The text presents the activities of Dr. Kathleen Vaughan Wilkes, a philosopher from the University of Oxford in the Inter-University Centre Dubrovnik (IUC) from the beginning of the 1980s to the end of the millennium. Dr. Wilkes was co-directing the longest standing IUC course Philosophy of Science, but she also initiated other IUC academic programmes. As a member of the IUC governing bodies, she was highly engaged in securing scholarships for participants from Central and East Europe in IUC programmes, mostly (...) through Open Society Foundation. Dr. Wilkes played a crucial role in spreading information from the city of Dubrovnik during the attacks of the Yugoslav People's Army in 1991 and during Croatian’s struggle for independence, for which she was awarded honorary citizenship and posthumously one of the squares was named after her. (shrink)

The trolley problem, first described by Foot (1967) and Thomson (The Monist, 59, 204–217, 1976), is one of the most famous and influential thought experiments in deontological ethics. The general story is that a runaway trolley is threatening the lives of five people. Doing nothing will result in the death of those persons, but acting in order to save those persons would unavoidably result in the death of another, sixth person. It appears that, depending on the situation, we have different (...) moral judgments about the permissibility of action. We will review and systematize all the proposals in the literature of the past 35 years that have attempted to grasp our moral intuitions in a simple deontological principle. In particular, seventeen proposals will be classified: six algorithmic, seven psychological, and four other invalid accounts. This review and classification sheds light on some subtle differences and clarify a few issues. (shrink)

In the last decade, the study of moral heuristics has gained in importance. I argue that we can consider speciesism as a moral heuristic: an intuitive rule of thumb that substitutes a target attribute (that is difficult to detect, e.g. “having rationality”) for a heuristic attribute (that is easier to detect, e.g. “looking like a human being”). This speciesism heuristic misfires when applied to some atypical humans such as the mentally disabled, giving them rights although they lack rationality. But I (...) argue that it is not necessarily irrational or inconsistent to hold on to this heuristic rule, because we have to take time and knowledge constraints, uncertainty aversion and emotional costs into account. However, this “heuristic defense” of speciesism uses a target attribute (rationality) that has implications of disrespect towards some atypical humans. Therefore, based on notions of impartiality and compassion, I argue for a morally better target attribute: sentience (“having a sense of well-being”). “Being a vertebrate” is suitable as a corresponding heuristic attribute because it is easy to detect and has a strong correlation with the target attribute of sentience. (shrink)

In his article ‘In Defense of Eating Meat’, Timothy Hsiao argued that sentience is not sufficient for moral status, that the pain experienced by an animal is bad but not morally bad, that the nutritional interests of humans trump the interests of animals and that eating meat is permissible. In this article I explore the strengths and weaknesses of Hsiao’s argument, clarify some issues and argue that eating meat is likely in conflict with some of our strongest moral intuitions.

This article presents an argument for veganism, using a formal-axiomatic approach: a list of twenty axioms are explicitly stated. These axioms are all necessary conditions to derive the conclusion that veganism is a moral duty. The presented argument is a minimalist or core argument for veganism, because it is as parsimonious as possible, using the weakest conditions, the narrowest definitions, the most reliable empirical facts and the minimal assumptions necessary to reach the conclusion. If someone does not accept the conclusion, (...) logical consistency requires that s/he should be able to point at axiom on which s/he disagrees. The argument exposes hidden assumptions and provides a framework for an overview of the philosophical literature on animal rights and vegetarianism / veganism. (shrink)

The mere means principle says it is impermissible to treat someone as merely a means to someone else’s ends. I specify this principle with two conditions: a victim is used as merely a means if the victim does not want the treatment by the agent and the agent wants the presence of the victim’s body. This principle is a specification of the doctrine of double effect which is compatible with moral intuitions and with a restricted kind of libertarianism. An extension (...) of this mere means principle, where not only using but also considering someone as merely a means is immoral, can explain and unify other deontological principles: doing versus allowing, partiality in imperfect duties of beneficence, and the asymmetry of procreational duties. A loop trolley dilemma is often presented as a counterexample of the mere means principle, but I argue that this dilemma generates a moral illusion, comparable to perceptual illusions. (shrink)

Both physicists and philosophers claim that quantum mechanics reduces to classical mechanics as 0, that classical mechanics is a limiting case of quantum mechanics. If so, several formal and non-formal conditions must be satisfied. These conditions are satisfied in a reduction using the Wigner transformation to map quantum mechanics onto the classical phase plane. This reduction does not, however, assist in providing an adequate metaphysical interpretation of quantum theory.

