How can reformational philosophy help us reconceptualise the notion of security? In the field of Security Studies, theoreticalismsabound, each of them rooted in a different philosophical tradition. One of these approaches, “securitization theory”, portrays security in connection to five “sectors” that seem to reflect some of the basic aspects of the cosmos analysed by reformational philosophy. I consider the potential of this theory in an initial attempt to introduce a reformational approach to Security Studies. I also briefly consider some of (...) its shortcomings. Finally, I reflect on the basic elements of a reformational notion of security. At this stage I am not offering a new theory of security but merely beginning to sketch a new concept of security in light of reformational philosophy. (shrink)

The present study aimed to verify the quarantine’s effects during a serious viral outbreak on the cardiovascular and performance associated with the Yo-Yo test in a sample of professional soccer players. 20 high-level soccer players participated in this study. The intermittent Yo-Yo test was performed pre- and post- COVID-19 quarantine in a random order. During each test, the soccer players’ running performance outcomes were monitored using a portable 5-Hz GPS with a 100 Hz accelerometer and a paired t-test was conducted (...) at a p-value of ≤ 0.05. The main results demonstrated significant differences between pre- versus post-COVID-19 quarantine in the following variables: relative distance, maximal speed, acceleration, deceleration, sprints > 19 km/h [0.8 % >0.5 %], and in high intensity running distance [16.48 m > 0.827 m]. We concluded that COVID-19-related restrictions and quarantine COVID-19 demonstrated adverse effects on professional soccer players’ Yo-Yo tests performance. (shrink)

Emotional intelligence is a psychological skill that aids athletes in the control of emotions and optimization of sports performance. The present study investigated the psychometric properties of the Self-Report Emotional Intelligence Test in 508 Brazilian youth and adult athletes. Data analysis was conducted through Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis, Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability and Pearson’s Correlation. EFA revealed the one-factor model with 26 items with the best adjustment. CFA confirmed the one-factor model with 26 items with best greater fit. No (...) evidence of invariance was found, suggesting that the SSEIT must be used with caution when comparing gender and age groups. The external validity was found in the correlation of EI and cognitive anxiety and self-confidence. It is concluded that the Brazilian version of SSEIT for the sports context presented acceptable psychometric properties, however, showed limitations that should be explored in the future. (shrink)

Este artigo, procurou verificar a presença e a influência das correntes filosóficas Marxismo e Fenomenologia em pensamentos do educador Paulo Freire. Neste estudo pôde-se refletir e compreender melhor essas correntes filosóficas e identificar como elas influenciaram o autor na elaboração dos conceitos sobre humanismo e educação. Na Fenomenologia a influência maior está na relação entre mundo/sujeito/coisas, e a busca pela cientificidade da filosofia, afirmando que essa ciência seria capaz de dar as respostas e definitivas aos problemas do conhecimento. No (...) Marxismo encontra fundamento para revelar o antagonismo presente na sociedade capitalista, autora de parte dos problemas sociais do mundo. En este artículo se intenta verificar la presencia y la influencia de la filosofía del marxismo y la fenomenología en el pensamiento del educador Paulo Freire. En este estudio se podría reflejar y comprender mejor estos filosófica e identificar la forma en que influyeron en el autor en la elaboración de los conceptos del humanismo y la educación. La fenomenología es una mayor influencia sobre la relación entre el mundo/sujeto/cosas, y la búsqueda de la filosofía científica, con el argumento de que la ciencia sería capaz de dar respuestas definitivas y los problemas del conocimiento. El marxismo se encuentra en la revelación de la base de este antagonismo en la sociedad capitalista. (shrink)

