Training can influence behavioral performance and lead to brain reorganization. In particular, training in one modality, for example, auditory, can improve performance in another modality, for example, visual. Previous research suggests that one of the mechanisms behind this phenomenon could be the cross-modal recruitment of the sensory areas, for example, the auditory cortex. Studying expert musicians offers a chance to explore this process. Rhythm is an aspect of music that can be presented in various modalities. We designed an fMRI experiment (...) in which professional pianists and non-musicians discriminated between two sequences of rhythms presented auditorily or visually. Behavioral results showed that musicians performed in both visual and auditory rhythmic tasks better than non-musicians. We found no significant between-group differences in fMRI activations within the auditory cortex. However, we observed that musicians had increased activation in the right Inferior Parietal Lobe when compared to non-musicians. We conclude that the musicians’ superior visual rhythm discrimination is not related to cross-modal recruitment of the auditory cortex; instead, it could be related to activation in higher-level, multimodal areas in the cortex. (shrink)

The paper presented here illustrates the issue of philosophy within the contemporary practice of American medicine. Four forms of relationship between both disciplines will be discussed: philosophy and medicine, philosophy within medicine, medical philosophy, and philosophy of medicine. The aim of the paper is to illustrate the specificity of the proposed forms of relationship, i.e. the contrast between the autonomous approach of the both disciplines and the realistic philosophy of medicine promoted by Edmund D. Pellegrin, which closely links the issue (...) of the nature and theory of medicine with the undertaking of philosophical reflection. The issue of the topicality of Edmund D. Pellegrin's philosophy of medicine in the context of the current challenges of American health care will also be discussed. (shrink)

The presented article illustrates David DeGrazia’s bioethical standpoint regarding the theoretical and the practical problem of memory in the context of the personal identity of a patient suffering from Alzheimer's disease. The first part of the article is a presentation of the theoretical problem of memory in the context of numerical and narrative identity being the center of the metaphysical theory of the human person. The second part of the article presents a practical memory problem in the bioethical case of (...) a patient diagnosed with early stages of Alzheimer’s disease. The American bioethicist and philosopher David DeGrazia proposes that the theoretical solutions regarding the identity of the human person find their practical application in bioethics in resolving moral dilemmas in the health care. The final part of the article focuses on criticizing the possibilities of practical applications of theoretical solutions on the subject of the human person in the bioethical position of David DeGrazia. (shrink)

This essay examines the use of fictions in the reasoning of the House of Lords and United Kingdom Supreme Court in the context of two recent lines of authority on English tort law. First, the essay explores the relevance of counter-factual scenarios to liability in the tort of false imprisonment, in the light of the Supreme Court decisions in Lumba and Kambadzi. The second series of decisions is on causation in negligence claims arising from asbestos exposure. These cases have revealed (...) fundamental, ongoing judicial disagreement about the nature and extent of the exceptions made to general principles. The cases are also shown to lend force to Del Mar’s argument about the diachronicity of legal fictions. Overall, it is argued that such fictions play an important role in common law reasoning. (shrink)

Judging Virtuously: Developing an Empathic Capacity for Perceptual Sensitivity: A Review of Amalia Amaya and Ho Hock Lai , Law, Virtue and Justice.