Classical utilitarianism is very demanding and entails some counter-intuitive implications in moral dilemmas such as the trolley problem in deontological ethics and the repugnant conclusion in population ethics. This article presents how one specific modification of utilitarianism can avoid these counter-intuitive implications. In this modified utilitarian theory, called ‘discounted’ or ‘mild’ utilitarianism, people have a right to discount the utilities of others, under the condition that people whose utility is discounted cannot validly complain against such discounting. A complaint made by (...) a utility discounted person is not valid if either the existence of the discounting people in that option is in a specific sense necessary or the existence of the discounted person is in a sense not necessary. According to mild utilitarianism, we should choose the option that maximizes the total validly discounted or complaint-free discounted utility, i e. the sum of everyone’s utility minus the complaint-free discounts. As there are two conditions that make a complaint invalid, this right to discount can be translated into two versions: the right to bodily autonomy and the right to procreation autonomy. The former right relates to the mere means principle in deontological ethics, the latter right is useful in avoiding the repugnant conclusion problem in population ethics. The possibility of democratically imposing an upper bound on the permissible amount of discounting is discussed. (shrink)

In this article I want to construct in a simple and systematic way an ethical theory of animal equality. The goal is a consistent theory, containing a set of clear and coherent universalized ethical principles that best fits our strongest moral intuitions in all possible morally relevant situations that we can think of, without too many arbitrary elements. I demonstrate that impartiality with a level of risk aversion and empathy with a need for efficiency are two different approaches that both (...) result in the same consequentialist principle of prioritarianism. Next, I discuss that this principle can be trumped by an ethic of care principle of tolerated partiality, and a deontological principle of basic right. These three principles represent different kinds of equality that can be applied to animal ethics. Finally, the predation problem leads to the introduction of a triple-N-principle that is related to the value of biodiversity. (shrink)

Neuroethics is an emerging interdisciplinary field with unsettled boundaries. Many of the ethical issues within the purview of neuroethics could be described as resulting from the clash between the scientific perspective on concepts such as free will, personal identity, consciousness, etc., and the putatively commonsense conceptions of those terms. The assumption that undergirds the framing of the conflict between these two approaches is that advances in neuroscience, psychiatry, and psychology can be used to explain phenomena covered by commonsense concepts and (...) in some cases undermine them entirely. This book is focused on the examination of the particular relationship between developments in neuroscience and commonsense moral concepts. Common sense, I argue, has been misinterpreted as a static, either foundational or degenerative, basis of our morality, when it is an ever shifting repository of theories from many domains. Within this discussion, I focus on the application of neuroscience to human beings, i.e., the ethics of neuroscience. But I also cover issues within the purview of the neuroscience of ethics, and attempt to address the infiltration of neuroscientific knowledge into everyday parlance and the impact of that on our commonsense morality and psychology. (shrink)

Health care providers are expected both to relieve pain and to provide anticipatory guidance regarding how much a procedure is going to hurt. Fulfilling those expectations is complicated by the cognitive modulation of pain perception. Warning people to expect pain or setting expectations for pain relief not only influences their subjective experience, but it also alters how nociceptive stimuli are processed throughout the sensory and discriminative pathways in the brain. In light of this, I reconsider the characterization of placebo analgesia (...) as pharmacologically inert and the use of it as deceptive. I show that placebo analgesia exploits the same physical mechanisms as proven analgesics and argue that it should be utilized to relieve pain. Additionally, I describe factors to help identify situations in which clinicians have the obligation to disclose the potential for pain coupled with ways of mitigating the risk of high-intensity pain by setting positive expectations. (shrink)

Just as one line appears to be longer than another in an optical illusion, we can have a spontaneous moral judgment that one individual is more important than another. Sometimes such judgments can lead to moral illusions like speciesism and other kinds of discrimination. Moral illusions are persistent spontaneous judgments that violate our deepest moral values and distract us away from a rational, authentic ethic. They generate pseudo-ethics, similar to pseudoscience. The antidote against moral illusions is the ethical principle to (...) avoid unwanted arbitrariness. Speciesism involves unwanted arbitrariness, and psychological research as well as the problem of wild animal suffering demonstrate that moral illusions such as speciesism can be very persistent. (shrink)

