In Wilmot-Smith’s recent ‘Law, “Ought”, and “Can”,’ he argues that legal obligation does not imply ability. In this short reply, I show that Wilmot-Smith’s arguments do not withstand critical scrutiny. In section 1, I attack Wilmot-Smith’s argument for the claim that allowing for impossible obligations makes for a better legal system, and I introduce positive grounds for thinking otherwise. In section 2, I show that, even if Wilmot-Smith had established that impossible obligations make for a better (...) class='Hi'>legal system, his subsequent attack on OIC fails. (shrink)

An enduring question in political and legal philosophy concerns whether we have a general moral obligation to follow the law. In this paper, I argue that Philip Soper’s intuitively appealing effort to give new life to the idea of legal obligation by characterising it as a duty of deference is ultimately unpersuasive. Soper claims that people who understand what a legal system is and admit that it is valuable must recognise that they would be morally (...) inconsistent to deny that they owe deference to state norms. However, if the duty of deference stemmed from people’s decision to regard the law as valuable as Soper argues, then people who do not admit the value of the state would have no duty as such to defer to its norms. And, more importantly, people who admit the value of the state would have a duty not to defer to particular norms, namely those norms which violate the values that ground their preference for a state. This critique of Soper operates within his parameters by accepting his claim that moral consistency generates reasons to act. Even on those terms, Soper’s defence of legal obligation as a duty of deference is unpersuasive. (shrink)

Individuals sometimes do things that they know will violate the terms of a statute. Most scholars deny that such actions are always morally wrong, but a coherent theoretical account of the relationships between 1) moral obligation, 2) legal obligation, and 3) criminal wrongdoing that can robustly classify hard cases has been elusive. This article starts with a Kantian account of the relationship between law and morality, and it proposes two closely related standards: one for legal (...) class='Hi'>obligation, and another for criminal wrongdoing. It then tests the plausibility and resilience of these standards by using them to generate illuminating new analyses of classic hypothetical cases involving alleged crimes committed under circumstances of necessity. These analyses offer reason to believe that the standards proposed in this article can anchor a Kantian theory of criminal responsibility that is simultaneously rigorous and humane. (shrink)

Conceiving legal obligations towards future generations is challenging—especially from a positivist stance and if obligations and claims are understood as being correlative in nature. Legal obligations towards future generations are often rejected from the outset if (and insofar as) there is no explicit acknowledgement or established doctrine. This neglects the power of sound legal interpretation. I argue that obligations towards future people and generations are grounded in the relational character of human rights and that their positivity is (...) not a problem in a legal order containing norm texts that can reasonably be interpreted as acknowledging human rights; no additional enactment is necessary for these obligations to be part of the positive law. This claim is based on a (novel) concept of fundamental rights which is compatible with legal positivism. (shrink)

