We believe that an account of the role of mirror neurons in language evolution should involve a greater emphasis on the auditory properties of these neurons. Mirror neurons in premotor cortex which respond to the visual and auditory consequences of actions allow for a modality-independent and agent-independent coding of actions, which may have been important for the emergence of language.

This monograph offers a comprehensive study of contingent a priori truths. Building onto a theoretical framework developed by the philosopher and logician Saul Kripke, the author also presents a new approach to these truths. The first part of the book details the many theories on contingent a priori truths. The coverage examines the cases of Kripke and David Kaplan, Donnellan and the de re requirement, Evans and weak contingency, as well as Plantinga, Salmon, Soames, and the pseudo a priori. (...) Overall, it provides a systematic discussion and critical review of all these many positions. Next, the author develops an alternative approach. His working hypothesis is that performative verbs must play a central role in Kripke's examples, even if they do not show up at the surface structure of the corresponding sentences. This opens up an entirely new way of looking at Kripke's cases and of treating them by exploring some aspects of the theory of illocutionary acts. His discussion also examines brute facts and institutional facts, indexicals and performatives, as well as Frege's theory of definitions. Providing an authoritative exploration into contingent a priori truths, this book will be of interest to students, academics, and researchers in philosophy and logic. (shrink)

This papers aims at clarifying some misunderstandings that seem to block an adequate account of de re thoughts within the Fregean framework. It is usually assumed that Fregean senses cannot be de re, or dependent upon objects. Contrary to this assumption, Gareth Evans and John McDowell have claimed that Fregean de re senses are not just possible, but in fact the most promising alternative for accounting for de re thoughts. The reasons blocking this alternative can be traced back to Russellian (...) considerations that contaminated the interpretation of Frege. This contaminated understanding is first detected in Tyler Burge’s distinction between de dicto and de re, then connected to the motivations behind David Kaplan’s notion of character, and finally found in John Searle’s descriptivist account. The difficulty in understanding de re thoughts is, roughly speaking, a side effect of the misunderstanding of the boundaries separating internal and external elements of thoughts, as well as the distinction between mental content and means of representation. (shrink)

In this paper, I review some standard approaches to the cases of contingent a priori truths that emerge from Kripke’s (1980) discussion of proper names and Kaplan’s (1989) theory of indexicals. In particular, I discuss Evans’ (1979) distinction between superficially and deeply contingent truths. I shall raise doubts about Evans’ strategy in general, and also about the roots and meaningfulness of the distinction.

El tema de las relaciones entre ciencia y religión es central en la obra de Ruse. No se trata de una mera curiosidad o de una cuestión tratada tangencialmente, sino que está en el corazón de sus preocupaciones intelectuales e incluso vitales (sección 1). Hay que señalar, además, que la actividad de Ruse coincide con una cierta encrucijada histórica, en la cual se enfrentan dos posiciones extremas y mutuamente hostiles, el creacionismo, por una parte, y el nuevo ateísmo, por otra (...) (sección 2). Para entender las propuestas respetuosas, matizadas y constructivas que hace Ruse, hay que situarlas en un marco teórico complejo, donde sean posibles actitudes menos burdas que el simple enfrentamiento (sección 3). Quizá la fórmula que mejor recoge las ideas de Ruse en este dominio sea la de “existencialismo darwinista”, como él mismo propone (sección 4). Por último, presentaré un resumen conclusivo de lo hallado (sección 5). (shrink)

La ética ambiental nació como justa contestación a los excesos del antropocentrismo. Sin embargo, un énfasis obsesivo en lo ético y en lo ambiental, con el consiguiente olvido de lo antropológico, puede estar dañando la vida humana, la libertad de las personas y la vida en general. Abogamos aquí por la construcción de una ecología humana que vaya más allá y más al fondo que las éticas ambientales al uso. Defendemos que el humanismo es perfectamente compatible con el reconocimiento del (...) valor inherente de todos los seres naturales. Lo hacemos basándonos principalmente en algunas ideas de Hans Jonas, aunque rechazamos su heurística catastrofista. De él retomamos la idea de que existe una responsabilidad moral hacia los demás seres vivos, empezando por los más próximos en el tiempo y en el espacio, y hacia el libre florecimiento de las personas actuales. Con ello, también, se rebaja el peso de lo ético sobre nuestra acción ecológica. Esta ha de atender principalmente a criterios experienciales, antropológicos, científicos y de sentido común. Por último, defendemos que la política, la educación y la comunicación ambiental deben orientarse directamente hacia la libertad y el desarrollo virtuoso de las personas actuales, y no hacia el control de las mismas por culpabilización. El tránsito desde la ética ambiental hacia la ecología humana —concluimos— puede ser beneficioso tanto para las personas como para la naturaleza. (shrink)

Este artículo trata de analizar la célebre frase orteguiana “e_l hombre no tiene naturaleza, sino que tiene… historia_” dentro del contexto de su obra, mostrando su génesis y su evolución, así como las interpretaciones que se le han venido dando a la misma. Junto a este análisis, se mostrará también la importancia de esta idea dentro de la filosofía de Ortega, así como la relevancia que estas ideas podrían tener para una posible reforma de la metafísica tradicional.