O artigo traz resultados de uma investigação de mestrado que teve por objetivo pesquisar as concepções de um grupo de professores a respeito das funções que os mesmos exercem frente à sociedade contemporânea. Partiu-se da premissa de que suas concepções guardam relação com suas práticas educativas e pedagógicas. Trata-se de uma pesquisa desenvolvida na perspectiva qualitativa, com cinquenta e um professores que atuam em seis escolas estaduais da cidade de Ponta Grossa-PR. Elegeu-se como aporte teórico autores que tratam da formação (...) de professores e da profissão docente, como Freire, Imbernón, Ens e Behrens, Tozetto, Sacristán e Tedesco. Os dados foram coletados por meio de questionários, categorizados e analisados seguindo os pressupostos na Análise de Conteúdo. Três categorias foram configuradas a partir de significantes presentes nas respostas dos professores participantes: Categoria I – Professor como um sujeito transformador: educação em uma forma ampla, Categoria II – Professor como profissional do conhecimento, e Categoria III – Professor enquanto sujeito que desempenha vários papéis sociais. Essas categorias nos possibilitaram inferir que as concepções dos professores em relação ao seu papel na sociedade contemporânea vão além da função social da escola, pois centram-se primeiramente na figura de um profissional transformador do mundo; seguida da noção de profissional do conhecimento e, por fim, da ideia de um profissional que desempenha vários papéis sociais. A pesquisa também apontou uma necessária redefinição da profissão docente para que os professores assumam novas competências profissionais na contemporaneidade. Palavras-chave: Profissão docente. Função dos professores. Sociedade contemporânea. Concepções. (shrink)

Translation of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics I into Portuguese, with a few notes, experimental glossary and introduction. The translation, which was made at 2003/4, was preliminary and its publication was intended to provide a didactic tool for courses as well as a provisional resource in research seminars. It needs some revision. I am currently working (slowly...) on the revision of the translation and a new revised one will surely appear at some point.

RESUMO Em nosso artigo, faremos uma breve exposição sobre o capítulo XXIV dos Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, de Nāgārjuna, e buscaremos oferecer uma defesa de nossa própria interpretação de sua filosofia, comparando-a com as interpretações semântica e pedagógica propostas, respectivamente, por Garfield e Siderits, por um lado, e Ferraro, por outro. Na nossa exposição, discutiremos a relação entre vazio, cooriginação dependente e verdade, apontando a íntima ligação entre esses termos no interior da filosofia de Nāgārjuna e buscando indicar em que sentido as quatro (...) nobres verdades do budismo, de acordo com o filósofo, só podem ser verdadeiras se elas forem vazias. A partir dessa análise, esperamos poder estabelecer uma relação entre verdade convencional e verdade suprema, tal como abordada nesse capítulo, segundo a qual tanto a verdade convencional quanto a suprema são vazias, sendo que a diferença entre ambas consistiria em que a primeira diz respeito à existência convencional das coisas, enquanto a segunda diz respeito à ausência de essência delas. Nesse sentido, tratar-se-á de analisar como seria possível, para Nāgārjuna, uma compreensão acerca da verdade que nos parece tão contraintuitiva, a saber, a de que a verdade só é possível se for relativa. Esperamos, assim, fazer uma pequena contribuição para a discussão de alguns dos conceitos mais relevantes do pensamento desse importante filósofo budista, sobretudo no que diz respeito à relação da verdade suprema com o vazio. ABSTRACT In our article, we shall make a brief exposition of the chapter XXIV of Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, and we shall attempt to offer a defense of our own interpretation of his philosophy, comparing it to the semantic and pedagogic interpretations proposed, respectively, by Garfield and Siderits, on the one hand, and Ferraro, on the other. In our exposition, we shall discuss the relationship between emptiness, dependent co-origination and truth, pointing to the intimate connection between those terms within Nāgārjuna's philosophy and attempting to indicate in what sense the four noble truths of Buddhism, according to the philosopher, can only be true if they are empty. Through this analysis, we hope to be able to establish a relation between conventional truth and ultimate truth according to which both conventional and ultimate truth are empty, distinguishing themselves only insofar as the first one concerns the conventional existence of things, while the second one concerns the absence of essence of the very same things. With this in mind, we shall analyze how could it be possible, for Nāgārjuna, to have a comprehension on truth that seems to be so counter-intuitive, to wit, that truth is only possible if it's relative. We hope thus to make a small contribution to the discussion of some of the most important concepts of this important Buddhist philosopher, especially with regard to the relation between ultimate truth and emptiness. (shrink)

Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics IV and VI, with notes. The translation is preliminary and intended as a provisional teaching tool to be also used in seminars and discussions with peers in order to reach a more elaborated version.

