Here, an epidemiological model considering pro and anti-vaccination groups is proposed and analyzed. In this model, susceptible individuals can migrate between these two groups due to the influence of false and true news about safety and efficacy of vaccines. From this model, written as a set of three ordinary differential equations, analytical expressions for the disease-free steady state, the endemic steady state, and the basic reproduction number are derived. It is analytically shown that low vaccination rate and no influx to (...) the pro-vaccination group have similar impacts on the long-term amount of infected individuals. Numerical simulations are performed with parameter values of the COVID-19 pandemic to illustrate the analytical results. The possible relevance of this work is discussed from a public health perspective. (shrink)

Clinical simulation using standardized patients has become standard in medical education—and is now being incorporated into some graduate programs in bioethics—for both formative and summative evaluation. In most hospitals, though, clinical ethics consultation is done by the ethics committee (or a subset of it). This study is the first, to our knowledge, to examine the effectiveness of standardized patient simulation in training hospital ethics committees to deal with ethically complex and emotionally fraught clinical situations. Following a substantial revision of the (...) institution’s nonbeneficial treatment policy, ethics committee members underwent a simulation to determine whether a specific requested treatment should be withheld on the basis of futility. Pre- and postintervention surveys showed improvement in all domains, although the small sample size limited the power of the study, with only one measure showing a statistically significant difference. An interesting incidental finding was that one-quarter of committee members voted against a determination of futility, even though the case clearly met the definition set forth in the policy. This highlights the emotional challenges in implementing an ethically rigorous, unanimously accepted policy that ultimately determines the timing and manner of a patient’s death. (shrink)

A long-standing theme in discussion of perception and thought has been that our primary cognitive contact with individual objects and events in the world derives from our perceptual contact with them. When I look at a duck in front of me, I am not merely presented with the fact that there is at least one duck in the area, rather I seem to be presented withthisthing (as one might put it from my perspective) in front of me, which looks to (...) me to be a duck. Furthermore, such a perception would seem to put me in a position not merely to make the existential judgment that there is some duck or other present, but rather to make a singular, demonstrative judgment, that that is a duck. My grounds for an existential judgment in this case derives from my apprehension of the demonstrative thought and not vice versa. (shrink)

I examine the question why in Proclus' view genetic processes provide demonstrative explanations, in light of the interpretation of Aristotle's theory of demonstration in late antiquity. I show that in this interpretation mathematics is not an explanatory science in the strict sense because its objects, being immaterial, do not admit causal explanation. Placing Proclus' account of demonstrative explanation in this context, I argue that this account is aimed at answering the question whether mathematical proofs provide causal explanation as opposed to (...) grounds. I show further that Proclus can answer this question in the affirmative due to his realist view of mathematical objects and the priority he ascribes to causal relations over logical relations. (shrink)

In this article I explain three puzzling features of Simplicius’ use of syllogistic reconstructions in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics: (1) Why does he reconstruct Aristotle’s non-argumentative remarks? (2) Why does he identify the syllogistic figure of an argument but does not explicitly present its reconstruction? (3) Why in certain lemmata does he present several reconstructions of the same argument? Addressing these questions, I argue that these puzzling features are an expression of Simplicius’ assumption that formal reasoning underlies Aristotle’s prose, (...) hence they reflect his attempt to capture as faithfully as possible Aristotle’s actual mode of reasoning. I show further that, as a consequence of this seemingly descriptive use of syllogistic reconstructions, logic serves Simplicius not only as an expository and clarificatory tool of certain interpretations or philosophical views, but also motivates and shapes his exegetical stances and approach. (shrink)

This book defends antitheodicism, arguing that theodicies, seeking to excuse God for evil and suffering in the world, fail to ethically acknowledge the victims of suffering. The authors argue for this view using literary and philosophical resources, commencing with Immanuel Kant's 1791 "Theodicy Essay" and its reading of the Book of Job. Three important twentieth century antitheodicist positions are explored, including "Jewish" post-Holocaust ethical antitheodicism, Wittgensteinian antitheodicism exemplified by D.Z. Phillips and pragmatist antitheodicism defended by William James. The authors argue (...) that these approaches to evil and suffering are fundamentally Kantian. Literary works such as Franz Kafka'sThe Trial, Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot, and George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, are examined in order to crucially advance the philosophical case for antitheodicism. (shrink)

This paper examines the widely accepted contention that geometrical constructions serve in Greek mathematics as proofs of the existence of the constructed figures. In particular, I consider the following two questions: first, whether the evidence taken from Aristotle's philosophy does support the modern existential interpretation of geometrical constructions; and second, whether Euclid's Elements presupposes Aristotle's concept of being. With regard to the first question, I argue that Aristotle's ontology cannot serve as evidence to support the existential interpretation, since Aristotle's ontological (...) discussions address the question of the relation between the whole and its parts, while the modern discussions of mathematical existence consider the question of the validity of a concept. In considering the second question, I analyze two syllogistic reformulations of Euclidean proofs. This analysis leads to two conclusions: first, it discloses the discrepancy between Aristotle's view of mathematical objects and Euclid's practice, whereby it will cast doubt on the historical and theoretical adequacy of the existential interpretation. Second, it sets the conceptual background for an alternative interpretation of geometrical constructions. I argue, on the basis of this analysis that geometrical constructions do not serve in the Elements as a means of ascertaining the existence of geometrical objects, but rather as a means of exhibiting spatial relations between geometrical figures. (shrink)