Judges decide cases by appeal to rules of general application they deem to be law. If a candidate rule resolves the case and is, ex ante and independently of the judge’s judgment, the law, then the judge has a legal obligation to declare it as such and follow it. That, at any rate, is conventional wisdom. Yet the principle is false – a rule’s being law or the judge’s believing it to be law is neither necessary nor even (...) sufficient for a judge being legally obliged to follow it. The principle’s falsity is especially apparent in so-called hard cases, where the line between legal and non-legal rules is obscure. Moreover, judges have authority to disregard law in hard cases not because moral obligations trump legal obligations. Rather, the law itself circumscribes its own authority. The implications for legal philosophy are significant; for one, a theory of juridical norms can be developed independently of the precise boundaries of legality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:85, LEGAL OBLIGATION IN HUME There is one aspect of the thought of David Hume that seems to me to be important and topical, especially if considered in relation to two reductionist and dogmatic tendencies that are still noticeable in the general theory of law. By dogmatic I understand conceptions that are insufficiently founded on experience. The first of these two dogmatic tendencies is the emphasis placed (...) on the notion of sanction which is viewed by some as prevailing over the concept of obligation to the point of absorbing it within itself. Law is that which the superior bodies of the dominant class impose. This doctrine has been affirmed even recently. But the master example is given by Bentham. To say that a man has the obligation to behave in a certain way is equivalent to saying that if he does not behave so, he will experience pain (or the absence of pleasure). Legal sanction is the source from which this pain comes. Thus Bentham goes so far as to say that pain is constitutive of 2 obligation in all its forms. This seems to be contrary to experience and common sense. In fact, one can observe a legal obligation independently of the consideration of the consequences inherent in its violation. For this and other reasons the doctrinal tendency to give prevalence to the notion of sanction over the notion of obligation does not take account of experience and is dogmatic. Against this dogmatism one observes even today that the concept of an obligation that arises from a constriction, the concept 3 of Zwangspflicht, is a contradictio in adjecto. Nevertheless, in order to avoid the contradiction inherent in the prevalence of sanction over obligation and the dependence of law on political power and on the power of those who command, it is easy to fall into a second and opposite dogmatism. This second dogmatism consists in affirming the existence of fundamental legal obligations deducible from a priori principles understood platonically 86. as Ol·(fO- T"*) WVXt\S and as vision of the mind. But demonstrative reason, so understood, is determined exclusively through relations of ideas which, in Hume's opinion, cannot themselves constitute legal obligation. A legal system requires modifications and limitations to the passions and interests of individuals. As is well known, Hume argues that a passion and an interest cannot be modified by selfevident rational principles. No criterion that is deducible from demonstrative reason can function as a guide to human behaviour. Now between the two dogmatisms to which I have referred, Hume represents a third way on the basis of experience and of common sense. The advantage offered by Hume's thought is that of showing both the distinction between and the complementary nature of legal obligation and sanction. In what follows I shall discuss what I consider to be the kernel of Hume's legal theory as contained in his conception of human nature, setting aside secondary elements that do not directly concern the subject proposed. First: A legal system is not conceivable without setting up fundamental legal rules which, in Hume's opinion are the rules of justice. Consequently, the discussion of law implies the discussion of justice. And the discussion of justice is part of legal theory. Here I restrict my consideration to the obligations that are expressed by fundamental legal rules which are: stability of possession transference of possession by consent, and performance of promises. We know that, according to Hume, such rules cannot be derived from demonstrative or a_ priori reason but are revealed to empirical knowledge. Second: Hume distinguishes between the setting up of legal obligation and the moral evaluation of the legal obligation. In order to grasp the peculiarity of legal obligation as compared with moral evaluation, I refer here to the constitution of legal obligation. In order to understand the third book of the Treatise, it is in my 87. opinion absolutely necessary to take into account the distinction between the setting up of the legal obligation and its moral evaluation. Third: The obligations expressed in fundamental legal rules do not arise through a natural inclination but by artifice or by convention. The concept of artifice implies in Hume... (shrink)

This article supports H. L. A. Hart's “any reasons” thesis (defended consistently from the first edition of The Concept of Law in 1961 to the Postscript to the second edition of 1994) that legal officials may accept law for any reasons, including non‐moral reasons. I develop a conception of non‐moral aesthetic ideals of official conduct which may provide legal officials with reasons to accept and apply even morally iniquitous law. I use this conception in order to rebut Gerald (...) Postema's and Joseph Raz's criticisms of Hart's view, and suggest that my revisions offer reasons for renewed confidence in Hart's account of law's normativity. (shrink)

Legal rationalist: law claims to give its subjects reasons for action. Normative reasons intuition: Reasons for action being key, the obvious way to establish that law makes a practical difference in people's deliberations is by arguing that the law claims to give reasons for action to its subjects. Explanatory Reasons Intuition: "And while it is possible to be confused about our normative reasons, it seems unlikely that everyone is confused all the time; so the fact that people consistently take (...) the law as their motivating reason and guide their conduct by the law does seem to suggest that the law does provide normative reasons for its subjects." And if it’s a necessary feature of law that it claims authority, then the argu- ment seems to establish that law claims to provide reasons for its subjects. Schematically the argument as a whole goes like this: The law claims to be a legitimate authority. If a legitimate authority directs a subject to φ the subject is obligated to φ ). The fact that an agent is obligated to φ is a reason for her to φ. So the law claims that its directives are reasons......Obligations as Reason-Giving : the fact that A is obligated to φ is itself a reason for A to φ. Unfortunately for the Legal Rationalist, OAR is false. Legal obligation has certain features which mean that the fact that a certain action’s being legally obligatory cannot itself constitute a reason to perform that action." Will explain away the intuitions in terms of triggering, and show how law can make a normative difference that is consistent with the falsity of OAR. Law's claim, and normative impact, can be captured exclusively in terms of second-order reasons. PartofwhatHartisafterhereistheideathatdeliberationon the matter of whether or not to φ is closed or settled by the obligation. But deliberation is cut off because the law has reached some sort of conclusion or answer or verdict on the question of whether or not to φ. The legal obligation not to φ contains a practical verdict about φing: it is not to be done. This idea – that the legal obligation not to φ provides or contains a verdict that φing is not to be done – is the idea that legal obligation is verdictive. For something to be verdictive is for it to express or embody a verdict or conclusion as to what ought to be done. It is plausible to say that wrongness is verdictive. So to say that such-and-such an action would be wrong is to express a verdict on that action – it is one which should not be done. To get a handle on the idea of the verdictive it helps to contrast it with the contributory. A contributory consideration is one which contributes to the verdict, by increasing the weight on the verdict’s side. So that φing would harm someone, or would cause extreme suffering, or would have costs that vastly outweighed any benefits, say, would be contributory considerations on the side of the verdict that φing would be wrong." "Wrong" is verdictive, and so it cannot itself be a reason for the action - it cannot be a reason for itself. Obligation and wrong in law are very close, and obligation should be treated as verdictive. This shows us that OAR is false. (shrink)

