Philosophia 49 (5):2003-2017 (2021)

John Fischer
University of California, Riverside
On a view most secularists accept, the deceased individual goes out of existence. How, then, can death be a bad thing for, or harm, the deceased? I consider the doctrine of subsequentism, according to which the bad thing for the deceased, or the harm of death to the deceased, takes place after he or she has died. The main puzzle for this view is to explain how we can predicate a property at a time to an individual who does not exist at that time. This is the Problem of Predication. I consider alternative attempts to solve this puzzle, including one suggested by Ben Bradley, and I argue that they do not succeed. I go on to provide a new way of addressing the Problem of Predication and thus defending subsequentism against this specific threat, contrasting my approach with others currently on offer.
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-021-00344-4
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References found in this work BETA

Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
Metaphysical Grounding.Ricki Bliss & Kelly Trogdon - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Well-Being and Death.Ben Bradley - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Death.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Noûs 4 (1):73-80.

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Citations of this work BETA

Dissolving Death’s Time-of-Harm Problem.Travis Timmerman - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

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