Philologus, founded in 1846, is one of the oldest and most respected periodicals in the field of Classics. It publishes articles on Greek and Latin literature, historiography, philosophy, history of religion, linguistics, reception, and the history of scholarship. The journal aims to contribute to our understanding of Greco-Roman culture and its lasting influence on European civilization. The journal Philologus, conceived as a forum for discussion among different methodological approaches to the study of ancient texts and their reception, publishes original scholarly (...) contributions with a strong international focus. Publications languages are: German, English, Italian, French. As of 2014 the publication of supplementary volumes will be resumed. The series Philologus. Supplemente / Philologus. Supplementary Volumes will publish monographs and edited volumes pertaining to all aspects of the study of ancient literature and its reception, with a special focus on topics concerning literary theory, philosophy and the history of scholarship from an interdisciplinary perspective. (shrink)

Karl R. Popper was a great admirer and friend of Hans Albert. What is it exactly that connected them? Answer to this question, barely a sketch, will also answer the question why and how I came to know Hans Albert. Within the normative methodological tradition set forth in Rene Descartes’ Regulae and Discourse on the Method, Karl R. Popper and Hans Albert converged on critical rationalism, the generalized version of Popper’s deductivist-falsificationist methodology of science.

Abstract In The Rational and the Social James Brown argues against the use of the method of reflective equilibrium in attempting to justify methodological norms. For, according to Brown, this would involve a circularity for that method presupposes an account of good scientific practice. In this paper it is argued that the method can be sustained without such a presupposition using either conherentism, reliabilism or defeasible foundationalism. That being so there is no circularity in applying it within normative methodology (...) of science. (shrink)

By now many formulations have been proposed to provide a definition of the realm of research topics in the methodology of science, which is sometimes also called, in the tradition of Anglo-Saxon terminology, the philosophy of science. There are various situations in which fundamental discrepancies exist among some of these formulations. Without resorting in this article to citation and detailed analysis of such definitions, let us emphasize from the outset that one of the principal sources of significant (...) differences among them lies in the following circumstance: the methodology of science may be treated either as a theoretical discipline or as a practical discipline . Inasmuch as closer examination of this question shows that practical interpretation of the methodology of science leads us to expect from it statements which — albeit in a different, nonindependent role — are also formulated in the framework of methodological investigations of a theoretical nature, to that degree, in this case one can speak of their being a single discipline, existing however, in two variants, the theoretical and the practical. Such a concept has the advantage that it creates the possibility of demonstrating the connections that exist within a very broad set of the most diverse intuitive versions of the tasks and character of methodological studies — versions that usually elevate to absolutes either the theoretical or the practical method whereby such researches are conducted. (shrink)

The paper is a study of the establishment of the theoretical, human and institutional presuppositions of the development of modern methodology of sciences in Slovakia 1946-1962. It focuses particularly on the examnination of V. Filkorn´s scientific and educational work, who was drawing on the previous and contemporary activity of S. Felber and I.Hrušovský. In that time V. Filkorn published his first essential works and developed an original conception of the methodology of sciences with its special view of the (...) method of science, scientific law, and the relationship between logic and dialectics. It is defined as logical analysis of the building of the system od science by means of modern logic and an articulated theory of categories. (shrink)

A number of authors have drawn attention to the contributions to geology of Robert Hooke, and it has been pointed out that in several ways his ideas were more advanced than those of Steno, who is sometimes taken to be the founder of geology as a scientific discipline. Moreover, it has been argued that in a number of instances Hooke should receive the credit for ideas which are usually believed to have originated in the work of James Hutton. This recognition (...) of the significance of Hooke's work is regarded by the present writer as being well founded. But, by contrast, the relationship between Hooke's geological ideas and his views on the proper methods for conducting scientific enquiries has been largely overlooked, and his views on the methodology of science, as revealed in his Posthumous works, have received little discussion. Moreover, on one of the few occasions on which they were discussed, by William Whewell, they were belittled. Whewell regarded Hooke's methodological contribution as merely ‘an attempt to adapt the Novum organon to the age which succeeded its publication’, 5 and he implied that the ‘same imperfections’ were to be found in the writings of both Hooke and Bacon. The influence of Bacon is, to be sure, most obvious in Hooke's general philosophy. Nevertheless, it will be argued that Hooke had a much clearer idea than did Bacon of the importance of so-called ‘hypothetico-deductive’ methods in science, and that in many ways his methodological views represent a significant advance on those of Bacon. (shrink)

The article provides an overview of activity of the department of logic and methodology of science of the H.S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy, National Academy of Science of Ukraine. This activity includes scientific research, translation of philosophical literature, organization of seminars on urgent problems of modern philosophy. Research projects, on the one hand, are based on scientific traditions formed over the years in the Institute, and on the other hand, they focus on the transformations in scientific cognition (...) and science, and build the projections for the future. It presents methodological backgrounds of the project «Semiotic analysis of cultural phenomena» (2018–2020), and outlines research tasks of the projects «Communicative transformations in modern science» (2020–2021) and «Logical, ontological and axiological dimensions of modern scientific knowledge» (2022–2024). Involvement of young scholars in research in logic, methodology and philosophy of science is the major challenge for the department. (shrink)