The focus of this monograph lies in the construction of a theory of legal obligation, understanding it as a discrete notion with its own defining traits. In this work, Bertea specifically addresses the question: how should legal obligation be distinctively conceptualized? The conceptualization of legal obligation he defends in this work gradually emerges from a critical assessment of the theories of legal obligation that have been most influential in the contemporary legal-theoretical (...) debate. Building on such critical analysis, Bertea's study purports to offer a novel and unconventional conceptualization of legal obligation, which is characterized as a law-engendered intersubjective reason for carrying out certain courses of conduct. (shrink)

What do normative terms like “obligation” mean in legal contexts? On one view, which H.L.A. Hart may have endorsed, “obligation” is ambiguous in moral and legal contexts. On another, which is dominant in jurisprudence, “obligation” has a distinctively moralized meaning in legal contexts. On a third view, which is often endorsed in philosophy of language, “obligation” has a generic meaning in moral and legal con- texts. After making the nature of and disagreements (...) between these views precise, I show how linguistic data militates against both rivals to the generic meaning view, and argue that this has significant implications for jurisprudence. (shrink)

Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.

In this paper, I seek to establish which sort of entity a legal obligation is. I will first consider that in the literature several referents have been associated to legal obligation. Some of them are linguistic in nature, whilst others have a factual quality or an ideal quality. After criticising the reductions of legal obligation to a linguistic object and to a state of affair, qua fact of some kind, I pass to explore the (...) claim that legal obligation is best conceptualised as an intersubjective reason for action. In this context, I will also claim that, from the perspective on legal ontology, reasons for action (and thus the obligations the law engenders) are ideal objects, or mental constructs, of a distinct quality. For, qua objects of thought, legal obligations are not merely psychological entities existing in the minds of the individuals imposing them or in the minds of the individuals subject to them. By contrast, they are abstract constructs that possess a somehow objective (or at least interpersonal, qua non-purely-psychological) reality. The final part of the essay will be devoted to discuss the implications that this ontological characterisation of legal obligation has for our understanding of law. (shrink)

This volume collects six original essays by internationally respected researchers who have devoted themselves to the study of legal obligation. It brings together works that innovatively address key dimensions of the current debates concerning legal obligation from different and, in some cases, even opposing theoretical perspectives. As a result, the collection offers a comprehensive discussion of legal obligation that promises to significantly advance our understanding of the obligatory dimension of law. What specifically connects the (...) contributions gathered here is one common thread: coming to terms with a notion – legal obligation – that is of both practical and theoretical importance. On the one hand, it is widely regarded as a fundamental legal concept by legal practitioners and laypeople alike, as not only judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and juries but also ordinary citizens make extensive use of obligation-related terms and discourses. On the other hand, the notion of legal obligation is of paramount significance for the theory of law. Indeed, even legal theorists who, quite understandably, refuse to reduce the law to a mere obligation-imposing device and opt instead for a view in which the normative dimension of the law also encompasses powers, rights, permissions, privileges and immunities, duly acknowledge the centrality of legal obligation for the understanding and conceptualisation of law. Hence the importance of the treatments presented in this volume. (shrink)