Esta pesquisa tem por objetivo realizar uma análise de projetos educacionais desenvolvidos por ONGs da RMC, tendo por cenário o período de aplicação das novas diretrizes neoliberais como tentativa de saída do capital para sua crise estrutural, sobressaindo-se a implementação da reestruturação produtiva, privatizações e a política do Estado mínimo, culminando em um processo de sociabilização, cuja crítica das formas de representação, destacando-se a ação estratégica do chamado terceiro setor e sua pedagogia do consenso, aplicadas por este Estado educador, se (...) faz imprescindível. (shrink)

Communication campaigns often highlight environmental progress to encourage further pro-environmental behaviour. Consequently, the drop in carbon emissions caused by the COVID-19 restrictions has been framed as a positive environmental outcome of the pandemic. We conducted an experimental study with a US-representative sample (N = 500) to show that raising awareness of emissions reduction has the contrary effect: an increase in moral self-concept facilitated a negative spillover, namely, it reduced climate-friendly behavioural intentions. Normative influence was able to prevent this negative spillover (...) because activating environmental norms inhibited compensatory feelings. Besides, awareness of recent emissions reduction was less likely to increase the moral self-concept of participants with a strong environmental self-identity. Our findings demonstrate that environmental progress increases moral self-concept which, in turn, could cause a negative spillover (i.e., reduce climate-friendly low-carbon behaviour and increase climate-harmful high-carbon behaviour). Normative influences and environmental self-identity can inhibit this negative spillover. (shrink)

This paper discusses how to define logics as deductive limits of sequences of other logics. The case of da Costa's hierarchy of increasingly weaker paraconsistent calculi, known as $ \mathcal {C}$n, 1 $ \leq$ n $ \leq$ $ \omega$, is carefully studied. The calculus $ \mathcal {C}$$\scriptstyle \omega$, in particular, constitutes no more than a lower deductive bound to this hierarchy and differs considerably from its companions. A long standing problem in the literature (open for more than 35 years) is (...) to define the deductive limit to this hierarchy, that is, its greatest lower deductive bound. The calculus $ \mathcal {C}$min, stronger than $ \mathcal {C}$$\scriptstyle \omega$, is first presented as a step toward this limit. As an alternative to the bivaluation semantics of $ \mathcal {C}$min presented thereupon, possible-translations semantics are then introduced and suggested as the standard technique both to give this calculus a more reasonable semantics and to derive some interesting properties about it. Possible-translations semantics are then used to provide both a semantics and a decision procedure for $ \mathcal {C}$Lim, the real deductive limit of da Costa's hierarchy. Possible-translations semantics also make it possible to characterize a precise sense of duality: as an example, $ \mathcal {D}$min is proposed as the dual to $ \mathcal {C}$min. (shrink)

Humans have engaged in artistic and aesthetic activities since the appearance of our species. Our ancestors have decorated their bodies, tools, and utensils for over 100,000 years. The expression of meaning using color, line, sound, rhythm, or movement, among other means, constitutes a fundamental aspect of our species' biological and cultural heritage. Art and aesthetics, therefore, contribute to our species identity and distinguish it from its living and extinct relatives. Science is faced with the challenge of explaining the natural foundations (...) of such a unique trait, and the way cultural processes nurture it into magnificent expressions, historically and ethnically unique. How do the human mind and brain bring about these sorts of behaviors? What psychological and neural processes underlie the appreciation of painting, music, and dance? How does training modulate these processes? Are humans the only species capable of aesthetic appreciation, or are other species endowed with the rudiments of this capacity? Empirical examinations of such questions have a long and rich history in the discipline of psychology, the genesis of which can be traced back to the publication of Gustav Theodor Fechner's Vorschule der Aesthetik in 1876, making it the second oldest branch in experimental psychology. The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Aesthetics brings together leading experts in psychology, neuroimaging, art history, and philosophy to answer these questions. It provides the most comprehensive coverage of the domain of empirical aesthetics to date. With sections on visual art, dance, music, and many other art forms and aesthetic phenomena, the breadth of this volume's scope reflects the richness and variety of topics and methods currently used today by scientists to understand the way our mind and brain endow us with the faculty to produce and appreciate art and aesthetics. (shrink)