Tradução dos livros Z e H da Metafísica de Aristóteles, com introdução e notas. Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics Books VII and VIII into Portuguese, with Introduction and Notes.

Tradução preliminar em pré-print. A Tradução definitiva é a de 2009.

Translation of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics II into Portuguese, with a few notes, experimental glossary and introduction. The translation, which was made at 2002 (with a new printing in 2004), was preliminary and its publication was intended to provide a didactic tool for courses as well as a provisional resource in research seminars. It needs some revision. I am currently working (slowly...) on the revision of the translation and a new revised one will surely appear at some point.

Translation of Aristotle's Physics I-II into Portuguese, with commentaries. Tradução para o português dos livros I e II da Física de Aristóteles, com comentários.

Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics I-III into Portuguese, with a few notes and introduction. The translation, which was made at 2007, is preliminary and its publication was intended to provide a didactic tool for courses as well as a provisional resource in research seminars. It needs some revision. I am currently working (slowly...) on the revision of the translation and a new revised one will surely appear at some point.

Joint attention customarily refers to the coordinated focus of attention between two or more individuals on a common object or event, where it is mutually “open” to all attenders that they are so engaged. We identify two broad approaches to analyse joint attention, one in terms of cognitive notions like common knowledge and common awareness, and one according to which joint attention is fundamentally a primitive phenomenon of sensory experience. John Campbell’s relational theory is a prominent representative of the latter (...) approach, and the main focus of this paper. We argue that Campbell’s theory is problematic for a variety of reasons, through which runs a common thread: most of the problems that the theory is faced with arise from the relational view of perception that he endorses, and, more generally, they suggest that perceptual experience is not sufficient for an analysis of joint attention. (shrink)

Translation of passages of Aristotle's De Anima into Portuguese. The passages are these: I.1, I.4 (the 'Rylean passage'); II.1-6; III.1-8. The translation is preliminary.

This chapter has two main sections. In the first section I briefly sketch Immanuel Kant’s moral theory as laid out in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). I explain Kant’s claim that morality must be grounded on what he calls a categorical imperative and examine his three formulations of this categorical imperative. In the second section I explain the distinction between “deontological” and “teleological” ethical theories. Kantian ethics is often presented as the paradigm example of a deontological ethical (...) theory, but I question whether Kant’s ethics should be understood as purely deontological. (shrink)

Entre 1843 e 1844, em dois textos polêmicos, Sobre a questão judaica e Glosas críticas ao artigo “O rei da Prússia e a reforma social”. De um prussiano, Karl Marx empreende sua crítica ao Estado e à sociedade civil-burguesa, após seu acerto de contas com o pensamento de Hegel, mas antes de seu estudo mais profundo de economia política. De um lado, o pensador faz a crítica da política, ainda que sem condições de fazer uma profunda crítica da economia política. (...) De outro, ele reconhece a impossibilidade de analisar o Estado sem adentrar a sociedade que lhe confere base, de maneira que não se furta de tentar compreender as determinações da sociedade civil-burguesa, esforço que tem início já nos textos em questão. (shrink)

The Platonic reevaluation of traditional poetry in positive terms that we read in the Phaedrus, in as much as it is conceived therein as a valuable educational resource for posterity, does not strictly imply anything new in the Platonic corpus, but rather a systemization and complementation of a set of ideas about the origin and function of poetry that Plato had already shared in some of his early, transitional and late dialogues. From this broad set of ideas, I am interested (...) in this study in concentrating especially on a series of passages taken from the Symposium, in order to compile two lines of analysis in this paradigmatic late dialogue which, I understand, constitute a clear precedent for the positive conception that Plato finally assumes about traditional poetry in the Phaedrus. (shrink)

Translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics IX and X (Theta & Iota) into Portuguese, with a few notes, experimental glossary and introduction. The translation, which was made at 2004, is preliminary and its publication was intended to provide a didactic tool for courses as well as a provisional resource in research seminars. It needs some revision. I am currently working (slowly...) on the revision of the translation and a new revised one will surely appear at some point.

