This article provides a critical reexamination of Blaise Pascal’s fragment on the “eternal silence of infinite spaces”, challenging the conventional objections, notably those by Paul Valéry. It presents an analytical journey through the philosophical and existential dimensions of Pascal’s text, exploring the unique interplay between human solitude and cosmic silence. The discussion navigates the intricate relationship between individual perception and the overarching sense of existential dread evoked by the universe’s vastness. This exploration is enriched by contrasting Pascal’s insights with broader (...) philosophical contexts, including references to Kierkegaard and the concept of the ‘music of the spheres’. Ultimately, the paper offers a nuanced interpretation of Pascal’s work, emphasizing its enduring relevance in understanding the human condition within the unfathomable expanse of the universe. (shrink)

Entre os muitos textos em que Leibniz introduz e apresenta o princípio de razão suficiente está, como se sabe, o do parágrafo 7 dos Princípios da Natureza e da Graça. O texto diz: "Jusqu'icy nous n'avons parlé qu'en simples Physiciens: maintenant il faut s'elever à la Metaphysique, en nous servant du Grand Principe, peu employé communement, qui porte que rien ne se fait sans raison suffisante, c'est à dire que rien n'arrive, sans qu'il soit possible à celuy qui connoitroit assés (...) les choses, de rendre une Raison qui suffise pour determiner, pourquoy il en est ainsi, et non pas autrement. Ce principe posé, la premiere question qu'on a droit de faire, sera, Pourquoy il y a plustôt quelque chose que rien? Car le rien est plus simple et plus facile que quelque chose. De plus, supposé que des choses doivent exister, il faut qu'on puisse rendre raison, pourquoy elles doivent exister ainsi, et non autrement" (LEIBNIZ, 1978a, 602). O texto é evidentemente muito denso e inclui uma enorme multiplicidade de aspectos que deveriam ser analisados, por exemplo, o pouco uso que se faz de um princípio que, todavia, está sempre presente em tudo o que pensamos e fazemos; o facto de ter de haver uma razão para haver algo e para haver o que há; o facto de o nada ser mais fácil do que o ente; que se entende, afinal, por razão, que é que queremos dizer quando dizemos que há razão para qualquer coisa; que é que a noção de suficiência acrescenta (ou não acrescenta) à noção de razão (isto é, uma razão insuficiente é, nalgum sentido do termo, ainda uma razão?), etc. O problema é, aliás, bem actual. D. Parfit, em On What Matters, escreve logo na primeira página do primeiro capítulo: "It is hard to explain the concept of reason, or what the phrase 'a reason' means. Facts give us reasons, we might say, when they count in favour of our having some attitude, or our acting in some way. But 'counts in favour of' means roughly 'gives a reason for'. Like some other fundamental concepts (…), the concept of a reason is indefinable in the sense that it cannot be helpfully explained merely by using words"(PARFIT, 2011, p. 31). Ou seja, não é claro a que é que corresponde a noção de razão, e apesar de Parfit ignorar tranquilamente o que a tradição pensou sobre o assunto, pode valer a pena regressar a Leibniz, também porque Leibniz se vangloria com frequência de dizer que o princípio de razão suficiente é o seu princípio. (shrink)

Segundo o autor do artigo, o estudo do tédio na obra de Kierkegaard tem sido objecto de relativamente pouco interesse, sobretudo quando comparado com a angústia, a melancolia, a ironia ou o desespero. A verdade, porém, é que o tédio constitui uma disposição fundamental, um limite extremo de uma forma da existência. Neste sentido, o artigo pretende fazer uma análise das principais formas que a disposição do tédio assume, e da sua particular relevância no interior do que, na obra de (...) Kierkegaard, se chama "estádio estético". Em ordem a esse fim, o autor analisa a relação que o tédio mantém com as possibilidades que a vida disponibiliza e, sobretudo, a sua peculiar relação com o nada. Mostra-se sobretudo que tipo de lucidez se pode considerar como efeito do tédio, qual o aspecto da vida que nele se torna patente e de que forma, por ele, o sujeito acaba por reconhecer estar constituído numa superioridade relativamente a tudo o que é finito. Assim, no centro deste estudo estão as determinações fundamentais de disposição e de finito, bem como, num segundo momento, o esboço de uma "anatomia comparada" das disposições fundamentais do sujeito humano, a saber, do tédio, da melancolia e da angústia. \\\ The study of boredom in Kierkegaard's work has attracted relatively little interest compared to the more visited themes of anxiety, melancholy, irony and despair. For Kierkegaard, boredom is a fundamental mood. And only when we are in this mood can we experience one of the extreme states of existence. For Kierkegaard, boredom manifests itself in what he terms the "aesthetic stage". With this premise in mind, the article explains the relationship boredom has with the possibilities life puts before us, but more importantly its peculiar relationship with nothingness. The article explores in particular the effect boredom has on lucidity and, more specifically, attempts to answer the question about the aspect of life that is better perceived when the subject is in a state of boredom. A crucial question, for example, is this: how does being in a state of boredom reveal to the human subject the fact that he/she is superior to everything that is finite? At the centre of the article are the notions of mood and finiteness, in accordance to which the author delivers what might be called a "comparative anatomy" of fundamental states of human existence such as boredom, melancholy and anxiety. (shrink)

