Thucydides and Aristophanes, austere historian and ribald comic playwright, lived in an Athens that had, since Themistocles, been moving from a regime of ancestral piety towards a secular empire. Thucydides suggests an agreement between his understanding and that of the pious Nicias — over and against this move. Aristophanes too is a vigorous proponent of peace, and the conclusions of many of his plays appear to suggest or encourage a conservative disposition towards ancestral piety or the rule of ancestral, (...) divine law.While these first impressions are not entirely misleading, a careful examination of the two thinkers’works, with attention to Nicias and the question of the gods, suggests a more complicated and revealing picture. Neither thinker is in agreement with Nicias, who proves to be representative of a fundamental human delusion. Each, however, sees that delusion as inescapable for political life, and so makes his appeal to more serious readers inconspicuously. (shrink)

Thucydides and Aristophanes, austere historian and ribald comic playwright, lived in an Athens that had, since Themistocles, been moving from a regime of ancestral piety towards a secular empire. Thucydides suggests an agreement between his understanding and that of the pious Nicias — over and against this move. Aristophanes too is a vigorous proponent of peace, and the conclusions of many of his plays appear to suggest or encourage a conservative disposition towards ancestral piety or the rule of ancestral, (...) divine law.While these first impressions are not entirely misleading, a careful examination of the two thinkers’works, with attention to Nicias and the question of the gods, suggests a more complicated and revealing picture. Neither thinker is in agreement with Nicias, who proves to be representative of a fundamental human delusion. Each, however, sees that delusion as inescapable for political life, and so makes his appeal to more serious readers inconspicuously. (shrink)

The scholiast is clearly busy glossing a rare word. Here, as elsewhere in the scholia, Homer is cited for just that purpose. There is also an effective tendency to build judgements on a writer's style around the label ‘Oμηρικς. Curiously, in our case the scholiast seems to have hit upon the right reading of the passage. The detail about decaying timbers in the context of Nicias' letter could not help striking educated Greek readers, who, like Thucydides himself, had Homer (...) at their fingertips, as an echo of Agamemnon's words in Il. 2.135.1 argue that Thucydides intends the reminiscence to be perceived, and moreover, uses it to trigger off our understanding that the figure of Nicias should be read against that of the Homeric Agamemnon. (shrink)

The informal character of political parties at Athens and the consequent absence of clearly defined party programmes often obscures the principles and aims of Athenian politicians. This obscurity is naturally greatest in the case of ‘moderates’, whose activities consisted largely of opposition to extremist elements of the Left or Right. Hence modern attempts to reconstruct their policies and assess their merits are liable to reach widely differing conclusions. A figure about whom there have been fluctuations of opinion, as well as (...) some misconceptions, is Nicias. A passage in Aristotle used to be accepted as evidence that he was an oligarch, and he was believed by many to have been a pacifist and a friend of Sparta. In an article which has had a deep influence upon subsequent accounts Allen B. West showed that he could be considered neither an oligarch nor a philo-Laconian pacifist. On one point, however, West echoes a commonly accepted view, though he expresses it in very moderate terms: he believes that Thucydides treats Nicias too sympathetically and is inclined to be blind to his faults. This view has been reaffirmed with much greater emphasis by other scholars who have strenuously challenged the impartiality of Thucydides in this respect. Such charges appear to me to have little foundation, and I shall attempt to substantiate my opinion by examining Thucydides’ account of Nicias. First, however, it is pertinent to ask whether the historian can have had any cogent reason for partisanship, and also to seek the source from which the commonly accepted view may have originated. (shrink)

Dissatisfaction with Thucydides' account of the years of confusion and inconclusive action that followed the Peace of Nicias has perhaps been too strong a stimulus to modern scholars. In their eagerness to repair the historian's omissions and illuminate his obscurities they have sometimes offered answers to questions of policy and motive that seem needlessly elaborate, complex, and farfetched, often basing their views of the foreign policy of cities on assumptions about internal political dissensions as unnecessary as they are implausible.

This paper argues against two commonly held views on the nature of courage and its relationship with virtue in Plato’s Laches. These views are the following: First, Laches’ and Nicias’ accounts of courage should be read as complementary, in the sense that each presents one of the two components of courage. Second, Socrates rejects the unity of virtue he defends in the Protagoras, endorsing instead the view that courage is only a part of virtue. In this paper, I aim (...) to show that the reader of the Laches is invited to endorse Nicias’ unitary understanding of courage as knowledge of good and evil and, as a consequence of this, to grant the unity of virtue. (shrink)

The speeches of Nicias and Alcibiades in the debate leading up to the launching of the Sicilian expedition contain a significant number of words, phrases, and themes that recur in Thucydides' later chapters reporting the launching of the expedition and its ultimate fate in Sicily. The verbal and thematic echoes often consist of words of sight and hearing; among the recurring themes are rivalry and competition, the contrast between public and private expenditures, and the desire for acquisition and financial (...) profit. (shrink)