Bringing together world-class scholars who have devoted themselves to the study of legal obligation, this book addresses key dimensions of the current debate: providing novel insights and perspectives, as well as critically discussing the leading theories of legal obligation. The notion of legal obligation is widely regarded as fundamental by both legal practitioners and legal theorists. For the language that explicitly refers to obligation is pervasive insofar as paradigmatic legal materials (...) make reference to obligation either directly, by specifying what a subject is obligated to do, or indirectly, by attributing rights, privileges, powers, permissions, and other normative statuses to both single individuals and groups. There is, then, broad agreement that obligation constitutes a central element in legal studies. At the same time, however, there is considerable disagreement among contemporary legal theorists about how legal obligation can or should be elucidated. This book accounts for both the significance of obligation in law and the variety of views of legal obligation championed in legal philosophy today. With contributions from renowned theorists, this book will be invaluable for scholars and students of legal theory, legal philosophy and jurisprudence. (shrink)

From the ethics perspective, “duty of care” is a difficult and contested term, fraught with misconceptions and apparent misappropriations. However, it is a term that clinicians use frequently as they navigate COVID-19, somehow core to their understanding of themselves and their obligations, but with uncertainty as to how to translate or operationalize this in the context of a pandemic. This paper explores the “duty of care” from a legal perspective, distinguishes it from broader notions of duty on professional and (...) personal levels, and proposes a working taxonomy for practitioners to better understand the concept of “duty” in their response to COVID-19. (shrink)

This paper discusses the implications of the ethical theory of Emmanuel Levinas for theoretical debates about legal obligation. I begin by examining the structure of moral reasoning in light of Levinas's account of ethics, looking particularly at the role of the third party (le tiers) in modifying Levinas's primary ethical structure of the face to face relation. I then argue that the primordial role of ethical experience in social discourse, as emphasised by Levinas, undermines theories, such as that (...) of H. L. A. Hart, that propose a systematic distinction between legal and moral species of obligation. (shrink)

What are laws, and do they necessarily have any basis in morality? The present work argues that laws are governmental assurances of protections of rights and that concepts of law and legal obligation must therefore be understood in moral terms. There are, of course, many immoral laws. But once certain basic truths are taken into account – in particular, that moral principles have a “dimension of weight”, to use an expression of Ronald Dworkin’s, and also that principled relations (...) are not always expressed by perfect statistical concomitances – the existence of iniquitous laws poses no significant threat to a moralistic analysis of law. Special attention is paid to the debate between Ronald Dworkin and H.L.A. Hart. Dworkin’s over-all position is argued to be correct, but issue is taken with his argument for that position. Hart’s analysis is found to be vitiated by an impoverished conception of morality and also of the nature of government. Our analysis of law enables us to answer three questions that, at this juncture of history, are of special importance: Are there international laws? If not, could such laws exist? And if they could exist, would their existence necessarily be desirable? The answers to these questions are, respectively: “no”, “yes”, and “no.” Our analysis of law enables us to hold onto the presumption that so-called legal interpretation is a principled endeavor, and that some legal interpretations are truer to existing laws than others. At the same time, it accommodates the obvious fact that the sense in which a physicist interprets meter-readings, or in which a physician interprets a patient’s symptoms, is different from the sense in which judges interpret the law. So our analysis of law enables us to avoid the extreme views that have thus far dominated debates concerning the nature of legal interpretation. On the one hand, it becomes possible to avoid the cynical view (held by the so-called “legal realists”) that legal interpretation is mere legislation and that no legal interpretation is more correct than any other. On the other hand, it becomes possible to avoid Blackstone’s view (rightly descried by Austin as a “childish fiction”) that judges merely discover, and do not create, the law. (shrink)

