This book provides the first systematic, book-length defence of natural law ideas in ethics, politics and jurisprudence since John Finnis's influential Natural Law and Natural Rights. Incorporating insights from recent work in ethical, legal and social theory, it presents a robust and original account of the natural law tradition, challenging common perceptions of natural law as a set of timeless standards imposed on humans from above. Natural law, Jonathan Crowe argues, is objective and normative, but nonetheless historically extended, socially embodied (...) and dependent on contingent facts about human nature. It reflects the ongoing human quest to work out how best to live flourishing lives, given the natures we have and the social environments we inhabit. The nature and purpose of law can only be adequately understood within this wider context of value. Timely, wide-ranging and clearly written, this volume will appeal to those working in law, philosophy and religious studies. (shrink)
The natural law tradition in ethics and jurisprudence has undergone a revival in recent years, sparked by the work of John Finnis and the 'new natural law theorists' in the early 1980s. The ensuing decades have seen the emergence of an increasingly rich body of natural law scholarship, but this diversification has gone unnoticed by many outside the field. This article seeks to clarify the relationship between the core claims of the new natural law outlook and the more specific views (...) of individual authors. It begins by discussing the place of the new natural law theory within contemporary natural law scholarship. It then offers an account of the core elements of the new natural law framework that emphasises their compatibility with a range of ethical and philosophical viewpoints. (shrink)
This article considers natural law perspectives on the nature of law. Natural law theories are united by what Mark Murphy calls the natural law thesis: law is necessarily a rational standard for conduct. The natural law position comes in strong and weak versions: the strong view holds that a rational defect in a norm renders it legally invalid, while the weak view holds that a rational defect in a legal norm renders it legally defective. The article explores the motivations for (...) the natural law position, before considering three lines of natural law argument found in the literature. I conclude by examining the arguments offered by John Finnis and Murphy in support of the weak natural law view. I suggest that these arguments fail to impugn the strong natural law thesis. Indeed, the functional argument outlined by Murphy provides a plausible route to a hybrid natural law view that incorporates both weak and strong claims. (shrink)
This article explores the claim that law is characteristically in search of the past. We argue that the structure of memory defines our relationship with the past and this relationship, in turn, has important implications for the nature of law. The article begins by examining the structure of memory, drawing particularly on the work of Henri Bergson. It then draws out the implications of Bergson’s theory for the interplay of past and present, highlighting the challenges this poses for law’s project (...) of retrieval. Law, as an artifact, seeks its origins in human action, but this often yields a static view of legal discourse as the retrieval of pivotal moments. Bergson, by contrast, shows us that past and present influence each other dynamically, giving rise to an integrated whole. The article concludes by exploring the potential for law to transcend the structure of memory. We argue that even beyond the limits of memory legal reasoning encounters a kind of residue left by the ethical foundations of law. Law searches vainly for the past, but what it finds is itself. (shrink)
This paper explores methodological connections between the existentialist and natural law traditions, with particular emphasis on the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre and John Finnis. Existentialist approaches to phenomenology hold promise in illuminating the epistemological foundations of natural law accounts, especially those emphasising human self-fulfilment through practical choice. Some methodological challenges common to projects in the fields of existentialist ethics and natural law are discussed. It is suggested that an existentialist perspective holds potential in reinforcing contemporary natural law responses to the (...) so-called 'fact-value distinction'. Such an approach affords a promising methodological structure for investigating the pre-moral foundations for social judgements of ethical significance, thereby providing qualified support for the type of natural law theory advocated by Finnis. (shrink)
This paper discusses the implications of the ethical theory of Emmanuel Levinas for theoretical debates about legal obligation. I begin by examining the structure of moral reasoning in light of Levinas's account of ethics, looking particularly at the role of the third party (le tiers) in modifying Levinas's primary ethical structure of the face to face relation. I then argue that the primordial role of ethical experience in social discourse, as emphasised by Levinas, undermines theories, such as that of H. (...) L. A. Hart, that propose a systematic distinction between legal and moral species of obligation. (shrink)
This article explores and critiques Ronald Dworkin's arguments on the value of integrity in law. Dworkin presents integrity in both legislation and adjudication as holding inherent political value. I defend an alternative theory of the value of integrity, according to which integrity holds instrumental value as part of a legal framework that seeks to realise a particular set of basic values taken to underpin the legal system as a whole. It is argued that this instrumental-value theory explains the value of (...) integrity more satisfactorily than Dworkin's inherent-value account. The article concludes with a discussion of Dworkin's 'one right answer thesis'. Although the proposed theory of integrity does not support a strong version of Dworkin's thesis, it does suggest that there will be a single correct answer to legal questions more often than for normative deliberation generally. (shrink)
Philosophers continue to be sceptical about the possibility of constructing an existentialist ethical theory. This article explores two of the main reasons for this scepticism and draws on Jean-Paul Sartre's "Existentialism and Humanism" to suggest that there is a way around them.
