We comment on two articles on social referencing and social appraisal. We agree with Walle, Reschke, and Knothe’s argument that at one level of analysis, social referencing and social appraisal are functionally equivalent: In both cases, another person’s emotional expression is observed and this expression informs the observer’s own emotional reactions and behavior. However, we also agree with Clément and Dukes’s view that, there is an important difference between social referencing and social appraisal. We also argue that they are likely (...) to occur at different stages of emotion process. (shrink)

In philosophical thought experiments, as in ordinary discourse, our understanding of verbal case descriptions is enriched by automatic comprehension inferences. Such inferences have us routinely infer what else is also true of the cases described. We consider how such routine inferences from polysemous words can generate zombie intuitions: intuitions that are ‘killed’ (defeated) by contextual information but kept cognitively alive by the psycholinguistic phenomenon of linguistic salience bias. Extending ‘evidentiary’ experimental philosophy, this paper examines whether the ‘zombie argument’ against materialism (...) is built on zombie intuitions. We examine the hypothesis that contextually defeated stereotypical inferences from the noun ‘zombie’ influence intuitions about ‘philosophical zombies’. We document framing effects (‘zombie’ vs ‘duplicate’) predicted by the hypothesis. Findings undermine intuitions about the conceivability of ‘philosophical zombies’ and address the philosophical ‘hard problem of consciousness’. Findings support a deflationary response: The impression that principled obstacles prevent scientific explanation of how physical processes give rise to conscious experience is generated by philosophical arguments that rely on epistemically deficient intuitions. (shrink)

The importance of the hidden curriculum is recognised as a practical training ground for the absorption of medical ethics by healthcare professionals. Pakistan’s healthcare sector is hampered by the exclusion of ethics from medical and nursing education curricula and the absence of monitoring of ethical violations in the clinical setting. Nurses have significant knowledge of the hidden curriculum taught during clinical practice, due to long working hours in the clinic and front-line interaction with patients and other practitioners.

We offer a functional perspective on hate, showing that hate has a unique pattern of appraisals and action tendencies. Hate is based on perceptions of a stable, negative disposition of persons or groups. We hate persons and groups more because of who they are, than because of what they do. Hate has the goal to eliminate its target. Hate is especially significant at the intergroup level, where it turns already devalued groups into victims of hate. When shared among group members, (...) hate can spread fast in conflict zones where people are exposed to hate-based violence, which further feeds their hate. Hate can be reassuring and self-protective, because its message is simple and helps confirming people’s belief in a just world. (shrink)

In his recent essay in the Philosophical Review, “Truth and Freedom,” Trenton Merricks contends (among other things) that the basic argument for the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge and human freedom is question-begging. He relies on a “truism” to the effect that truth depends on the world and not the other way around. The present essay argues that mere invocation of this truism does not establish that the basic argument for incompatibilism is question-begging. Further, it seeks to clarify important elements of (...) the debate, including the fixity-of-the-past premise in the incompatibilist's argument and the Ockhamist response. It sketches some potential links between the issues here and recent work on ontological dependence, and it connects the issues raised by Merricks to important work that has appeared in (among other places) the Philosophical Review. (shrink)

On a view most secularists accept, the deceased individual goes out of existence. How, then, can death be a bad thing for, or harm, the deceased? I consider the doctrine of subsequentism, according to which the bad thing for the deceased, or the harm of death to the deceased, takes place after he or she has died. The main puzzle for this view is to explain how we can predicate a property at a time (such as having a misfortune or (...) being harmed) to an individual who does not exist at that time. This is the Problem of Predication. I consider alternative attempts to solve this puzzle, including one suggested by Ben Bradley, and I argue that they do not succeed. I go on to provide a new way of addressing the Problem of Predication and thus defending subsequentism against this specific threat, contrasting my approach with others currently on offer. (shrink)

We study the set of possible sizes of maximal independent families to which we refer as spectrum of independence and denote \\). Here mif abbreviates maximal independent family. We show that:1.whenever \ are finitely many regular uncountable cardinals, it is consistent that \\); 2.whenever \ has uncountable cofinality, it is consistent that \=\{\aleph _1,\kappa =\mathfrak {c}\}\). Assuming large cardinals, in addition to above, we can provide that $$\begin{aligned} \cap \hbox {Spec}=\emptyset \end{aligned}$$for each i, \.

In this article we examine gender differences in nonverbal expressiveness, with a particular focus on crying and smiling. We show that women cry and smile more as well as show more facial expressiveness in general, but that the size of this gender difference varies with the social and emotional context. We interpret this variation within a contextual framework (see also Brody & Hall, 2008; Deaux & Major, 1987; LaFrance, Hecht, & Paluck, 2003). More specifically, we distinguish three factors that predict (...) the size of gender differences in emotional expressiveness: gender-specific norms, social role and situational constraints, and emotional intensity. These factors interact in different ways for smiling and crying. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 56, Issue 3, Page 450-466, June 2022.

