Genes are often described by biologists using metaphors derived from computa- tional science: they are thought of as carriers of information, as being the equivalent of ‘‘blueprints’’ for the construction of organisms. Likewise, cells are often characterized as ‘‘factories’’ and organisms themselves become analogous to machines. Accordingly, when the human genome project was initially announced, the promise was that we would soon know how a human being is made, just as we know how to make airplanes and buildings. Impor- tantly, (...) modern proponents of Intelligent Design, the latest version of creationism, have exploited biologists’ use of the language of information and blueprints to make their spurious case, based on pseudoscientific concepts such as ‘‘irreducible complexity’’ and on flawed analogies between living cells and mechanical factories. However, the living organ- ism = machine analogy was criticized already by David Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. In line with Hume’s criticism, over the past several years a more nuanced and accurate understanding of what genes are and how they operate has emerged, ironically in part from the work of computational scientists who take biology, and in particular developmental biology, more seriously than some biologists seem to do. In this article we connect Hume’s original criticism of the living organism = machine analogy with the modern ID movement, and illustrate how the use of misleading and outdated metaphors in science can play into the hands of pseudoscientists. Thus, we argue that dropping the blueprint and similar metaphors will improve both the science of biology and its understanding by the general public. (shrink)

The idea of phenotypic novelty appears throughout the evolutionary literature. Novelties have been defined so broadly as to make the term meaningless and so narrowly as to apply only to a limited number of spectacular structures. Here I examine some of the available definitions of phenotypic novelty and argue that the modern synthesis is ill equipped at explaining novelties. I then discuss three frameworks that may help biologists get a better insight of how novelties arise during evolution but warn that (...) these frameworks should be considered in addition to, and not as potential substitutes of, the modern synthesis. †To contact the author, please write to: Departments of Ecology and Evolution and Philosophy, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY 11794; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

The paper intends to investigate the sources of the very concept of charisma in Max Weber, starting from some polemical readings made by Carl Schmitt. Aside from theologian Karl Holl, particular attention is devoted to Protestant jurist Rudolf Sohm and to his masterwork Kirchenrecht. Weber started to read it attentively in 1909, at the beginning of his project called Economy and Society, In the writings that make the most of this posthumous work that he never really ended, charisma is meant (...) as the non-juridical key for official and hierarchic organizations – Roman Church may not be the only good example: charisma creates concrete social associations elsewhere. Gradually, such organizations get more and more legal, as long as they lose their ‘extraordinary’ traits. The analysis will show how obedience and recognition are originally created by charisma and how they structure the ties that bind the followers to their leader, a hero, a prophet, or similar charismatic personalities. Being originally anti-economic, anti-institutional, charisma gets to be gradually objectified in a legal order provided with specific economical traits. In its last part, the paper analyses the famous conference Max Weber held in Munich in 1919, Politics as Vocation. Politics is identified as the intersection between charisma and bureaucracy, in the handling of the relationship between the two elements of devotion to the leader and the cause and the party machine. (shrink)

Ever since Socrates, philosophers have been in the business of asking ques- tions of the type “What is X?” The point has not always been to actually find out what X is, but rather to explore how we think about X, to bring up to the surface wrong ways of thinking about it, and hopefully in the process to achieve an increasingly better understanding of the matter at hand. In the early part of the twentieth century one of the most (...) ambitious philosophers of sci- ence, Karl Popper, asked that very question in the specific case in which X = science. Popper termed this the “demarcation problem,” the quest for what distinguishes science from nonscience and pseudoscience (and, presumably, also the latter two from each other). (shrink)

Discussions about the biological bases of the concept of race in the human species seem to be never ending. One of the latest rounds is represented by a paper by Neven Sesardic, which attempts to build a strong scientific case for the existence of human races, based on genetic, morphometric and behavioral characteristics, as well as on a thorough critique of opposing positions. In this paper I show that Sesardic’s critique falls far short of the goal, and that his positive (...) case is exceedingly thin. I do this through a combination of analysis of the actual scientific findings invoked by Sesardic and of some philosophical unpacking of his conceptual analysis, drawing on a dual professional background as an evolutionary biologist and a philosopher of science. (shrink)

It is an unfortunate fact of academic life that there is a sharp divide between science and philosophy, with scientists often being openly dismissive of philosophy, and philosophers being equally contemptuous of the naivete ́ of scientists when it comes to the philosophical underpinnings of their own discipline. In this paper I explore the possibility of reducing the distance between the two sides by introducing science students to some interesting philosophical aspects of research in evolutionary biology, using biological theories of (...) the origin of religion as an example. I show that philosophy is both a discipline in its own right as well as one that has interesting implications for the understanding and practice of science. While the goal is certainly not to turn science students into philoso- phers, the idea is that both disciplines cannot but benefit from a mutual dialogue that starts as soon as possible, in the classroom. (shrink)

The philosophical study of consciousness is chock full of thought experiments: John Searle’s Chinese Room, David Chalmers’ Philosophical Zombies, Frank Jackson’s Mary’s Room, and Thomas Nagel’s ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ among others. Many of these experiments and the endless discussions that follow them are predicated on what Chalmers famously referred as the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness: for him, it is ‘easy’ to figure out how the brain is capable of perception, information integration, attention, reporting on mental (...) states, etc, even though this is far from being accomplished at the moment. What is ‘hard’, claims the man of the p-zombies, is to account for phenomenal experience, or what philosophers usually call ‘qualia’: the ‘what is it like’, first-person quality of consciousness. (shrink)

Thought experiments are cheap and popular, but how do they work?