Este livro é um 'ancestral' em pré-print do meu livro de 2006, Introdução à Teoria da Predicação em Aristóteles (ISBN 978-85-268-0716-1), publicado pela Editora da Unicamp (ver https://www.academia.edu/6912408/Introdu%C3%A7%C3%A3o_%C3%A0_teoria_da_predica%C3%A7%C3%A3o_em_Arist %C3%B3teles). O ancestral foi felizmente muito citado, mesmo depois da aparição do livro definitivo em 2006. -/- This is an ancestor (in pré-print) of my 2006 Book, 'Introdução à Teoria da Predicação em Aristóteles' (ISBN 978-85-268-0716-1), published by Editora da Unicamp (see https://www.academia.edu/6912408/Introdu%C3%A7%C3%A3o_%C3%A0_teoria_da_predica%C3%A7%C3%A3o_em_Arist %C3%B3teles). The ancestor was cited by many, even after the definitive book (...) appeared in 2006. (shrink)

This is an introductory handbook for some of the main themes around the notion of predication in Aristotle. It does not aim at being exhaustive, but only sketches some important lines about the subject; it contains an introductory essay, besides the translation (into Portuguese) and commentary of basic texts (such as Posterior Analytics I-22, Categories 1-5, Interpretation 1-6 etc.).

I discuss the methodological passage in the begin- ning of Ethica Eudemia I.6 (1216b26-35), which has received attention in connection with Aristotle’s notion of dialectic and his methodology in Ethics. My central focus is not to discuss whether Aristotle is prescribing and using what has been called the method of endoxa. I will focus on how this passage coheres with the remaining parts of the same chapter, which also are advancing methodological remarks. My claim is that the meth- od of (...) Ethica Eudemia I.6 is in agreement with many features of Aristotle’s theory of explanation as presented in the Posterior Analytics: Aristotle’s main concern is a warning against misuses of explanatory arguments. (shrink)

This book discusses Aristotle’s notions of essence and substance as they are developed in Metaphysics ZH. I examine Aristotle's argument at length and defends an unorthodox interpretation according to which his motivation is to provide an answer against a conflation between criteria for existential priority (delivering substances as primary beings) and criteria for explanatory priority (delivering essences as primary principles).

In Posterior Analytics 71b9 12, we find Aristotle’s definition of scientific knowledge. The definiens is taken to have only two informative parts: scientific knowledge must be knowledge of the cause and its object must be necessary. However, there is also a contrast between the definiendum and a sophistic way of knowing, which is marked by the expression “kata sumbebekos”. Not much attention has been paid to this contrast. In this paper, I discuss Aristotle’s definition paying due attention to this contrast (...) and to the way it interacts with the two conditions presented in the definiens. I claim that the “necessity” condition ammounts to explanatory appropriateness of the cause. (shrink)

Gödei's Theorem seems to me to prove that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds cannot be explained as machines. So also has it seemed to many other people: almost every mathematical logician I have put the matter to has confessed to similar thoughts, but has felt reluctant to commit himself definitely until he could see the whole argument set out, with all objections fully stated and properly met. This I attempt to do.

Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics V.1-8 with a few notes.

Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda into Portuguese.