This essay argues that the practical reason approach to the study of social conventions (and social normativity more generally) fails to adequately account for the fluency of social action in environments that we experience as familiar. The practical reason approach, articulated most recently in Andrei Marmor’s Social Conventions: From Language to Law (2009) does help us, though not wholly adequately, to understand how we tend to react to, and experience, unfamiliar situations or unfamiliar behaviors, that is, those situations in which (...) a certain practice becomes problematic or is problematized, or where we are obliged to, or moved to, justify or deliberate. The reason why the practical reason approach is not wholly adequate when it comes to understanding unfamiliar situations or unfamiliar behaviors is that it tends to subsume the unfamiliar under the familiar, that is, it tends to negatively evaluate anything that is deemed to be not in accordance with the rules and reasons already familiar to the observer. This excludes the possibility of the observer having to transform himself or herself, and thus change what is familiar to him or her. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to show to what extent Wittgenstein’s thinking about the problem of the meaning of life was influenced by Tolstoy. I begin with the problem of what Tolstoy’s writings, especially philosophical, Wittgenstein knew. Then I proceed to three areas of impact: (1) treating the question of the meaning of life as the central problem for philosophy, (2) defining Ethics in terms of the meaning of life, and (3) the idea that the solution of the problem of (...) the meaning of life lies in a practical change, not in giving a theoretical answer, which in turn is broken down into three more specific ideas, namely that (3a) the question concerning the meaning of life is a pseudo-question, that (3b) this vanishing of the question is not yet the solution, and that (3c) the solution of the problem of life consists in taking a religious attitude towards the world. I try to show that in point 1 Wittgenstein accepted Tolstoy’s general idea, but gave it his own version, which in turn makes the definition of Ethics in terms of the meaning of life in point 2 understandable; whereas in point 3 Wittgenstein accepts Tolstoy’s ideas and tries to formulate them in his own way. (shrink)

This paper considers the similarities between Adam Smith's device of the impartial spectator and the use of perspectival devices in common law reasoning. The paper adopts a reading of Smith's device as one involving the exercise of imaginative sympathy by an ordinarily virtuous, and culturally and historically situated, spectator who does not have a stake in the outcome of the scene being evaluated. The point here is to show that the impartial spectator is 1) a device of common, ordinary virtue (...) – both in the sense of being located in a culture at a specific point in time, and in the sense of possessing only moderate, achievable virtues ; and 2) a device that enables a focus on a situation, which requires imaginative work, emotional engagement and careful, particularised description. Having so modelled Smith's device, the paper shows the similarities between it and the use of perspectival devices in common law reasoning, specifically here via the ‘right-thinking member of society' test in defamation law. (shrink)

The paper aims at presenting a synthetic reconstruction of Kierkegaard’s late critique of what he called “official Christianity,” that is that which in the world counts as Christianity but which, according to Kierkegaard, has nothing to do with real Christianity. The paper begins with a short presentation of what according to Kierkegaard the essence of real Christianity is, with special emphasis on his idea of imitating Christ. Then his main reproaches follow: leading a pagan life and calling it Christian, rejection (...) of imitation of Christ and putting some verbal activities instead, and rejection of imitation of Christ and worshiping him instead. Those three points are supplemented by Kierkegaardian critique of clergy. In the final section it is argued that Kierkegaard’s critique is universal in scope, i.e. it concerns all major Christian denominations. (shrink)

What is the role and value of virtue, emotion and imagination in law and legal reasoning? These new essays, by leading scholars of both law and philosophy, offer striking and exploratory answers to this neglected question. The collection takes a holistic approach, inquiring as to the connections and relations between virtue, emotion and imagination. In addition to the principal focus on adjudication, essays in the collection also engage with a variety of different legal, political and moral contexts: eg criminal law (...) sentencing, the Black Lives Matter movement and professional ethics. A number of different areas of the law are addressed and the issues explored include: the benefits and limits of empathy in legal reasoning; the role of attention and perception in judicial reasoning;, the identification of judicial virtues and judicial vices ; the values and dangers of certain imaginative devices ; and the interactive and social dimensions of virtue, emotion and imagination. (shrink)

The papers selected for this volume offer a panorama of problems and methods at the intersection of legal theory and the humanities. The issues addressed include the role of the emotions and the imagination in legal reasoning, and the protection of the diversity of voices and perspective in the name of community. The articles balance renewed calls to humanise legal theory with those that analyse and explore the relevance of specific domains of the humanities - such as literature, architecture, music, (...) painting, drawing and film - for law. (shrink)

This collection brings together the most important and influential papers theorising the changing relationship between law and science. The articles span historical overviews of the attempts by legal scholars to model legal science on scientific methodology, and the efforts by legal philosophers scrutinising the claims made on behalf of genetics and neuroscience as to their implications for law and legal concepts. The volume strikes a balance between those that seek to protect law's autonomy against the perceived unwelcome inroads of science, (...) and those that seek to shape and change law by incorporating the latest scientific developments. (shrink)

This book provides a collection of 11 cutting-edge essays by leading young scholars, challenging long-held assumptions and offering new research paradigms in Philosophy of Law, in five parts: 1) methodology/metatheory; 2) reasoning/evaluating; 3) values/the moral life; 4) institutions/the social life; and 5) the global/international dimension.