This statement, in Nicias' letter from Sicily, has puzzled readers and editors, and it has baffled translators, who expect phrases with π προάσει to indicate a pretext or ostensible reason for an action. In my first discussion of prophasis I suggested that ‘what Nicias means is that they are leaving without offering any other reason or pretext’, and Dover, in the Historical Commentary, goes halfway towards accepting this interpretation ; but it does not satisfy me now, and it (...) is firmly rejected by Hunter Rawlings. A different approach to the question is needed. Nicias is not concerned with any excuses or pretexts that these deserters are offering. He is explaining the ‘true prophasis’ of this epidemic of desertion, and does so in terms of opportunity — they can find employment in the enemy's forces and there are numerous opportunities elsewhere. Translators may not want to render π' ατομολίας προάσει as ‘taking the opportunity to desert to the enemy’, arguing that ‘prophasis cannot mean opportunity’. But a prophasis is an explanation, true or false, that can be given for an action, and the best explanation can often be found in the circumstances — the opportunity that tempts or encourages. These deserters have a prophasis. This is not the only passage in Thucydides where ‘opportunity’ seems to be the word that translators need. A good example is in 4.126.5, where Brasidas is explaining how barbarian armies fight: ατοκράτωρ δ μάχη μάλιστ' ν κα πρόασιν το σᾡζεσθαί τινι πρεπόντως πορίσειε. (shrink)

This statement, in Nicias' letter from Sicily, has puzzled readers and editors, and it has baffled translators, who expect phrases with π προάσει to indicate a pretext or ostensible reason for an action. In my first discussion of prophasis I suggested that ‘what Nicias means is that they are leaving without offering any other reason or pretext’ , and Dover, in the Historical Commentary, goes halfway towards accepting this interpretation ; but it does not satisfy me now, and (...) it is firmly rejected by Hunter Rawlings. A different approach to the question is needed. Nicias is not concerned with any excuses or pretexts that these deserters are offering. He is explaining the ‘true prophasis’ of this epidemic of desertion, and does so in terms of opportunity — they can find employment in the enemy's forces and there are numerous opportunities elsewhere . Translators may not want to render π' ατομολίας προάσει as ‘taking the opportunity to desert to the enemy’, arguing that ‘prophasis cannot mean opportunity’. But a prophasis is an explanation, true or false, that can be given for an action, and the best explanation can often be found in the circumstances — the opportunity that tempts or encourages. These deserters have a prophasis. This is not the only passage in Thucydides where ‘opportunity’ seems to be the word that translators need. A good example is in 4.126.5, where Brasidas is explaining how barbarian armies fight: ατοκράτωρ δ μάχη μάλιστ' ν κα πρόασιν το σᾡζεσθαί τινι πρεπόντως πορίσειε. (shrink)

Plato's "laches" is an investigation into the nature of courage with the intention of demonstrating the difficulty of singling out one virtue, namely courage, and defining it separately from the other cardinal virtues such as bravery, wisdom, justice, temperance, and piety. As the dialogue proceeds it becomes evident that socrates not only relates courage with the battlefield, but also with other spheres of life. Of special interest is his reference of being courageous regarding desires and pleasures where an overlap of (...) virtues is anticipated. This extension of the range of manifestations of courage indicates that his conception of courage transcends the traditional one in which he hints at a new sort of unity of courage and temperance, and on the other of courage and justice. One of plato's main aims in writing this dialogue was to mark out the intellectual limits of the two generals' positions, especially that of nicias, whose philosophical position could appear to be deceptively similar to the socratic one which he did not fully understand. (shrink)

This book provides an introduction to Plato’s work that gives a clear statement of what Plato has to say about the problems of thought and life. In particular, it tells the reader just what Plato says, and makes no attempt to force a system on the Platonic text or to trim Plato’s works to suit contemporary philosophical tastes. The author also gives an account that has historical fidelity - we cannot really understand the Republic or the Gorgias if we forget (...) that the Athens of the conversations is meant to be the Athens of Nicias or Cleon, not the very different Athens of Plato’s own manhood. To understand Plato’s thought we must see it in the right historical perspective. (shrink)

This book provides an introduction to Plato’s work that gives a clear statement of what Plato has to say about the problems of thought and life. In particular, it tells the reader just what Plato says, and makes no attempt to force a system on the Platonic text or to trim Plato’s works to suit contemporary philosophical tastes. The author also gives an account that has historical fidelity - we cannot really understand the Republic or the Gorgias if we forget (...) that the Athens of the conversations is meant to be the Athens of Nicias or Cleon, not the very different Athens of Plato’s own manhood. To understand Plato’s thought we must see it in the right historical perspective. (shrink)