I examine Alexander of Aphrodisias’ theory of action, addressing the question how his view that human actions are determined by reason accounts for the capacity of doing otherwise. Calling into question the standard view that Alexander frees agents from internal determination, I argue that (1) the capacity of doing otherwise is a consequence of determination by reason, since it enables agents to do something different from what they would have done had they followed external circumstances; and (2) this capacity is (...) compatible with causal determination by reason because as a case of potentiality for opposites, it grants agents the qualified possibility of doing otherwise insofar as their nature as human beings is concerned – a possibility which remains also when their actions are causally determined by reason and by their internal disposition. I show further that these elements of Alexander’s theory of action are ultimately based on his conception of the soul, specifically on his commitment to Aristotle’s view that the human soul is not purely rational, as the Stoics hold, but has nonrational and rational parts. (shrink)

In his last book, David Armstrong sets out his metaphysical system in a set of concise and lively chapters each dealing with one aspect of the world. He begins with the assumption that all that exists is the physical world of space-time. On this foundation he constructs a coherent metaphysical scheme that gives plausible answers to many of the great problems of metaphysics. He gives accounts of properties, relations, and particulars; laws of nature; modality; abstract objects such as numbers; and (...) time and mind. (shrink)

For millennia, war was viewed as a supreme test. In the period 1750-1850 war became much more than a test: it became a secular revelation. This new understanding of war as revelation completely transformed Western war culture, revolutionizing politics, the personal experience of war, the status of common soldiers, and the tenets of military theory.

Este trabajo evalúa y analiza la experiencia del aburrimiento en la sociedad contemporánea. Toma como punto de partida las consideraciones schopenhauerianas sobre la voluntad, el ciclo del sufrimiento y el aburrimiento. Posteriormente, observa de qué manera lo anterior está anclado, en la actualidad, a las formas espaciales y temporales que se despliegan con el establecimiento del capitalismo. Se argumenta que el aburrimiento, en esta configuración específica, tiene un carácter dual: el capitalismo es un excelente pasatiempo, pero también tiene un componente (...) de aburrilidad, que hace que estemos permanentemente sumergidas en un ciclo similar —y a la vez distinto en muchas formas— del que había propuesto Schopenhauer. Se propone un ejercicio hermenéutico de varios pasajes de El Mundo como voluntad y representación, y a la vez se articula un intento fenomenológico de “ir a la experiencia misma del aburrimiento”. Finalmente, la conclusión incluye una breve reflexión sobre el aburrimiento durante el COVID- 19. (shrink)

The article argues that youth’s exposure to thin-idealizing content posted by their adored celebrities on interactive and highly engaging social networking sites poses potential challenges for these young people. Celebrity SNS presence responds to youth’s desire for social connectedness, public approval, and fame, which are highlighted at the time of their identity search and establishment. SNS content likely interacts with teens’ unique developmental characteristics, personal background, and interests to propel processes such as identification and social comparison with famous personae leading (...) to negative body image perceptions. The article suggests that even ostensibly “innocent” SNS content that presents thin-idealizing images and messages about the body may place pressures on youth and encourage a preoocupation with and risky behaviors associated with body image even unintentionally. The article further recognizes that netusers, readers, and social networking sites all share in the responsibility to minimize the risks posed to youth in this context. (shrink)

Is consciousness a purely physical phenomenon? Most contemporary philosophers and theorists hold that it is, and take this to be supported by modern science. But a significant minority endorse non-physicalist theories such as dualism, idealism and panpsychism, among other reasons because it may seem impossible to fully explain consciousness, or capture what it's like to be in conscious states (such as seeing red, or being in pain), in physical terms. This Element will introduce the main non-physicalist theories of consciousness and (...) explain the most important arguments for them, and consider how they each respond to the scientific and other arguments in support of physicalism. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core. (shrink)

I argue that Aristotle’s late-antique commentators read into his theory of demonstration the notion of tekmeriodic proofs in attempt to integrate into the theory of demonstration the assumption that the principles of demonstration should be evident. In so doing, I trace the late antique commentators’ view to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ discussion of the principles of demonstration, showing how his assumption that the principles of demonstration should be evident underlies their notions of tekmeriodic proofs.

Many patients believe that cardiopulmonary resuscitation is more likely to be successful than it really is in clinical practice. Even when working with accurate information, some nevertheless remain resolute in demanding maximal treatment. They maintain that even if survival after cardiac arrest with CPR is extremely low, the fact remains that it is still greater than the probability of survival after cardiac arrest without CPR. Without realising it, this line of reasoning is strikingly similar to Pascal’s Wager, a Renaissance-era argument (...) for accepting the proposition for God’s existence. But while the original argument is quite logical—if not universally compelling—the modern variant makes several erroneous assumptions. The authors here present a case of a patient who unwittingly appeals to Pascal’s Wager to explain his request for maximal treatment, in order to highlight the crucial divergences from the original Wager. In understanding the faulty assumptions inherent in the application of Pascal’s Wager to code status decisions—and identifying the underlying motivations which the Wager serves to confirm—providers can better ensure that the true values and preferences of patients are upheld. (shrink)