In this essay, I reflect on the implications of intellectual virtues in scientific endeavor. To this end, I first offer a depiction of scientific endeavor by resorting to the notion of academic attitude, which involves aspects concerning the generation and possession of knowledge. Although there are differences between these activities, they have in common the engagement of diverse intellectual agents (scientists). In this sense, I analyze how intellectual virtues are linked to 1) scientific research tasks, such as theory appraisal, and (...) 2) those tasks of vigilance and intervention in the uses of scientific knowledge. I conclude that intellectual virtues play a leading role in achieving higher quality scientific research and adequate foresight on the uses and impacts of scientific findings. In this order of ideas, I propose an agenda for further inquiries on these matters, highlighting the relevance of reflecting and empirically researching the relationship between intellectual virtues and science, as well as cultivating intellectual virtues in various stages of scientific training. (shrink)

La perspectiva simult nea de filosof a y literatura, permite valorar qu grado de conocimiento hay en la ficci n, c mo se construyen subjetividad y texto, mundo y lenguaje. Muestra las posibilidades, te ricas y pr cticas, de la relaci n interna entre diferentes espacios argumentativos, entre actividades que poseen una vertiente creativa y, a la vez, una importante faceta reflexiva.

On page 1 of his classic text, Millsap states, “Measurement invariance is built on the notion that a measuring device should function the same way across varied conditions, so long as those varied conditions are irrelevant [emphasis added] to the attribute being measured.” By construction, measurement invariance techniques require not only detecting varied conditions but also ruling out that these conditions inform our understanding of measured domains. In fact, measurement invariance techniques possess great utility when theory and research inform their (...) application to specific, varied conditions that, if not detected, introduce measurement biases, and, thus, depress measurement validity. Yet, we see emerging bodies of work where scholars have “put the cart before the horse” when it comes to measurement invariance, and they apply these techniques to varied conditions that, in fact, may reflect domain-relevant information. These bodies of work highlight a larger problem in measurement that likely cuts across many areas of scholarship. In one such area, youth mental health, researchers commonly encounter a set of conditions that nullify the use of measurement invariance, namely discrepancies between survey reports completed by multiple informants, such as parents, teachers, and youth themselves. In this paper, we provide an overview of conceptual, methodological, and measurement factors that should prevent researchers from applying measurement invariance techniques to detect informant discrepancies. Along the way, we cite evidence from the last 15 years indicating that informant discrepancies reflect domain-relevant information. We also apply this evidence to recent uses of measurement invariance techniques in youth mental health. Based on prior evidence, we highlight the implications of applying these techniques to multi-informant data, when the informant discrepancies observed within these data might reflect domain-relevant information. We close by calling for a moratorium on applying measurement invariance techniques to detect informant discrepancies in youth mental health assessments. In doing so, we describe how the state of the science would need to fundamentally “flip” to justify applying these techniques to detect informant discrepancies in this area of work. (shrink)

Se examina la interpretación aristotélica del azar como causa accidental en el ámbito de los fines de aquello que puede ser realizado por la naturaleza o por el pensamiento. ¿Por qué un acontecimiento fortuito pertenece al orden de los fines? ¿Qué quiere decir que los sucesos fortuitos son “para algo” (ἓνεκά του)? Se repasan las principales respuestas de los especialistas, se indican algunas deficiencias y se propone una lectura no causal-explicativa de la expresión ἓνεκά του, diferente de la teleología del (...) como-si, como explicación de la finalidad del acontecimiento fortuito. (shrink)

Building on literature in political CSR and corporate political activity (CPA) as well as responsible innovation and responsible lobbying, we introduce a framework to assess the legitimacy status of corporate political activity. We focus on the fact that companies frequently face sharp regulatory backlash after penetrating markets with their innovations. In response to regulatory backlash, big tech companies often employ an arsenal of corporate political activities to (re-)shape national and local regulatory environments, which raises the important questions about the legitimacy (...) of CPA tactics that we address. To develop and apply this framework, we briefly survey and then assess Uber’s corporate political activities in its 2015 New York City political campaign. (shrink)