Introduction: There is currently no binding, internationally accepted and successful approach to ensure global equitable access to healthcare during a pandemic. The aim of this ethical analysis is to bring into the discussion a legally regulated vaccine allocation as a possible strategy for equitable global access to vaccines. We focus our analysis on COVAX (COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access) and an existing EU regulation that, after adjustment, could promote global vaccine allocation. -/- Methods: The main documents discussing the two strategies are (...) examined with a qualitative content analysis. The ethical values reasonableness, openness and transparency, inclusiveness, responsiveness and accountability serve as categories for our ethical analysis. -/- Results: We observed that the decision-making processes in a legal solution to expand access to vaccines would be more transparent than in COVAX initiative, would be more inclusive, especially of nation states, and the values responsiveness and accountability could be easily incorporated in the development of a new regulation. -/- Discussion: A legal strategy that offers incentives to the pharmaceutical industry in return for global distribution of vaccines according to the Fair Priority Model is an innovative way to achieve global and equitable access to vaccines. However, in the long term, achieving the Sustainable Development Goals will require from all nations to work in solidarity to find durable solutions for global vaccine research and development. Interim solutions, such as our proposed legal strategy for equitable access to vaccines, and efforts to find long-term solutions must be advanced in parallel. (shrink)

As the burden of misconduct in medical research is increasingly recognised, questions have been raised about how best to address this problem. Whilst there are existing mechanisms for the investigation and management of misconduct in medical literature, they are inadequate to deal with the magnitude of the problem. Journal editors and publishers play an essential role in protecting the veracity of the medical literature. Whilst ethical guidance for journal editors and publishers is important, it is not as readily enforceable as (...) legal obligations might be. This article questions the legal obligations that might exist for journal editors and publishing companies with respect to ensuring the veracity of the published literature. Ultimately, there is no enforceable legal obligation in Australia, the United Kingdom, or the United States. In light of this, more robust mechanisms are needed to deliver greater confidence and transparency in the investigative process, the management of concerns or findings of misconduct and the need to cleanse the literature. We show that the law disincentivises journals and publishers from ensuring truth in their publications. There are harmful consequences for medical care and public confidence in the medical profession and health care system when the foundations of medical science are questionable. (shrink)

In contemporary positive law there are legal institutions, such as conscientious objection in the context of military service or “conscience clauses” in medical law, which for the sake of respect for judgments of conscience aim at restricting legal obligations. Such restrictions are postulated to protect human freedom in general. On the basis of Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy, it shall be argued that human dignity, understood as the existential perfection of a human being based on special unity, provides a foundation (...) for imposing limitations on the scope of legal obligations in general. Human freedom plays a crucial role in understanding dignity as perfection based on the special individuality of a personal being, which in turn is based on the free choice to pursue a unique way of life. Therefore, Aquinas’ argumentation is, at its core, liberal – the perfection rather than the imperfection of a human being underlies the requirement to limit legal obligations. Dignity understood as the special unity of a person also provides the basis for limiting obligations in the case of conscientious objection; however, in that case, such limitations aim at safeguarding internal integrity rather than the individualisation of a given way of life. _This project was financed with funds from the National Science Centre allocated on the basis of the decision number DEC-2013/09/B/HS5/04232._. (shrink)

In light of a history of categorical exclusion, it is critical that pregnant people are included in research to help improve the knowledge base and interventions needed to address public health. Yet the volatile legal landscape around reproductive rights in the United States threatens to undue recent progress made toward the greater inclusion of pregnant people in research. We offer ethical and practical guidance for researchers, sponsors, and institutional review boards to take specific steps to minimize legal risks (...) and ensure the ethical conduct of research with pregnant people in an evolving legal environment. (shrink)

Mit diesem Text möchte ich zu der Debatte über den Status und die Legitimität prinzipientreuen Ungehorsams in einer demokratischen Gesellschaft beitragen. Nach der Einführung dieses Begriffs argumentiere ich dafür, dass sich prinzipientreuer Ungehorsam nicht nur als moralische und politische Haltung, sondern auch als rechtliche Verpflichtung darstellen lässt. Im Ergebnis vertrete ich, dass wir nicht nur prinzipientreu gegen das Gesetz verstoßen können, ohne notwendigerweise unsere rechtlichen Verpflichtungen zu verletzen, sondern dass rechtliche Verpflichtungen prinzipientreuen Ungehorsam sogar vorschreiben können. Mit dieser Rahmung des (...) Problems prinzipientreuen Gesetzesbruchs wird die Diskussion um eine neue Position erweitert, nach der wir nicht nur eine moralische Rechtfertigung haben können, das Gesetz zu missachten, sondern auch eine rechtliche Verpflichtung dazu, nämlich eine Verpflichtung, das Gesetz aus prinzipiellen rechtlichen Gründen zu brechen. (shrink)

