RESUMENLa filosofía del último Schelling presenta elementos decisivos para una ontología de la libertad. Hay dos temas que en el último Schelling llevan precisamente al desarrollo de la ontología de la libertad, encabezada por Luigi Pareyson: el éxtasis de la razón, a la que dio una interpretación profunda el mismo Pareyson y la estructura de la libertad de Dios, en cuya configuración yo también he insistido. El éxtasis es la interrupción del desarrollo de la razón, que llega a sus límites (...) y está fundada desde el ser – en el ser que la precede, y que escapa de su poder. Desde aquí Schelling intenta elaborar una concepción compleja y no siempre lineal de la libertad de Dios, ya como libertad de la creación, ya –más originariamente– como libertad frente a su propio ser. En este intento Schelling no alcanza a liberarse completamente de la tradición metafísica del principio de necesidad. La ontología de la libertad se libera de éste considerando la libertad no sólo como inicio, sino tambien como elección entre ser y no ser. De esta manera, por un lado, lo originario escapa radicalmente a la necesidad y, por el otro lado, precisamente porque su ser es elegido en una alternativa, la suya no es una simple autoposicion, que sucumbe a la necesidad, sino la posición de algo otro de sí, el ser, respecto al cual puede ejercer su libre poder.PALABRAS CLAVEDIOS, LIBERTAD, ONTOLOGÍA, RAZÓN, EXTASISABSTRACTThe philosophy of the last Schelling presents decisive insights for an ontology of freedom. Particularly two themes of the last Schelling lead to the ontology of freedom proposed by Luigi Pareyson: the ecstasy of reason of which Pareyson himself gave a profound interpretation and the structure of God’s freedom on the configuration of which I insisted too. Ecstasy is the interruption of the development of reason, which comes to its limits and is founded by the being, which is beyond reason’s power. From here, Schelling tries to process a complex and not always linear conception of God’s freedom both as freedom of creation and, more originally, as freedom of his own being. In this attempt Schelling does not depart completely from the metaphysical tradition of the principle of necessity. The ontology of freedom thinks freedom not only as a beginning, but as a choice between being and not being. In this way, on the one hand the absolute origin escapes radically from the necessity and on the other hand, just because its being is chosen within an alternative, its position of the being is not a simple self-position, which would succumb to the necessity, but the position of something different from itself: the being with regard to which it can exercise its free power.KEY WORDSGOD, FREEDOM, ONTOLOGY, REASON, ECSTASY. (shrink)

The metaphysical indispensability of the opposite principles of the one and the many can be justified by thinking of the original no longer as immovable or as causa sui. In the latter case a duplication is certainly justified but such as to flow back into unity. There is only real difference if what the original posits has a dimension of otherness in relation to it. Only by thinking of the original as liberty can a principle be conceived that is capable (...) of positing itself being able not to posit itself (because liberty is beginning and choice) and therefore one can think that what is posited is other than that which posits. This other is the being of the original liberty that has passed through pure beginning to existence. The original relationship of liberty and being can then further manifest itself in that the original liberty, which positing itself posits the totality of being, can posit aspects of its being outside itself. In this way the dimension of otherness is fully displayed because being posited outside itself, in that it is being of liberty, is free being that, though finite, cannot, precisely because it is free, give rise to full mediation with the infinite original. On the other hand, the principle of unity is not lost, but takes on a new form, that is to say that of love. (shrink)

The 'Enciclopedia Filosofica' is an encyclopaedia of philosophical topics promoted by the Centre for Philosophical Studies of Gallarate and published, in its third and last edition in 2006, by the Bompiani publishing house in Milan. The first edition of the 'Enciclopedia Filosofica' was promoted by the Centre for Philosophical Studies of Gallarate in the 1950s, seeing the light in 1957-58. A second edition, published by the Sansoni publishing house in Florence, was published in 1968-69 and reprinted in 1979. The third (...) and last edition, published by Bompiani in 2006, is intended to cover the whole of philosophical knowledge and related disciplines with over ten thousand entries edited by about a thousand academics, both Italian and non-Italian, and distributed in twelve volumes for a total of 12,496 pages. (shrink)