Figurative elements in language have their own particularities, including words that deviate from their generally accepted definition to amplify our language or to paraphrase an issue. It is still...

Ethical climates remain one of the most popular ways to assess the ethical orientations of companies. There has been a plethora of studies examining the relationship between ethical climates and critical outcomes, which was triggered by Victor and Cullen's seminal work published 35 years ago. After such a long period of strong research activity in this topic area, it is time to take stock of the accumulated empirical evidence. This meta-analytic review incorporates the considerations of alternative conceptualizations of ethical climates (...) and integrates an international comparative perspective on the consequences of ethical climates. Given the state of the field, it is imperative to assess the tenability of the various relationships of ethical climate types across national contexts. As such, we first provide an update on how ethical climates are related to key organizational outcomes and assess how country-level factors affect the consequences of ethical climates. We present our findings along theoretical, empirical, and methodological issues, discuss the implications of our findings for extant research and provide suggestions for future research for each of the three avenues. (shrink)

Opponents to consciousness in fish argue that fish do not feel pain because they do not have a neocortex, which is a necessary condition for feeling pain. A common counter-argument appeals to the multiple realizability of pain: while a neocortex might be necessary for feeling pain in humans, pain might be realized differently in fish. This paper argues, first, that it is impossible to find a criterion allowing us to demarcate between plausible and implausible cases of multiple realization of pain (...) without running into a circular argument. Second, opponents to consciousness in fish cannot be provided with reasons to believe in the multiple realizability of pain. I conclude that the debate on the existence of pain in fish is impossible to settle by relying on the multiple realization argument. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to a certain way of thinking of the action of another. The posture of mind is characteristically expressed by a specific use of what G. E. M. Anscombe calls stopping modals. On this use, the sentence, “You can’t do that; it is mine,” registers the necessity of justice. My question is: what is the relation between the status of a person, a bearer of rights, the recognition of others as persons, and the practice of addressing the (...) demands of justice to one another? According to a certain strand in the tradition, the answer is: in the sphere of justice, a special union arises among language, mind, and world such that there is a sense in which addressing, recognizing, and being a person are one reality. The paper articulates the relevant sense of ‘one reality’ and offers an argument in support of the formula. In the course of the argument I suggest that this issue is central to understanding the philosophical significance of the second person and appreciating that it marks an irreducible and fundamental form of thought. (shrink)

Epistemic deontology is the view that the concept of epistemic justification is deontological: a justified belief is, by definition, an epistemically permissible belief. I defend this view against the argument from doxastic involuntarism, according to which our doxastic attitudes are not under our voluntary control, and thus are not proper objects for deontological evaluation. I argue that, in order to assess this argument, we must distinguish between a compatibilist and a libertarian construal of the concept of voluntary control. If we (...) endorse a compatibilist construal, it turns out that we enjoy voluntary control over our doxastic attitudes after all. If, on the other hand, we endorse a libertarian construal, the result is that, for our doxastic attitudes to be suitable objects of deontological evaluation, they need not be under our voluntary control. (shrink)

This article presents results from the national survey conducted in 2018 for the project Research Integrity in Norway. A total of 31,206 questionnaires were sent out to Norwegian researchers by e-mail, and 7291 responses were obtained. In this paper, we analyse the survey data to determine attitudes towards and the prevalence of fabrication, falsification and plagiarism and contrast this with attitudes towards and the prevalence of the more questionable research practices surveyed. Our results show a relatively low percentage of self-reported (...) FFPs, while the number of researchers who report having committed one of the QRPs during the last three years reached a troublesome 40%. The article also presents a ranking of the perceived severity of FFP and QRPs among Norwegian researchers. Overall, there is a widespread normative consensus, where FFP is considered more troublesome than QRPs. (shrink)

In this paper, we trace the conceptual history of the term ?metamathematics? in the nineteenth century. It is well known that Hilbert introduced the term for his proof-theoretic enterprise in about 1922. But he was verifiably inspired by an earlier usage of the phrase in the 1870s. After outlining Hilbert's understanding of the term, we will explore the lines of inducement and elucidate the different meanings of ?metamathematics? in the final decades of the nineteenth century. Finally, we will investigate the (...) earlier occurrences and come to the conclusion that the conceptual prehistory of the Hilbertian notion of metamathematics dates back to 1870, whereas the history of the word starts in 1799 at the latest. What is this: metamathematics? It is something amazing everybody, [?] since it makes the mind dizzy and withdraws thinking its sole fulcrum.1 1 Brunner 1898, p. 832: ?Was ist das: Metamathematik? Es ist etwas, was einen Jeden in das äusserste Staunen versetzt, [?] was das Gehirn schwindlig macht und dem Denken seinen einzigen Stütz- und Angelpunkt zu entziehen droht? (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Alston's arguments for doxastic involuntarism. Alston fails to distinguish (i) between volitional and executional lack of control, and (ii) between compatibilist and libertarian control. As a result, he fails to notice that, if one endorses a compatibilist notion of voluntary control, the outcome is a straightforward and compelling case for doxastic voluntarism. Advocates of involuntarism have recently argued that the compatibilist case for doxastic voluntarism can be blocked by pointing out that belief is never intentional. (...) In response to this strategy, I distinguish between two types of intentionality and argue that belief is no less intentional than action is. (shrink)

