sculpture, the woman has actually become a statue. But she also has the limits of a sculpture: although (...) she is speaking, she cannot be heard. The following revelation of the woman’s identity, conveyed through an allusion to Xenophon’s tale of Panthea, serves the purpose of showing the superiority of literature over the visual arts: Xenophon’s account − a literary work − is said to be able to create what visual arts cannot, i. e. the illusion of sound. (shrink)

Between what we call “us” and what we call “them”, a line must be drawn, which immediately becomes a contentious border, or a divide, that brings to the fore who “we” are, and that consigns to the background, or to the margin, those people who do not count as “us”. Wherever this border is traced — whether along the lines of existing nation-states, racial or linguistic communities, or political affiliations — the resulting potential for antagonism leads to both internal social (...) tensions within a society and, at the level of nations, to outright war—the ultimate example of the friend/enemy divide conceptualized by Carl Schmitt. Once this is recognized, the problem we encounter is the following: can we think of nothing else along the boundaries between “us” and “them”, but an antithesis, nothing else but an antagonism? Under what conditions, “from within what axiomatic” (Derrida), can political thinkers be assured, that the “us/them” relation is by necessity one of hostility? In this paper I will set up a dialogue between Bernhard Waldenfels and Jacques Derrida around the figure of the stranger [_étranger_] — a figure which “frequently operates as a limit-experience for humans trying to identify themselves over and against others” (Kearney) — in order to challenge the logic of this presupposition. My aim is to show how the encounter between these thinkers allows us to challenge _at the same time_ the antagonistic view of the “us/them” relation and the logic of binary opposition that informs it. (shrink)

En los últimos años se ha propuesto una importante cantidad de métodos estadísticos demográficos. La gran mayoría han sido desarrollados con la finalidad de pronosticar las componentes demográficas y/o medidas derivadas a partir de la suposición de un modelo subyacente. El presente trabajo pretende realizar un ejercicio comparativo integral a través de la estimación y pronóstico de la fecundidad a partir de tres propuestas —métodos clásicos de pronóstico, tales como los modelos ARIMA y los suavizados exponenciales, modelos para datos funcionales (...) (MDF) y modelos jerárquicos bayesianos (MJB)—, como un primer paso hacia el estudio de las proyecciones de población derivadas de cada una de ellas, empleando datos de la Argentina. El ejercicio tiene como horizonte final la estimación de la mortalidad y la fecundidad a través de los tres métodos mencionados para luego integrarlos en proyecciones de población. (shrink)

RESUMEN En este artículo se analizan las ideas contrapuestas de Domingo Faustino Sarmiento y José Martí sobre el binomio "civilización-barbarie", categoría medular de los discursos políticos e intelectuales del siglo XIX, con el fin de explorar sus concepciones sobre el nuevo sujeto político. Se exploran los "contextos de enunciación" desde los cuales desarrollaron sus posiciones ético-políticas; la opción por el hombre natural (Martí) frente al sujeto político ideal (Sarmiento); y la apelación y desmontaje de las categorías raciales en ambos autores. (...) El estudio de estas categorías revela una dialéctica de persistencia y abandono de imaginarios coloniales. ABSTRACT This article analyzes the conflicting ideas of Domingo Faustino Sarmiento and José Martí about the binomial "civilization-barbarism", a core category of political and intellectual discourses of the 19th century, to explore their conceptions of the new political subject. The "enunciation contexts" from which they developed their ethical-political positions; the option for the "natural man" (Martí) versus the ideal political subject (Sarmiento); and the appeal and dismantling of racial categories in both authors. The study of these categories reveals a dialectic of persistence and abandonment of colonial imaginaries. (shrink)

El transhumanismo o el movimiento a favor del mejoramiento humano a través de la tecnología vive, actualmente, un momento álgido. Los avances en Inteligencia Artificial e ingeniería genética permiten que soñemos con seres capaces de vencer a la muerte y poseer capacidades hasta ahora desconocidas. Sin embargo, en este artículo veremos que no todo el mundo está de acuerdo con estas ideas y hay quienes consideran las promesas del transhumanismo más como pesadillas que como sueños. Estos son los conservadores. Los (...) conservadores consideran que las mejoras prometidas por el transhumanismo conllevarán el fin de la especie humana. Frente al transhumanismo, los conservadores defienden la conservación y protección de la esencia y la naturaleza humana. También se rebelan contra la manipulación ilimitada del ser humano y la limitación de estas prácticas a aquellas contenidas en la esencia humana. Todo ello les otorga cierta reminiscencia aristotélica en la que muchos de ellos se amparan y la cual vale la pena estudiar. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore the cartographical method as a political option able to destroy the linguistic and semiotic empire of sense. Starting from the difference between map and tracing, Deleuze and Guattari understood the power of a rhizomatic expression, commonly represented by the obsessive and compulsive gesture of autistics, or their impossibility of speaking correctly. This phenomenon has been deeply analysed by Fernand Deligny through his experience in the Cévennes, where he inaugurated his personal anti-psychoanalytic and anti-linguistic method. During (...) this collective living, the wanderings of the autistic children, called Lignes d’erre, were traced and gathered in a cartography in which action overtakes word and speech, and human gestures are reterritorialized. Characterized by movement without finality, life in Cévennes becomes a “life raft”, where the raft is no more the shipwreck of humanity, but the shelter for no- speakers. Therefore, a new spatial configuration is given, where the bonds between people and with objects exist exactly as the pieces of wood in the raft: namely slacken, rhizomatic. (shrink)

