Fundamental to spatial knowledge in all species are the representations underlying object recognition, object search, and navigation through space. But what sets humans apart from other species is our ability to express spatial experience through language. This target article explores the language ofobjectsandplaces, asking what geometric properties are preserved in the representations underlying object nouns and spatial prepositions in English. Evidence from these two aspects of language suggests there are significant differences in the geometric richness with which objects and places (...) are encoded. When an object is named (i.e., with count nouns), detailed geometric properties – principally the object's shape (axes, solid and hollow volumes, surfaces, and parts) – are represented. In contrast, when an object plays the role of either “figure” (located object) or “ground” (reference object) in a locational expression, only very coarse geometric object properties are represented, primarily the main axes. In addition, the spatial functions encoded by spatial prepositions tend to be nonmetric and relatively coarse, for example, “containment,” “contact,” “relative distance,” and “relative direction.” These properties are representative of other languages as well. The striking differences in the way language encodes objects versus places lead us to suggest two explanations: First, there is a tendency for languages to level out geometric detail from both object and place representations. Second, a nonlinguistic disparity between the representations of “what” and “where” underlies how language represents objects and places. The language of objects and places converges with and enriches our understanding of corresponding spatial representations. (shrink)

Philosophers differ widely in the extent to which they condone the exploration of the realms of possibilia. Some are very enamoured of thought experiments in which human intuition is trained upon the products of human imagination. Others are much more sceptical of the fruits of such purely cognitive explorations. That said, it is clear that human beings cannot dispense with modal speculation altogether. Rationality rests upon the ability to make decisions and that in turn rests upon the ability to learn (...) about what is possible and what is probable. Thus, on pain of irrationality, we must have some means of exploring other possible worlds. Thankfully, intuition is not the only aid we have at our disposal. Science also is in the business of finding regularities, which hold counterfactually. Scientific theory tells us about the likelihood of particular outcomes flowing from particular processes given particular background conditions. Thus, it also tells us about the contents of 1 of 21 other possible worlds. One consequence of the possibility of such inferences has been a theoretical interest, not just in the contents, but also in the geography of the domain of all possibly worlds. Metaphysicians, epistemologists and philosophers of language are very familiar with locutions such as “nearby possible worlds”. Similarly, evolutionary theory tells us that there is little chance of us discovering an organism that is mammal-like in most respects except in having six limbs. It’s not that we know such an organism to be impossible, but rather that we think it would be the product of an evolutionary history very different to the actual history of life on earth. Put another way, such organisms would be denizens of distant possible worlds. Clearly then, both biology and philosophy have ample motivation to be interested in the reasoning and evidence that supports such claims. Seemingly, in both disciplines there is a certain lure to this modal cartography, but ought we in fact to be convinced of its merits? Is it science or philosophy or not a good example of either? What sort of problems can it solve? What sort of problems will it create? How might we test its accuracy? In his excellent book Theoretical Morphology: The Concept and Its Applications, George McGhee provides an admirable introduction to the complex theoretical landscape surrounding the exploration of possible biological form. (shrink)

Given the personal acquaintance between Alan M. Turing and W. Ross Ashby and the partial proximity of their research fields, a comparative view of Turing’s and Ashby’s work on modelling “the action of the brain” (letter from Turing to Ashby, 1946) will help to shed light on the seemingly strict symbolic/embodied dichotomy: While it is clear that Turing was committed to formal, computational and Ashby to material, analogue methods of modelling, there is no straightforward mapping of these approaches onto symbol-based (...) AI and embodiment-centered views respectively. Instead, it will be demonstrated that both approaches, starting from a formal core, were at least partly concerned with biological and embodied phenomena, albeit in revealingly distinct ways. (shrink)

This article tackles an old, classical problem, which is acquiring a new epochal relevance with the techno-aesthetic processing of form and substance, expression and content. The field of digital architecture is embarked in the ancient controversy between the line and the curve, binary communication and fuzzy logic. Since the 1990s, the speculative qualities of digital architecture have exposed spatial design to the qualities of growing or breeding, rather than planning. However, such qualities still deploy the tension between discrete spaces and (...) continual curving. In this context, the article suggests the computational coexistence of discrete coding with continual morphing, defying any easy resolution for an aesthetic of continuity or discontinuity, the superiority of the analog or the meta-logic of the digital. The metaphysical dimension of such coexistence needs to include the abstract capacities of experiencing the transition from one state to another as the registering of algorithmic processing. Computation is intrinsic to microperceptions, incomputable quantities deploying the infectious property of the digital code. The article draws on the digital architecture of Greg Lynn to explore whether the computational nature of the digital calculus has the potential to challenge the bifurcation between the biological and the mathematical, the physical and the mental. (shrink)