This essay argues that the practical reason approach to the study of social conventions (and social normativity more generally) fails to adequately account for the fluency of social action in environments that we experience as familiar. The practical reason approach, articulated most recently in Andrei Marmor’s Social Conventions: From Language to Law (2009) does help us, though not wholly adequately, to understand how we tend to react to, and experience, unfamiliar situations or unfamiliar behaviors, that is, those situations in which (...) a certain practice becomes problematic or is problematized, or where we are obliged to, or moved to, justify or deliberate. The reason why the practical reason approach is not wholly adequate when it comes to understanding unfamiliar situations or unfamiliar behaviors is that it tends to subsume the unfamiliar under the familiar, that is, it tends to negatively evaluate anything that is deemed to be not in accordance with the rules and reasons already familiar to the observer. This excludes the possibility of the observer having to transform himself or herself, and thus change what is familiar to him or her. (shrink)

This paper discusses a much-neglected aspect of Neil MacCormick's theory of legal reasoning, namely what he calls ‘consequential reasoning’. For MacCormick, consequential reasoning is both an omnipresent feature of legal reasoning in England and Scotland, as well as being a valuable one. MacCormick articulates the value of consequential reasoning by seeing it as contributing to the forward-looking requirement of formal justice, ie, of deciding the instant case on grounds that one is willing to adopt when deciding future similar cases. This (...) paper situates consequential reasoning in the overall picture of legal reasoning MacCormick develops in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, going on to show the evolution of his view on consequential reasoning in later work, which culminates in Rhetoric and the Rule of Law. It is argued that MacCormick's later view of consequential reasoning, ie, of a process of testing possible rulings by evaluating the acceptability or unacceptability.. (shrink)

This paper argues that the exercise of the imagination requires us 1) to attempt to describe features of a certain practice that appear, at first blush, natural and obvious; 2) to understand that that which appears natural and obvious could be otherwise; and 3) to be open to the introduction of changes to that which appears natural and obvious. Imagination, in this sense, is quite different to creativity. The latter works on the basis of the introduction of variations to settled (...) phenomena. This exercise of creativity is important, but ultimately, it contributes principally to the stability and identity of a community and reinforces its most firmly established features. Imagination, on the other hand, is more difficult, for it strikes at the very heart of that which is settled. Changes to that which is settled may not only be resisted, but may also be violently opposed. And yet, it is precisely the very ability and willingness to be open to such changes that may be of the most ethical and political significance. These differences between creativity and imagination are illustrated in the context of the practice of philosophy. (shrink)