Scientific practice is a type of social practice, and every enterprise of knowledge in general exhibits important social dimensions. But should the fact that scientific practice is born out of and tied to the collaborative efforts of the members of a social group be taken to affect the products of these practices as well? In this paper, I will try in to give an affirmative answer to this question. My strategy will be to argue that the aim of science (...) is partially determined by a socio-historical context and that this aim, together with the available background knowledge, stands behind a methodology that is responsible for empirically and aim-adequate theoretical results. (shrink)

In spite of the many efforts made to clarify von Neumann’s methodology of science, one crucial point seems to have been disregarded in recent literature: his closeness to Hilbert’s spirit. In this paper I shall claim that the scientific methodology adopted by von Neumann in his later foundational reflections originates in the attempt to revaluate Hilbert’s axiomatics in the light of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. Indeed, axiomatics continues to be pursued by the Hungarian mathematician in the spirit of (...) Hilbert’s school. I shall argue this point by examining four basic ideas embraced by von Neumann in his foundational considerations: a) the conservative attitude to assume in mathematics; b) the role that mathematics and the axiomatic approach have to play in all that is science; c) the notion of success as an alternative methodological criterion to follow in scientific research; d) the empirical and, at the same time, abstract nature of mathematical thought. Once these four basic ideas have been accepted, Hilbert’s spirit in von Neumann’s methodology of science will become clear. (shrink)

This book examines the various norms for the logic and methodology of science, placing them in the context of the cognitive interests and explanatory ideals that motivate science. Various themes in the philosophy of science are examined, including the views of K. Popper, T. Kuhn, and L. Laudan. Characteristic cases of scientific theories are examined in order to illustrate and justify the proposed norms. These include, on the one hand, the emergence of the science of (...) Galileo, Kepler, and Newton from the older metaphysical style of explanation to be found in Aristotle and, on the other hand, Darwin's theory of natural selection. Also included are characteristic cases of pseudoscience, including creation science, Lysenkoism, Velikovsky, UFOs and ancient astronauts, astrology, parapsychology, and various kinds of alternative medicine. From these examples and the more theoretical discussion, there emerges a series of norms for demarcating science and pseudoscience. Various aspects of the scientific method are examined in detail, including the role of hypotheses, the logical structure of theories, and how these relate to the experimental methods of John Stuart Mill. collection; for example, what do we say about observational reports of the existence of UFOs? In this context there is a discussion of some of the issues raised in the so-called science wars. It is concluded that the sociology of science can at times be helpful to the scientific community in improving their methods of investigation. (shrink)

The book discusses methodological issues relating to the philosophy of science and the natural and social sciences. It reconstructs the methods of measurement and scientific explanation, the relation of data, phenomena and mechanisms, the problem of theory-ladenness of explanation and the problem of historic explanation. From the sciences chosen for methodological analysis are those of early classical mechanics, early thermodynamics, Bohr's theory of atom, early quantum mechanics, research into great apes and political economy.

Unter dem Begriff der „Verwissenschaftlichung der Methodologie der Wissenschaft“ verstehen wir den Einfluß wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis auf die eine oder andere Art und Weise auf die Methodologie der Wissenschaft, insbesondere den Gebrauch von wissenschaftlichen Ideen und Methoden für die Formulierung und Lösung von methodologischen Problemen der Wissenschaft und Problemen der Methodologie selbst. Es werden vier Haupttendenzen im Prozeß der Verwissenschaftlichung der Methodologie vorgestellt: (a) der Übergang vom „statement view“ zum mathematischen Holismus; (b) die Verwissenschaftlichung auf system-theoretischer Basis; (c) der Einzug soziologischer (...) Methoden in die methodologische Analyse der Wissenschaft und (d) die methodologischen Anwendungen von Forschungsresultaten im Bereich der Künstlichen Intelligenz. Darüberhinaus werden einige besondere Formen der Implementierung wissenschaftlicher Konstruktionen in der Methodologie ins Auge gefaßt. (shrink)

This article reexamines Vico’s early critique of Cartesian reasoning and of how the Cartesian method, which comes from epistemology, creates problems for the sciences once embedded into their methodologies and given a foundational role. The focus will be on De nostri temporis studiorum ratione (1709), where Vico argues against generalizing the Cartesian method and overemphasizing clarity and distinctness in the search for truth. To this end, Vico’s relation to Cartesianism is first carefully contextualized. Then, Vico is presented as a hylomorphist (...) when it comes to how scientific disciplines and their instruments interrelate, something key for understanding why he questions the “instrumentalization” of the Cartesian method in the first place. Afterwards, Vico’s account of the impossibility of maximal scientific progress when the Cartesian method is prioritized across the sciences is presented, as probabilistic reasoning and the importance of the imagination and memory take centerstage. Lastly, the article looks at Vico’s opposition to the geometrical method’s role in physics and his defense of visual thinking in mathematics. The hope throughout is to advance a picture of the early Vico as being not only a neo- Baconian pragmatist, but a hypermodern ”meta-Cartesian” thinker concerned with humanity’s optimizing its creative potential in order to achieve scientific advances. (shrink)

The methodology of the empirical sciences is treated from a set-theoretical point of view. Starting from Tarski's formulation of the methodology of the deductive sciences, a relation between terms, called degree of centrality, is introduced. Epistemic correlation, and therefore the notion of interpretative system, is defined using this relation.

