This uniquely fascinating volume is not merely a learned treatise in historical semantics; it is itself a stupendous display of world harmony as a creed-a vivid demonstration that "all is all.".

The human body is a multifaceted reality. As such, it has become a reference pole for a new positivity. Among the various areas of corporeal expression and recuperation, sport has become the most absorbing and efficient. Sport as a system shapes the human body in all its aspects, and confers on it a new status: the "corps sportif" which is a new paradigm of our civilization.

Le corps humain est une réalité plurielle. En tant que tel, il est devenu un pôle de référence pour une nouvelle positivité. De tous les lieux d'expression et de récupération du corps, le sport est devenu le plus accaparant et le plus efficace. Le système sportif façonne le corps humain dans tous ses aspects et lui confère un statut nouveau, celui de corps sportif, ce nouveau paradigme des temps actuels.The human body is a multifaceted reality. As such, it has become (...) a reference pole for a new positivity. Among the various areas of corporeal expression and recuperation, sport has become the most absorbing and efficient. Sport as a system shapes the human body in all its aspects, and confers on it a new status: the "corps sportif" which is a new paradigm of our civilization. (shrink)

A persistent criticism of Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is that it begs the question of its own possibiIity as science. In this essay I propose a reading of Husserl which addresses this question and attempts to show that the phenomenological ideal of freedom from all presuppositions, that is, the ideal of radical methodological autonomy, is not dogmatically assumed as valid but rests on a conception of philosophy which, although not explicitly formulated by Husserl, nevertheless informs his thinking on questions of (...) method and, ultimately, the nature of science. According to this conception, phiIosophy, phenomenological or otherwise, is not sui generis the ground of is own possibiIity but is derived from the logic of experience itself and so is immanent to conscious, intentional life in all of its manifold occupations and interests. That is, experience ultimately fulfills itself not in the accumulation of objective facts but in its continued faithfulness to the idea of a more perfect knowledge. Thus, in the end, I hope to show that the question of the status and possibiIity of phenomenological philosophy is not of interest to phenomenologists alone but addresses the enterprise of philosophy itself. (shrink)

De 1958 à 1968, le cardinal L.-J. Suenens a mené un long combat pour obtenir un changement d’attitude de l’Église catholique au sujet de la contraception. L’ouverture de ses archives conciliaires permet actuellement de découvrir les moyens qu’il a utilisés et les manoeuvres qu’il a entreprises pour arriver à ses fins. Il a fait appel à des médecins , à des théologiens et à des philosophes provenant surtout de l’Université catholique de Louvain, ainsi qu’à des évêques amis . Comme membre (...) de la commission de coordination du concile, chargé du texte de Gaudium et Spes, il a veillé à ce que le chapitre sur le mariage reste ouvert à un développement de la doctrine. Courageusement, à de multiples reprises, il a tenté – mais sans résultat – de convaincre le pape Paul VI. Après la publication en 1968 de l’encyclique Humanae Vitae, il a réussi à faire publier une Déclaration de l’épiscopat belge, afin de libérer les consciences et de canaliser la contestation. (shrink)