Moral responsibility and autonomy are closely related structurally and contentwise: they are both members of the “freedom family”. Here I argue that because of these similarities, they are often conflated or at least not carefully separated, and that this has resulted in confusions in important contemporary debates. Autonomy and moral responsibility involve the agent’s identification with the sources of her actions; but autonomy-identification is more robust than responsibility-identification.

Previous research on sustainable entrepreneurship has mainly aimed to understand the antecedents of entrepreneurs’ sustainability-oriented behavior. Yet the literature lacks a more nuanced understanding of how entrepreneurs implement sustainability strategies when creating a new venture. Drawing on sustainability concepts, we first examine how entrepreneurs balance the economic, environmental, and social dimensions as part of their ventures’ strategic ambitions. We show that sustainable entrepreneurs prioritize the three sustainability dimensions and possibly reprioritize them in response to stakeholder interests. Applying a stakeholder theory (...) perspective, we theorize that how entrepreneurs balance their sustainability dimensions and goals depends on the degree of stakeholder involvement and of external expectations. Our contributions refine the growing sustainable entrepreneurship literature and call attention to the importance of including weightings and time when examining the dimensions of sustainability. (shrink)

I revisit my article, “Why Immortality Is Not So Bad,” in which I argued that Bernard Williams’s thesis that immortality would necessarily be boring for any human being is false. Here I point out various ways in which Williams’s treatment of the issues has tilted and distorted the subsequent debates.

In this article, I address the question whether or not robots should be social actors and suggest that we do not have much choice but to construe collaborative robots as social actors. Social cues, including emotional displays, serve coordination functions in human interaction and therefore have to be used, even by robots, in order for long-term collaboration to succeed. While robots lack the experiential basis of emotional display, also in human interaction much emotional expression is part of conventional social practice; (...) if robots are to participate in such social practices, they need to produce such signals as well. I conclude that if we aim to share our social spaces with robots, they better be social actors, which may even include the display of emotions. This finding is of empirical as well as philosophical relevance because it shifts the ethical discussion away from the question, how social collaborative robots should be, to the question, what kinds of human-robot collaborations we want. (shrink)

In this article, I address the question whether or not robots should be social actors and suggest that we do not have much choice but to construe collaborative robots as social actors. Social cues, including emotional displays, serve coordination functions in human interaction and therefore have to be used, even by robots, in order for long-term collaboration to succeed. While robots lack the experiential basis of emotional display, also in human interaction much emotional expression is part of conventional social practice; (...) if robots are to participate in such social practices, they need to produce such signals as well. I conclude that if we aim to share our social spaces with robots, they better be social actors, which may even include the display of emotions. This finding is of empirical as well as philosophical relevance because it shifts the ethical discussion away from the question, how social collaborative robots should be, to the question, what kinds of human-robot collaborations we want. (shrink)

Its difficult to process the number of fish killed annually by the fishing industry. Nevertheless, governments are encouraging people to eat even more fishsee, e.g., the USDA dietary guidelinesand although animal advocates certainly dont concur with this advice, they generally havent prioritized fish in their lobbying efforts. Given the influence of utilitarianism on animal advocacy, the odds are good that this is motivated by an expected utility calculation. For those concerned about fish, is there any way to defend them against (...) this calculation? I argue for an affirmative answer: once you factor in an asymmetry between fishing and terrestrial animal agriculture, the expected utility calculation comes out in favor of devoting resources to reducing fishing. (shrink)

This chapter first talks about LEGO modal epistemology. Modal epistemology has the two parts. Some of it is the study of how one knows that some things are contingent and others necessary. The other part of modal epistemology concerns how much one know about what is contingent and necessary. The chapter then talks about what went wrong with the imagination‐based story. Whatever the story about how one knows what he/she can build, it had better be one that factors in his/her (...) background knowledge, since that is what makes the imagination useful. With working knowledge of those little pieces, one can make judgments about what can and can not be done with them. Crucially, there are various ways to make those judgments. The chapter further focuses on a segment of the LEGO community that might seem a bit fussy: purists. (shrink)

