12 found
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  1. Nonsense: a user's guide.Manish Oza - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Many philosophers suppose that sometimes we think we are saying or thinking something meaningful when in fact we’re not saying or thinking anything at all: we are producing nonsense. But what is nonsense? An account of nonsense must, I argue, meet two constraints. The first constraint requires that nonsense can be rationally engaged with, not just mentioned. In particular, we can reason with nonsense and use it within that-clauses. An account which fails to meet this constraint cannot explain why nonsense (...)
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  2. The value of thinking and the normativity of logic.Manish Oza - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (25):1-23.
    (1) This paper is about how to build an account of the normativity of logic around the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking. I take the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking to mean that representational activity must tend to conform to logic to count as thinking. (2) I develop a natural line of thought about how to develop the constitutive position into an account of logical normativity by drawing on constitutivism in metaethics. (3) I argue that, while (...)
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  3. The personality of public authorities.Manish Oza - 2024 - Law and Philosophy 43 (4):415-450.
    This paper is about when associations, and in particular associations that are part of the state, should be treated as legal persons. I distinguish two forms of association – those that render coherent the agency of their members and those that are group agents – and argue that only the latter should be treated as persons. Following this, I discuss the conditions under which associations that are part of the state can legitimately be group agents.
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  4.  18
    Agency and theoretical reason in The Practical Self.Manish Oza - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    My comments focus on the relation between theoretical reason and agency in Gomes’ account. I argue that, while Gomes is right that agency plays a role in relating us to an objective world, accounting for it does not require us to exclude theoretical reason in advance by requiring that the propositions to which we practically assent be theoretically undecidable. There are both theoretical and practical grounds for taking ourselves to have agency in thinking, and we should prefer an account of (...)
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  5. Fictions in legal reasoning.Manish Oza - 2022 - Dialogue 61 (3):451-463.
    A legal fiction is a knowingly false assumption that is given effect in a legal proceeding and that participants are not permitted to disprove. I offer a semantic pretence theory that shows how fiction-involving legal reasoning works.
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  6. Hegel and formal idealism.Manish Oza - 2022 - Hegel Bulletin:1-25.
    I offer a new reconstruction of Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s idealism. Kant held that we impose categorial form on experience, while sensation provides its matter. Hegel argues that the matter we receive cannot guide our imposition of form on it. Contra recent interpretations, Hegel’s argument does not depend on a conceptualist account of perception or a view of the categories as empirically conditioned. His objection is that given Kant’s dualistic metaphysics, the categories cannot have material conditions for correct application. This (...)
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    Nonsense: a user's guide.Manish Oza - 2025 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):452-482.
    Many philosophers suppose that sometimes we think we are saying or thinking something meaningful when we're not saying or thinking anything at all: we are producing nonsense. But what is nonsense? An account of nonsense must, I argue, meet two constraints. The first constraint requires that nonsense can be rationally engaged with, not just mentioned. In particular, we can reason with nonsense and use it within that-clauses. An account which fails to meet this constraint cannot explain why nonsense appears meaningful. (...)
    No categories
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  8.  4
    Freedom Under the Private Law Allan Beever.Manish Oza - 2024 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 37 (2):639-644.
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  9. Logical Form and the Limits of Thought.Manish Oza - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
    What is the relation of logic to thinking? My dissertation offers a new argument for the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking in the following sense: representational activity counts as thinking only if it manifests sensitivity to logical rules. In short, thinking has to be minimally logical. An account of thinking has to allow for our freedom to question or revise our commitments – even seemingly obvious conceptual connections – without loss of understanding. This freedom, I argue, requires that (...)
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  10. Allan Beever, Freedom Under the Private Law[REVIEW]Manish Oza - 2024 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence:1-6.
  11. Irit Samet, Equity: Conscience Goes to Market. [REVIEW]Manish Oza - 2020 - University of Toronto Law Journal 7 (2):216-222.
  12.  34
    Edward Kanterian: Frege: A Guide for the Perplexed. London/New York: Continuum, 2012. ISBN 978-0-8264-8764-3; $24.95, £14.99 (paperback); 248 pages. [REVIEW]Manish Oza - 2015 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 18 (1):278-285.