La puesta en escena del Laques es sencilla: el diálogo tiene lugar en la palestra, donde se han reunido Melesias y Lisímaco, ciudadanos atenienses y padres de dos jóvenes adolescentes, con los generales Laques y Nicias, a fin de debatir sobre la conveniencia del entrenamiento con armas del que un tal Estesíleo ofrece una exhibición. A ellos se les une Sócrates. A partir de allí el diálogo deriva hacia el tratamiento de otras importantes cuestiones, como son el objeto de (...) la educación, las características que debe reunir el buen educador, la naturaleza unitaria de la virtud o la naturaleza de la valentía. Y también, la importancia de la indagación y debate en común. En este sentido, el Laques constituye una potente herramienta propedéutica de la que Platón se sirve, no tanto en vista a transmitir doctrinalmente su propio pensamiento, cuanto a caracterizar cómo entiende la filosofía y a despertar en el lector la reflexión sobre cuestiones filosóficamente pertinentes y la revisión crítica de sus propias opiniones. (shrink)

Lys. You have seen the exhibition of the man fighting in armour, Nicias and Laches, but we did not tell you at the time the reason why my friend Melesias and I asked you to go with us and see him. I think that we may as well confess what this was, for we certainly ought not to have any reserve with you. The reason was, that we were intending to ask your advice. Some laugh at the very notion (...) of advising others, and when they are asked will not say what they think. They guess at the wishes of the person who asks them, and answer according to his, and not according to their own, opinion. But as we know that you are good judges, and will say exactly what you think, we have taken you into our counsels. The matter about which I am making all this preface is as follows: Melesias and I have two sons; that is his son, and he is named Thucydides, after his grandfather; and this is mine, who is also called after his grandfather, Aristides. Now, we are resolved to take the greatest care of the youths, and not to let them run about as they like, which is too often the way with the young. (shrink)

Publication by Eugene Vanderpool of the ostrakon with the name vindicates an inference made by Gustav Gilbert, Beiträge zur innern Geschichte Athens, 144 f. There he claimed that Nicostratus son of Dieitrephes and Nicostratus , who is mentioned by Aristophanes, Wasps 81 f, were identical. Gilbert supposed that the qualities implied of Nicostratus in that passage were of the type to endear him to Nicias.

Clizia, the titular protagonist of Machiavelli's play, was trapped between her master's sexual advances and her mistress's attempt to avoid scandal. For their part, and with no arbiter in sight, husband and wife remained at strategic loggerheads as to whom the young girl should marry. After lengthy bickering, a solution finally emerged:Sofronia: Who should we turn to?Nicomaco: Who else but to our own confessor fra Timoteo, who is a little saint and has already performed several miracles.Sofronia: Such as?Nicomaco: What do (...) you mean, “Such as?” Don't you know that through his prayers donna Lucrezia, messer Nicia Calfucci's sterile wife, became pregnant?Sofronia: What a miracle, a friar gets a woman pregnant! It would have been a real miracle if a nun got her pregnant! (shrink)

The problem of the relationship between warmaking and the health of the city constitutes an important part of the Platonic corpus. In the Platonic dialogue Alcibiades I, considered in antiquity one of Plato's most important works, Socrates leads Alcibiades to agree that there ought to be a close link between justice and decisions about war. In light of this, Alcibiades’ actual advice to the city regarding the Peace of Nicias, as portrayed by Thucydides in History of the Peloponnesian War, (...) is put in stark relief within the dialogue. Plato's dialogue about Alcibiades can thus be seen as offering an alternative and morally critical account of how Alcibiades could have used his talents and rhetorical skills in addressing the city on the issue of war. More broadly, it reminds us of the difference between true statesmanship focused on the common good, and political or military rule engaged in for personal benefit or ambition. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Careful analysis of the details of the text allows us to refine Socrates objections to his definition of manliness as prudent perseverance. He does not appreciate that Socrates objections merely require that he make his definition more precise. Nicias refuses to consider objections to his understanding of manliness as avoiding actions that entail risk. The two sets of objections show that manliness entails first calculating that a risk is worth taking and then subsequently not rejecting that calculation without (...) due consideration. (shrink)

This book provides an introduction to Plato’s work that gives a clear statement of what Plato has to say about the problems of thought and life. In particular, it tells the reader just what Plato says, and makes no attempt to force a system on the Platonic text or to trim Plato’s works to suit contemporary philosophical tastes. The author also gives an account that has historical fidelity - we cannot really understand the Republic or the Gorgias if we forget (...) that the Athens of the conversations is meant to be the Athens of Nicias or Cleon, not the very different Athens of Plato’s own manhood. To understand Plato’s thought we must see it in the right historical perspective. (shrink)

Thucydides describes Antipho as ‘inferior to no one of his time in and more capable than any of initiating ideas and giving expression to them’. What does he mean here by? Does it refer to ability? or does it refer to courage and consistency of principle? and in either case how are we to relate this description of Antipho to Thucydides description of Nicias as less worthy than any other Greek of the historian's day to meet with the misfortunes (...) that he did? (shrink)