This paper is my first effort to revaluate the disagreement between two central texts for Aristotle's the conception of ousia: Categories and Metaphysics VII. Scholars have taken chapter Zeta-3 as a payment of the debt with the Categories, so that the hylomorphic analysis of the composite substance would require a revision of the subject-criterion, now improved by the addition of the “a this” and “separate” criterion. This paper, however, downgrades the importance of the Categories for understanding Aristotle's Metaphysics Z. The (...) two texts are dealing with different arguments and are not incompatible with one another. I myself consider this paper somehow obsolete, for I have returned to the same subject more than once: in my 2003 paper on Z-3 and, most importantly, on my Book 'As Noções Aristotélicas de Substância e Essência' (2008). (shrink)

I discuss the notion of education or educatedness (paideia) involved in the ‘educated human being’ (pepaideumenos), which Aristotle presents at the beginning of his Parts of Animals and a few other passages. The competence of educated human beings makes them able to evaluate some aspects of the explanations in a given domain without having a determinate knowledge about the specific subject-matter in that domain. I examine how such a competence is possible and how it is related to other critical abilities (...) which Aristotle usually ascribes to the science of being qua being. Discuto a noção de educação ou cultura (paideia) envolvida na figura do ser humano cultivado (pepaideumenos), que Aristóteles apresenta no início do tratado As Partes dos Animais e em algumas outras passagens. A competência do ser humano cultivado o habilita a avaliar certo aspecto das explicações propostas em um dado domínio, sem requerer dele um conhecimento determinado sobre o assunto específico do mesmo domínio. Examino de que modo essa competência é possível e como ela se articula a outras habilidades críticas que Aristóteles geralmente associa à ciência do ser enquanto ser. (shrink)

Davidsonian event semantics is often taken to form an unhappy marriage with compositional semantics. For example, it has been claimed to be problematic for semantic accounts of quantification Proceedings of the 16th Amsterdam Colloquium, 2007), for classical accounts of negation Semantics and contextual expression, 1989), and for intersective accounts of verbal coordination. This paper shows that none of this is the case, once we abandon the idea that the event variable is bound at sentence level, and assume instead that verbs (...) denote existential quantifiers over events. Quantificational arguments can then be given a semantic account, negation can be treated classically, and coordination can be modeled as intersection. The framework presented here is a natural choice for researchers and fieldworkers who wish to sketch a semantic analysis of a language without being forced to make commitments about the hierarchical order of arguments, the argument-adjunct distinction, the default scope of quantifiers, or the nature of negation and coordination. (shrink)

I discuss what Aristotle means when he say that scientific demonstration must proceed from necessary principles. I argue that, for Aristotle, scientific demonstration should not be reduced to sound deduction with necessary premises. Scientific demonstration ultimately depends on the fully appropriate explanatory factor for a given explanandum. This explanatory factor is what makes the explanandum what it is. Consequently, this factor is also unique. When Aristotle says that demonstration must proceed from necessary principles, he means that each demonstration requires the (...) principle that is the necessary one for the fully appropriate explanation of its explanandum. This picture also provides a key to understand Aristotle's thesis that scientific explanation depends on essences: it is the essence of the attribute to be explained that should be stated as the fully appropriate explanatory factor. (shrink)

This PhD thesis is a careful discussion of Aristotle's Metaphysics VII (Zeta) almost line by line (or at least argument by argument). It might be interesting to know that a revised and shortened version of it was published as a book in Portuguese, "As Noções Aristotélicas de Substância e Essência", Campinas: Editora da Unicamp, 2008. Actually, I believe the original version of the PhD thesis has been superseded by the book.

I discuss Aristotle's treatment of essence and definition in Metaphysics VII.4. I argue that it is coherent and perfectly in accord with its broader context. His discussion in VII.4 offers, on the one hand, minimal criteria for what counts as definition and essence for whatever kind of object, but also, on the other hand, stronger criteria for a primary sort of definition and essence—and thereby it serves the interest of book VII in pointing to the explanatory power of the essence (...) of composite substances. (shrink)

These are commentaries to the translation into Portuguese of Nicomachean Ethics VI, found in the same volume of Dissertatio.

Tradução para o Português de Ethica Nicomachea VI.

I discuss in this paper the six requirements Aristotle advances at Posterior Analytics A-2, 71b20-33, for the premisses of a scientific demonstration. I argue that the six requirements give no support for an intepretation in terms of “axiomatization”. Quite on the contrary, the six requirements can be consistently understood in a very different picture, according to which the most basic feature of a scientific demonstration is to explain a given proposition by its appropriate cause.