Últimamente, y en especial a partir del enfoque de capacidades y funcionamientos de Amartya Sen, se han cuestionado las mediciones de pobreza donde se tiene en cuenta sólo una dimensión del bienestar, como es el ingreso, y se ha dado creciente importancia a la medición de la pobreza desde una perspectiva multidimensional. La propuesta de medida de pobreza de tiempo e ingreso LIMTIP toma el trabajo no remunerado invisibilizado como punto de partida para establecer un umbral de requerimientos de tiempo. (...) Si el ingreso del hogar alcanza para compensar el valor de estos déficits de tiempo, entonces serán pobres de tiempo pero no de ingreso ajustado. Si el ingreso no alcanza para comprar sustitutos de este déficit de tiempo, entonces las personas y los hogares en que habitan serán pobres de tiempo e ingresos. La medida de pobreza de ingreso y tiempo LIMTIP corrige medidas de pobreza absoluta a las que estamos acostumbrados para hacerlas más fieles a sus supuestos. Este trabajo incorpora la dimensión temporal a la medición de pobreza utilizando la metodología LIMTIP sobre datos de la Encuesta de Uso de Tiempo y Voluntariado realizada en la ciudad de Rosario en 2010. (shrink)

Cet article explore l’expérience esthétique particulière que nous procurent les promenades sonores. En partant d’une étude d’un cas paradigmatique – les tournées audio Remote X du collectif Rimini Protokoll – et par le biais d’une réflexion sur la perception opérant à partir de Husserl et Merleau-Ponty, je m’intéresse en particulier aux renversements perceptifs qui émaillent le parcours déambulatoire du spectateur ainsi qu’au brouillage entre le réel et l’imaginaire, qu’il éprouve au niveau même de son inscription corporelle dans l’espace. Une telle (...) approche mène à la conclusion que la notion de perception synesthésique offerte par Merleau-Ponty permet non seulement de dépasser le défi posé à la théorie husserlienne de l’imagination ( phantasia ) par l’expérience esthétique ici en question, mais aussi et, de surcroît, de penser le paradoxe d’une affinité du divers sensoriel qui affleure dans les performances contemporaines lorsque de multiples dispositifs médiatiques sont en jeu. (shrink)

The kind of collective improvisation attained by the “free jazz” at the beginning of the sixties sets a challenge to analytic theories of collective intentionality, that emphasize the role played by future-directed plans in the interlocking and interdependent intentions of the individual participants, because in the free jazz case the performers’ interdependence or [interplay] stems from an intuitive understanding between musicians. Otherwise said: what happens musically is not planned in advance, but arises from spontaneous interactions in the group. By looking (...) at the way jazz improvisers take up the challenge of making music together without a pre-conceived notion as to what kind of effect they will achieve and without a pre-set code of agreements, my aim has been to clarify what kind of strategies — other than advanced action plans and joint commitments — are used by improvising musicians to integrate their improvisations into a unified shared activity. In developing this proposal I initially drawn pre-theoretically on one paradigmatic study case — Ornette Coleman’s double quartet Free Jazz, A collective Improvisation and brought it in conversation with Husserl’s phenomenology of time. In a final move, I brought this phenomenological frame into dialogue with some recent readings of the predictive coding model. All in all, what we learned from the Free Jazz case is that the interdependence and interlocking of attitudes among individual participants characteristic of shared intention is not determined by a future-directed plan and the rational pressure to be responsive to and coordinate with others, it typically engages. Rather, in the free jazz case, the performers’ connection and interplay depend on the players’ readiness to feel each other out, by listening to each other playing, in a way that no doubt presupposes the Husserlian retention-protention scheme. (shrink)