Can Wittgenstein's famous family resemblance concept be applied to resolve the problem of defining species in biology?

The U.S. Supreme Court’s Dobbs ruling triggered a global debate about access to abortion and the legislative models governing it. In the United States, there was a sudden reversal of federal guidance about pregnancy termination that is unprecedented in Western and high-income countries. The strong polarization on the issue of abortion and the difficulty of finding a point of compromise lead one to consider the experiences of countries that have had different paths. Italy stands as a candidate for being a (...) partially alternative model because it allows abortion up to 12 weeks, but without considering it a subjective right. The legislation in place since 1978 aims to balance the interests of the fetus and those of the woman. An issue often raised concerning Italian law is that of conscientious objection granted to doctors. Many gynecologists declare themselves objectors, and this makes access to abortion more difficult in some regions of Italy. After discussing this issue and envisaging different ways to deal with it, the article concludes by highlighting new dilemmas about a possible divorce between the law and medical ethics in different directions and offers some avenues to begin setting up a response. (shrink)

The joke among scientists is that ‘philosopher’ is the last stage of one’s scien- tific career, to be arrived at when one can no longer get grants funded or graduate stu- dents to advise. Despite the fact that some of the greatest minds in evolutionary biology (from Darwin to Ernst Mayr) were very much interested in the philosophical aspects of what they were doing, the bad joke persists in the halls of academia.

There appears much new in philosophy of biology, the exploding field in philosophy of science over the past few decades.

Today, the field of Parmenidean studies is still divided over the fundamental question of the correct exegesis of the verb 'to be' in the poem On Nature. The two principal interpretative lines supported by scholars are, on the one hand, the traditional view that understands the verb ‘to be’ in its existential sense and, on the other, the one that arose in the 20th century that focuses on its predicative sense. This paper examines the latest and most ambitious attempt to (...) interpret the thought of Parmenides and the profound influence that he had on pluralist philosophers, starting from a purely predicative approach. It is an epistemological interpretation of the Eleaticism proposed by Patricia Curd, centred on the notion of ‘predicational monism’, which has the unquestionable merit to place Parmenides within the pre-Socratic naturalistic debate but that, after a careful analysis, fails to convince. In fact, this interpretation, which certainly appears to be one of the most articulate and intelligent proposals of recent years, raises a series of exegetical and argumentative problems that do not seem possible to resolve without exiting the predicative horizon. (shrink)

We present an account of semantics that is not construed as a mapping of language to the world but rather as a mapping between individual meaning spaces. The meanings of linguistic entities are established via a “meeting of minds.” The concepts in the minds of communicating individuals are modeled as convex regions in conceptual spaces. We outline a mathematical framework, based on fixpoints in continuous mappings between conceptual spaces, that can be used to model such a semantics. If concepts are (...) convex, it will in general be possible for interactors to agree on joint meaning even if they start out from different representational spaces. Language is discrete, while mental representations tend to be continuous—posing a seeming paradox. We show that the convexity assumption allows us to address this problem. Using examples, we further show that our approach helps explain the semantic processes involved in the composition of expressions. (shrink)

Lettura prospettica di un caposaldo del pensiero hobbesiano: il sorgere del rapporto tra l'uomo ed il potere, tra la naturale condizione umana e la nozione di civiltà, attraverso due frammenti particolarmente rappresentativi della concezione hobbesiana del passaggio dallo stato di natura alla civiltà: il tredicesimo capitolo del Leviathan, sulla condizione naturale dell'uomo, ed il quinto capitolo, sulle cause ed origini della civitas, del De cive, giacché la mera esistenza dell'uomo ed il suo riconoscimento di una legge naturale, a giudizio di (...) Hobbes, non implica affatto necessariamente una qualsiasi forma consolidata di organizzazione sociale. Sebbene il De cive (pubblicato in latino nel 1642 e, in inglese, nel 1651) preceda cronologicamente il Leviathan (pubblicato, viceversa, dapprima in inglese, nel 1651, poi in latino, nel 1668), nell'ordine logico dell'esposizione qui presentata, il brano del Leviathan può essere considerato propedeutico al quinto capitolo del De cive, delineandone i presupposti, segnatamente la condizione di continuo pericolo per tutti causata dallo stato generale di reciproca guerra, che costituisce forse l'aspetto più noto (e frainteso) del pensiero hobbesiano. Per una migliore comprensione dei testi e delle differenti (spesso opposte) interpretazioni cui hanno dato vita, si è ritenuto di proporre, per quanto concerne i brani di Hobbes, tanto la loro traduzione in lingua italiana quanto le stesure originali in latino e inglese, presentate con i testi a fronte; tale scelta fornisce l'opportunità di osservare l'accurata scelta di alcuni dei vocaboli chiave della filosofia di Hobbes, la cui trasposizione da una lingua all'altra è stata spesso causa di fraintendimenti o volgarizzazioni in tutto o in parte ingiustificate. Allo scopo di offrire una più completa prospettiva del pensiero hobbesiano delineato nei brani selezionati, si è ritenuto di affiancare ad essi dei frammenti di interpreti novecenteschi (con delle sintetiche schede bio-bibliografiche) di alcuni concetti formulati da Hobbes e, segnatamente, di F. Tönnies, M. Horkheimer, L. Strauss, C. Schmitt, T. Parsons, N. Bobbio, H. Warrender. (shrink)