Cette étude analyse les rapports des éthiques aristotéliciennes et du Lachès eu égard à la notion de courage, plus particulièrement les thèmes qui se recoupent dans les trois ouvrages. La première partie montre comment la restriction que propose le Stagirite du contexte du courage au sens fondamental du terme s’inspire, malgré les apparences, de ce que proposent Lachès et Socrate dans le cadre de la première définition du courage donnée dans le dialogue. La deuxième partie examine le rôle et le (...) statut de l’expertise; elle explique comment Aristote, faisant de cette attitude un faux courage, s’appuie sur trois considérations présentées dans le Lachès . La troisième partie concerne l’exclusion des bêtes du domaine du courage, et explore la relation entre les distinctions linguistiques offertes par Nicias et celles qu’établit Aristote dans les éthiques. La dernière section commente les différences entre vertu, vice et non-vertu dans les éthiques. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato's Practice of Philosophical Inquiry (SPEP Studies in Historical Philosophy)Rosamond Kent SpragueFrancisco J. Gonzalez. Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato's Practice of Philosophical Inquiry (SPEP Studies in Historical Philosophy). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998. Pp. 418. Paper, $29.95.What this rich and independent-minded book asks us to do is to give serious consideration to the question, "What, in Plato's view, are we doing when we philosophize?" (1) (...) If we employ our own conceptions of philosophy as the models for formulating and discussing specific Platonic questions, we may be imposing upon him ways of thinking that are foreign to his thought. To do this is particularly distorting in the case of dialectic.Gonzalez has chosen to confine himself to the early and middle dialogues, so that his book is a direct challenge to the work of Richard Robinson. Of the important views that have more recently arisen, Gonzalez allies himself most nearly with the non-doctrinal approach, but not to the extent of embracing scepticism. There is much philosophical knowledge in the dialogues, but such knowledge is primarily non-propositional. As for the esotericist and the developmentalist, both are misguided in proceeding on the assumption that Plato is attempting to formulate definitions and to arrive at a systematic philosophy; they regard the dialogues as treatises, which they are not. As Gonzalez quite justly inquires, "can there be any form of writing less suited to presenting a systematic philosophy than Plato's dramatic dialogues?" (4)In contrast to Robinson, who relies on the analysis of passages taken out of context, Gonzalez focusses mainly on whole dialogues, taking them to be dramatic portrayals of dialectic at work. He begins with detailed studies of the Laches and Charmides. In both cases, Socrates starts with ordinary knowledge (in the persons of the title characters), but "clearly intends to transcend it" (20). Neither will he accept "the 'sophistic' understanding that attempts to substitute definitions for this experience" (21) on the part of Nicias and Critias. The knowledge sought by Socrates by means of the dialectical method is shown to thave three characteristics: it is "knowledge how," it is "self-knowledge," and it is "non-propositional" (61).The next chapters consider three presuppositions of Plato's dialectic: words (in the Cratylus), arguments (in the Euthydemus), and images (in Republic X). All three are necessary to the dialectical enterprise, but, like ordinary knowledge in the aporetic dialogues, are transcended.Gonzalez' confrontation with Robinson naturally requires that he address the topic [End Page 113] of the method of hypothesis in the Meno, Phaedo, and Republic. This is a method that does yield propositional results, but it remains at the level of poion ti and fails to provide similar knowledge of the ti. Gonzalez' interpretation of the divided line is of particular interest here: as he sees it, dialectic is not intended as simply an extension continuous with the method of hypothesis. To take it this way is, with Robinson, to collapse dialectic into mathematics, making the former as deductive as the latter. The good (which "is not for Plato an exclusively moral term" 216) is "already there before the inquiry as the ground of its possibility" (236); this is what "unhypothesized" means. The movement of thought is circular, but not with a vicious circularity; "reflexivity" is the term preferred.To my mind the most rewarding and most convincing section of the book is the concluding chapter on the philosophical digression in the Seventh Letter. (The issue of authenticity is not significant, since, if the Letter is a forgery, "this forger had a better understanding of Plato than many other scholars, both ancient and contemporary" (246). Although "the subject of this wisdom simply cannot be expressed in words" (252) (and here Gonzalez emphasizes that Plato means spoken as much as written words), there is no contradiction in being able to talk or write about it. If "our only means of attaining true knowledge of a thing have the defect of being unable to express this nature" (263), Plato suggests an up and down movement which transcends this defect. The nature of this movement he describes as tribein, a process... (shrink)

Thucydides describes Antipho as ‘inferior to no one of his time in and more capable than any of initiating ideas and giving expression to them’. What does he mean here by? Does it refer to ability? or does it refer to courage and consistency of principle? and in either case how are we to relate this description of Antipho to Thucydides description of Nicias as less worthy than any other Greek of the historian's day to meet with the misfortunes (...) that he did? (shrink)

