A theory of syllogistic reasoning is proposed, derived from the medieval doctrine of 'distribution of terms'. This doctrine may or may not furnish an adequate ground for the logic of the syllogism but does appear to illuminate the psychological processes involved. Syllogistic thinking is shown to have its origins in the approach and avoidance behaviour of pre-verbal organisms and, in verbal (human) organisms, to bridge the gap between the intuitive grasp shown by most of us of the validity of simple (...) logical arguments and the failure of intuition in more complex arguments that require resort to calculation. Some difficulties are considered affecting the use of syllogisms as experimental material. These include failure on the part of the investigator to take account of the fact that a syllogism is always part of a continuing argument in which the topic of the argument is known to all parties and the possibility that subjects may find ways of appearing to solve syllogisms without actually doing so. (shrink)

This second edition has been revised to provide additional coherence to the themes examined and introduces sections on topical issues, for example the chapter on Utilitarianism now includes a discussion on law and economics.

The essay replies to comments by Finnis, Gardner and Endicott, on my book, Law as a Moral Idea. It is questioned whether Finnis is right to suggest that governance by law is a requirement of justice. It is suggested that Hart's positivism may have rested upon an unduly private conception of morality. Gardner's suggestion that Law as a Moral Idea falsely manufactures disagreement with Hart is rejected, principally by pointing out that Gardner focuses upon only one issue, where the book (...) already acknowledges that Hart might conceivably agree, and ignores other issues where the disagreement with Hart seems indisputable. In response to Endicott, it is acknowledged that 'politics' could be understood as a moral idea comparable to the idea of 'law', but denied that this robs either thesis of interest. The nature of doctrinal reasoning and law's justificatory force is then discussed. (shrink)

The authors of this book engage in essay form in a lively debate over the fundamental characteristics of legal and moral rights. They examine whether rights fundamentally protect individuals' interests or whether they instead fundamentally enable individuals to make choices. In the course of this debate the authors address many questions through which they clarify, though not finally resolve, a number of controversial present-day political debates, including those over abortion, euthanasia, and animal rights.

This article discusses the 2005 OUP biography of Michael Polanyi by William T. Scott and Martin X. Moleski S.J., Michael Polanyi, Scientist and Philosopher . The discussants are N. E. Wetherick, Brian G Gowenlock, and John Puddefoot; Martin X. Moleski, S. J. briefly responds, providing a previously unpulished letter from Polanyi to Reverend Dr. Knox, a Presbyterian mininster.

This chapter contains section titled: The Impious Hypothesis Pufendorf Conclusion.