In this article, Lucas maintains the falseness of Mechanism - the attempt to explain minds as machines - by means of Incompleteness Theorem of Gödel. Gödel’s theorem shows that in any system consistent and adequate for simple arithmetic there are formulae which cannot be proved in the system but that human minds can recognize as true; Lucas points out in his turn that Gödel’s theorem applies to machines because a machine is the concrete instantiation of a formal system: (...) therefore, for every machine consistent and able of doing simple arithmetic, there is a formula that it can’t produce as true but that we can see to be true, and so human minds and machines have to be different. Lucas considers as well in this article some possible objections to his argument: for any Gödelian formula we could, for instance, construct a machine able to produce it or we could put the Gödelian formulae that we had proved as axioms of a further machine. However - as Lucas underlines - for every of such machines we could again formulate another Gödelian formula, the Gödelian formula of these machines, that they are not able to proof but that we can recognize as true. More general arguments, such as the possibility to escape Gödelian argument by suggesting that Gödel’s theorem applies to consistent systems while we could be inconsistent ones, are moreover refuted by Lucas by maintaining that our inconsistency corresponds to occasional malfunctioning of a machine and not to his normal inconsistency; indeed, a inconsistent machine is characterized by producing any statement, on the contrary human being are selective and not disposed to assert anything. (shrink)

I have two aims in this paper. First, I argue that, in Aristotle’s theory of the four causes, there is a basic and common feature by which all causes are causes: they all work in a triadic framework in which they explain why a given attribute holds of a given underlying thing. Secondly, I argue against a version of “compatibilism” according to which each kind of cause is complete in its own domain and does not compete with any other kind. (...) I claim that there are priority relations according to which some kinds of cause are subordinated to others, even if these relations do not hold in every cases. (shrink)

From playing basketball to ordering at a food counter, we frequently and effortlessly coordinate our attention with others towards a common focus: we look at the ball, or point at a piece of cake. This non-verbal coordination of attention plays a fundamental role in our social lives: it ensures that we refer to the same object, develop a shared language, understand each other’s mental states, and coordinate our actions. Models of joint attention generally attribute this accomplishment to gaze coordination. But (...) are visual attentional mechanisms sufficient to achieve joint attention, in all cases? Besides cases where visual information is missing, we show how combining it with other senses can be helpful, and even necessary to certain uses of joint attention. We explain the two ways in which non-visual cues contribute to joint attention: either as enhancers, when they complement gaze and pointing gestures in order to coordinate joint attention on visible objects, or as modality pointers, when joint attention needs to be shifted away from the whole object to one of its properties, say weight or texture. This multisensory approach to joint attention has important implications for social robotics, clinical diagnostics, pedagogy and theoretical debates on the construction of a shared world. (shrink)