Although ethical decision‐making theory has evolved over the years, within the field of management, research still revolves around James Rest’s (1986) four‐step framework, dominated by a positivist epistemology and a quantitative methodology. Given that currently there is a call for a theoretical, epistemological, and methodological renovation for the enlargement and enrichment of knowledge about how decisions are morally made in organizations, this paper has a double aim. First, by showing the models’ main flaws and limitations, it critically assesses the prominent (...) theoretical models of Rest, Trevino, and Jones. Then, for decision making in organizations, the paper aims to posit a fresh moral theory that addresses the phenomenon from a comprehensive epistemological perspective. To do so, it steps back from those prominent models in order to review John Dewey’s “theory of moral life.” At the core of the proposed comprehensive theoretical framework are Dewey’s concepts of a “moral standard” and “valuation.” Finally, the paper shows how the Dewey‐based framework can both overcome the flaws and limitations that are identified in those prominent models and can enrich empirical research, therefore contributing to developing as a whole the ethical decision‐making field. (shrink)

Is Bayesian decision theory a panacea for many of the problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science, or is it philosophical snake-oil? For years a debate had been waged amongst specialists regarding the import and legitimacy of this body of theory. Mark Kaplan had written the first accessible and non-technical book to address this controversy. Introducing a new variant on Bayesian decision theory the author offers a compelling case that, while no panacea, decision theory does in fact have (...) the most profound consequences for the way in which philosophers think about inquiry, criticism and rational belief. The new variant on Bayesian theory is presented in such a way that a non-specialist will be able to understand it. The book also offers new solutions to some classic paradoxes. It focuses on the intuitive motivations of the Bayesian approach to epistemology and addresses the philosophical worries to which it has given rise. (shrink)

Is Bayesian decision theory a panacea for many of the problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science, or is it philosophical snake-oil? For years a debate had been waged amongst specialists regarding the import and legitimacy of this body of theory. Mark Kaplan had written the first accessible and non-technical book to address this controversy. Introducing a new variant on Bayesian decision theory the author offers a compelling case that, while no panacea, decision theory does in fact have (...) the most profound consequences for the way in which philosophers think about inquiry, criticism and rational belief. The new variant on Bayesian theory is presented in such a way that a non-specialist will be able to understand it. The book also offers new solutions to some classic paradoxes. It focuses on the intuitive motivations of the Bayesian approach to epistemology and addresses the philosophical worries to which it has given rise. (shrink)

In this article, I address a controversial aspect of Rawls’s treatment of the question of justice between generations: how the parties in the original position could be motivated to select Rawls’s preferred principle of intergenerational savings, which he dubs the just savings principle. I focus on the explanation found in his later work, where he proposes that the correct savings principle is the principle that any generation would have wanted preceding generations to have followed. By expanding upon this explanation, I (...) respond to the objection that this explanation disregards the perspective of the first generation. I demonstrate that this objection ceases to be a concern when a proper account of the parties’ reasoning is developed. What is notable about the explanation I defend is that it relies on the parties adopting maximax – not maximin – as a rule for rational decision making. Having established this intermediary conclusion, I depart with Rawls and consider what savings principle the parties would choose if given more options. Ultimately, I argue that the parties would select a principle that Rawls would have undoubtedly rejected if presented to him at face value. This is because the principle of savings I argue would be selected requires continual economic growth over generations to increase upwards indefinitely – a conclusion Rawls is explicitly trying to avoid in his theory of justice. (shrink)

Milton Hatoum was born in 1952 in Manaus. His family was Lebanese. He studied architecture at São Paulo University and literature in Barcelone and Paris. He is a French literature professor at Amazonas University. His two novels: Relato de um certo Oriente (1989) and Dois Irmãos (2000), won the pr..

This paper is the result of some partial research done under the title Daily education, pedagogy and the environment: constructing an ecological perspective of education, where the ethnography of pedagogical practice is one of the principal components. The pedagogical proposal is framed within the t..