Although there is substantial literature examining the flow of foreign investments into various regions of the world, there is still a lack of research about joint ventures and foreign investment activities in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). One objective of this paper is to remedy this neglect and extend previous empirical work by focusing on foreign investments in the MENA region. The second objective is to focus on non-traditional determinants that have tended to be overlooked or underestimated in (...) previous research. The increasing globalization has led to a reconfiguration of the ways in which multinationals pursue various types of foreign investments,and changed the motives for and the determinants of FDI. This has prompted some to suggest that non traditional determinants have become more important. In view of that, the paper will focus on factors such as governance, legal environment, and economic freedom and examine their impact on foreign investment activities in the MENA region. (shrink)

There are currently two legally established criteria for death: the irreversible cessation of circulation and respiration and the irreversible cessation of neurologic function. Recently, there have been technological developments that could undermine the irreversibility requirement. In this paper, I focus both on whether death should be identified as an irreversible state and on the proper scope of irreversibility in the biological definition of death. In this paper, I tackle the distinction between the commonsense definition of death and the biological definition (...) of death to show that even the commonsense concept of death is specified by biological facts. Resting on this argument, I argue that any definition of death is a posteriori. Thus, irreversibility is part of any definition of death because the actual phenomenon of death is irreversible. In addition, I show that the proper domain of irreversibility in a definition of death is circumscribed by physical possibilities and that irreversibility in the definition of death refers to current possibilities for the reversal of relevant biological processes. I conclude that, despite recent technological advancements, death is still irreversible. (shrink)

Timothy Hsiao attempts to defend industrial animal farming by arguing that it is not inherently cruel. We raise three main objections to his defense. First, his argument rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of cruelty. Second, his conclusion, though technically true, is so weak as to be of virtually no moral significance or interest. Third, his contention that animals lack moral standing, and thus that mistreating them is wrong only insofar as it makes one more disposed to mistreat other (...) humans, is untenable on both philosophical and biological grounds. (shrink)

In 1959 two French neurologists, Pierre Mollaret and Maurice Goullon, coined the term coma dépassé to designate a state beyond coma. In this state, patients are not only permanently unconscious; they lack the endogenous drive to breathe, as well as brainstem reflexes, indicating that most of their brain has ceased to function. Although legally recognized in many countries as a criterion for death, brain death has not been universally accepted by bioethicists, by the medical community, or by the public. I (...) this paper, I defend brain death as a biological concept. I challenge two assumptions in the brain death literature that have shaped the debate and have stood in the way of an argument for brain death as biological. First, I challenge the dualism established in the debate between the body and the brain. Second, I contest the emphasis on consciousness, which prevents the inclusion of psychological phenomena into a biological criterion of death. I propose that the term organism should apply both to the functioning of the body and the brain. I argue that the cessation of the organism as a whole should take into account three elements of integrated function. Those three elements are: 1) the loss of integrated bodily function; 2) the loss of psychophysical integration required for processing of external stimuli and those required for behavior; and, 3) the loss of integrated psychological function, such as memory, learning, attention, and so forth. The loss of those three elements of integrated function is death. (shrink)

To cause pain, it is not enough to deliver a dose of noxious stimulation. Pain requires the interaction of sensory processing, emotion, and cognition. In this paper, I focus on the role of cognition in the felt intensity of pain. I provide evidence for the cognitive modulation of pain. In particular, I show that attention and expectation can influence the experience of pain intensity. I also consider the mechanisms that underlie the cognitive effects on pain. I show that all the (...) proposed mechanisms of pain modulation affirm the view that cognition impacts the sensory and discriminative aspects of pain. I conclude that pain perception is a cognitively penetrated phenomenon. (shrink)

Recenze seznamuje s knihou Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction, jejímž autorem je Timothy John Bayne. Recenze je zaměřena na obsah jednotlivých kapitol a celkové zhodnocení knihy. Cílem je seznámit čtenáře s klíčovými tématy, jimž se Bayne v knize věnuje, a s jeho argumentací. Klíčová slova: filosofie mysli, Timothy John Bayne, Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction.