Event concepts are unstructured atomic concepts that apply to event types. A paradigm example of such an event type would be that of diaper changing, and so a putative example of an atomic event concept would be DADDY'S-CHANGING-MY-DIAPER.1 I will defend two claims about such concepts. First, the conceptual claim that it is in principle possible to possess a concept such as DADDY'S-CHANGING-MY-DIAPER without possessing the concept DIAPER. Second, the empirical claim that we actually possess such concepts and that they (...) play an important role in our cognitive lives. The argument for the empirical claim has the form of an inference to the best explanation and is aimed at those who are already willing to attribute concepts and beliefs to infants and nonhuman animals. Many animals and prelinguistic infants seem capable of re-identifying event-types in the world, and they seem to store information about things happening at particular times and places. My account offers a plausible model of how such organisms are able to do this without attributing linguistically structured mental states to them. And although language allows adults to form linguistically structured mental representations of the world, there is no good reason to think that such structured representations necessarily replace the unstructured ones. There is also no good reason for a philosopher who is willing to explain the behavior of an organism by appealing to atomic concepts of individuals or kinds to not use a similar form of explanation when explaining the organism's capacity to recognize events. -/- We can form empirical concepts of individuals, kinds, properties, event-types, and states of affairs, among other things, and I assume that such concepts function like what François Recanati calls ‘mental files’ or what Ruth Millikan calls ‘substance concepts’ (Recanati 2012; Millikan 1999, 2000, 2017). To possess such a concept one must have a reliable capacity to re-identify the object in question, but this capacity of re-identification does not fix the reference of the concept. Such concepts allow us to collect and utilize useful information about things that we re-encounter in our environment. We can distinguish between a perception-action system and a perception-belief system, and I will argue that empirical concepts, including atomic event concepts, can play a role in both systems. The perception-action system involves the application of concepts in the service of (often skilled) action. We can think of the concept as a mental file containing motor-plans that can be activated once the individual recognizes that they are in a certain situation. In this way, recognizing something (whether an object or an event) as a token of a type, plays a role in guiding immediate action. The perception-belief system, in contrast, allows for the formation of beliefs that can play a role in deliberation and planning and in the formation of expectations. I distinguish between two particular types of belief which I call where-beliefs and when-beliefs, and I argue that we can model the formation of such perceptual beliefs in nonlinguistic animals and human infants in terms of the formation of a link between an empirical concept and a position on a cognitive map. According to the account offered, seemingly complex beliefs, such as a baby's belief that Daddy changed her diaper in the kitchen earlier, will not be linguistically structured. If we think that prelinguistic infants possess such concepts and are able to form such beliefs, it is likely that adults do too. The ability to form such beliefs does not require the capacity for public language, and we can model them in nonlinguistic terms; thus, we have no good reason to think of such beliefs as propositional attitudes. Of course, we can use sentences to refer to such beliefs, and thus it is possible to think of such beliefs as somehow relations to propositions. But it is not clear to me what is gained by this as we have a perfectly good way to think about the structure of such beliefs that does not involve any appeal to language. (shrink)

Este artigo é um 'ancestral' de vários argumentos que desenvolvi depois em múltiplos outros artigos. Defendo que a teoria da ciência dos Segundos Analíticos não é incompatível com as ciências naturais tais como desenvolvidos nos tratados científicos de Aristóteles.

This paper is an attempt to present disclosive ethics as a framework for computer and information ethics – in line with the suggestions by Brey, but also in quite a different manner. The potential of such an approach is demonstrated through a disclosive analysis of facial recognition systems. The paper argues that the politics of information technology is a particularly powerful politics since information technology is an opaque technology – i.e. relatively closed to scrutiny. It presents the design of technology (...) as a process of closure in which design and use decisions become black-boxed and progressively enclosed in increasingly complex socio-technical networks. It further argues for a disclosive ethics that aims to disclose the nondisclosure of politics by claiming a place for ethics in every actual operation of power – as manifested in actual design and use decisions and practices. It also proposes that disclosive ethics would aim to trace and disclose the intentional and emerging enclosure of politics from the very minute technical detail through to social practices and complex social-technical networks. The paper then proceeds to do a disclosive analysis of facial recognition systems. This analysis discloses that seemingly trivial biases in recognition rates of FRSs can emerge as very significant political acts when these systems become used in practice. (shrink)

Collective volume with papers by alumni and students from the Campinas Aristotle Group.

I examine Aristotle’s definition of scientific knowledge in Posterior Analytics 71b 9-12 and try to understand how it relates to the sophistical way of knowing and to "kata sumbebekos knowledge". I claim that scientific knowledge of p requires knowing p by its appropriate cause, and that this appropriate cause is a universal (katholou) in the restricted sense Aristotle proposes in 73b 26-27 ff., i.e., an attribute coextensive with the subject (an extensional feature) and predicated of the subject in itself (an (...) intensional feature). Kata sumbebekos knowledge, on the other hand, can occur even when the predicate of a conclusion is coextensive with its subject and is proved by a convertible meson which is not the most appropriate from an explanatory standpoint. (shrink)

Translation of Aristotle's Parts of Animals Book I into Portuguese, with full commentaries.

This paper discusses some intricacies of hylomorphism in Aristotle's discussion in his Metaphysics VII.