O presente texto é uma investigação bibliográfica sobre a obra de Sartre, O Ser e o Nada. Delimita-se o foco em apresentar o projeto sartreano de pensar a condição humana na sua existência radical, contingente e engajada no mundo. A atenção recai sobre o problema da liberdade que não se caracteriza de forma abstrata, mas que se concretiza na ação dentro de situação existencial e histórica. O objetivo é descrever a possibilidade de se pensar, a partir da compreensão sobre a (...) condição humana, o esboço de uma ética para educação – entendida como a liberdade de criar-se a si mesmo, de maneira autêntica, enquanto ser no mundo engajado com a própria situação existencial e histórica. This is a research based on literature on work by Sartre, Being and Nothingness. Our main objective is to present the sartrean project of thinking the human condition as radically contingent and engaged existences in the world. There is attention to the problem of freedom that is not characterized in the abstract, but which is actualized in action within the historical and existential situation. The objective is to describe the possibility of considering, from the perspective of the human condition, the sketch of an ethics from education – understood as the freedom of authentically creating oneself, as a being engaged in the world within his or her own historical and existential situation. (shrink)

Têm sido frequentes, na história recente do Brasil, os casos de interferência da religião em discussões públicas acerca de temas morais e, também, em decisões políticas. Isso frequentemente implica decisões polêmicas em temas que vêm recebendo cada vez mais atenção. Neste trabalho, teceremos alguns comentários sobre essa situação, tendo por ponto de partida a filosofia de David Hume.

In this work we present some reflections about the interaction of preschool children (between 3 and 5 years old) with sound-producing objects. We implemented the phenomenological approach of Alfred Schutz, who under the influence of Edmund Husserl, elaborated his own notions concerning the Lebenswelt or life-world. We present some situations of interaction with musical instruments by children that have been documented in different research on musical education in early childhood, the same ones we use to exemplify possible analyses from the (...) perspective of the phenomenology of the social world. We conclude with some remarks that conceive of Schutz’s theory as a relevant perspective for the analysis of children’s experiences with sound-producing objects. (shrink)

Completeness is an important but misunderstood norm of explanation. It has recently been argued that mechanistic accounts of scientific explanation are committed to the thesis that models are complete only if they describe everything about a mechanism and, as a corollary, that incomplete models are always improved by adding more details. If so, mechanistic accounts are at odds with the obvious and important role of abstraction in scientific modelling. We respond to this characterization of the mechanist’s views about abstraction and (...) articulate norms of completeness for mechanistic explanations that have no such unwanted implications. _1_ Introduction _2_ A Balancing Act: When Do Details Matter? _3_ The Norms of Causal Explanation _4_ The Norms of Constitutive Explanation _5_ Salmon-Completeness _6_ From More Details to More Relevant Details _7_ Non-explanatory Virtues of Abstraction _8_ From Explanatory Models to Explanatory Knowledge _9_ Mechanistic Completeness Reconsidered _10_ Conclusion. (shrink)

This edited volume explores the different and seminal ways colours matter to philosophy. Each chapter provides an insightful analysis of one or more cases in which colours raise philosophical problems in different areas and periods of philosophy. This historically informed discussion examines both logical and linguistic aspects, covering such areas as the mind, aesthetics and the foundations of mathematics. The international contributors look at traditional epistemological and metaphysical issues on the subjectivity and objectivity of colours. In addition, they also assess (...) phenomenological problems typical of the continental tradition and contemporary problems in the philosophy of mind. The chapters include coverage of such topics as Newton’s and Goethe’s theory of light and colours, how primary qualities are qualitative and colours are primary, explaining colour phenomenology, and colour in cognition, language and philosophy. "This book beautifully prepares the ground for the next steps in our research on and philosophising about colour" Daniel D. Hutto "It is not an overstatement to say that How Colours to Philosophy is a ground breaking publication" Mazviita Chirimuuta "Anyone interested in philosophical issues about color will find it highly stimulating." Martine Nida-Rümelin "The high quality papers included in this anthology succeed admirably in enriching current philosophical thinking about colour” Erik Myin “This is certainly the most complete collection of philosophical essays on colours ever published” André Leclerc “All in all this collections represents a new milestone in the ongoing philosophical debate on colours and colour expressions” Ingolf Max. (shrink)

Genetic engineering has been a topic of discussion for over 50 years, but it is only recently that gene editing has become a reality. CRISPR biotechnologies have made gene editing much safer, precise and feasible. We have witnessed the first cases of human germline genetic modification resulting in live births, conducted by He Jiankui. In this paper, we will analyse He Jiankui’s case in relation to one of the most difficult problems in procreative ethics (or the ethics of future generations): (...) the non‐identity problem. We believe that this analysis will help us to understand the ethics involved in gene editing and hopefully allow for a better, more philosophically grounded legislation on CRISPR and other gene‐editing technologies. (shrink)