The Myners Review of the pension fund industry has started a debate on pension fund governance and the fund industry itself. This paper provides a review of pension fund trusteeship in the UK, its role, operating models and impact. It argues that deficiencies in the systems uncovered by the Myners Review stem from a tension between conflicting philosophies - that of trusteeship built on stakeholder principles but operating in shareholder markets.

Upon entering the examination room, Caitlyn encounters a woman sitting alone and in distress. Caitlyn introduces herself as the hospital ethicist and tells the woman, Mrs. Dennis, that her aim is to help her reach a decision about whether to perform an autopsy on her recently deceased husband. Mrs. Dennis begins the encounter by telling the ethicist that she has to decide quickly, but that she is very torn about what to do. Mrs. Dennis adds, “My sons disagree about the (...) autopsy.” As a standardized patient, a specialized actor, the woman playing Mrs. Dennis has already delivered the same opening lines several times to different learners practicing their clinical ethics consultation skills. An SP encounter is a simulated patient encounter used for educational purposes that requires the standardization of verbal and behavioral responses. In the encounter, the simulator, or “patient,” uses a scripted medical history to enable the learner to employ a certain skill, say, the ability to perform a neurological exam. The use of standardized patients in the evaluation of clinical skills has become a staple in medical education. To tackle the challenge of teaching clinical ethics consultation skills, we have incorporated SP encounters into the curriculum of the Bioethics Program of The Union Graduate College and the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai. SP encounters are incorporated into one of our onsite classes, the Onsite Clinical Ethics Practicum, and they are part of the capstone examination, which all of our graduates must complete successfully. The inclusion of simulated encounters into the curriculum is one way in which we equip our students with the core competencies specified by the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities Task Force for clinical ethicists. (shrink)

This paper presents results from a large-scale study of history teachers in Swedish secondary schools. The study examines perceptions of history, content being taught, teaching methods and use of digital technology. The study uses the Technological Pedagogical and Content Knowledge (TPACK) framework to analyse the results together with narrative theory. The main results indicate that knowledge of the past and contemporary perspectives from a canonical tradition are prioritised, together with a content-based lecture-style pedagogy. The use of digital technology does not (...) seem to challenge methods or bring new perspectives to history teaching. However, to fully understand history teaching with technology, a framework that emphasises all parts of history education is needed. This calls for further development of the TPACK model, which is further discussed in this article. (shrink)

The web is being loaded daily with a huge volume of data, mainly unstructured textual data, which increases the need for information extraction and NLP systems significantly. Named-entity recognition task is a key step towards efficiently understanding text data and saving time and effort. Being a widely used language globally, English is taking over most of the research conducted in this field, especially in the biomedical domain. Unlike other languages, Arabic suffers from lack of resources. This work presents a BERT-based (...) model to identify biomedical named entities in the Arabic text data that investigates the effectiveness of pretraining a monolingual BERT model with a small-scale biomedical dataset on enhancing the model understanding of Arabic biomedical text. The model performance was compared with two state-of-the-art models, and it outperformed both models with 85% F1-score. (shrink)

Is animal farming permissible when animals would have a positive welfare? The happy animal farming problem represent the paradigmatic problem in population ethics, because its simple structure introduces the most important complications of population ethics. Three new population ethical theories that avoid the counter-intuitive repugnant and sadistic conclusions are discussed and applied to the animal farming problem. Breeding farm animals would not be permissible according to these theories, except under some rather unrealistic conditions, such as those farm animals being so (...) happy that they themselves would prefer a continuation of animal farming. Given the fact that many people believe that most farm animals are not so happy and the fact that one can formulate reasonable population ethical theories that condemn happy animal farming, it can be concluded that it is better to avoid animal farming and the consumption of animal products in general. (shrink)

I propose a new fundamental principle in ethics: everyone who makes a choice has to avoid unwanted arbitrariness as much as possible. Unwanted arbitrariness is defi ned as making a choice without following a rule, whereby the consequences of that choice cannot be consistently wanted by at least one person. Other formulations of this anti-arbitrariness principle are given and compared with very similar contractualist principles formulated by Kant, Rawls, Scanlon and Parfit. The structure of arbitrariness allows us to fi nd (...) ways to avoid unwanted arbitrariness. The two most important implications of the anti-arbitrariness principle are discussed: non-dictatorship and non-discrimination. (shrink)