Se examina la interpretación aristotélica del azar como causa accidental en el ámbito de los fines de aquello que puede ser realizado por la naturaleza o por el pensamiento. ¿Por qué un acontecimiento fortuito pertenece al orden de los fines? ¿Qué quiere decir que los sucesos fortuitos son "para algo"? Se repasan las principales respuestas de los especialistas, se indican algunas deficiencias y se propone una lectura no causal-explicativa de la expresión ἓνεκά του, diferente de la teleología del como-si, como (...) explicación de la finalidad del acontecimiento fortuito. The Aristotelian interpretation of randomness is examined as an accidental cause in the sphere of ends of that which can be brought about by nature or by thought. Why would a fortuitous event belong to the order of ends? What does it mean to say that fortuitous events are "for something"? The main responses to specialists are reviewed, some deficiencies are noted, and a non-causal-explicative reading is proposed for the expression ἓνεκά του. This reading differs from the "as-if teleology" as an explanation of the finality of the fortuitous event. (shrink)

A good education provides useful ‘knowledge, skills, attitudes, and dispositions’ (Brighouse, Ladd, Loeb, & Swift, 2016, p. 6).1 Educational justice cares about the distribution of these goods beca...

A good education provides useful ‘knowledge, skills, attitudes, and dispositions’ (Brighouse, Ladd, Loeb, & Swift, 2016, p. 6).1 Educational justice cares about the distribution of these goods beca...

A good education provides useful ‘knowledge, skills, attitudes, and dispositions’ (Brighouse, Ladd, Loeb, & Swift, 2016, p. 6).1 Educational justice cares about the distribution of these goods beca...

In ‘Justice and Nature’, Thomas Nagel claims that social institutions are not responsible for inequalities caused primarily by nature, as opposed to socially caused inequalities. I evaluate this claim. To do so, I distinguish causal responsibility from substantive responsibility. I argue that Nagel rightly identifies conditions in virtue of which social institutions are not substantively responsible for an inequality, but the causal responsibility of nature is irrelevant for that assessment. The natural/social distinction is, I hold, misleading, and I offer two (...) pragmatic reasons to stop using it. Besides, past criticisms to the natural/social distinction have questioned whether identifying the causal responsability of nature for an inequality is descriptively meaningful, epistemically possible, and morally relevant. My reconstruction of Nagel’s view avoids these criticisms, I explain, by depriving the causal responsibility of nature of any role to identify an inequality as naturally caused. Moreover, I show that my reconstruction of Nagel’s view, purged of the natural/social distinction, helps to justify the asymmetrical treatment of class-based inequalities and inequalities among people with different native endowments in the Rawlsian principle of fair equality of opportunity. (shrink)

In ways accentuated by the global coronavirus pandemic, corporations constitute vital instruments of the acts of beneficence needed by the people of the world to make progress in public health and increase collective and individual well-being. This article contributes to understanding the variety of moral forces that may lead corporations to commit acts of beneficence, including Friedman’s business case for corporate beneficence, the duty of beneficence as developed by business ethicists, and Dunfee’s social contract account of corporate obligation. Whereas Mejia (...) recently contributed to scholarship on corporate beneficence by expressly adopting shareholder primacy’s conception of corporate governance, this article embraces a stakeholder-oriented, managerialist picture of corporate governance. I extend the literature on beneficence by incorporating what I argue is the intuition underlying Dunfee’s contractualist formula of minimal contribution, namely that management’s duty to do good is awakened and unshackled to the extent management judges the corporation can afford to commit acts of beneficence, all stakeholders considered. The all-stakeholders-considered case for corporate beneficence compels management to act, I argue, when inaction would undermine the moral integrity of managers personally committed to promoting the well-being of humanity. (shrink)

The concept of “Bio-Digital Architecture” is not new and it is within an area of great speculation and few well-demarcated definitions. A key factor in the definition and practice of technology is the difference between its production and use. If we assume that forms of use are also technical, this distinction is intrinsic to countries based on economies without added value and their histories focused on reverting this situation. This article proposes the revision of a paradigm shift in South America (...) that combined the sustainable “Bio Architecture” background from the developmental state with a different economic model era. Through a historical review of the sociology of symbolic production, and the development of devices and interfaces, mechanisms are proposed to recognize paradigm shifts, in a context where technological utopias are associated with the materialization of new social utopias of developing. Focused on specific cases, this research explains the culmination of the principles of “Second-order cybernetics”, in the epistemological formulation of “Autopiesis”, and the early visualization of these principles through digital media in the experience of “Protobio”. Finally, this work concludes with the description of the concrete application of these principles, not in an illustrative way, but in the design of the electronic information architecture of the operating system, continuing with the challenge of translating the logic of the immune system into an economic, political and social context completely different from its predecessors, with “Virus Detection”—VirDet—and “Oyster 2.0”. (shrink)