Conditional structures lie at the heart of the sciences, humanities, and everyday reasoning. It is hence not surprising that conditional logics – logics specifically designed to account for natural language conditionals – are an active and interdisciplinary area. The present book gives a formal and a philosophical account of indicative and counterfactual conditionals in terms of Chellas-Segerberg semantics. For that purpose a range of topics are discussed such as Bennett’s arguments against truth value based semantics for indicative conditionals.

The paper takes a fresh look at two essays that Adam Smith wrote at the very beginning of his career. In these essays, Smith explains his philosophy of science, which is social constructivist. A social constructivist reading of Smith strengthens the scholarly consensus that The Wealth of Nations needs to be interpreted in light of the general moral theory he explicates in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, as the two essays and TMS stress the importance of the same concepts: e.g., (...) moral imagination, the socially embedded individual, and humility. The connecting tissue between all three works is made up of sentiments and values. Smith regards the socially embedded human as the agent in all three realms, and humans are always driven by values. Smith not only conceives of economics as an applied moral philosophy, but also bases both research areas on a view of knowledge creation that stresses specific epistemic values. If mainstream economic theory wants to have any claim to Adam Smith, it would have to change not only what it argues but also how it argues. Economists would have to replace the language of mathematics with the language and logic of moral philosophy and give values centre stage. (shrink)

Consumerism will be understood as a ‘folk religion’, as a contemporary everyday way to make sense of and deal with transcendence. Contrary to longstanding critiques I will argue that consumerism also carries an ethical potential that comes into conflict with the results of the capitalist order of production.

The generation of route descriptions is a fundamental task of navigation systems. A particular problem in this context is to identify routes that can easily be described and processed by users. In this work, we present a framework for representing route networks with the qualitative information necessary to evaluate and optimize route descriptions with regard to ambiguities in them. We identify different agent models that differ in how agents are assumed to process route descriptions while navigating through route networks and (...) discuss which agent models can be translated into PDL programs. Further, we analyze the computational complexity of matching route descriptions and paths in route networks in dependency of the agent model. Finally, we empirically evaluate the influence of the agent model on the optimization and the processing of route instructions. (shrink)

Humans are creatures of articulation: an essential part of our form of life is the expression of what appears to us significant in what we experience and how we behave. The aim of this volume is to proceed from this realisation to an integrative anthropology that not only takes into account the uniqueness of our form of life, but also our evolutionary context. This has important consequences for our understanding of our corporeality, actions, language, consciousness and morals.

Definition of the problemStaff and patients in institutions of organized health care experience and express a variety of adverse conditions of these organizations. Within a theoretical framework of institutional pathology we can explain some of these “miserable conditions” as effects of the activities of organizations belonging to the political system (health policy) and to the economic system (health economy). Clinical ethics committees (CECs) cannot effectively handle such adversities or even address them properly. Standard organizational ethics can address them but cannot (...) handle them effectively.ArgumentsI propose to strengthen organizational ethics by a theory of institutional pathology. Basic nosological distinctions such as disease, illness and sickness, whose primary reference is to biological organisms and persons, can be analogically extended to socially constituted entities (e.g. hospitals) in terms of functional deficiency, miserable conditions, and need for reform of such entities. A very promising focus for analysis are organizational disorders of responsibility allocation. This group of institutional pathological disorders engenders, amongst other kinds of miserable conditions, specifically morally relevant miserable conditions.ConclusionThe institutional pathology paradigm, oriented to concrete institutions and organizations, can help “clinical” organizational ethics to considerably expand, in theoretical ethics as well as in ethically guided practice e.g. for members of CECs and organizational ethics advisors, the capacities for observing, evaluating and, if necessary, amending disturbed relations of responsibility. (shrink)