The general inorganic nature of traditional selection theory (based on differential growth between any two systems) is pointed out, wherefrom it follows that this theory cannot provide explanations for the characteristics of organic evolution. Specific biophysical aspects enter with the complexity of macro-molecules: vital physical conditions for the perpetuation of the system, irrevocable extinction (= death) and random change leading to novelty, are the result of complexity per se. Further biophysical properties are a direct function of the pathway along which (...) random mutation in nucleic acids is converted into continuous protein — (specifically enzyme) — function, from there into organismic phenotype with fitness components which may, or may not, correspond to identifiable structural units in DNA. The general machine-like properties of enzymes, in that there is no additive relationship between structural (amino acid) composition and functional output, is discussed in more detail. The continuous growth functions of molecular concentrations, directed by enzyme turnover, determine simple laws of growth and morphogenesis in the organic hierarchy and thus of phenotype. Thus, the combined effect of DNA-structure and of environmental parameters (temperature, pressure, pH, etc.) on protein function determines ultimately the actual phenotype and hence, quality and intensity of genotypic selection. (shrink)

Much research into morphogenesis focuses on discovering mechanisms and models able to generate or describe the forms we can observe in nature. These studies all provide insights, even though they do not directly touch upon what is the focus of this article: the understanding of form. To this end a conceptual scheme based on the following ideas is proposed: understanding , emerging , persisting , selection , and the relation concerning complexity versus uncertainty , in particular, the relation between form (...) and function. This article is thus a contribution to both the epistemology and the ontology of nature and, in particular, of the living world. (shrink)

Expression of most genes is regulated by the interaction of multiple transcription factors with cis‐regulatory sequences. Many studies have focused on how changes in promoters and enhancers alter gene expression and phenotype. Recently, Hare et al., using elegant wet and computational approaches uncovered a series of enhancers driving the expression of the even‐skipped gene in scavenger flies (Sepsidae).1 Despite the strong sequence divergence between the enhancers in sepsids and drosophilids, they lead to remarkably similar patterns of gene expression in transgenic (...) Drosophila embryos. This can be explained by the existence of intra‐enhancer compensatory mutations and the presence of overlapping/near binding sites for activators and repressors. BioEssays 30:1052–1057, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

How biological form is generated remains one of the most fascinating but elusive challenges for science. Moreover, it is widely documented in contemporary literature that development is tightly coordinated. The idea that such development is governed by a coordinating field of force, the morphogenetic field, and its position in embryology research paradigms, is traced in this article. Empirical evidences for field phenomena are described, ranging from bioelectromagnetic effects, morphology, transplantation, regeneration, and other data. Applications of medical potential including treatment of (...) cancer, birth defects, and wound healing are highlighted. The article hypothesizes that distinct morphological forms may have distinct field parameters. Experimentally tractable field parameters may thus provide an exciting research program for probing morphogenesis and phylogenetic diversity. (shrink)

Heyes’ book is an important contribution that rightly integrates cognitive development and cultural evolution. However, understanding the cultural evolution of cognitive gadgets requires a deeper appreciation of complexity, feedback, and self-organization than her book exhibits.

The scaling of body parts is central to the evolution of morphology and shape. Most traits scale proportionally with each other and body size such that larger adults are essentially magnified versions of smaller ones. This pattern is so ubiquitous that departures from it – disproportionate scaling between trait and body size – pique interest because it can generate dramatically exaggerated traits. These extreme morphologies are frequently hypothesized to result from sexual selection and their study has a long history, with (...) several hypotheses seeking to explain their evolution. Despite this effort, surprisingly little progress has been made in demonstrating the forms of selection that produce different scaling patterns or in identifying the mechanisms that underlie the expression and evolution of scaling relationships. Here we review recent insights regarding the proximate mechanisms that regulate and integrate trait growth and that offer a new framework for studying the evolution of morphological scaling. (shrink)

This paper reclaims the idea that human society is a form of life, an idea once vibrant in the work of Toennies, Durkheim, Simmel, Le Bon, Kroeber, Freud, Bion, and Follett but moribund today. Despite current disparagements, this idea remains the only and best answer to our primary experience of society as vital feeling. The main obstacle to conceiving society as a life is linguistic; the logical form of life is incommensurate with the logical form of language. However, it is (...) possible to extend our conceptual reach by appealing to alternative symbolisms more congenial to living form such as, and especially, art. (shrink)

In Making Sense of Life , Keller emphasizes several differences between biology and physics. Her analysis focuses on significant ways in which modelling practices in some areas of biology, especially developmental biology, differ from those of the physical sciences. She suggests that natural models and modelling by homology play a central role in the former but not the latter. In this paper, I focus instead on those practices that are importantly similar, from the point of view of epistemology and cognitive (...) science. I argue that concrete and abstract models are significant in both disciplines, that there are shared selection criteria for models in physics and biology, e.g. familiarity, and that modelling often occurs in a similar fashion. (shrink)

In Making Sense of Life, Keller emphasizes several differences between biology and physics. Her analysis focuses on significant ways in which modelling practices in some areas of biology, especially developmental biology, differ from those of the physical sciences. She suggests that natural models and modelling by homology play a central role in the former but not the latter. In this paper, I focus instead on those practices that are importantly similar, from the point of view of epistemology and cognitive science. (...) I argue that concrete and abstract models are significant in both disciplines, that there are shared selection criteria for models in physics and biology, e.g. familiarity, and that modelling often occurs in a similar fashion. (shrink)

A spiral running along the surface of a cone standing on top is proposed as a model for evolution, the progress of which is considered as composed of a linear progression following the direction of time and representing the linear increase in the number of taxa, while a circular component stands for the ever recurring functional types of organisms.