In the last decades, Hegel’s mature political philosophy has come to be associated with some form of social or welfare liberalism. Challenging this line of interpretation, this study aims to show that his work harbours a more ambitious philosophical programme, grounded in a different vision of the modern state. However, this programme is only partly spelled out in the Philosophy of Right. While the conceptual logic that guides Hegel’s dialectical progression points beyond the modern liberal standpoint, some of his concrete (...) political choices are more conservative, and some are even opposed to the change of perspective I claim to be at stake in his work. In response to this tension, I undertake a systematic reconstruction of his social and political views, divided into two main parts. First, I highlight the critical dimension I take to be explicitly present in the Philosophy of Right but neglected or misrepresented in the secondary literature. I argue that the different stages of Hegel’s progression are not merely added to one another, but qualitatively transformed, and hence that his account of the state should not be read as a mere complement to the stage of civil society, but as a direct challenge to its underlying logic. Second, I draw the political and economic conclusions implicit in this line of approach. Shifting the focus from Hegel’s interpreters to Hegel himself, I show that the conscious pursuit of the common good he regards as essential to a rational state is not compatible with a capitalist production system nor with the constitutional monarchy he proposes. A true dialectical synthesis of the particular interests of individuals and the general interests of society entails nothing less than a comprehensive democratization of the economic and the political spheres. And the need for this transformation holds the key to Hegel’s enduring political relevance. (shrink)

This investigation analyzed the attitudes of Portuguese judges and victim support professionals toward intimate partner homicide committed by women. By administering an online survey disseminated by the Portuguese Superior Council for the Magistracy and the Commission for Citizenship and Gender Equality, we found that both groups of professionals are not always aligned in their attitudes toward domestic violence and intimate partner homicide, which could jeopardize the articulation between both sectors needed for an effective preventive intervention. However, most professionals of both (...) groups tend to disagree that women provoke their aggressors or lie about their condition as victims of domestic violence and agree that there is a need for increased security and prevention of intimate partner homicides against female and male victims when reporting domestic violence. (shrink)

L’articolo si incentra sul recente volume dell’autrice, “La filosofia a scuola e le relazioni con gli altri”, basato su una ricerca svoltasi attraverso interviste a studenti e docenti di filosofia in cinque istituti superiori di Udine. Agli intervistati è stato chiesto se la filosofia insegnata a scuola riuscisse a mutare la loro visione del mondo e, soprattutto, le loro relazioni con gli altri. L’articolo si sviluppa in tre parti: la prima analizza le premesse metodologiche del libro, la seconda verte sul (...) cambiamento di Weltanschauung e sulle relazioni interpersonali, la terza sulla filosofia come disciplina scolastica. Attraverso la prospettiva fenomenologica, diviene così possibile comprendere gli effetti più o meno incisivi della filosofia sull’esistenza dei ragazzi. (shrink)

A growing body of evidence in cognitive psychology and neuroscience suggests a deep interconnection between sensory-motor and language systems in the brain. Based on recent neurophysiological findings on the anatomo-functional organization of the fronto-parietal network, we present a computational model showing that language processing may have reused or co-developed organizing principles, functionality, and learning mechanisms typical of premotor circuit. The proposed model combines principles of Hebbian topological self-organization and prediction learning. Trained on sequences of either motor or linguistic units, the (...) network develops independent neuronal chains, formed by dedicated nodes encoding only context-specific stimuli. Moreover, neurons responding to the same stimulus or class of stimuli tend to cluster together to form topologically connected areas similar to those observed in the brain cortex. Simulations support a unitary explanatory framework reconciling neurophysiological motor data with established behavioral evidence on lexical acquisition, access, and recall. (shrink)

