Drawing on many areas of expertise, from paleontology to psychology, Tomasello offers a plausible, evolutionary story abouthow our ancestors are likely to have developed cooperative behaviors and collaborative lifeways in order to survive and thrive.He also claims that this narrative explains why they would have begun to think in characteristically cooperative and moral ways,developing a “we is greater than me” [we>me] psychological orientation. Do the arguments offered support this extra claim? Thisarticle suggests that they do not. It seeks to alleviate (...) this shortcoming by drawing upon some conceptual resources offered bySartre’s Theory of Practical Ensembles. The centerpiece of the article consists of a detailed analysis of Sartre’s account of the genesisof the “group-in-fusion,” seeking to show that the genesis of a we-way of thinking in a group made up of many requires themediation of what Sartre calls a “third party” (le tiers). After closely examining Sartre’s treatment of the “third party” in theapocalyptic genesis of the “group-in-fusion,” I evaluate the success of this notion in resolving those questions that Tomasello’saccount raises while, at the same time, addressing the ontological question concerning the nature of the individual-grouprelation, in a way that suggests new and significant alternatives to standard dilemmas in contemporary social philosophy. (shrink)

The intentionality of improvisation represents surely one of the most pressing and controversial issues in contemporary action theory: how do we find the way to characterize the proper intentionality of improvisation, which is an unplanned yet intentional action? This article will address this question bringing together Merleau-Ponty’s motor intentionality and Bergson’s conception of duration. My argument will unfold in three main stages. First, I will briefly describe the traditional scheme that is used to think of intentional action in contemporary action (...) theory and discuss how the phenomenon of improvisation casts doubts on it. Second, I will outline an initial, and provisional account of improvisation by crossing the descriptions of musical improvisation provided by Jankélévitch with the testimonials of two improvisatory composers—Enrico Pieranunzi and Keith Jarrett—and reports from Charles Rosen, an American pianist and Roger Sessions, an American composer. Finally, I will refine the basic concepts and lay out a phenomenological account of improvisation, by extending and applying the phenomenological notion of motor intentionality to the examples and testimonials gathered from the observation of a specific kind of improvisatory activity—musical composition. This methodology is intended to contrast both with more standard philosophical approaches based on hypothetical examples, and with more standard laboratory-based methodologies in cognitive sciences, psychology, and experimental philosophy. Overall, this approach is intended to redress the balance of action theory—one-sided directed towards planning, as a key aspect of human agency—with an analysis of the bodily and responsive aspect of intentionality. (shrink)

The intentionality of improvisation represents surely one of the most pressing and controversial issues in contemporary action theory: how do we find the way to characterize the proper intentionality of improvisation, which is an unplanned yet intentional action? This article will address this question bringing together Merleau-Ponty’s motor intentionality and Bergson’s conception of duration. My argument will unfold in three main stages. First, I will briefly describe the traditional scheme that is used to think of intentional action in contemporary action (...) theory and discuss how the phenomenon of improvisation casts doubts on it. Second, I will outline an initial, and provisional account of improvisation by crossing the descriptions of musical improvisation provided by Jankélévitch with the testimonials of two improvisatory composers—Enrico Pieranunzi and Keith Jarrett—and reports from Charles Rosen, an American pianist and Roger Sessions, an American composer. Finally, I will refine the basic concepts and lay out a phenomenological account of improvisation, by extending and applying the phenomenological notion of motor intentionality to the examples and testimonials gathered from the observation of a specific kind of improvisatory activity—musical composition. This methodology is intended to contrast both with more standard philosophical approaches based on hypothetical examples, and with more standard laboratory-based methodologies in cognitive sciences, psychology, and experimental philosophy. Overall, this approach is intended to redress the balance of action theory—one-sided directed towards planning, as a key aspect of human agency—with an analysis of the bodily and responsive aspect of intentionality. (shrink)

According to a recent and prominent view, a ‘we-perspective’ arises out of a dyadic I-you relation involving a special form of reciprocity in which I relate to another as a you – as somebody who is also attending and addressing me. As important as this argument might be, one obvious limitation lies in that it typically applies to dyadic forms of ‘we’ which are bound to the here and now of face-to-face interactions between ‘ad hoc pairs of individuals’. Drawing inspiration (...) from Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason and Freud’s Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, I will argue that in order to trace a way out of this impasse, one needs to shift the theoretical focus from dyadic face-to-face (immediate) relations of reciprocity between I and You, self and other to ternary relations of ‘mediated reciprocity’ involving the figure and the functions of a third party (le tiers). (shrink)