The prelims comprise: Introduction Computer Science and Mathematics The Formal Verification Debate Abstraction in Computer Science Conclusion.

In the growing Prussian university system of the early nineteenth century, "Wissenschaft" (science) was seen as an endeavor common to university faculties, characterized by a rigorous methodology. On this view, history and jurisprudence are sciences, as much as is physics. Nineteenth century trends challenged this view: the increasing influence of materialist and positivist philosophies, profound changes in the relationships between university faculties, and the defense of Kant's classification of the sciences by neo-Kantians. Wilhelm Dilthey's defense of the independence (...) of the methodology of the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) from those of the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) is as much a return to the ideal of Wissenschaft as a cooperative endeavor as it is a defense of the autonomy of interpretive or hermeneutic methods. The debate between Dilthey and the neo-Kantian Wilhelm Windelband at the close of the century illuminates the development of this dialogue over the nineteenth century. (shrink)

From the early-1950s on, F.A. Hayek was concerned with the development of a methodology of sciences that study systems of complex phenomena. Hayek argued that the knowledge that can be acquired about such systems is, in virtue of their complexity (and the comparatively narrow boundaries of human cognitive faculties), relatively limited. The paper aims to elucidate the implications of Hayek’s methodology with respect to the specific dimensions along which the scientist’s knowledge of some complex phenomena may be limited. (...) Hayek’s fallibilism was an essential (if not always explicit) aspect of his arguments against the defenders of both socialism ([1935] 1948, [1940] 1948) and countercyclical monetary policy ([1975] 1978); yet, despite the fact that his conceptions of both complex phenomena and the methodology appropriate to their investigation imply that ignorance might beset the scientist in multiple respects, he never explicated all of these consequences. The specificity of a scientific prediction depends on the extent of the scientist’s knowledge concerning the phenomena under investigation. The paper offers an account of the considerations that determine the extent to which a theory’s implications prohibit the occurrence of particular events in the relevant domain. This theory of “predictive degree” both expresses and – as the phenomena of scientific prediction are themselves complex in Hayek’s sense – exemplifies the intuition that the specificity of a scientific prediction depends on the relevant knowledge available. (shrink)

This article addresses some recent tendencies in economic methodology defined as a philosophy of science for economics. I review the problem of normative/positive distinction in methodology and argue that normativity in its past forms is intolerable today but is, at the same time, indispensable for methodological inquiry. Using recent texts by Mirowski and Nik-Khah and by Alexandrova and Northcott on the applications of auction theory as a case study, I compare in more detail various approaches to economic (...) methodology inspired by the science and technology studies (STS) and philosophy of science literatures, respectively. On the basis of this comparison, I show that the STS programme in economic methodology may prove fruitful in the future, but there is still a place for more aprioristic philosophical thinking. Methodology and history of economics also play a fundamental role that goes beyond the descriptive analysis of STS and offer conceptual clarification paired with normative concerns provided by philosophers of science. (shrink)

Originally published in 1983. This book concentrates on the impact of philosophy of science on sociology and other disciplines. It argues that the impact of the philosophy of science on sociology from the rise of the Vienna Circle until the mid-1980s resulted in a deep-reaching and, in the author’s view, undesirable methodological reorientation in sociology.

I. Mathematical logic has long since come into use in the solution of individual problems of interest in the methodology of science. In this connection the question arises as to how effective this use is, and what its prospects are. Before formulating any general and categorical judgments on that score, it would be useful to discuss special cases of the application of mathematical logic to the methodology of science. In the present article we shall deal with (...) one case of this order, to wit, the utilization of mathematical logic in investigating the problem of possibility and necessity. (shrink)

With the advent of the relativity theory science has entered a transformative period in which previous certainties are undergoing critical scrutiny and renovation. Critical movements in science arise at periods of its history when its foundations are brought into question. True it is that natural philosophers still regard science as a growing body of propositions dealing with natural events enabling them to find the structural laws of the external world. But this “external world” about them changes in (...) significance, interpretation, and meaning as new epoch-making theories are propounded and experimental verification of some of their consequences tend to give them scientific plausibility. (shrink)

This volume contains the contributed papers of invitees to SEMS 2012 who have also given talks at the conference. The invitees are experts in philosophy of science and technology from Asia (besides China), Australia, Europe, Latin America, North America, as well as from within China. The papers in this volume represent the latest work of each researcher in his or her expertise; and as a result, they give a good representation of the cutting-edge researches in diverse areas in different (...) parts of the world. (shrink)