This paper aims to find, in Merleau-Ponty’s late thinking, a definition of the virtual which aligns with the latest advancements in digital technology while avoiding a reduction to the digital realm or a stark opposition to reality. The virtual is considered as a crucial characteristic in Merleau-Ponty’s late ontology, especially in The Visible and the Invisible, where a “virtual focus” or “virtual center” of the flesh is introduced. The argument posits that Merleau-Ponty’s monism of the flesh results in a dynamic (...) view of virtuality, with significant ontological implications that reshape the relationship between the digital and the analogue. Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the virtual is defined by several key features: it applies to a monist perspective on reality, to a dynamic relationality between dialectic poles, and to the fabric of reality. This interpretation of the virtual implies a divergence from the digital, as virtuality belongs to the whole spectrum of reality. (shrink)

Although Hegel is increasingly recognized as an important figure in the history of political economy, his economic views are never strictly economic. In contrast to other modern thinkers, his primary concern is not the economic efficacy of different practices or institutions but the extent to which they enable and promote the development of human freedom. In this article, I argue that Hegel's pioneering critique of modern liberal economy plays out simultaneously at a more empirical level, corresponding to the properly economic (...) dimension of his analysis, and at a deeper, logical level, which grounds and guides his position. Moreover, I argue that the tendency to favour the first of these levels, found in most of the literature on Hegel's economic thought, reduces the Philosophy of Right's main argument to a more or less vigorous plea for economic interventionism. Against this kind of reading, I show that a renewed focus on the text's logical structure reveals a different and more radical philosophical proposition, which has yet to be fully acknowledged. In particular, I argue that Hegel's dialectical logic leads him beyond the liberalism-interventionism debate, towards a qualitatively different conception of social and economic relations. (shrink)

Although Hegel is increasingly recognized as an important figure in the history of political economy, his economic views are never strictly economic. In contrast to other modern thinkers, his primary concern is not the economic efficacy of different practices or institutions but the extent to which they enable and promote the development of human freedom. In this article, I argue that Hegel's pioneering critique of modern liberal economy plays out simultaneously at a more empirical level, corresponding to the properly economic (...) dimension of his analysis, and at a deeper, logical level, which grounds and guides his position. Moreover, I argue that the tendency to favour the first of these levels, found in most of the literature on Hegel's economic thought, reduces the Philosophy of Right's main argument to a more or less vigorous plea for economic interventionism. Against this kind of reading, I show that a renewed focus on the text's logical structure reveals a different and more radical philosophical proposition, which has yet to be fully acknowledged. In particular, I argue that Hegel's dialectical logic leads him beyond the liberalism‐interventionism debate, towards a qualitatively different conception of social and economic relations. (shrink)

The paper discusses a posthuman reading of Merleau-Ponty’s later works and an application of the concept of flesh to the digital dimension. Whereas, in the Phenomenology of Perception, the world and other beings are seen from an egological and human perspective, in The Visible and the Invisible this perspective is reshaped. Human body is made of the same stuff of other bodies, and they constitute a common being, the flesh of the world. Merleau-Ponty sets out a path through flat ontology (...) and posthumanism, opposing human perspective as a privileged one. His posthuman turn passes through the concepts of reversibility and divergence. Humans are made of the same stuff as non-humans, so they reverse into one another, but, on the other hand, they are not reduced to an undifferentiated entity, because of their divergence. Merleau-Ponty’s problematizing perspective is here actualized and applied to the hybridization between human bodies and digital protheses. (shrink)

The paper is focused on the concept of perceptual relation according to experimental phenomenology, belonging to Gestaltist and ecological traditions. First of all, it will be shown the meaning of “relation” in the perceptual domain, including a specific definition of object and subject. For this purpose, the paper will present the difference with the representationalist perspective, which challenges immediate experience and the perception of unified objects. Secondly, the concept of “perceptual relation” will be compared to the idea of Gestalttheorie’s “intrinsic (...) relation”. It will be sustained that perceptual relations do not concern only connections between the parts and the whole of a configuration, but they extend to otherness, namely perceptual object, other subjects, and the Umwelt. For this purpose, the paper will provide some examples of ambiguity of the relation ground-figure, especially reversible and bistable figures. (shrink)

El autor muestra en el artículo que la reforma baconiana del saber no puede ser enteramente comprendida y justamente valorada si es que no se repara en el fuerte cariz religioso, de raigambre calvinista, de esta empresa. Desde este punto de vista, el saber no es un puro empeño teórico, sino la herramienta mediante la cual el hombre podrá recuperar su condición original de señor de la naturaleza. Este saber, sin embargo, no puede estar desprovisto de caridad: debe poder mejorar (...) la triste condición humana. Esto último situaría, paradójicamente, a Bacon, el llamado padre de la Revolución Industrial, entre aquellos que repudiarían nuestro actual mundo tecnificado, puesto que el saber debe desterrar la soberbia humana y fundarse en la obediencia a la voluntad de Dios. (shrink)