Le point sur l'Inopos. Rassemblement des connaissances sur le principal cours d'eau délien : géographie, aménagement, place dans la littérature, iconographie et possibles homonymes, culte. Digression sur la topographie du Quartier de l'Inopos. 57. Le bain délien d'Arlémis. De la confrontation de Valérius Flaccus, V 103-104 et A'Anlh. palai. VI 273, il ressort que l'Inopos passait pour servir au bain d'Artémis. 58. La crypte du Sarapieion A. Présentation détaillée du dispositif cultuel, qui permettait de puiser l'eau de l'Inopos, censé être (...) une dérivation du Nil, dans la crypte du temple du Sarapieion A. L'eau arrivait par infiltration naturelle et non par un branchement artificiel. 59. Sur le plan du Sarapieion A. L'espace C n'appartient pas au Sarapieion A et s'ouvrait librement sur l'Inopos. 60. Le casse-tête du Colosse des Naxiens et le fragment 18 de Sémos de Délos. Examen raisonné des solutions qui ont été apportées au problème topographique issu de la confrontation de Plutarque, Nicias III 7, et des ruines. Établissement critique du texte du fragment 18 de Sémos de Délos, d'où il ressort qu'il ne concerne en rien la topographie du Colosse des Naxiens ni du Palmier de Nicias. 61. Sur l'extension du Téménos de Léto. Considérations sur l'extension du Létoon archaïque ; il est possible qu'en ait fait partie le pseudo «Temple d'Anios» (GD 68), dont une particularité architecturale trouve son symétrique au Temple de Léto. 62. Sur l'identification du Gymnase. L'identification, maintenant assurée par J. Tréheux, de GD 76 et du «Gymnase» des inscriptions, rend difficilement compréhensible la fin de la stèle de Pausanias. La salle A doit être Vepistasion des inscriptions. 63. Bromias, aulète du chœur sacré. Ce nom, porté par une aulète en fonction de 250 à 231 au moins, doit s'ajouter à la liste des sobriquets connus rappelant le bruit de l'instrument. 64. Encore les queux. Compléments à Déliaca, n° 46. 65. Religion et politique. Les rapports du politique et du religieux ont donné souvent lieu à des positions excessives parce qu'insuffisamment raisonnées : si l'on entend par «dévotion» la part non prescrite du culte, il est sûr qu'elle a été amplement exploitée par les puissances politiques. Mais celles-ci ne paraissent pas être intervenues pour ajouter, supprimer ni même modifier la théologie, la liturgie ni l'histoire sainte locales ; tout au plus ont-elles profité de la situation existante pour se mettre en avant ou défendre des prétentions. (shrink)

The Laches features two Athenian generals (Laches and Nicias) and Socrates discussing the essential meaning of courage. Laches defines it as “a certain perseverance of the soul,” while Nicias argues that it consists in “knowledge of what is to be feared and hoped for both in war and in all other matters.” This paper, with the aid of several Plato scholars, argues that although most scholars agree that Socrates does not present his own view of the matter, hence (...) leaving the dialogue without a proper resolution, it may still be surmised that for Socrates, courage means willful yet wise perseverance. (shrink)

This book shows how Plato's "Statesman" and Thucydides' presentation of the moral collapse in Athenian political discourse reveal many points of agreement between Plato and Thucydides. Discussions of other dialogues including "Meno," "Laches," "Charmides," "Symposium," "Phaedo," "Sophist," and "Laws" confirm this agreement. Please see thucydides(dot)org for some editorial errata and corrections. The book was released in paperback in December 2021.

The main conversation in the Laches is about courage. But the main conversation does not begin till the middle of the dialogue. In the first half Plato sets the stage for the serious discussion that follows. Two elder men of Athens, Lysimachus and Melesias, are worried about the education of their sons. They themselves are the sons of two eminent Athenians, Thucydides and Aristides, and they feel that while their famous fathers conducted the affairs of the city with great energy (...) they did not show a similar concern for the education of their sons. They feel inferior to their fathers and do not want their own sons to feel the same way. They wish their sons to be like their own fathers, not like themselves--active citizens, not idle aristocrats. In this frame of mind, they are most anxious for expert and sound advice about their sons' education. Someone recommended to them for this purpose a new military exercise, fighting in armor. They invited two eminent generals of the day, Nicias and Laches, to see with them an exhibition of fighting in armor, and now they eagerly seek the generals' opinion about the worth of it. (shrink)

The only reference to the Athenian general Lamachus in the Platonic corpus is at Laches 197c6 where Nicias compares Laches to him. In response to Laches' criticism that Nicias is embellishing himself with his words , and trying to deny that those agreed to be courageous are indeed courageous, Nicias says: Οὔκουν σέ γε, ὦ Λάχης, ἀλλὰ θάρρει‧ φημὶ γάρ σε εἶναι σοφόν, καὶ Λάμαχόν γε, εἴπερ ἐστὲ ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ ἄλλους γε συχνοὺς Ἀθηναίων.