La perception à travers l’imaginationDans le présent travail, je mets en relation les lectures de Wittgensteil et de Gadamer avec les manuscrits de Merleau-Ponty avec l’intention de traverser la construction du « concept de représentation » et de réfléchir sur les questions suivantes : quel lieu occupe la dimension esthétique dans l’expérience humaine? Dans l’expérience esthétique, faut-il retrouver autant le profil émotionnel que le profil cognitif? Le point de départ est que l’esthétique ne doit pas être comprise comme une simple (...) perception par les sens; ce qu’aucun discours sur l’esthétique ne peut occulter est sa nécessaire implication de l’horizon problématique de la perception, à partir de l’étymologie même du terme, dérivé du grec aisthesis.Un tel terme porte en lui autant le champ subjectif instable des sensation que le champ stable et tendanciellement structuré des discriminations perceptives.L’affirmation théorique est que l’expérience de la rencontre d’une oeuvre d’art dévoile un monde et à peine cessons-nous de voir une oeuvre d’art comme objet pour la voir comme un monde que nous nous rendons compte que l’art se révèle être l’expédient pour clarifier le sens de notre rapport perceptif avec le monde, cette syntonie perceptive entre l’essence du monde et le sentir des sujets, cette processualité expressive dans laquelle activité et passivité sont les horizons, qu’on peut certes distinguer dans la description, mais qui coopèrent à l’intérieur d’elle-même.Perception Through ImaginationIn the present work, I bring the lectures of Wittgenstein and Gadamer into contact with the manuscripts of Merleau-Ponty with the intention of going over the construction of the “concept of representation” and of reflecting on the following questions: what place does the aesthetic dimension occupy in human experience? In aesthetic experience, is just as necessary to recognize the emotional profile as the cognitive profile? The point of the departure is that aesthetics must not be understood as a simple perception by the senses. That which no discourse of aesthetics may conceal is its necessary implication of the problematic horizon of perception, following the actual etymology of the term, derived from the Greek aisthēsis.This term contains just as much the subjective and unstable field of sensation as it does the stable field of perceptual discriminations that tend to be structured. The theoretical affirmation is that the experience of the encounter with a work of art unveils a world. No sooner do we stop seeing the work of art as an object and start seeing as a world, then we realize that art reveals itself to be the expedient that clarifies the meaning of our perceptual relationship with the world, this perceptual syntony between the essence of the world and the sensing of subjects, this expressive processuality in which activity and passivity are horizons that can certainly be distinguished in description, but that cooperate internally. (shrink)

In this work we will try to demonstrate the presence and the role that God has in Thomas Hobbes's political philosophy. We consider that this religious belief, that it is the system's equilibrium, guaranties that the Hobbesian political project does not fall into revolutionary or totalitarian excesses. Thus, we shall analyse the arguments of the existence of God that are introduced by the philosopher Malmesbury with the objective of proving that reason does not necessarily lead to atheism, but that such (...) faculty requires the Revelation intervention to be able to channel it into a peaceful and lasting life. (shrink)

In this work we will try to demonstrate the presence and the role that God has in Thomas Hobbes's political philosophy. We consider that this religious belief, that it is the system's equilibrium, guaranties that the Hobbesian political project does not fall into revolutionary or totalitarian excesses. Thus, we shall analyse the arguments of the existence of God that are introduced by the philosopher Malmesbury with the objective of proving that reason does not necessarily lead to atheism, but that such (...) faculty requires the Revelation intervention to be able to channel it into a peaceful and lasting life. (shrink)

Applied ontology is the attempt to put to use the rigorous tools of philosophical ontology in the development of category systems which can be of use in the formalization and systematization of knowledge of a given domain. In what follows we shall sketch some elements of the ontology of legal and socio-political institutions, paying attention especially to the normativity involved in such institutions. We shall see that there is more than one type of normativity, but that this fact that has (...) often been ignored in standard attempts by philosophers to build ontologies of legal and other socio-political entities. In order to provide a sound system of categories for legal and socio-political institutions and entities, however, the manifold of normativity needs to be addressed. The classical examples of normative statements have been moral propositions; they do not merely describe states of affairs; they tell us how states of affairs ought to be. The distinction between how things are and how they ought to be is the basis of the distinction between fact and value. Analytic philosophers for a long time shunned discussions of normativity and ethics. They considered ethical statements as pseudo-propositions, or as expressions of pro- or con-attitudes of no theoretical significance.1 Nowadays, in contrast, prominent analytic philosophers discuss normative problems and there are important books written by such philosophers on topics such as law and justice. Here we pay attention to three seminal thinkers in this development: H. L. A. Hart, John Rawls, and John R. Searle in concerning ourselves especially with the way in which they deal with the issue of normativity. Hart is, within the context of recent analytic philosophy, the most important philosopher of law, Rawls the most.. (shrink)