21 found
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Leo Townsend [21]Leo Charles Townsend [1]
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Leo Townsend
University of Vienna
Leo Townsend
University of Oslo
  1.  98
    Discursive Injustice and the Speech of Indigenous Communities.Leo Townsend - forthcoming - In Leo Townsend, Preston Stovall & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), The Social Institution of Discursive Norms. New York: pp. 248-263.
    Recent feminist philosophy of language has highlighted the ways that the speech of women can be unjustly impeded, because of the way their gender affects the uptake their speech receives. In this chapter, I explore how similar processes can undermine the speech of a different sort of speaker: Indigenous communities. This involves focusing on Indigeneity rather than gender as the salient social identity, and looking at the ways that group speech, rather than only individual speech, can be unjustly impeded. To (...)
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  2. Consultation, Consent, and the Silencing of Indigenous Communities.Leo Townsend & Dina Lupin Townsend - 2020 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 37 (5):781-798.
    Over the past few decades, Indigenous communities have successfully campaigned for greater inclusion in decision-making processes that directly affect their lands and livelihoods. As a result, two important participatory rights for Indigenous peoples have now been widely recognized: the right to consultation and the right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). Although these participatory rights are meant to empower the speech of these communities—to give them a proper say in the decisions that most affect them—we argue that the way (...)
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  3.  19
    Discursive Paternalism.Leo Townsend - 2021 - Ratio 34 (4):334-344.
    Ratio, Volume 34, Issue 4, Page 334-344, December 2021.
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  4. Group Assertion and Group Silencing.Leo Townsend - 2020 - Language & Communication 1 (70):28-37.
    Jennifer Lackey (2018) has developed an account of the primary form of group assertion, according to which groups assert when a suitably authorized spokesperson speaks for the group. In this paper I pose a challenge for Lackey's account, arguing that her account obscures the phenomenon of group silencing. This is because, in contrast to alternative approaches that view assertions (and speech acts generally) as social acts, Lackey's account implies that speakers can successfully assert regardless of how their utterances are taken (...)
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  5. Groups with Minds of Their Own Making.Leo Townsend - 2020 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (1):129-151.
    According Philip Pettit, suitably organised groups not only possess ‘minds of their own’ but can also ‘make up their minds’ and 'speak for themselves'--where these two capacities enable them to perform as conversable subjects or 'persons'. In this paper I critically examine Pettit's case for group personhood. My first step is to reconstruct his account, explaining first how he understands the two capacities he considers central to personhood – the capacity to ‘make up one’s mind’, and the capacity to ‘speak (...)
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  6.  61
    Is It Rational to Trust?Jeremy Wanderer & Leo Townsend - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (1):1-14.
  7.  57
    Are "Epistemic" and "Communicative" Models of Silencing in Conflict?Leo Townsend & Dina Lupin Townsend - 2021 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (10):27-32.
  8. The Epistemology of Collective Testimony.Leo Townsend - 2021 - Journal of Social Ontology.
    In this paper, I explore what gives collective testimony its epistemic credentials, through a critical discussion of three competing accounts of the epistemology of collective testimony. According to the first view, collective testimony inherits its epistemic credentials from the beliefs the testimony expresses— where this can be seen either as the beliefs of all or some of the group’s members, or as the beliefs of group itself. The second view denies any necessary connection to belief, claiming instead that the epistemic (...)
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  9.  35
    Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents. [REVIEW]Leo Townsend - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):183–187.
  10.  19
    Introduction: Themes in the Study of Human Cognition as a Social Phenomenon.Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend - 2021 - In Leo Townsend, Hans Bernhard Schmid & Preston Stovall (eds.), The Social Institution of Discursive Norms. New York City: Routledge. pp. 1-21.
    Anglophone philosophy in the last three decades has seen a growing interest in the way participation in human society—as characterized by our doing things that count as taking up and conferring norm-governed roles within institutions like language, the law, social custom, and education—is part of what explains our existence as rational (to whatever extent we are) animals. Using the label discursive norms to refer to the standards of evaluation that attend the exercise of rational thought and agency, this development in (...)