Pogost motiv v rimski paliati so medgeneracijski konflikti. Medtem ko očetje največkrat poudarjajo konvencionalno moralo in kažejo varčnost, že kar skoporitost, se sinovi v njihovi odsotnosti radi predajajo razvratu: zapravljajo denar, popivajo in se spuščajo v razmerja s heterami, ponavadi ob pomoči kakega nabritega domačega sužnja. Ker vlada v komediji saturnalijski narobe svet, na koncu »zmagajo« sinovi in sužnji, ki so tudi glavni junaki teh komedij. Tu in tam pa Plavt sinovom položi na jezik besede, ki odstopajo od njihovega siceršnjega (...) ravnanja in jih prikažejo v odgovornejši luči. Njegova najrazvpitejša »moralistična« komedija je Trinovčevo (Trinummus), vendar zasledimo moralno navdahnjene vložke in značajske lastnosti tudi v drugi komediji s podobnim izhodiščem, ki deluje veliko bolj razposajeno: v Hišnem strahu (Mostellaria). Ob primerjavi mladih protagonistov v Plavtovih komedijah Hišni strah in Trinovčevo ugotovimo, da je komedija Trinovčevo občutno bolj moralistična od Hišnega strahu, vendar po drugi strani tudi v slednjem ni mogoče videti gole burke kot, denimo, v Oslih (Asinaria) istega avtorja. Če si v Oslih oba protagonista, oče in sin, ki se pehata za isto meretrix, pravzaprav zaslužita zgolj posmeh občinstva, imajo glavni junak Hišnega strahu, njegov prijatelj in ljubica več značajskih lastnosti, ki so jih morale prikupiti tudi kritikom Katonovega kova. (shrink)

On the fundamentals of Hindu philosophy and doctrines.

Making decisions for incapacitated patients has been a perennial problem in bioethics. Surrogate decision-makers are sometimes expected to use substituted judgment to make such decisions. Applying...

The use of brain technology that contributes to psychological changes has spurred a debate about personal identity. Some argue that neurotechnology does not undermine personal continuity (Levy, 2011) while others argue that it does (Kreitmair, 2019; Schechtman, 2010). To make these assessments, commentators fail to identify psychological changes that cause personal discontinuity. In this paper, I present a view that identifies personal continuity with the maintenance of a self-concept. I argue that a concept of self requires the ability to self-ascribe (...) physical and psychological features and that the diachronic self emerges with self-ascriptions of features that require endurance over time. I maintain that an adequate concept of self does not depend on the maintenance of any particular combination of self-ascriptions and that it can be maintained despite even significant changes in psychological or physical traits. Finally, I apply the self-concept view to identify changes that can result in discontinuity of self. (shrink)

This article discusses the assumptions that are necessary to derive the conclusion that veganism - avoiding the use of animal products from conventional agriculture, hunting and fishing - is a moral duty. Using a formal-axiomatic framework, it is shown that twenty assumptions or axioms are sufficient to come to the conclusion. The argument is made as parsimonious as possible, using the weakest conditions, the most restrictive definitions and most reliable empirical facts. The argument assumes an antidiscrimination principle and a weak (...) basic right not to be used merely a means for someone else’s non-vital ends. It demonstrates that being a human is not morally relevant whereas sentience is a morally relevant criterion that meets the assumptions. If one does not agree with the conclusion that veganism is a moral duty, logical consistency requires that one must be able to indicate at least one axiom that one rejects. The argument makes hidden assumptions visible and provides a framework for a review of the philosophical literature about animal rights and vegetarianism/veganism. (shrink)

Since the mid‐1950s, the various research programs within cognitive science have advanced our basic understanding of human mental function. Over the past 20 years, this basic science of mind has also contributed to the genesis of an applied science of learning and teaching that can powerfully inform educational practice and dramatically improve educational outcomes. Classroom practice based on this applied science differs from traditional instruction in several ways. Instruction based on cognitive theory envisions learning as an active, strategic process. It (...) assumes that learning follows developmental trajectories within subject‐matter domains. It recognizes that learning is guided by the learners' introspective awareness and control of their mental processes. It emphasizes that learning is facilitated by social, collaborative settings that value self‐directed student dialogue. (shrink)