Personal und Patienten in Einrichtungen organisierter Krankenbehandlung erfahren und bekunden vielfältige miserable Zustände dieser Organisationen. Einige „Miseren“ lassen sich im Rahmen einer Theorie institutioneller Pathologien als störende Auswirkungen der Aktivitäten und Strukturen von Organisationen des Politiksystems und des Wirtschaftssystems erklären. Deshalb können Klinische Ethik-Komitees solchen Miseren nicht wirksam begegnen oder sie sogar nicht einmal thematisieren. Organisationsethik kann sie thematisieren, aber ihnen nicht wirksam begegnen. Vorgeschlagen wird die Verstärkung von Organisationethik durch eine Theorie institutioneller Pathologie. Institutionspathologisch aufgeklärte, „klinische“ Organisationsethik kann helfen, (...) in Ethiktheorie und Praxis, etwa für Mitglieder von KEKs und Organisationethikberater, die Möglichkeiten der Beobachtung, Bewertung und ggf. Besserung von gestörten Verantwortungsverhältnissen erheblich zu erweitern. (shrink)

The core feature that distinguishes moods from emotions is that moods, in contrast to emotions, are diffuse and global. This article outlines a dispositional theory of moods (DTM) that accounts for this and other features of mood experience. DTM holds that moods are temporary dispositions to have or to generate particular kinds of emotion-relevant appraisals. Furthermore, DTM assumes that the cognitions and appraisals one is disposed to have in a given mood partly constitute the experience of mood. This article outlines (...) a number of implications of DTM (e.g., regarding the noncognitive causation and rationality of moods) and summarizes empirical results supporting the theory. (shrink)

There has been little debate in political philosophy about whether the intentions of governments matter to the legitimacy of their policies. This paper fills this gap. First, I provide a rigorous statement of political anti-intentionalism, the view that intentions do not matter to political legitimacy. I do so by building on analogous debates in moral philosophy. Second, I sketch some strategies to defend political anti-intentionalism, which I argue are promising and available to a wide range of theories of legitimacy. Third, (...) I show that the distinction has implications for debates surrounding neutrality and political liberalism. (shrink)

According to a standard criticism, Robert Brandom's “normative pragmatics”, i.e. his attempt to explain normative statuses in terms of practical attitudes, faces a dilemma. If practical attitudes and their interactions are specified in purely non-normative terms, then they underdetermine normative statuses; but if normative terms are allowed into the account, then the account becomes viciously circular. This paper argues that there is no dilemma, because the feared circularity is not vicious. While normative claims do exhibit their respective authors' practical attitudes (...) and thereby contribute towards establishing the normative statuses they are about, this circularity is not a mark of Brandom's explanatory strategy but a feature of social practice of which we theorists partake. (shrink)

Delayed-choice experiments in quantum mechanics are often taken to undermine a realistic interpretation of the quantum state. More specifically, Healey has recently argued that the phenomenon of delayed-choice entanglement swapping is incompatible with the view that entanglement is a physical relation between quantum systems. This paper argues against these claims. It first reviews two paradigmatic delayed-choice experiments and analyzes their metaphysical implications. It then applies the results of this analysis to the case of entanglement swapping, showing that such experiments pose (...) no threat to realism about entanglement. (shrink)

Argues for a closer connection between memories of injustice and promises of justice as a means to overcome violence.

CST is widely disregarded in the academic and public discourse. This essay argues that this is the case for two related reasons. Firstly, CST is based on the pre-Enlightenment approach to moral philosophy, virtue ethics, while the mainstream in business ethics favours the rule-based approaches consequentialism and deontology and their variants. Secondly, mainstream approaches also have adopted a positivist epistemology where theories represent the Truth that must not be questioned: they have become ideologies. This paper argues that CST, mainly through (...) the virtue ethical doctrine of the mean, is saved from having become an ideology and is much closer to the ideal of science as a self-questioning system than the mainstream in business ethics. This essay explains this counter-intuitive conclusion by tracing the history of CST and embedding it in an epistemic discussion and then suggesting what business ethics could take from CST to regain the all-important discursiveness it once had. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the new Tweety puzzle. The original Tweety puzzle was addressed by approaches in non-monotonic logic, which aim to adequately represent the Tweety case, namely that Tweety is a penguin and, thus, an exceptional bird, which cannot fly, although in general birds can fly. The new Tweety puzzle is intended as a challenge for probabilistic theories of epistemic states. In the first part of the paper we argue against monistic Bayesians, who assume that epistemic states can (...) at any given time be adequately described by a single subjective probability function. We show that monistic Bayesians cannot provide an adequate solution to the new Tweety puzzle, because this requires one to refer to a frequency-based probability function. We conclude that monistic Bayesianism cannot be a fully adequate theory of epistemic states. In the second part we describe an empirical study, which provides support for the thesis that monistic Bayesianism is also inadequate as a descriptive theory of cognitive states. In the final part of the paper we criticize Bayesian approaches in cognitive science, insofar as their monistic tendency cannot adequately address the new Tweety puzzle. We, further, argue against monistic Bayesianism in cognitive science by means of a case study. In this case study we show that Oaksford and Chater’s (2007, 2008) model of conditional inference—contrary to the authors’ theoretical position—has to refer also to a frequency-based probability function. (shrink)

Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism suggests that the sense of normative terms like “ought” and “good” as they appear in ethical discourse is to be elucidated in terms of the relation in which a living individual stands to the life-form or “species” of which it is an exemplar—in our case: the human life-form. A theory of this form has to provide a story about questions such as: What enables us to distinguish the different kinds of life within the theory? What makes them, (...) despite those differences, all sorts of natural goodness? And where, in relation to those continuities and discontinuities, is the account of practical reason to be situated? In this paper, I investigate how a developed ethical naturalism has to conceive of the relation between the genus concept life and the concept of the specific kind of life characteristic of us: rational or practically self-conscious life. I argue that there is a deep ambiguity with respect to this question in the account Philippa Foot presents in Natural Goodness. An ambiguity that covers a dilemma. A properly developed ethical naturalism would have to develop the concept of reason out of the reflection on life. (shrink)

Tradition is a complex phenomenon of which we can find a multiplicity of conceptualizations in the philosophical, sociological, anthropological, and economic literature. In this paper, I offer both a critical and a constructive contribution to answering the question of how tradition should be conceptualized. In the critical part, I argue against attempts to construct a unified conception of tradition. In the constructive part, I discuss three taxonomies proposed in the literature and then develop an analytical grid for conceptions of tradition (...) as an alternative. This analytical grid is based on a sample of 28 accounts of tradition sourced from the contemporary scholarly literature, and makes use of seven dimensions to distinguish among these conceptions. (shrink)

Assuming an essential difference between scientific data and phenomena, this paper argues for the view that we have to understand how empirical findings get transformed into scientific phenomena. The work of scientists is seen as largely consisting in constructing these phenomena which are then utilized in more abstract theories. It is claimed that these matters are of importance for discussions of theory choice and progress in science. A case study is presented as a starting point: paleomagnetism and the use of (...) paleomagnetic data in early discussions of continental drift. Some general features of this study are presented in formalized language. It is suggested that the presentation given is particularly suited for a semantic conception of theories. Even though the construction of scientific phenomena is the main topic of this paper, the view presented here is more adapted to realism than social constructivism. (shrink)

Is it possible to argue that one’s memory is reliable without using one’s memory? I argue that it is not. Since it is not, it is impossible to defend the reliability of one’s memory without employing reasoning that is epistemically circular. Hence, if epistemic circularity is vicious, it is impossible to succeed in producing a cogent argument for the reliability of one’s memory. The same applies to any other one of one’s cognitive faculties. I further argue that, if epistemic circularity (...) is vicious, it is impossible to produce a cogent argument for the reliability of anything. For example, if epistemic circularity were vicious, a cogent argument for the reliability of one’s car would not be possible. The seeming viciousness of epistemic circularity even threatens, I propose, the possibility of justification and knowledge. Much, therefore, hangs one the question of whether epistemic circularity is indeed bad. I argue that epistemic circularity, or bootstrapping, need not be bad. When we use a crystal ball—a source perspicuously guilty of unreliability—to confirm its own reliability, bootstrapping is foolish. When we attribute reliability to a witness solely because the witness says he is reliable, bootstrapping is dogmatic. Foolish and dogmatic bootstrapping are bad. However, when a witness provides a rich body of testimony, using that testimony to gauge the witness’s reliability need not be a vicious form of circularity. When done critically, I argue, such reasoning exemplifies a form of bootstrapping that is benign. (shrink)

This article proposes an analysis of the collaborative monitoring of an entrepreneurial project, namely a school store, at the primary school level. The concept of “double credibility” serves as an analytical standpoint to look at the collaboration between a teacher and a researcher whose common aim is to teach pupils how to be enterprising through the school store. The concept of “double credibility” entails that the common project of the research partners must be both credible for research and practice. Three (...) negotiation processes of the partners’ points of view are more specifically analyzed. This allows to highlight the common and specific concerns that each partner bring into play to maintain the “double credibility” of the project, all with a view to allow pupils to learn through the school store. (shrink)

Volume 22, Issue 2, June 2019, Page 95-97.