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  11. Introduction to Special Issue on 'Group Speech Acts'.Leo Townsend & Michael Schmitz - 2020 - Language & Communication 72:53-55.
  12. Trust and Commitment in Collective Testimony.Leo Townsend - 2020 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: pp. 39-58.
    In this paper I critically discuss Miranda Fricker’s ‘trust-based’ view of collective testimony—that is, testimony that comes from a group speaker. At the heart of Fricker’s account is the idea that testimony involves an ‘interpersonal deal of trust’, to which the speaker contributes a commitment to ‘second-personal epistemic trustworthiness’. Appropriating Margaret Gilbert’s concept of joint commitment, Fricker suggests that groups too can make such commitments, and hence that they, like individuals, can ‘enter into the second-personal relations of trust that characterise (...)
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  13. Being and Becoming in the Theory of Group Agency.Leo Townsend - 2013 - Abstracta 7 (1).
    Article Title: ‘Being and Becoming in the Theory of Group Agency’This paper explores a bootstrapping puzzle which appears to afflict Philip Pettit’s theory of group agency. Pettit claims that the corporate persons recognised by his theory come about when a set of individuals ‘gets its act together’ by undertaking to reason at the collective level. But this is puzzling, because it is hard to see how the step such a collective must take to become a group agent – the collectivisation (...)
     
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  14. Joint Commitment and Collective Belief.Leo Townsend - 2015 - Phenomenology and Mind 9 (9):46-53.
    According to Margaret Gilbert, two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to believe that p as a body. But the way she construes joint commitment in her account – as a commitment of and by the several parties to “doing something as a body” – encourages the thought that the phenomenon accounted for is not that of genuine belief. I explain why this concern arises and explore a different way of construing (...)
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  15.  26
    Epistemic Injustice and Indigenous Peoples in the Inter-American Human Rights System.Dina Lupin Townsend & Leo Townsend - 2020 - Social Epistemology 35 (2):147-159.
    In this paper we examine the epistemic treatment of Indigenous peoples by the Inter-American Court and Commission on Human Rights, two institutions that have sought to affirm the rights of Indigeno...
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  16.  2
    Representation and Epistemic Violence.Leo Townsend & Dina Lupin - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):577-594.
    Sometimes an individual gets taken as speaking for a wider group without laying claim to any such authority – they are thrust unwillingly, and sometimes even unknowingly, into the role of that grou...
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  17.  59
    Essays in Collective Epistemology Edited by Jennifer Lackey, Ed. [REVIEW]Leo Townsend - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):105-108.
  18. Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality.Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.) - 2021 - Cham: Springer.
    This edited volume examines the relationship between collective intentionality and inferential theories of meaning. The book consists of three main sections. The first part contains essays demonstrating how researchers working on inferentialism and collective intentionality can learn from one another. The essays in the second part examine the dimensions along which philosophical and empirical research on human reasoning and collective intentionality can benefit from more cross-pollination. The final part consists of essays that offer a closer examination of themes from inferentialism (...)
     
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  19. The Philosophy of Fanaticism: Epistemic, Affective, and Political Dimensions.Leo Townsend, Ruth Rebecca Tietjen, Michael Staudigl & Hans Bernard Schmid (eds.) - forthcoming - London: Routledge.
  20.  10
    The Social Institution of Discursive Norms: Historical, Naturalistic, and Pragmatic Perspectives.Leo Townsend, Preston Stovall & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.) - 2021 - Routledge.
    The essays in this collection explore the idea that discursive norms--the norms governing our thought and talk--are profoundly social. Not only do these norms govern and structure of social interactions, but they are sustained by a variety of social and institutional structures. The chapters are divided into three thematic sections. The first offers historical perspectives on discursive norms, including a chapter by Robert Brandom on the way Hegel transformed Kant's normativist approach to representation by adding both a social and a (...)
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  21.  27
    Margaret Gilbert, Joint Commitment How We Make the Social World. Reviewed By. [REVIEW]Leo Townsend - 2015 - Philosophy in Review 35 (3):140-142.