Pour introduire à l’article de Lewis et Langton sur la définition des propriétés intrinsèques, il faut rappeler que les propriétés intrinsèques diffèrent d’autres notions comme les propriétés essentielles, les propriétés monadiques, les propriétés catégoriques, les propriétés qualitatives. Les propriétés intrinsèques sont définies selon David Lewis à partir de la notion plus primitive de propriété « naturelle », ce qu’il a continué à modifier jusqu’à des textes plus récents.

Very often reality is identified with our knowledge of it, and in turn our knowledge of reality is identified with the linguistic manner of describing it. It is claimed that the three moments cannot be identified, by pointing out some crucial differences among them obtained through an analysis of the power and limitations of languages and of the manners of acquisition of knowledge.

Several complementary approaches have been fruitful in the study of transport from the ER to the Golgi complex in yeast. Mutational analysis has led to the identification of genes required for this process, many of which are now being studied at the molecular and biochemical level. In the case of SEC18, DNA sequence analysis has demonstrated homology to a factor needed for transport in mammalian in vitro systems. In addition, the events that take place at this stage of the secretory (...) pathway have been reconstituted in vitro. (shrink)

Although Hegel is increasingly recognized as an important figure in the history of political economy, his economic views are never strictly economic. In contrast to other modern thinkers, his primary concern is not the economic efficacy of different practices or institutions but the extent to which they enable and promote the development of human freedom. In this article, I argue that Hegel's pioneering critique of modern liberal economy plays out simultaneously at a more empirical level, corresponding to the properly economic (...) dimension of his analysis, and at a deeper, logical level, which grounds and guides his position. Moreover, I argue that the tendency to favour the first of these levels, found in most of the literature on Hegel's economic thought, reduces the Philosophy of Right's main argument to a more or less vigorous plea for economic interventionism. Against this kind of reading, I show that a renewed focus on the text's logical structure reveals a different and more radical philosophical proposition, which has yet to be fully acknowledged. In particular, I argue that Hegel's dialectical logic leads him beyond the liberalism‐interventionism debate, towards a qualitatively different conception of social and economic relations. (shrink)

This paper draws on previous research carried out by the author on the educative relationship between teacher and student in schools and universities, in order to enrich it with further studies and considerations on distance learning. The author uses the phenomenological method, assuming the point of view of both members of the relationship (student and teacher). The general characteristics of the relationship (reciprocity, asymmetry, and verticality) and the differences between the two parties involved (age and/or developmental stage, educational role, mastery (...) of the discipline, and institutional role) remain, but are articulated differently: this mainly happens, because in distance learning the perception of the body of the other person is partial or absent, hindering the phenomena of pairing and empathy. It is thus shown that distance learning cannot replace face-to-face teaching, however, it is able to support and supplement it. (shrink)

This paper is focused on the possibility of a dialogue between Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) and phenomenology, a dialogue concerning the problem of objects and relations. In the first part, the author shows what is interesting in OOO from a phenomenological perspective and why it should be considered as a challenge for contemporary philosophy. The second part develops the phenomenological perspective of the author, a perspective based on Merleau-Ponty’s “carnal” phenomenology, as well as some suggestions coming from the Italian school of (...) Gaetano Kanizsa. The third part is dedicated to the objections of the author to the OOO view regarding the separation between objects and relations: a separation which leads to Harman’s quadruple object. In the concluding portion, the author shows that, despite evident differences between phenomenological and OOO’s views of relations, OOO offers new starting points for phenomenological reflections, thanks to its specific focus on objects and its pluralistic view of reality. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce a theory of finite sets FST with a strong negation of the axiom of infinity asserting that every set is provably bijective with a natural number. We study in detail the role of the axioms of Power Set, Choice, Regularity in FST, pointing out the relative dependences or independences among them. FST is shown to be provably equivalent to a fragment of Alternative Set Theory. Furthermore, the introduction of FST is motivated in view of a (...) non-standard development. MSC: 03E30, 03E35. (shrink)

We propose a set theory, called NRFST, in which the Cantorian axiom of infinity is negated, and a new notion of infinity is introduced via non standard methods, i. e. via adequate notions of standard and internal, two unary predicates added to the language of ZF. After some initial results on NRFST, we investigate its relative consistency with respect to ZF and Kawai's WNST.