This volume argues that Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion and his thought in general continue to be highly relevant for present and future research on interreligious relations.

The novella "The Judge" by Ernst Wiechert gives testimony to the poet’s critical analysis and examination of the immediate National Socialist past and, at the same time, tries to provide some forward-looking re-orientation in terms of a comprehensive humanism based on Christian ideals. Wiechert’s narrative follows a dramatic structure in accordance with the tragedies of Classical Greek Antiquity. Faced with an existential crisis, the title character has to prove his moral integrity and steadfastness. Deluded by the pervasive Nazi ideology, the (...) judge’s son goes astray by killing a former friend but finally, thanks to his father’s cautious, gentle guidance, finds his way back. At the end of the novella the son even atones for his wrongs while his father, an unfaltering representative and unswerving advocate of law and justice, resigns from his office in the face of the lawlessness he has experienced under the Nazi terror regime. Apart from analysing the plot of Wiechert’s novella, this study also examines the clearly outlined characters as well as the complex theme of guilt, repentance and forgiveness. Finally, the article focuses on the author’s intention of taking part in the social and political discourse of post-war Germany by conveying his message of humanity and moral integrity. (shrink)

Because of the declining fiscal capabilities of the German welfare state and the resulting reductions in social services provided by the government, increasing attention has been given to the voluntary social engagement of businesses, often referred to as corporate citizenship. In that context, scholars and politicians alike have pointed to the United States as a country with a strong corporate citizenship culture and advocated a transatlantic transfer of the respective practices. Against this background, it is the first aim of this (...) paper to examine the socio‐economic environment for corporate citizenship in both countries. Second, it will be investigated if corporate citizenship is really practiced more widely in the United States than in Germany and what forms of corporate citizenship are used by businesses. For that purpose, the corporate citizenship activities of the 100 largest companies in the United States and Germany each will be analyzed. Results show that more US than German companies undertake corporate citizenship activities and apply a wider variety of different forms. The possibilities for a transatlantic transfer are limited because of the differences in the cultural and political systems of both countries. (shrink)

The article aims for examining the ‘technological stasis’ of the data structure in OpenStreetMap – the successful global collaborative geodata project devoted to ‘create and distribute free geographic data for the world’. Digital structures are strongly influenced by continuing stagnation. This technological stasis – the lack of change in technology – influences data in various ways, as demonstrated by the intensive discussion of the issue by computer scientists and software engineers. However, existing research describing stagnating software is often technic centred (...) and fuzzy, while critical research is barely considering issues of technological stasis in the digital context at all. Therefore, this paper aims for enriching this body of knowledge in order to shed light on aging data structures. I reframe technological stasis with a social-constructivist perspective – using the approach of Social Construction of Technology – especially with the concept of technological frames. Based on the case example of OpenStreetMap, my findings suggest that the data structure – and its stasis – is the outcome of competing understandings and perspectives, shaped by power asymmetries. Although the data structure did not significantly change for more than 10 years, I demonstrate that this is not because of a lack of motivation, nor technological difficulties of carrying out such changes. The technological stasis is rather rooted in the dominant position of few project members who are able to change the software design; it is their perception of the project that defines how data should be stored and what features are dispensable. (shrink)

So far, little is known about the neurocognitive mechanisms associated with emotion effects on prospective memory (PM) performance. Thus, this study aimed at disentangling possible mechanisms for the effects of emotional valence of PM cues on the distinct phases composing PM by investigating event-related potentials (ERPs). Participants were engaged in an ongoing N-back task while being required to perform a PM task. The emotional valence of both the ongoing pictures and the PM cues was manipulated (pleasant, neutral, unpleasant). ERPs were (...) recorded during the PM phases, such as encoding, maintenance, and retrieval of the intention. A recognition task including PM cues and ongoing stimuli was also performed at the end of the sessions. ERP results suggest that emotional PM cues not only trigger an automatic, bottom-up, capture of attention, but also boost a greater allocation of top-down processes. These processes seem to be recruited to hold attention towards the emotional stimuli and to retrieve the intention from memory, likely because of the motivational significance of the emotional stimuli. Moreover, pleasant PM cues seemed to modulate especially the prospective component, as revealed by changes in the amplitude of the ERP correlates of strategic monitoring as a function of the relevance of the valence for the PM task. Unpleasant pictures seemed to modulate especially the retrospective component, as revealed by the largest old/new effect being elicited by unpleasant PM pictures in the recognition task. (shrink)

Setting out the 'state of the art' in proportionality doctrine, this book combines theoretical reconstruction with case-law examples, defending and developing the dominant model of proportionality.