It has been suggested that Gene Roddenberry, the creator of the original Star Trek series (TOS), more or less consciously built the equivalent of a philosophical argument in favor of Stoic philosophy by centering his story lines on the interacting and exquisitely complementary characters of Mr. Spock, Captain Kirk, and Doctor McCoy. Spock in particular was apparently purposefully meant by Roddenberry to represent Stoicism as he understood it. Modern practitioners of Stoicism, however, tend to see Spock as a “stoic” (lower-s) (...) in the vernacular sense of the term: going through life constantly sporting a stiff upper lip and suppressing his emotions. I argue in this chapter that, on the contrary, the evolution of Spock from the young officer serving on the Enterprise NCC-1701 to ambassador to the Romulans in the last movie based on TOS can be understood as the story of someone entering the path to sagehood in the Stoic sense. And yes, Stoicism definitely is about far more than stiff lips and the suppression of emotions. (shrink)

L’articolo affronta gli interessi storico-artistici del letterato e storico Francesco Saverio Quadrio (Ponte in Valtellina 1695-Milano 1756), noto soprattutto per i suoi studi sulla storia della poesia e della sua terra natale, la Valtellina. Nei suoi libri Quadrio ha raccolto e combinato diverse informazioni anche su artisti e opere d’arte. Non tutte le notizie raccolte sono affidabili, ma i suoi studi sono comunque stati una delle fonti per l’aggiornamento di volumi importanti per la loro grande diffusione internazionale, come gli studi (...) di Johann Caspar Füssli o il famoso Dictionary of Painters Pilkington. Si è perciò cercato di comprendere il metodo di lavoro di Quadrio, indagando l’origine delle sue ipotesi, ma anche gli effetti di queste nella storiografia successiva. (shrink)

A collection of five essays published previously. Partial contents.

In his article, Florian Vermeiren attributes to Leibniz – like other interpreters before him – the distinction of two different kinds of relations: 1) relations in the proper sense of the word as, for example, the fatherhood subsisting between Sophroniscus and Socrates, which Leibniz considers situated ‘outside the subjects’ involved; 2) relational properties, such as being a father, inherent in Sophroniscus. The distinction is clearly present in Leibniz’s writings. According to Vermeiren, Leibniz considers ‘purely mental’ only the relations ‘out of (...) the subjects’ and not the relational predicates, by means of which, on the other hand, the individuals of the Leibnizian world would be truly related. In this sense, therefore, Leibniz would admit the reality of relations, which would play an important role in his ontology. At least since 1686 (the year in which he wrote the Discourse), however, Leibniz states that the world is made only of individuals with their internal modifications: just as there are no properties with a leg in one subject and a leg in another, there are no individuals bound together by any kind of material nexus or ‘real’ ties. Thus, if we make a list of all fathers on the one hand and sons on the other, there remains the problem of how to properly connect the fathers exactly with their sons. Attributing to each of two related individuals a relational property is not enough to connect them. Being a father in David must necessarily refer in some way to Solomon as a son. Leibniz is aware of this, as his attempts to analyze relational propositions in his essays on rational grammar show. Given the sentence ‘Cajus is killed by Titius’ for example, Leibniz attempts to reduce it to an inference between a pair of categorical sentences, each of which attributes a relational predicate to the subject. Relations (and relational properties) result from the substances and their modes, “without producing any change” of themselves but only in virtue of a consequence, that is of a logical inference. The image of the world derived so from the Monadology and other Leibnizian writings is that of a world composed of a collection of isolated individuals, independent of each other and lacking mutual connections. Relational properties correspond to internal modifications of each individual: the second term, in the case of binary relations (the ‘external’ one: Helen, if Paris loves Helen) is resolved into an internal representation (of Paris, in this case). It is God who coordinates the various representations of individuals with each other, to result in a harmonious whole. Since relations are a consequence of the existence of the individual substances with their intrinsic properties, God himself can be said to be the creator of relations, in so far as he calls the individuals into existence. And this is exactly what Leibniz states, in his commentary on Temmik’s book. (shrink)