The Korean economist Ha-Joon Chang proposed the theory of "kicking away the ladder", in reference to how the world’s great powers managed to establish themselves as such after a prolonged period of robust measures to protect their development. Once they achieved that, they entered the free global market, demanding that small countries eschew any protectionist measures and immediately enter the ‘free trade’ in a highly unprotected manner. According to this approach, Cybernetics in Latin America can be interpreted in different ways: (...) it can be a confirmation of the disappearance of technological, social, and industrial development defended by the already non-existent Latin American developmental states that had a utopian view of technology as a tool for self-determination, but, on the other, it can also be a provocation for those in the region who still believe in the possibilities of Cybernetics to develop and support its proposals. There is a fundamental difference between using technology and producing it, while the ways of using it are also techniques or technologies in themselves. This paper outlines the meaning of first-order cybernetics and then interprets what second-order cybernetics has represented in Latin America, its Viable System Model, and how its components have evolved. (shrink)

El presente documento tiene como propósito central analizar los discursos deotredad en la experiencia migratoria hacia Estados Unidos en personas mayoresretornadas a Durango. En un intento por vincular las metáforas queaparecen en el pensamiento del autor, se discuten las anécdotas de 18 participantes mayores de 60 años que trabajaron o vivieron en Estados Unidos, y quienes fueron seleccionados por medio de una muestra intencional. Dentro de los principales resultados se advierten tramas lingüísticas que aparecen en lascomunicaciones orales, donde se manifiestan (...) tensiones entre el territorio, los nacionalismos, el lenguaje y la producción de mismidad como mecanismos que utilizaron los sujetos para hacer frente a las múltiples violencias, segregaciones y desigualdad del contexto migratorio. (shrink)

Nuestro ensayo La erótica platónica busca ampliar la comprensión del concepto de Eros en Platón a partir del diálogo del Banquete. Buscamos presentar una visión genealógica sobre el origen, la aparición e importancia del concepto y su emoción sentimental en el contexto de la cultura griega en general y del mundo socrático, en lo particular, que nos presenta la visión platónica de la filosofía. A partir de los distintos personajes que conforman la obra, su autor nos va presentando distintas significaciones (...) del eros o amor para cada uno de ellos. Podemos comprender la visión del significado del tema en cuestión desde las vertientes poética, pedagógica, médica, mítica, sexual y filosófica. Esta última desplegada en la postura de Sócrates al referir la importancia que tuvo una mujer, Diotima de Mantinea, en su formación y comprensión del hecho erótico, tanto para su vida como para su visión de la filosofía. Al final del diálogo notaremos una descripción algo desbordada que da el discípulo socrático, Alcibíades, de su maestro y llegamos a comprender que la filosofía es un ejercicio amoroso por el deseo (carencia) del saber en el hombre y que el filósofo, a diferencia del hombre sabio que no busca ningún saber porque ya lo posee, será un entusiasta y enamorado permanente de la filosofía por sentir que su ser requiere una permanente búsqueda del conocimiento de sí gracias al lema socrático del conócete a ti mismo . On Plato`s erotic. An interpretationOur Platonic Er otic essay seeks to broaden the understanding of the concept of Eros in Plato's dialogue Banquet . We seek to present a genealogy of the origin, occurrence and importance of the concept and its sentimental emotion in the context of Greek culture in general and the Socratic world, in particular, that presents the Platonic view of philosophy. From the various characters that make up the work its author presents different meanings of Eros or love for each of them. We can understand the vision of the meaning of the subject matter from different perspectives: poetic, educational, medical, mythical, sexual and philosophical. The latter displayed in the position of Socrates in reference to the importance that a woman, Diotima of Mantinea, had in his training and understanding of the erotic fact, both for her life and her vision of philosophy. At the end of the dialogue there is a description -somewhat overwhelmed- of his teacher given by Alcibiades, the Socratic disciple. We then understand that philosophy is a loving exercise by desire of knowledge in man (lack of); thus the philosopher, unlike the wise man, who seeks no further knowledge because it already has it, will be an enthusiastic and permanent lover of philosophy since he feels that his being requires an ongoing search of self-knowledge by means of following the Socratic motto know thyself. (shrink)