The kind of collective improvisation attained by the “free jazz” at the beginning of the sixties sets a challenge to analytic theories of collective intentionality, that emphasize the role played by future-directed plans in the interlocking and interdependent intentions of the individual participants, because in the free jazz case the performers’ interdependence or [interplay] stems from an intuitive understanding between musicians. Otherwise said: what happens musically is not planned in advance, but arises from spontaneous interactions in the group. By looking (...) at the way jazz improvisers take up the challenge of making music together without a pre-conceived notion as to what kind of effect they will achieve and without a pre-set code of agreements, my aim has been to clarify what kind of strategies — other than advanced action plans and joint commitments — are used by improvising musicians to integrate their improvisations into a unified shared activity. In developing this proposal I initially drawn pre-theoretically on one paradigmatic study case — Ornette Coleman’s double quartet Free Jazz, A collective Improvisation and brought it in conversation with Husserl’s phenomenology of time. In a final move, I brought this phenomenological frame into dialogue with some recent readings of the predictive coding model. All in all, what we learned from the Free Jazz case is that the interdependence and interlocking of attitudes among individual participants characteristic of shared intention is not determined by a future-directed plan and the rational pressure to be responsive to and coordinate with others, it typically engages. Rather, in the free jazz case, the performers’ connection and interplay depend on the players’ readiness to feel each other out, by listening to each other playing, in a way that no doubt presupposes the Husserlian retention-protention scheme. (shrink)

Cet article explore l’expérience esthétique particulière que nous procurent les promenades sonores. En partant d’une étude d’un cas paradigmatique – les tournées audio Remote X du collectif Rimini Protokoll – et par le biais d’une réflexion sur la perception opérant à partir de Husserl et Merleau-Ponty, je m’intéresse en particulier aux renversements perceptifs qui émaillent le parcours déambulatoire du spectateur ainsi qu’au brouillage entre le réel et l’imaginaire, qu’il éprouve au niveau même de son inscription corporelle dans l’espace. Une telle (...) approche mène à la conclusion que la notion de perception synesthésique offerte par Merleau-Ponty permet non seulement de dépasser le défi posé à la théorie husserlienne de l’imagination ( phantasia ) par l’expérience esthétique ici en question, mais aussi et, de surcroît, de penser le paradoxe d’une affinité du divers sensoriel qui affleure dans les performances contemporaines lorsque de multiples dispositifs médiatiques sont en jeu. (shrink)

The kind of collective improvisation attained by free jazz at the beginning of the sixties appears interesting from the perspective of contemporary debates on collective intentionality for several reasons. The most notable of these, is that it holds a mirror up to what analytical philosophers of action identify as “the complexly interwoven sets of collective intentions” that make a group more than the sum of its parts. But at the same time, free jazz poses a challenge to these philosophical theories (...) of collective intentionality, because what happens is not planned in advance but arises from spontaneous interactions in the group. The second and no less decisive reason is that jazz musicians act together in a very distinctive way, which casts into clear relief the interplay between togetherness and agonism, individual freedom and group commitment, which is contained in every human interaction. In other words, in free jazz we find what Hannah Arendt calls the “paradoxical” or “twofold” character of “human plurality.” Starting with the analysis of two paradigmatic case studies—Charles Mingus’s Folk Forms No. 1 and Ornette Coleman’s Free Jazz: A Collective Improvisation—my main concern in this paper is to provide a phenomenological account of the individual-yet-plural intentionality that emerges and runs through the improvisatory process in the free jazz case. After having made the negative point that this phenomenon represents a challenge to the analytical theories of collective intentionality, I shall argue that it can be accounted for from a phenomenological perspective. My basic thesis is that the overall cohesiveness of the improvisatory process must be regarded as a meaningful realization of an overall feeling, shared and shaped together by musicians over time—and not as the execution of an advanced plan. (shrink)