The political situation in Hellas in the early part of 419 B.C. was extremely promising for the Athenians. Alcibiades had succeeded in 420 in concluding an alliance with Argos, Mantinea and Elis, and although the Fifty years Truce of Nicias had not yet been formally denounced and the alliance with the Argives and their allies was purely defensive, yet the star of Lacedaemon was to all appearances on the wane. Alcibiades had brought off successfully his first great coup and (...) had begun his ascent towards the principal place in the leadership of Athens. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:366 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY In harmony with Glaucon or Kant, but unlike Thrasymachus, Ballard is unconvinced by Socrates' virtual identification of virtue with art (T~xpv)or expert knowledge (cf. 24f., 50-79). For the "tragic" intellectualism embraced by both Socrates and Thrasymachus precludes the "existential loyalty" prized by Ballard's Plato and Plato's Glaucon. Against "existential loyalty," Socrates' philosopher-kings, if left to themselves, would commit crimes of omission perhaps more heinous than (...) the crimes of commission perpetrated by Thrasymachus' paragon of wisdom, the perfect tyrant. Although aware that only their leadership can prevent the greatest evils in states, philosophers nevertheless refuse to rule, even in the ideal state, unless compelled (cf. Republic, 519B7-520A4). Thus neither Thrasymachus' tyrant nor Socrates' philosopher would willingly sacrifice their own pleasure and happiness for the common good. Their "epicurean" taste contrasts sharply with Ballard's more Kantian or Biblical call for "existential loyalty." No compulsion would be necessary to obtain the return of Ballard's philosophers to the political responsibilities of the "cave." For his subordination of reason to myth precludes escape from the "cave" either in the satanic direction of Thrasymachus or the divine direction of Socrates (cf. 120). However one may evaluate Ballard's solution to the central problem of Platonism, his book surely encourages the dialectic which, in spite of his intentions, may lead to the knowledge cherished by the Republic's Thrasymachus and Socrates. Against their "tragic" intellectualism, neither Ballard nor anyone else can prove more than what the Republic's Socrates admitted: The fact of infallible knowledge is incontestable only for those experiencing it within themselves, while the claim to possess it necessarily seems mere pretense or, at worst, tragic hubris to men whose introspection reveals no rational instrument (~p~,~ov) capable of apprehending the absolute good (Republic, 527D5--528A1; cf. Protagoras, 352A8-353B3; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, l177B27-11791A3; Metaphysics, 982B28-98385). The following minor errors were noted: Page 6, note 1: read "Bury" for "Bary"; page 24 (line 7 from bottom): read "Prot. 358C for "Prot. 385C" ; page 28, line 4: read "Nicias" for "Nisias" ; page 66 (line 8 from bottom): read "Republic IX" for "Republic IV." HARRY NEUMANN Scripps College Plato on Immortality. By Robert Leet Patterson. (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965. Pp. 141. $5.00.) In this sympathetic account of Plato's arguments for the immortality of the soul (as presented in the Phaedo and the Phaedrus) Professor Patterson has attempted to argue that Plato believed that his arguments were complete 'demonstrations' of the immortality of the soul. The author is concerned to indicate the intention, the background, and the structure of the various arguments which Socrates presents in defense of the view that the soul is immortal. In the course of his discussions Patterson seems to involve himself in a number of large issues (e.g, the problem of psycho-physical dualism, the concept of substance, the critique of materialism and epiphenomenalism, and the meaning of Plato's doctrine of Forms) which are not dealt with comprehensively and which transcend the primary concern of his book. The digressions which lead Patterson into exceedingly difficult philosophical problems and, in some cases, into the realm of exotic analogies (e.g., he at one point compares Plato's dualism to the views of Jainism, Hinayana, Samkhya, Nyaya-Vaiseshik, and Mimamsa metaphysics I) detract from the value of the book and tend to divert him from his basic intention. His defences of Plato's arguments are, on the other hand, interesting, if debatable. The basic teaching of the Phaedo is, it is said, that the soul in essence does not belong to the realm of becoming, but is a sempiternal entity. The first argument which Socrates prepublic : Utopia or Dystopia? " (The Modern Schoolman, May, 1967). On the relation of sophistry to the problem of the xwp~qp~,see Diotim~ts Concept of Love," American Journal of Philology, 86 (1965), 47-50. BOOK REVIEWS 367 sents is said to have a "Heraclitean" structure (p. 22) presumably because it appeals to a conception of "opposites." On this basis, the argument could just as well be described as Pythagorean. At any rate, the argument assumes... (shrink)