Nuestro trabajo intenta presentar, en su primera parte, la práctica de la filosofía clínica a partir de su pertinencia dentro de la filosofía antigua (clásica) en tanto ejercicio espiritual de transformación de sí. Con ello se quiere referir con el concepto de espíritu en comprender un ejercicio no como producto sólo del pensamiento sino a una totalidad psíquica y emocional del individuo, en sentirse dentro de la perspectiva del todo. Era un arte de vivir, un modo de vida que intenta (...) comprender más profundamente la totalidad de la existencia. La filosofía no es una disciplina que perseguía plantarse ante la dimensión única del conocimiento teórico sino en el marco del yo y del ser: consiste en un itinerario, un proceso, un viaje para la ampliación de la conciencia, que busca aumentar la captación, la atención, la vivencia y expansión del ser. En su segunda parte nos adentramos a examinar la figura del tirano en y como conciencia política degradada. Para ello nos centramos en el proceso de la personalidad de la condición de lo tiránico y del tirano dentro de la vida política, pero también como éste se nos presenta como germen en nosotros mismos y de cómo se establece a partir de ello –junto a las condiciones sociales requeridas-, su existencia proyectada en un individuo particular. La filosofía clínica es una filosofía crítica en la medida que tiene por asunto el pensamiento en sí mismo; es una filosofía con conciencia de sí misma; coloca al pensamiento en una sala de observación y cuidados intensivos ¿Se trata de comprender la política como un ejercicio espiritual? Por supuesto, un ejercicio cotidiano a lo largo de nuestra existencia, donde pueda permitirnos desarrollar una atención,una inteligencia, un crecimiento y una transformación de nuestra individualidad social autónoma como ciudadano de una región y del mundo, pero comprometida con su comunidad de vida. De un modo de aprender el dominio de uno mismo, del cumplimiento de los deberes, de la libertad pública y privada, que nos lleva a renunciar de todo aquello que no dependa de nosotros y ocuparnos de lo que sí depende; mantener una rectitud de acción en conformidad con el grado de evolución de nuestra razón. On the tyranny in Plato Our work attempts to present, in its first part, the practice of clinical philosophy from its relevance as a spiritual exercise of self-transformation within ancient (classical) philosophy. The¡ concept of spirit is meant to bring about an understanding of this exercise not as a sole product¡ of thinking, but as the involvement of the individual’s psychic and emotional totality, which entails that the individual should feel as a part of the whole. It was an art of living, a way of life that attempts to understand more deeply the totality of existence. Philosophy is not a discipline that sought to face the sole dimension of theoretical knowledge. Rather, it is built around the framework of self and being. It consists of a route, a process, a journey to broaden consciousness. It seeks to increase uptake, attention, experience and expansion of being. In the second part we examine in depth the figure of the tyrant as degraded political consciousness. To this aim we focus on the process of the personality of the tyrannical and the tyrant within political life, but also on how the latter is a seed within ourselves, and on how, on this basis,his existence projected onto a particular individual becomes established –together with the required social conditions. Clinical philosophy is a critical philosophy inasmuch as its subject-matteris thought in itself; it is a philosophy with self-awareness; it places thought in an observation and intensive care room. Are we to understand politics as a spiritual exercise? Of course, an everyday exercise throughout our existence, which enables us to develop a degree of attention, intelligence, growth and transformation of our social autonomous individuality as citizens of a region and the world, while sill committed to our life community. It enables us to learn self-control, to carry out our duties, to exercise public and private freedom, in a way that makes us give up everything which doesnot depend upon us and pay attention to what actually does. It enables us to maintain rectitude of action, in agreement with our reason’s degree of evolution. (shrink)