The cell theory—the thesis that all life is made up of one or more cells, the fundamental structural and physiological unit—is one of the most celebrated achievements of modern biological science. And yet from its very inception in the nineteenth century it has faced repeated criticism from some biologists. Why do some continue to criticize the cell theory, and how has it managed nevertheless to keep burying its undertakers? The answers to these questions reveal the complex nature of the cell (...) theory and the cell concept on which it is based. Like other scientific ‘laws’, the assertion that all living things are made of cells purchases its universality at the expense of abstraction. If, however, this law is regarded merely as a widely applicable empirical generalization with notable exceptions, it still remains too important to discard. Debate about whether the cell or the organism standpoint provides the more correct account of anatomical, physiological, and developmental facts illustrates the tension between our attempts to express the truth about reality in conceptual terms conducive to a unified human understanding. (shrink)

Morphospaces are theoretical tools to explore the morphological organization of living and fossil organisms. They have been used mostly by the paleontological community in an effort to get the most out of one of the only pieces of evidence that fossil material usually provide: the morphology of hard parts. The expectation with the establishment of theoretical morphospaces is that, by abstracting and modeling the fundamental parts of form, the multiple processes that generate the phenotypes of embryonic and adult structures will (...) be better understood. In this essay, we suggest that ontogenetic trajectories can be used as the generative functions that build morphospaces, and propose approaches to build theoretical models for the establishment of left–right asymmetries during vertebrate heart embryogenesis. BioEssays 26:405–412, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Morphological EvoDevo is a field of biological inquiry in which explicit relations between evolutionary patterns and growth or morphogenetic processes are made. Historically, morphological EvoDevo results from the coming together of several traditions, notably Naturphilosophie, embryology, the study of heterochrony, and developmental constraints. A special feature binding different approaches to morphological EvoDevo is the use of formalisms and mathematical models. Here we will introduce anatomical network analysis, a new approach centered on connectivity patterns formed by anatomical parts, with its own (...) concepts and tools specifically designed for the study of morphological EvoDevo questions. Riedl’s concept of burden is tightly related to the use of anatomical networks, providing a nexus between the evolutionary patterns and the structural constraints that shape them. (shrink)

Geckos have gained ecological access to novel microhabitats by exploiting intermolecular van der Waals forces, which allow them to climb smooth vertical surfaces. They use microscopic surface‐based phenomena to thrive in a macroscopic mass‐ and kinetic energy‐based world. Here we detail this as a premier example of integrative biology, spanning seven orders of magnitude and a lot of interesting biology. Emergent properties arising from molecular adhesion include several adaptive radiations that have produced a great diversity of geckos worldwide. BioEssays 27:647–652, (...) 2005. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Abstract In his critique of modern libertarian thinking, Jeffrey Friedman (1997) argues that libertarian moral theory makes social science irrelevant. However, if its moral claims are hypothetical rather than categorical imperatives, then economics, history, sociology, and other disciplines play a central role in libertarian thought. Limitations on human knowledge necessitate abstractly formulated rules, among which are claims of rights. Further, Friedman's remarks on freedom rest on an erroneous understanding of the role of definitions in philosophy, and his characterization of the (...) ?right to do wrong? as a ?logical contradiction? reveals a misunderstanding of logic. (shrink)

It is now well documented that biology needs morphometrics. Morphometrics can provide useful and often unexpected information about development and growth, functional—especially mechanical—adaptation, and evolutionary difference and relationship. Such studies often apply coordinate data from anatomical landmarks. Recently semi-landmarks and sliding landmarks increase information content, especially of apparently featureless regions . Yet, how we landmark our materials limits the results we get and the questions we ask. Here we show different landmarking schemes leading to different equivalences between specimens and different (...) results. Geometric morphometric methods often treat landmarks as points on rubber sheets. Distortions of the sheets are often visualized by techniques like thin plate splines showing changes or differences as stretches or contractions. The statistics of morphometrics can handle these. Further consideration of anatomical landmarks, however, implies that real biologies are sometimes more complex. Sometimes two-dimensional rubber sheets of anatomies contain cusps or holes representing appearances or disappearances of structures. In three dimensions, equivalent rubber blocks may show not only appearances or disappearances but also reversals of positions of structures. Such phenomena are generally ignored in landmarks and analyses. We show that in some cases morphometrics can take account of such matters. But we also suggest that sometimes these modifications from elastic analogues are so complex that new methods may be required for our morphometric packages. It is in this sense that improvement of morphometrics needs deeper understanding of biology. (shrink)