This paper argues that concepts of legality in legal theory can be profitably understood as being underwritten by modes of spatio-temporal objectification. In the first part of the paper, a scheme of such modes is provided, and a map of jurisprudential inquiries is thereby offered. In the second part of the paper, two concepts of legality – underwritten by two different modes of spatio-temporal objectification – are analysed. The analysis shows how both concepts of legality lead to different sets of (...) prescriptive resources as to the evaluation and design of legal systems. Finally, it is argued that the response of legal theory to practical challenges within the public sphere cannot afford to be based on any one concept of legality. Rather, we need to be pluralists about concepts of legality, recognising the limitations of any one such concept – represented, in this paper, by way of spatio-temporal objectification that underwrites those concepts. A crisis in legal theory can- not be claimed on the basis of any alleged lack of correspondence between any one concept of legality and reality. On the contrary, a crisis will ensue to the extent that legal theory becomes dominated by theoretical imperial- ism, namely, by the belief that any one concept of legality is capable of capturing the world as it is, and, therefore, also capable of standing as a foundation for a prescriptive agenda. The vice of theoretical imperialism in- duces anxiety over the identity of a discipline, and leads to a quelling of the very theoretical diversity that is required for an ethical response to the spe- cific complexity of the public sphere.Resumen:En este artículo se sostiene que los conceptos de legalidad, dentro de la teoría del derecho, pueden entenderse con mayor provecho si se piensa que están determinados por modos de objetivación espacio-temporal. En la primera parte se presenta un esquema de tales modos y, de esa manera, se ofrece un mapa de las investigaciones iusfilosóficas. En la segunda parte, se analizan dos conceptos de legalidad —determinados por dos modos diferentes de objetivación espacio-temporal—. El análisis muestra cómo ambos conceptos de legalidad conducen a diferentes conjuntos de fuentes prescriptivas para la evaluación y el diseño de los sistemas jurídicos. Finalmente, se sostiene que la respuesta de la teoría del derecho a los problemas prácticos del ámbito público no puede basarse en un solo concepto de legalidad. Por el contrario, es necesario ser pluralistas sobre los conceptos de legalidad y reconocer las limitaciones de cada uno de ellos —representados, en este ensayo, por la objetivación espacio-temporal que los suscribe—. No se puede asegurar que la teoría del derecho esté en crisis sobre la base de una presunta falta de correspondencia entre algún concepto de legalidad y la realidad. Por el contrario, aquella se generará en la medida en que la teoría del derecho llegue a estar dominada por un imperialismo teórico, a saber, por la creencia de que cualquier concepto de legalidad es capaz de capturar el mundo tal como es, y, por lo tanto, que es capaz de erigirse como fundamento para una agenda prescriptiva. El vicio de un imperialismo teórico induce una inquietud sobre la identidad de una disciplina, y conduce a sofocar la diversidad teórica que se requiere para dar una respuesta ética a la complejidad concreta del ámbito público. (shrink)

This paper considers whether, and if so how, the modelling of joint action in social philosophy – principally in the work of Margaret Gilbert and Michael Bratman – might assist in understanding and applying the concept of concerted practices in European competition law. More specifically, the paper focuses on a well-known difficulty in the application of that concept, namely, distinguishing between concerted practice and rational or intelligent adaptation in oligopolistic markets. The paper argues that although Bratman's model of joint action (...) is more psychologically plausible and phenomenologically resonant, its less demanding character also makes it less useful than Gilbert's in our understanding of the legal concept of concerted practice and in dealing with the above difficulty. The paper proceeds in two parts: first, a discussion of the concept of concerted practices in European competition law; and second, a discussion of Gilbert and' Bratman's models of joint action, including a comparative assessment of their ability to provide an evidentiary target and an evidentiary platform for conceited practices. (shrink)

This paper argues that legal theorists should give up the pursuit of determining the mode of law's existence - whether in the form of rules, as in HLA Hart, or in the form of norms, as in Hans Kelsen. Attempting to determine the mode of law's existence results in two mistakes: first, it presupposes the possibility of content-determination (of rules or norms), resulting in a more (Kelsen) or less (Hart) stringent reference theory of meaning; second, it presupposes unproblematic access to (...) a sphere of brute reality upon which the existence of rules or norms is said to supervene. Both mistakes are illustrated by reference to a reading of Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law and HLA Hart's The Concept of Law. Two alternatives for legal theory are offered: first, meta-analysis, as exemplified in the paper, whereby a theorist considers the puzzles and difficulties of taking a certain theoretical aim (in this paper, that of determining the mode of law's existence) and talking about it in specific ways (in this paper, using existence talk); and second, an ontology-free legal theory the task of which is to pursue the improvement of the role that legal work plays in the protection of the moral quality of the lives of individuals and communities. The foundations of an ontology-free legal theory are illustrated by reference to the pragmatic pluralism of Hilary Putnam's approach to ethics in his Ethics without Ontology. (shrink)

This paper argues that we need to go beyond norms and normativity in the study of social life. The main purpose of the paper is to offer concepts and resources for a study of familiarity and estrangement, which, it is argued, is better placed to remind us, as we constantly need to be reminded, of one the most difficult things about living together, namely, how we understand the world of another person and with what attitude we approach all that which (...) is unfamiliar to us. (shrink)