The concept of legal obligation is utterly central to legal practice. But positivism lacks a comprehensive account of legal obligation, focusing only on the second-order recognition obligations of officials with no account of the first-order legal obligations of citizen. As legal obligations are conceptually related to legally valid norms, this failure calls into question positivism’s theory of legal validity. In this essay, I develop Hart’s account of social obligation and supplement his (...) account of the second-order legal obligations of official qua official with an account of the first-order obligations of citizens. The latter is constituted, I argue, by social pressure in the form of the authorization of the state’s coercive machinery for non-compliance.Resumen:El concepto de obligación jurídica es completamente central para la práctica jurídica. Sin embargo, el positivismo carece de una explicación integral de la obligación jurídica, puesto que se concentra solamente en el reconocimiento de obligaciones de segundo orden que recaen sobre los oficiales, y no explican las obligaciones jurídicas de primer orden que recaen sobre los ciudadanos. Cuando las obligaciones jurídicas se relacionan conceptualmente con normas válidas jurídicamente, el error de no tener una explicación integral de la obligación jurídica pone en crisis la teoría positivista de la validez jurídica. En este ensayo se desarrolla la explicación hartiana de la obligación social y se complementa su explicación de las obligaciones jurídicas de segundo orden del oficial en su calidad de oficial con una explicación de la obligación de primer orden de los ciudadanos. Esta última se constituye, argumenta el autor, por la presión social en la forma de la autorización que tiene el Estado de echar a andar la maquinaria coercitiva si no se cumple con la obligación. (shrink)

On the premise that ‘morality’ refers to a system of rules governed by a material categorical imperative, I argue that the sources thesis of legal positivism (and, consequently, its separation thesis) is untenable. This is because it portrays legal obligations as hypothetical imperatives, which they cannot be if a material categorical imperative exists. Legal systems lay down obligation-asserting rules; but any rules are necessarily invalid if they require behaviour contrary to a material categorical imperative. Because the (...) sources thesis attests otherwise, legal positivism presupposes, minimally, that a material categorical imperative cannot be known to exist. I argue, however, that human agents cannot coherently question that a material categorical imperative exists. By definition, they necessarily adopt hypothetical imperatives. But understanding the concept of a hypothetical imperative requires the concept of a categorical imperative to be understood, and understanding having the concept of a categorical imperative postulates that there can be only one categorical imperative, that it exists, and that it is Alan Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC). This argument only fails if the concept of a categorical imperative is incoherent. In all of this, I follow Kant, except about the material content of the categorical imperative and the nature of free will. (shrink)

Muwāsāt encompasses the moral duty to provide aid to those in need, prioritising those closest to us while sharing what resources we can spare. However, should a person's legally protected values be at risk, assistance and solidarity become mandatory obligations. Islamic law recognises this social duty as fard al-kifāya, with muwāsāt as the justification for this sufficient obligation. On the other hand, muwāsāt is also included in the legal justification of in-kind obligations such as zakat and alimony. Muwāsāt (...) actually has a broad conceptual content that includes each individual in the society helping each other, sharing, and sharing what they have when necessary. The aim of muwāsāt is to keep social sensitivity towards those in need alive. Muwāsāt constitutes the wisdom of meeting the needs of the other party by sharing the resources available to each individual in the society when the legal values that Islam aims to protect are in danger. In this context, this study aims to evaluate the rights of those in need over those who have the means to meet their needs by considering the proposal in the context of the provisions. To prioritize the legal values of Islam and safeguard the sanctity of life, as well as protect bodily integrity and uphold the right to privacy, the principle of muwāsāt necessitates that all Muslims must uphold these responsibilities towards themselves, each other and the state. This study aims to investigate muwāsāt, which defines the duty to provide assistance to any individual who is cognisant of their plight, within their capacity, when their legal rights that must be safeguarded are threatened, in the framework of social accountability. In this context, it can be said that muwāsāt has a direct connection with the proposed obligations in Islamic law. Muwāsāt is included in the justification of fard al-kifāya obligations. However, the fact that the obligation of zakat, the obligation of fidya, and the responsibility of alimony are included in the legal justification of meeting the needs of the needy by those who are not dependent on anyone, shows us that muwāsāt is the basis of obligations involving cooperation. Similarly, the legal reason for banning interest is that it destroys the balance in society. In particular, the basis for the state to impose an upper limit on exorbitant prices is based on the principle that every individual has an equal right to meet basic needs. In other words, determining the profit margin in the prices of basic needs is a requirement of muwāsāt. The definition of the state’s obligation, along with individual responsibility in muwāsāt, aims to ensure that there is no individual in society whose basic needs are not met. Consequently, muwāsāt has an aspect that includes social responsibility and legal liability along with conscientious responsibility. This shows that Islam adopts the protection of life as the highest legal value. Muwāsāt is not limited to meeting basic needs, but also includes giving this support to a person when he needs moral support, sharing his pain by standing next to him, feeling him and internalizing his pain. For this reason, muwāsāt actually defines the moral stance that a Muslim should have. Based on this moral stance, it is safe to say that the most fundamental concern of Islam is to protect the material and spiritual integrity and human existence. This study aims to express, in the context of Islamic law, that the main purpose of Islam is to protect human beings in their material and spiritual integrity by examining and evaluating muwāsāt in its broad scope. (shrink)