We study \(\kappa \) -maximal cofinitary groups for \(\kappa \) regular uncountable, \(\kappa = \kappa ^{. Revisiting earlier work of Kastermans and building upon a recently obtained higher analogue of Bell’s theorem, we show that: Any \(\kappa \) -maximal cofinitary group has \({ many orbits under the natural group action of \(S(\kappa )\) on \(\kappa \). If \(\mathfrak {p}(\kappa ) = 2^\kappa \) then any partition of \(\kappa \) into less than \(\kappa \) many sets can be realized as the (...) orbits of a \(\kappa \) -maximal cofinitary group. For any regular \(\lambda > \kappa \) it is consistent that there is a \(\kappa \) -maximal cofinitary group which is universal for groups of size \({. If we only require the group to be universal for groups of size \(\kappa \) then this follows from \(\mathfrak {p}(\kappa ) = 2^\kappa \). (shrink)

Although the seasons have been a perennial theme in literature and art, their significance for philosophy and environmental theory has remained largely unexplored. This pioneering book demonstrates the ways in which inquiry into the seasons reveals new and illuminating perspectives for philosophy, environmental thought, anthropology, cultural studies, aesthetics, poetics, and literary criticism. The Seasons opens up new avenues for research in these fields and provides a valuable resource for teachers and students of the environmental humanities. The innovative essays herein address (...) a wide range of seasonal cultures and geographies, from the traditional Western model of the four seasons––spring, summer, fall, and winter––to the Indigenous seasons of Australia and the Arctic. Exemplifying the crucial importance of interdisciplinary research, The Seasons makes a compelling case for the relevance of the seasons to our daily lives, scientific understanding, diverse cultural practices, and politics. (shrink)

Metacognition, the ability to monitor and evaluate our own cognitive processes, confers advantages to individuals and their own judgment. A more recent hypothesis, however, states that explicit metacognition may also enhance the collective judgment of groups, and may enhance human collaboration and coordination. Here, we investigate this social function hypothesis of metacognition with arguably one of the oldest collaboration problems humans face, common-pool resource use. Using an agent-based model that simulates repeated group interactions and the forming of collective judgments about (...) resource extraction, we show that (1) in “kind” environments (where confidence and judgment accuracy correlate positively), explicit metacognition may allow groups to reach more accurate judgments compared to groups exchanging object-level information only; while (2) in “wicked” environments (where confidence and judgment accuracy correlate negatively), explicit metacognition may protect groups from the large judgment errors yielded by groups using metacognitive information for individual-level learning only (implicit metacognition). With explicit metacognition, this research highlights a novel mechanism which, among others, provides a testable explanation of the often-observed finding that groups all over the world communicate to enhance common property use. (shrink)

We need better understanding of functional differences of behavioral phenotypes across cultures because cultural evolution (e.g., temporal changes in innovation within populations) is less important than culturally molded phenotypes (e.g., differences across populations) for understanding gene effects. Furthermore, changes in one behavioral domain likely have complex downstream effects in other domains, requiring careful parsing of phenotypic variability and functions.

I argue that we can interpret the stories told by near-death experiences in a naturalistic way. Thus, the profound significance of NDEs need not come from a supernaturalistic conception of them, according to which in an NDE the individual is in touch with a heavenly realm. We can respect the sincerity of NDE reports, but we can capture their meaning in a naturalistic framework.

Name der Zeitschrift: Internationales Jahrbuch für philosophische Anthropologie Jahrgang: 7 Heft: 1 Seiten: 155-174.

Even in a journal with the welcoming title Philosophy and Literature, contributors rightly feel obliged to explain why they are relating philosophical and literary texts to one another. Seeing literature as an engagingly vivid, "speaking picture" "figuring forth" the difficult abstractions of philosophy was once a default way of linking the two. But such a connection shortchanges the thinking at work in literature, reducing it to a popularizing tool, and overlooks the stories, examples, and metaphors that inform some powerful works (...) of philosophy. The most thoughtful work on philosophy and literature now sees them contributing in distinctive, equally... (shrink)

This special issue addresses how aspects of the communicative situation influence how influential persuasive utterances (or other strategies of influence) are in their contexts of use. Specifically, we study the effects of interactional, speaker-, addressee- and channel-related factors and of the interpersonal relationship between speaker and hearer, as well as the effects of referring to the shared context itself. The papers combined in this special issue provide evidence for the considerable impact of the here and now of the interactional context (...) on the persuasiveness of strategies of influence and contribute to our understanding of mechanisms of persuasion. (shrink)

This special issue addresses how aspects of the communicative situation influence how influential persuasive utterances (or other strategies of influence) are in their contexts of use. Specifically, we study the effects of interactional, speaker-, addressee- and channel-related factors and of the interpersonal relationship between speaker and hearer, as well as the effects of referring to the shared context itself. The papers combined in this special issue provide evidence for the considerable impact of the here and now of the interactional context (...) on the persuasiveness of strategies of influence and contribute to our understanding of mechanisms of persuasion. (shrink)