The narrative of Thucydides on the period from the Peace of Nicias to the Athenian expedition to Sicily has been less intensively studied than any other part of the History. It is true that the Melian Dialogue, which contrasts so sharply with the rest of the fifth book, has accumulated a large bibliography. The problems arising from the campaign culminating in the battle of Mantinea have also received a considerable amount of attention. On the other hand, the accounts of (...) negotiations and intrigues, mostly in the Peloponnese, which occupy much of the fifth book, have tended to be ignored, being thought to be obscure, confusing, and tedious. Scholars interested in the history of the period have experienced difficulty in tracing a coherent pattern in its catalogue of diplomatic manœuvres and in establishing the motives which prompted them. Scholars interested in the historical technique of Thucydides have been disappointed, even repelled, because his facility for mastering his material seems to have to a large extent deserted him. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Cross-Examining Socrates. A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato’s Early DialoguesMark L. McPherranJohn Beversluis. Cross-Examining Socrates. A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato’s Early Dialogues. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xii + 416. Cloth, $69.95.This book is a valuable and thoroughly-researched contribution to the study of Plato's Socratic dialogues. Its fine qualities stem in part from its cathartic motivations: for years Beversluis suppressed his ever-growing reservations concerning (...) the "standard picture" of Socrates's interaction with his various interlocutors (16). On Beversluis's account, this position naively takes Socrates's own apologia at face-value, portraying him as a self-sacrificing soul-therapist who treats his corrupt, one-dimensional interlocutors fairly, despite their many carefully drawn faults (e.g., stupidity, vanity, and violence, followed by face-saving exits). Beversluis aims to rectify this picture by retrying Socrates in a class-action suit on behalf of Socrates's interlocutors—who, he thinks, the standard account has quite unfairly maligned (while it has simultaneously ignored Socrates's "dark side"; e.g., his unscrupulous, hypocritical, and harmful tactics [esp. his conscious use of fallacy]).Beversluis's book contains a Preface, Introduction, and seventeen chapters, finishing with a very good bibliography, general index, and indexes of passages cited, names, and modern authors. Chapter 1, "The Socratic Interlocutor," examines the structure of Plato's Socratic dialogues and the role of their interlocutors. Beversluis contrasts Plato's dialogues with those produced by Augustine, Anselm, Hume, and Berkeley, arguing that a key difference between them lies in the fact that Socrates is presented as having no system to expound, championing instead the intrinsic value of philosophizing. Also, Socrates's interlocutors are drawn from a "narrow sociological group," (29) and are unprepared for their (unpleasant) encounters with Socrates (31).Chapter 2, "Elenchus and sincere assent," cogently argues that the "say what you believe" constraint on Socrates's use of the elenchus represents a consensus in need of critical reappraisal. In particular, Beversluis contends that Socrates often relies on qualified or uncomprehending assent, and that our texts do not support the idea that Socrates never argues with the soul-ignoring intention to win an argument using faulty argumentation and willful misrepresentation of the interlocutor's statements.The next fourteen chapters closely assess Socrates's encounters with Crito, Ion, Hippias, Laches and Nicias, Charmides and Critias, Euthyphro, Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Hippocrates, Protagoras, Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles. The book ends with a chapter on "The last days of the Socratic interlocutor," outlining the view that Plato's later work features non-elenctic spokesmen who are sensitive to the moral dangers of careless (i.e., Socrates's) elenchus-wielding.In his central chapters, Beversluis argues that "Saint Socrates" is in fact a philosophical [End Page 583] Jekyl and Hyde. Although scholars have celebrated the former philanthropic figure as a model philosopher, that has obscured his Hyde-like, predatory behavior towards innocents such as Euthyphro and Crito. However, here readers are themselves given a mixed bag: while Beversluis offers, for example, a detailed and smart defense of Cephalus against those who portray him as a petty-minded, superstitious, moral fraud (Chapter 9)—as well as sensitive, careful analyses of Socrates's less-than-clear arguments throughout—other chapters occasionally go overboard in their apologetic efforts. One example will have to suffice here.According to Beversluis, Euthyphro's typical characterization as a pretentious, dense, father-bashing, religious zealot who "would have done well in the Nazi Youth Movement," (R. F. Holland; 163), has drawn attention away from the fact that Socrates's treatment of Euthyphro is abusive and ineffectual. But although Beversluis rightly sees that the figure of Euthyphro is being used in a complex fashion by Plato, his account is marred in several ways. For example, although it is likely that Socrates does not himself possess complete definitions of virtue-concepts such as justice (164-169), unlike Euthyphro, Socrates can presumably provide elenchus-proof defenses of his own non-traditionalist claims. Again, while Socrates may overwhelm Euthyphro with his principles of proper definition (Eu. 5c-d, 6d-e), proceeding on uncomprehending, merely verbal agreement (169-177), Plato surely did not intend... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:366 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY In harmony with Glaucon or Kant, but unlike Thrasymachus, Ballard is unconvinced by Socrates' virtual identification of virtue with art (T~xpv)or expert knowledge (cf. 24f., 50-79). For the "tragic" intellectualism embraced by both Socrates and Thrasymachus precludes the "existential loyalty" prized by Ballard's Plato and Plato's Glaucon. Against "existential loyalty," Socrates' philosopher-kings, if left to themselves, would commit crimes of omission perhaps more heinous than (...) the crimes of commission perpetrated by Thrasymachus' paragon of wisdom, the perfect tyrant. Although aware that only their leadership can prevent the greatest evils in states, philosophers nevertheless refuse to rule, even in the ideal state, unless compelled (cf. Republic, 519B7-520A4). Thus neither Thrasymachus' tyrant nor Socrates' philosopher would willingly sacrifice their own pleasure and happiness for the common good. Their "epicurean" taste contrasts sharply with Ballard's more Kantian or Biblical call for "existential loyalty." No compulsion would be necessary to obtain the return of Ballard's philosophers to the political responsibilities of the "cave." For his subordination of reason to myth precludes escape from the "cave" either in the satanic direction of Thrasymachus or the divine direction of Socrates (cf. 120). However one may evaluate Ballard's solution to the central problem of Platonism, his book surely encourages the dialectic which, in spite of his intentions, may lead to the knowledge cherished by the Republic's Thrasymachus and Socrates. Against their "tragic" intellectualism, neither Ballard nor anyone else can prove more than what the Republic's Socrates admitted: The fact of infallible knowledge is incontestable only for those experiencing it within themselves, while the claim to possess it necessarily seems mere pretense or, at worst, tragic hubris to men whose introspection reveals no rational instrument (~p~,~ov) capable of apprehending the absolute good (Republic, 527D5--528A1; cf. Protagoras, 352A8-353B3; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, l177B27-11791A3; Metaphysics, 982B28-98385). The following minor errors were noted: Page 6, note 1: read "Bury" for "Bary"; page 24 (line 7 from bottom): read "Prot. 358C for "Prot. 385C" ; page 28, line 4: read "Nicias" for "Nisias" ; page 66 (line 8 from bottom): read "Republic IX" for "Republic IV." HARRY NEUMANN Scripps College Plato on Immortality. By Robert Leet Patterson. (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965. Pp. 141. $5.00.) In this sympathetic account of Plato's arguments for the immortality of the soul (as presented in the Phaedo and the Phaedrus) Professor Patterson has attempted to argue that Plato believed that his arguments were complete 'demonstrations' of the immortality of the soul. The author is concerned to indicate the intention, the background, and the structure of the various arguments which Socrates presents in defense of the view that the soul is immortal. In the course of his discussions Patterson seems to involve himself in a number of large issues (e.g, the problem of psycho-physical dualism, the concept of substance, the critique of materialism and epiphenomenalism, and the meaning of Plato's doctrine of Forms) which are not dealt with comprehensively and which transcend the primary concern of his book. The digressions which lead Patterson into exceedingly difficult philosophical problems and, in some cases, into the realm of exotic analogies (e.g., he at one point compares Plato's dualism to the views of Jainism, Hinayana, Samkhya, Nyaya-Vaiseshik, and Mimamsa metaphysics I) detract from the value of the book and tend to divert him from his basic intention. His defences of Plato's arguments are, on the other hand, interesting, if debatable. The basic teaching of the Phaedo is, it is said, that the soul in essence does not belong to the realm of becoming, but is a sempiternal entity. The first argument which Socrates prepublic : Utopia or Dystopia? " (The Modern Schoolman, May, 1967). On the relation of sophistry to the problem of the xwp~qp~,see Diotim~ts Concept of Love," American Journal of Philology, 86 (1965), 47-50. BOOK REVIEWS 367 sents is said to have a "Heraclitean" structure (p. 22) presumably because it appeals to a conception of "opposites." On this basis, the argument could just as well be described as Pythagorean. At any rate, the argument assumes... (shrink)