The kind of collective improvisation attained by free jazz at the beginning of the sixties appears interesting from the perspective of contemporary debates on collective intentionality for several reasons. The most notable of these, is that it holds a mirror up to what analytical philosophers of action identify as “the complexly interwoven sets of collective intentions” that make a group more than the sum of its parts. But at the same time, free jazz poses a challenge to these philosophical theories (...) of collective intentionality, because what happens is not planned in advance but arises from spontaneous interactions in the group. The second and no less decisive reason is that jazz musicians act together in a very distinctive way, which casts into clear relief the interplay between togetherness and agonism, individual freedom and group commitment, which is contained in every human interaction. In other words, in free jazz we find what Hannah Arendt calls the “paradoxical” or “twofold” character of “human plurality.” Starting with the analysis of two paradigmatic case studies—Charles Mingus’s Folk Forms No. 1 and Ornette Coleman’s Free Jazz: A Collective Improvisation—my main concern in this paper is to provide a phenomenological account of the individual-yet-plural intentionality that emerges and runs through the improvisatory process in the free jazz case. After having made the negative point that this phenomenon represents a challenge to the analytical theories of collective intentionality, I shall argue that it can be accounted for from a phenomenological perspective. My basic thesis is that the overall cohesiveness of the improvisatory process must be regarded as a meaningful realization of an overall feeling, shared and shaped together by musicians over time—and not as the execution of an advanced plan. (shrink)

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_ Source: _Volume 45, Issue 2, pp 288 - 302 In this paper I intend to show that Merleau-Ponty’s conception of movement as primordial expression, whereby movement is a shaping force that can be discerned in the forms it creates, allows us to go beyond the superficial definition of movement as “change of place” and discover its most essential characteristic: that is the expression of a motion—intrinsic to feeling—which can take on the form of either a generative thrust or an (...) act that traces out and sheds light on the reserve of shapes that everything we have felt has silently traced within us. My argument will unfold in three main stages. First, I intend to show that from Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on pictorial movement there emerges a richer and more refined definition of movement that brings together the two meanings of Aristotelian dunamis : potentia passiva, or being acted upon, and potentia activa, or tending towards act. Second, I will show that this particular understanding of movement allows us to uncover the lived dimension of movement that is intrinsic to sense experience and enacts the metamorphosis of our impressions into the expression that reveals to us the carnal obverse [envers charnel] of our experiences of the visible world. Finally, I will show that this particular understanding of movement proves to be a strategy for thinking of both the emergence of sense within the flesh of the world and the advent of history that unravels at its heart. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage vise à montrer que la question de la réflexion et de son éveil au sein de la vision occupe une place centrale dans la pensée de Maurice Merleau-Ponty et apparaît comme la source secrète d'une énigme et d'une interrogation fondamentales, à partir desquelles son oeuvre entière peut être relue et révéler une nouvelle cohérence. Mais qu'il s'agisse de la perception, de l'expression ou de la chair, c'est à chaque fois la question de la conscience et de son éveil (...) réflexif qui est repensée à nouveau frais et relancée comme un nouveau défi. De ce fait, cet ouvrage vise également à faire apparaître la nouvelle signification - ou configuration - que prend le commencement de la réflexion chez Merleau-Ponty, dans le dévoilement progressif d'une seule figure typique, composée par touches successives, à partir des différentes figurations qu'elle revêt dans son oeuvre. Elle trouve à s'incarner dans la figure, hautement évocatrice du peintre qui "pense le pinceau à la main", au moment "où sa vision se fait geste". [Source: 4e de couv.]. (shrink)

This article examines the particular aesthetic experience brought about by soundwalks. In each case, the point of departure is the phenomenological analysis of two case study: Janet Cardiff’s Walks and the audio-tours Remote x by Rimini Protokoll. Drawing upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, I will examine the conflicts of perception and the peculiar shift from one order of perception to another that punctuate the spectator’s walking, as well as the intertwining of the real and the imaginary coming into being in such (...) performances and experienced at the very level of his bodily inscription in space. More specifically, my aim is to address the challenge that the aesthetic experience here in question sets to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception and to show how the extension of the notion of perception achieved by Merleau-Ponty makes it possible to overcome the paradox. (shrink)

On demande : où l’histoire se fait-elle? […] Quel est ce mouvement qui trace et laisse derrière lui les figures du sillage? Il est du même ordre que le mouvement de la Parole et de la Pensée, et enfin que l’éclatement du monde sensible entre nous : partout il y a sens, dimensions, figures par-delà ce que “chaque conscience” aurait pu produire […]. Cette interrogation et cette ébauche de réponse nous placent au cœur de la conception merleau-pontienne du mouvement de (...) l’expression, le mouvemen... (shrink)