- The Cognitive Science of Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Degrees of belief.Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.) - 2009 - London: Springer.details
|
|
Coming to Terms with our Human Fallibility: Christensen on the Preface.Mark Kaplan - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):1-35.details
|
|
Disagreement and the value of self-trust.Robert Pasnau - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2315-2339.details
|
|
The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press: Oxford.details
|
|
How can belief be akratic?Eugene Chislenko - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13925-13948.details
|
|
Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role?Susanna Siegel - 2013 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 4. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 240.details
|
|
What can we Learn from Buridan's Ass?Ruth Weintraub - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):281-301.details
|
|
Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.details
|
|
Decision Theory Unbound.Zachary Goodsell - forthcoming - Noûs.details
|
|
Against Radical Credal Imprecision.Susanna Rinard - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):157-165.details
|
|
How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence.James M. Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153-179.details
|
|
Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
|
|
Le droit de ne pas croire.Pascal Engel - 2012 - ThéoRèmes 2 (1).details
|
|
Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
|
|
Representation theorems and realism about degrees of belief.Lyle Zynda - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):45-69.details
|
|
Subjective causal networks and indeterminate suppositional credences.Jiji Zhang, Teddy Seidenfeld & Hailin Liu - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 27):6571-6597.details
|
|
Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.details
|
|
Decision theory and cognitive choice.John R. Welch - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):147-172.details
|
|
You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
|
|
Must rational intentions maximize utility?Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):73-92.details
|
|
Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
|
|
Can we do without pragmatic encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.details
|
|
Epistemology quantized: Circumstances in which we should come to believe in the Everett interpretation.David Wallace - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):655-689.details
|
|
Skeptical arguments.Jonathan Vogel - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):426–455.details
|
|
Defeasible Conditionalization.Paul D. Thorn - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):283-302.details
|
|
Against Deductive Closure.Paul D. Thorn - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):103-119.details
|
|
The Application of Constraint Semantics to the Language of Subjective Uncertainty.Eric Swanson - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (2):121-146.details
|
|
Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
|
|
Uncertainty, equality, fraternity.Rush T. Stewart - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9603-9619.details
|
|
Two Forms of Inconsistency in Quantum Foundations.Jer Steeger & Nicholas Teh - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (4):1083-1110.details
|
|
Probabilistic Opinion Pooling with Imprecise Probabilities.Rush T. Stewart & Ignacio Ojea Quintana - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (1):17-45.details
|
|
Distention for Sets of Probabilities.Rush T. Stewart & Michael Nielsen - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (3):604-620.details
|
|
What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
|
|
The Normative Role of Knowledge.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):265-288.details
|
|
Respecting Evidence: Belief Functions not Imprecise Probabilities.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (475):1-30.details
|
|
Acting on belief functions.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2023 - Theory and Decision 95 (4):575-621.details
|
|
Sleeping beauty should be imprecise.Daniel Jeremy Singer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3159-3172.details
|
|
Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution.Paul Silva - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):564-586.details
|
|
Reification as dependence on extrinsic information.Julius Sensat - 1996 - Synthese 109 (3):361 - 399.details
|
|
The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):667-685.details
|
|
On the coherence of higher-order beliefs.Stefan Schubert & Erik J. Olsson - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):112-135.details
|
|
Impossibility Results for Rational Belief.Gerhard Schurz - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):134-159.details
|
|
Chilling out on epistemic rationality: A defense of imprecise credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.details
|
|
Book review. [REVIEW]Michael Schütte - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (1):143-146.details
|
|
Answering the Bayesian Challenge.Mark Sargent - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (2):237-252.details
|
|
Suspending belief in credal accounts.Andrew del Rio - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):3-25.details
|
|
An Improved Dutch Book Theorem for Conditionalization.Michael Rescorla - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1013-1041.details
|
|
A Puzzle About Ineffable Propositions.Agustín Rayo - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):289 - 295.details
|
|
A Conflict between Indexical Credal Transparency and Relevance Confirmation.Joel Pust - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (3):385-397.details
|
|