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_ Source: _Volume 45, Issue 2, pp 288 - 302 In this paper I intend to show that Merleau-Ponty’s conception of movement as primordial expression, whereby movement is a shaping force that can be discerned in the forms it creates, allows us to go beyond the superficial definition of movement as “change of place” and discover its most essential characteristic: that is the expression of a motion—intrinsic to feeling—which can take on the form of either a generative thrust or an (...) act that traces out and sheds light on the reserve of shapes that everything we have felt has silently traced within us. My argument will unfold in three main stages. First, I intend to show that from Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on pictorial movement there emerges a richer and more refined definition of movement that brings together the two meanings of Aristotelian dunamis : potentia passiva, or being acted upon, and potentia activa, or tending towards act. Second, I will show that this particular understanding of movement allows us to uncover the lived dimension of movement that is intrinsic to sense experience and enacts the metamorphosis of our impressions into the expression that reveals to us the carnal obverse [envers charnel] of our experiences of the visible world. Finally, I will show that this particular understanding of movement proves to be a strategy for thinking of both the emergence of sense within the flesh of the world and the advent of history that unravels at its heart. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage vise à montrer que la question de la réflexion et de son éveil au sein de la vision occupe une place centrale dans la pensée de Maurice Merleau-Ponty et apparaît comme la source secrète d'une énigme et d'une interrogation fondamentales, à partir desquelles son oeuvre entière peut être relue et révéler une nouvelle cohérence. Mais qu'il s'agisse de la perception, de l'expression ou de la chair, c'est à chaque fois la question de la conscience et de son éveil (...) réflexif qui est repensée à nouveau frais et relancée comme un nouveau défi. De ce fait, cet ouvrage vise également à faire apparaître la nouvelle signification - ou configuration - que prend le commencement de la réflexion chez Merleau-Ponty, dans le dévoilement progressif d'une seule figure typique, composée par touches successives, à partir des différentes figurations qu'elle revêt dans son oeuvre. Elle trouve à s'incarner dans la figure, hautement évocatrice du peintre qui "pense le pinceau à la main", au moment "où sa vision se fait geste". [Source: 4e de couv.]. (shrink)

This article examines the particular aesthetic experience brought about by soundwalks. In each case, the point of departure is the phenomenological analysis of two case study: Janet Cardiff’s Walks and the audio-tours Remote x by Rimini Protokoll. Drawing upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, I will examine the conflicts of perception and the peculiar shift from one order of perception to another that punctuate the spectator’s walking, as well as the intertwining of the real and the imaginary coming into being in such (...) performances and experienced at the very level of his bodily inscription in space. More specifically, my aim is to address the challenge that the aesthetic experience here in question sets to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception and to show how the extension of the notion of perception achieved by Merleau-Ponty makes it possible to overcome the paradox. (shrink)

On demande : où l’histoire se fait-elle? […] Quel est ce mouvement qui trace et laisse derrière lui les figures du sillage? Il est du même ordre que le mouvement de la Parole et de la Pensée, et enfin que l’éclatement du monde sensible entre nous : partout il y a sens, dimensions, figures par-delà ce que “chaque conscience” aurait pu produire […]. Cette interrogation et cette ébauche de réponse nous placent au cœur de la conception merleau-pontienne du mouvement de (...) l’expression, le mouvemen... (shrink)

The general aim of this paper is to reach a better understanding of the dynamic process that gives rise to a self and its conscious activity. In order to meet this overall goal, I will analyse in detail the three main stages of the creative process, taking Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on the painter’s experience provided in Eye and Mind as my starting point. My argument will unfold in three main stages. First, I will focus on his notion of flesh, in order (...) to explore the experience of bodily feeling that precedes the very emergence of a self in the midst of perceptual life. Second, I will analyze descriptions of the circle of artistic creation, provided by famous painters—such as Paul Klee and Paul Cézanne—in order to reach a better understanding of the dynamic process through which bodily selfhood occurs and brings about consciousness in a continuous intertwining with the world that constantly nurtures the performance of its expressive gesture. Third, I will return to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of flesh, this time grasped in its practical form as a moving and expressive body, in order to achieve a more radical formulation of this same process. In conclusion, this approach should show that the arousal of consciousness, this shining eye allowing things hidden in the shadow to appear, is in some way conditional upon an expressive gesture which prolongs vision and leads back to it. (shrink)

Today, the “we” has not lost its place in contemporary debates. On the contrary, it has become a crucial question in the political and philosophical debates relating to global-scale disasters and traumatic events, which expose all of humanity to the same risks and same threats. In a dramatic and paradigmatic way, these events invite us to “mourn” the fantasy of self-sufficiency of the I and remind us to which extent our lives are immediately linked to those of others. At the (...) same time, however, these events, which yields the potential to reveal a relationality constitutive of “who we are,” also suggest the need to reframe our understanding of the “we,” and to overcome the us/them divide upon which it has been construed until now. In this essay, I take up this challenge by first engaging in a critical discussion of Judith Butler’s ethics of vulnerability, and then turning to the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. (shrink)