We use exact saturation to study the complexity of unstable theories, showing that a variant of this notion called pseudo-elementary class (PC)-exact saturation meaningfully reflects combinatorial dividing lines. We study PC-exact saturation for stable and simple theories. Among other results, we show that PC-exact saturation characterizes the stability cardinals of size at least continuum of a countable stable theory and, additionally, that simple unstable theories have PC-exact saturation at singular cardinals satisfying mild set-theoretic hypotheses. This had previously been open even (...) for the random graph. We characterize supersimplicity of countable theories in terms of having PC-exact saturation at singular cardinals of countable cofinality. We also consider the local analog of PC-exact saturation, showing that local PC-exact saturation for singular cardinals of countable cofinality characterizes supershort theories. (shrink)

A central feature of experimental development economics is the use of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to evaluate the effectiveness of prospective socioeconomic interventions. The use of RCTs in development economics raises a host of ethical issues which are just beginning to be explored. In this article, I address one ethical issue in particular: the routine use of the status quo as a control when designing and conducting a development RCT. Drawing on the literature on the principle of standard care in (...) medical research ethics, as well as considerations of distributive justice in non-ideal circumstances, I argue that the practice of using the status quo as a control is ethically justifiable. However, I add an important qualification based on the natural duty of rescue to address the concern that my account is overly permissive. (shrink)

This paper introduces new logical systems which axiomatize a formal representation of inconsistency (here taken to be equivalent to contradictoriness) in classical logic. We start from an intuitive semantical account of inconsistent data, fixing some basic requirements, and provide two distinct sound and complete axiomatics for such semantics, LFI1 and LFI2, as well as their first-order extensions, LFI1* and LFI2*, depending on which additional requirements are considered. These formal systems are examples of what we dub Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFI) (...) and form part of a much larger family of similar logics. We also show that there are translations from classical and paraconsistent first-order logics into LFI1* and LFI2*, and back. Hence, despite their status as subsystems of classical logic, LFI1* and LFI2* can codify any classical or paraconsistent reasoning. (shrink)

In this paper I challenge the pernicious aspects of Milton Friedman's methodological outlook that continues to hold sway over mainstream neoclassical economists. I do this by showing how Friedman's own methodological dicta could have been used against him when he famously advanced the expectations critique of the Phillips curve at his presidential address to the American Economic Association. I use this case study to further suggest that psychological and neurophysiological data should not be deemed irrelevant to economic science.

We advocate here that the tractarian image of Logic was the great responsible for its collapse. We examine then some mentions of colors in Wittgenstein´s first book to show that its logic holds a conflict between truth-functionality (explicitly assumed and advocated there) and a (hidden) holism. This antagonism was already set in the very formulation of its ontology. Wittgenstein himself admits he did not notice this by the time of the Tractatus ´ elaboration. If he had noticed it, he could (...) have anticipated the Color Exclusion Problem. We discuss also unexpected interferences of space and time in the environment, which presented both the special kind of color exclusion (to be found in other systems) and his original notions of Logic. This shows inter alia that the image of coordinate system was modulating both the logical space notion in the Tractatus and its natural development in several systems of propositions [ Satzsysteme ] in his return to Philosophy. (shrink)

An overcomplete logic is a logic that ‘ceases to make the difference’: According to such a logic, all inferences hold independently of the nature of the statements involved. A negation-inconsistent logic is a logic having at least one model that satisfies both some statement and its negation. A negation-incomplete logic has at least one model according to which neither some statement nor its negation are satisfied. Paraconsistent logics are negation-inconsistent yet non-overcomplete; paracomplete logics are negation-incomplete yet non-overcomplete. A paranormal logic (...) is simply a logic that is both paraconsistent and paracomplete. -/- Despite being perfectly consistent and complete with respect to classical negation, nearly every normal modal logic, in its ordinary language and interpretation, admits to some latent paranormality: It is paracomplete with respect to a negation defined as an impossibility operator, and paraconsistent with respect to a negation defined as non-necessity. In fact, as it will be shown here, even in languages without a primitive classical negation, normal modal logics can often be alternatively characterized directly by way of their paranormal negations and related operators. So, instead of talking about ‘necessity’, ‘possibility’, and so on, modal logics could be seen just as devices tailored for the study of (modal) negation. This paper shows how and to what extent this alternative characterization of modal logics can be realized. (shrink)

Philosophische Bemerkungen. By Ludwig Wittgenstein. Edited by r. Rhees. (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1964; Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1964, p. 348). Published in the original German version without English translation. [Translator's Note: I chose to translate all the passages cited by Malcolm, the ones from the Bemerkungen as well as those of the Untersuchungen, directly from German. To this end, I used the editing of Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, Werkausgabe Band 1 and 2, 1984. In time, I am very (...) grateful to numerous suggestions for translation outputs and relevant corrections made by an anonymous reviewer of this magazine.]. (shrink)

Apresentaçáo da traduçáo do artigo de Paul Thagard.