This paper offers an account of two political traditions. The first tradition is that of allegiance to abstract principles and procedures; the second is that of responsiveness to the needs of persons and communities. The first two parts of the paper describe some of the basic features of each tradition, while also paying attention to the problems and difficulties within them. The third part of the paper shows how we can see the same tension, i.e., between allegiance and responsiveness, at (...) play in the practice of public philosophy. The paper argues for the importance of maintaining a tension between the two traditions. Ultimately, the paper calls for more attention to be paid to the relationship between, on the one hand, how we understand law and pursue justice, and, on the other, how we practice public philosophy. (shrink)

This paper argues that the development of ethical education in law schools ought not to be restricted to the use of textual resources. In the first part of the paper, the continuing dominance of text as the object of analysis in legal theory, legal scholarship and legal practice is illustrated. The dangerous implications of this continuing dominance on the capacity to see and recognise the great variety and depth of suffering and vulnerability is also discussed. It is argued that recourse (...) ought to be had to those traditions of moral philosophy that emphasise the importance of cultivating vision as a form of moral discipline - a discipline, in turn, that can benefit a great deal from the use of non-textual resources, and in particular, from both the appreciation of and involvement in the visual and movement-based arts. In the second part of the paper the treatment of ethical education in the recent Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching Report on Educating Lawyers is discussed. It is argued that we ought not to subsume the development of ethical education under the canopy of professionalism - a canopy already saturated with text, both in the form of the substantive and procedural law that is expected to be applied, and in the form of the evaluation of professional conduct in accordance with the relevant professional code. Finally, in the third part of the paper, a number of policy recommendations are made. Ultimately, the paper calls for an ethical education that combines both textual and non-textual resources. It is only via such a combination that law schools can provide sufficient opportunities for the range of ethical experiences that are required in order to enhance the effective development of the ethical imagination in law students. (shrink)

This paper offers some resources for the development of moral sensitivity in law schools and law firms. It does so, first, on the basis of a picture of legal life, which draws on the embodied-connectionist strand in cognitive science. Legal life requires role-differentiated behaviour, and immersion in these roles, and associated tasks, has the consequence that persons are oriented to notice only certain things rather than others (where those things will sometimes be morally relevant things to notice). Further, the lawyer-client (...) relationship is one characterised by the exercise of dominance, control and manipulation (by the lawyer) of a client dependent on the exercise of the lawyer's expertise. Moral education in law schools and law firms must help alleviate the problematic effects of these features of legal life on the moral sensitivity of persons. It can do so by the education of attention and encounter. Both terms are discussed and, by drawing on the Beyond Text in Legal Education project at the University of Edinburgh, associated pedagogical activities are described. Finally, the activities proposed, and their policy implications, are considered by reference to the wider concerns of both tertiary and professional legal education. (shrink)

This paper argues against two extreme attitudes to the history of a discipline: on the one hand, ignorance and dismissiveness; and on the other hand, canonisation. The ever-present challenge is to find a balance between these two extremes. The paper attempts to walk the middle way by offering an alternative history of theories of law. It does so by revealing the basic characteristics of theories of law that tend towards either the explanatory paradigm of discourse or of tradition. Discourse -oriented (...) theories tend to give explanatory priority to autonomous systems or orders of already articulated rules or norms. They also tend to conceptualise behaviour from the first person ex ante perspective, and tend to require explicit deliberation, even at the level of social conventions. The political value behind these theories tends to be the imposition of social order from above and the constraint of the power of officials by the rule of law. Tradition-oriented theories tend to give explanatory priority to the long-term activities of persons interacting in certain distinct contexts. They tend to conceptualise behaviour as consisting of embodied, though not completely unreflective, learning, resulting in the formation of certain skills and propensities. They also tend to focus on the transmission of social knowledge via the involvement of persons in certain contexts of interaction. The political value behind these theories is that of responsiveness and attention to the needs of the disadvantaged. The paper does not set out to evaluate the strengths or weaknesses of either explanatory paradigm. Rather, the aim is to offer an alternative history of the discipline of jurisprudence, with the hope that it encourages the construction of other such histories, thereby opening up possibilities for finding new insights in the works of the past. If, as it is argued, the formation of a jurisprudential orientation is at least partly dependent on how a legal theorist understands the history of jurisprudence, then offering alternative ways of seeing that history also carries with it the potential for renewing the discipline. (shrink)