.The author discusses Hart's concept of legal obligation, especially his contention that there is an obligation to obey the law which is peculiarly legal, i.e., non‐moral. This view is held to be mistaken. What is denied is that legal rules, merely by their being issued, offer a justification for the use of coercion to ensure compliance with them. Although moral and other social rules are considered self‐justifying, that is not the case of legal rules. (...) Any analogy between these two types of rules in justifying their implementation by force is deemed wrong.**. (shrink)

Kelsen’s critique of absolute sovereignty famously appeals to a basic norm of international recognition. However, in his discussion of legal obligation, generally speaking, he notoriously rejects mutual recognition as having any normative consequence. I argue that this apparent contradiction in Kelsen's estimate regarding the normative force of recognition is resolved in his dynamic account of the democratic generation of law. Democracy is embedded within a modern political ethos that obligates legal subjects to recognize each other along four (...) dimensions: as contractors whose mutually beneficial cooperation measures esteem by fair standards of contribution; as autonomous agents endowed with equal rights; as friends who altruistically care for each others’ welfare, and as fallible agents of diverse experiences and worldviews. (shrink)

One of the major objectives in a democratic state is ensuring health security of the citizens including combating epidemic diseases. The subject matter of this article is the presentation and analysis of legal regulations regarding preventive vaccination in Poland, in particular the aspect of imposing a legal obligation and restricting parents’ right to express consent for medical intervention. The reflections made herein are aimed at finding an answer to the question whether the adopted legal solutions are (...) admissible in a democratic state with regard to ensuring health security. The purpose of the analysis is also to assess whether the abovementioned legal regulations have been formulated in a clear way and do not raise interpretation doubts and, consequently, whether they are comprehensible to the parents obliged to comply with them. As it follows from analysis of the legal provisions, parents must not refuse to subject a child to obligatory preventive vaccination and their consent is not required by law, both as regards the medical qualifying examination to exclude contraindications to performing vaccination and the vaccination itself. It is a legal obligation, from which exemption is only possible on grounds of certain medical conditions that would render vaccination inadvisable. The legal provisions that concern obligatory preventive vaccination in Poland, including in particular those referring to its enforceability, have not been formulated in a way that is sufficiently comprehensible to parents who are under the obligation of complying with them, irrespective of the fact that the language of the provisions of law should be clear and raise no interpretative doubts. In a democratic state the protection of public health against epidemic hazards justifies the implementation of legal solutions that restrict an individual’s freedom of self-determination, thus limiting the right of patients or their statutory representatives to grant or refuse consent for a medical intervention in the form of preventive vaccination – the purpose of this legal solution being to prioritize the safeguarding of state health security. It is vitally important to engage in a social dialogue with the purpose of convincing the public of the need for vaccination, its significance and its implementation for the better good. (shrink)

Allen prefaces his book with a quote from Milton's Apology. In it, Milton confesses to a certain education and training in the art of rhetoric, but contrasts it to the genuine eloquence that truth inspires in those speakers who earnestly desire to teach the good things they know to others. It would seem no accident that Allen has chosen the passage; his intention is to tell us the good things he has found in his inquiry into Socrates' trial and condemnation. (...) Accordingly, the book concentrates on Plato's Apology and Crito. (shrink)

A lawyer explains the difference between law and ethics--what you can do versus what you should do--and how leaders can create more ethical, satisfying, and profitable workplaces.