This book is an admirable addition to the genre of books which concentrate on a single Platonic dialogue so as to exhibit the mutual dependence of the overt logos and the interlocutors' historically situated characters. The overt logos of the second half of the Laches is an aporetic discussion of courage, and Schmid shows how Plato portrays the different character flaws of the famous generals, Laches and Nicias, as hindrances to further investigation. Through a fine treatment of the relevant (...) sections of Thucydides' The Peloponnesian War, Schmid makes clear how these flaws also led to the failures of courage by Laches at the battle of Mantinea and by Nicias in the Sicilian campaign. He maintains that the secondary literature has failed to appreciate sufficiently not only that Laches' definition of courage is thoroughly traditional, deriving from Homer and Tyrtaeus, but also that Nicias's definition is not Socratic but rather sophistic and Promethian, connected with Periclean humanism. Laches defines courage as "the endurance of the soul" who fears disgrace, especially in reference to soldiers in a phalanx, but his definition omits the element of boldness, for instance, of a general who formulates an unexpected and even unpopular plan of attack or retreat. Nicias defines courage as "the knowledge of dreadful and emboldening things" which, for instance, enables a general to lead soldiers to victory. His definition not only denies the unavoidable contingency of life, and especially of war, but also overlooks the endurance of soul which is required to control one's fear of this contingency and to pursue one's plan. (shrink)