The American philosopher Robert Nozick is best known for his controversial book, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, in which he advanced a radical libertarian account of the state. However, as A. R. Lacey observes in this commendably concise overview of Nozick's philosophical writings, Nozick himself always resisted being labelled a political philosopher. Indeed, as Lacey's book demonstrates, Nozicks published work touched on a remarkably wide range of philosophical issues, including not only political philosophy and ethics, but also epistemology, the nature of (...) rationality, and various topics in metaphysics. ISBN: 0691090459. (shrink)
This thought-provoking Research Handbook provides a snapshot of current research on natural law theory in ethics, politics and law, showcasing the breadth and diversity of contemporary natural law thought. The Research Handbook on Natural Law Theory examines topics such as foundational figures in Western natural law theory, natural law ideas in a variety of religious and cultural traditions, normative foundations of natural law, as well as issues of law and governance. Featuring contributions by leading international scholars, this Research Handbook offers (...) a valuable resource for scholars in law, philosophy, religious studies and related fields. (shrink)
Natural law ethics holds that practical rationality consists in engaging in non-defective ways with a range of fundamental goods. These basic goods are characteristically presented as reflecting the natural properties of humans, but the details of this picture vary widely. This article argues that natural law ethics can usefully be understood as a type of dispositional theory of value, which identifies the basic goods with those objectives that humans are characteristically disposed to pursue and value for their own sake. Natural (...) law theories of practical rationality can then be understood as attempts to capture the principles that would govern engagement with the basic goods under ideal conditions. The article begins by offering an account of normative inclinations as human dispositions both to act in certain ways and to believe that the actions are worthwhile or required. It then explores the implications of this account for natural law ethics, discussing the role of the basic goods in practical rationality, whether the goods may change over time and the connection between the goods and human nature. (shrink)
Mediation is becoming more and more prominent as a mode of legal dispute resolution. The problem of legitimacy in mediation raises the question of why mediation is legitimate as a means of settling social disputes. This issue mirrors a long-running and deep-seated problem of legitimacy in law generally. We argue that the most promising strategy for justifying the normative force of law - namely, that law provides a mutually beneficial mechanism of social coordination - does not translate straightforwardly to the (...) mediation context. A distinctive response to the problem of legitimacy in mediation is therefore needed. The consensual nature of mediation may render it legitimate in some contexts, but it is unlikely to do so in others. Our conclusion is threefold: the problem of legitimacy in mediation exists; it is distinct from the problem of legitimacy in law generally; and the problem is more intractable than is generally thought. (shrink)
The dominant theoretical approach to the prohibition of exclusionary conduct in competition law distinguishes exclusionary conduct from normal competitive conduct based on their economic outcomes....
This article engages with Desmond Manderson's recent book, Proximity, Levinas and the Soul of Law. I begin by examining a vexed topic in Levinas scholarship: namely, the very possibility of a Levinasian legal theory. Manderson makes a constructive and, I think, important contribution to this question, insisting that Levinas does not require us to segregate the domains of ethics and law, as some interpreters have suggested. This basic issue provides us with a springboard to explore two other themes in Manderson's (...) reading of Levinas. The first concerns the relationship between self- and other-oriented approaches to ethical and legal discourse; the second, the role of ethical experience in informing and shaping judicial reasoning. (shrink)
The principle of government neutrality, as commonly understood, enshrines the idea that government bodies ought to treat all citizens equally. I argue that the traditional interpretation of this principle in liberal constitutionalism has involved a prohibition against legal actors distinguishing between subjects on the basis of their personal characteristics. This approach is unsatisfactory, as it constrains the law's ability to respond to evolved social practices of discrimination. To illustrate this point, I draw on the writings of Jean-François Lyotard and recent (...) judicial decisions on the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. (shrink)