Two processes have shaped the political order of the modern age: bureaucratization and democratization. The political sociology of Max Weber is commonly associated only with the first of these. Its relationship to democracy, by contrast, seems ambiguous. Political scientists oriented towards natural law, such as Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin or Robert Eden, condemn the value-relativism of his political sociology, its agnosticism or even nihilism, and conclude that it is incapable of taking a positive stance vis-à-vis democracy. Others take offence at (...) the overemphasis on power in Weber’s theory (Aron, von Ferber), at the élitist or oligarchic understanding of politics which puts Weber close to pre-fascist élite theorists such as Mosca, Pareto or Michels (Mommsen), at the latent fascism implicit in his concept of charisma (Becker 1988) and so on. Max Weber appears as a forerunner of Carl Schmitt (Mommsen, Habermas), or as a precursor of the authoritarian and dictatorial Führerstaat (Löwith). Even those who value him for his pitiless unmasking of the illusory character of modern mass democracy and its transformation into Bonapartist Caesarism (Marcuse, Lukács) leave little doubt that they regard Weber as standing solidly on the side of the latter.1 Max Weber and democracy? Not all his interpreters, perhaps, but certainly a large number, would find ‘Max Weber contra democracy’ a more accurate title. (shrink)

This chapter will address the axiological objection to cognitive enhancement, which is that the use of cognitive enhancers reduces the value of cognitive achievement. In a recent defense of cognitive enhancement, Carter and Pritchard (2019) utilize the extended mind hypothesis to argue that cognitive enhancers do not compromise knowledge acquisition. In this chapter, it will be demonstrated that the reliance on the extended mind hypothesis leaves some cognitive enhancers vulnerable to the axiological objection. To expand the scope of the argument, (...) it will be shown that criteria for cognitive integration are applicable even to enhancers that cause changes to cognition internal to the human organism. This chapter will begin with a description of several cognitive enhancers and with the identification of the type of cognitive process they purportedly improve. It will then be demonstrated that even when those improvements are internal, they need not affect cognitive character and do not compromise cognitive agency. (shrink)

Selon Gilles-Gaston Granger, la différence entre la logique et les mathématiques est une différence de degré. De la logique des propositions aux mathématiques en passant par le calcul des prédicats et le reste des calculs logiques, la forme perd en pureté et le contenu gagne progressivement en épaisseur. Du degré zéro de l’opposition d’une forme à un contenu au niveau de la logique propositionnelle aux formes logico-mathématiques productrices de « contenus formels », le calcul s’enrichit en propriétés d’individuation au détriment (...) de ses propriétés méta-logiques. Granger ne prétend pas avoir fondé par là un véritable critère de logicité. Toujours est-il qu’il part d’un nombre de présupposés explicitement établis lui servant de point d’appui pour démarquer la logique des mathématiques. En revenant sur ces présupposés, nous voudrions montrer, comme l’a reconnu Pascal Engel précédemment, qu’ils ne sont pas exempts d’ambiguïtés, tant par leurs ramifications philosophiques que par les difficultés techniques qu’ils suscitent. Néanmoins, et à la différence d’Engel, nous n’irons pas jusqu’à dire que la conception grangérienne constitue, malgré ses ambiguïtés, un critère de logicité. (shrink)

Education (good teachers and good schools) is crucial for the successful integration of vulnerable groups in the society. Multicultural diversity presents an opportunity to make schools more inclusive, creative and open-minded. Although there are different projects and activities for Roma inclusion in schools, the number of Roma children attending formal education is still very low. Without having attended formal education, the chances for social exclusion are high and minimal for leading a self-defined life. To increase the rate of school registration (...) and the rate for completion, long-term policy interventions and financial support from international donations are needed. This paper aims to analyze the general situation of Roma children and youth the age of pre-school education, primary and secondary education, as well as the engagement of youth in volunteering activities as a significant role in the inclusion of Roma children in schools. Engagement in volunteering activities can help young people to be more integrated into society, as through volunteering they gain valuable experiences, new skills, and competencies that can improve their employability possibilities and enhance their attitudes towards citizenship. (shrink)