So far, little is known about the neurocognitive mechanisms associated with emotion effects on prospective memory (PM) performance. Thus, this study aimed at disentangling possible mechanisms for the effects of emotional valence of PM cues on the distinct phases composing PM by investigating event-related potentials (ERPs). Participants were engaged in an ongoing N-back task while being required to perform a PM task. The emotional valence of both the ongoing pictures and the PM cues was manipulated (pleasant, neutral, unpleasant). ERPs were (...) recorded during the PM phases, such as encoding, maintenance, and retrieval of the intention. A recognition task including PM cues and ongoing stimuli was also performed at the end of the sessions. ERP results suggest that emotional PM cues not only trigger an automatic, bottom-up, capture of attention, but also boost a greater allocation of top-down processes. These processes seem to be recruited to hold attention towards the emotional stimuli and to retrieve the intention from memory, likely because of the motivational significance of the emotional stimuli. Moreover, pleasant PM cues seemed to modulate especially the prospective component, as revealed by changes in the amplitude of the ERP correlates of strategic monitoring as a function of the relevance of the valence for the PM task. Unpleasant pictures seemed to modulate especially the retrospective component, as revealed by the largest old/new effect being elicited by unpleasant PM pictures in the recognition task. (shrink)

Definition of the Problem: One of the main ethical arguments against the therapeutic transplantation of fetal tissue in severe cases of Parkinson’s disease is the allegation that the relationship between the abortion and the transplantation is a (bad)-means-to-a-(good)-end-relation.Arguments: This paper differentiates between the actual experimental single-case treatment and a potential mass treatment. In the former case, ethical guidelines seem to guarantee that abortion and transplantation are two distinct actions and therefore abortion is not a means to the end transplantation on (...) principle. However, in the latter case – the potential mass treatment of patients with more severe cases of Parkinson’s disease – there seem to be several technical, logistical and psychological reasons for the impossibility to distinguish between abortion and transplantation.Conclusion: Although abortion is not a means to the end transplantation as a matter of principle the ethical problems of a mass treatment would be immense. (shrink)

Definition of the problem: Is it the brain that makes a human being a person? This anthropological question has been raised because of the findings of modern human brain research, and there are severe ethical consequences anew: If the appropriate anthropological answer is yes, then all invasive research would be problematic, because one would touch the basis of human essence. The problem is that the two major philosophical paradigms that offer an answer to the anthropological question, dualism and monism, have (...) opposing concepts. Arguments: This paper argues that the error of these two paradigms is that they understand the human body and the human mind as ’res’– as things. The explanation of the human being as an interactive unit of body and mind is impossible in both paradigms. A third anthropological view that tries to make that understandable is the anthropology of the Hebrew Bible. It does assume the category ’thing’ while speaking about humans, it presumes the category ’aspect’. There is no Hebrew word for ’mind’ in contrast to ’body’ or vice versa. The biblical language only knows terms for the unity of human beings seen under a certain aspect. Conclusion: Here, the body and thus the brain are important and necessary condition for human essence, but this is not a sufficient explanation for the human personality. Invasive research on the human brain is here neither generally forbidden nor tolerated – one has to demonstrate in every single case whether the planned operation touches regions that are crucial for the personality of the human subject. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung. Eines der zentralen Argumente für eine grundsätzliche Ablehnung von fetalen Hirngewebetransplantationen z.B. bei schweren Formen der Parkinsonkrankheit ist die vermeintliche Verzweckung der Abtreibung des Fetus. Die hier zu klärende Frage ist, ob das Verhältnis von Abtreibung und Transplantation wirklich grundsätzlich eine Mittel-Zweck-Beziehung darstellt. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz wird dies anhand der Kriterien,direkte Zweckgerichtetheit’ und,Zweckgebundenheit’ eines Mittels überprüft. Wie die Analyse zeigen kann, muß bei der Beantwortung der Ausgangsfrage zwischen der zur Zeit üblichen und durch strenge ethische Auflagen beschränkten experimentellen Einzelfallanwendung (...) und einer potentiellen Massenanwendung der Methode differenziert werden. Im ersten Fall gewährleisten die Richtlinien eine prinzipielle Trennung beider Handlungen und lassen weder eine grundsätzliche direkte Zweckgerichtetheit noch eine Zweckgebundenheit der Abtreibung hinsichtlich der Transplantation erkennen. Die wahrscheinlichen Folgen einer Massenanwendung verändern diese Einschätzung jedoch. Hier ist aus diversen technischen, logistischen und psychologischen Gründen damit zu rechnen, daß eine scharfe Trennung beider Handlungen nicht mehr möglich sein wird. Das Argument,schlechtes Mittel für einen guten Zweck’ kann somit zwar nicht grundsätzlich gegen jede Behandlung schwerer Einzelfälle mit fetalen Transplantaten (z.B. von Parkinson) angeführt werden, es weist aber zu Recht auf massive Probleme einer Ausweitung dieser experimentellen Therapie hin. (shrink)