This paper explores how transformative experience generates decision-making problems of particular seriousness in medical settings. Potentially transformative experiences are especially likely to be encountered in medicine, and the associated decisions are confronted jointly by patients and clinicians in the context of an imbalance of power and expertise. However in such scenarios the principle of informed consent, which plays a central role in guiding clinicians, is unequal to the task. We detail how the principle’s assumptions about autonomy, rationality and information handle (...) transformative experiences poorly, appealing to several difficult cases for medical decision-making to illustrate the resulting problem, and we consider how the existing literature on complications with consent fails to offer a resolution. We argue that recognition of the problem has a role to play in achieving a more effective response to transformative decisions. In Sect. 1 we introduce several representative cases of challenging patient decision-making that clinicians might face. In Sect. 2 we detail how transformative experience has been analysed in the recent literature, before outlining in Sect. 3 the theoretical basis of the principle of informed consent, which plays a central role in how clinicians are expected to support decision-making. In Sect. 4, having laid the groundwork for a clear description, we return to the cases given in Sect. 1 to confirm how their transformative nature presents a problem: either clinicians treat the decisions faced by these patients as ‘normal’, encouraging them to focus on information provision that patients may be unable to act on, or they treat them as transformative, in which case they lack the resources to recognise whether they are helping patients make (subjectively) good decisions. In Sect. 5 we argue that the existing literature does not offer any escape from this problem. We close in Sect. 6 by noting the significant impact that appreciating the problem of transformative experience could have on supporting transformative decisions in medicine and briefly suggesting how we might aim to develop new approaches to dealing with these. (shrink)

A central claim in abortion ethics is what might be called the Harm Claim – the claim that abortion harms the fetus. In this article, we put forward a simple and straightforward reason to reject the Harm Claim. Rather than invoking controversial assumptions about personal identity, or some nonstandard account of harm, as many other critics of the Harm Claim have done, we suggest that the aborted fetus cannot be harmed for the simple reason that it does not occupy any (...) well-being level. (shrink)

A central claim in abortion ethics is what might be called the Harm Claim – the claim that abortion harms the fetus. In this article, we put forward a simple and straightforward reason to reject the Harm Claim. Rather than invoking controversial assumptions about personal identity, or some nonstandard account of harm, as many other critics of the Harm Claim have done, we suggest that the aborted fetus cannot be harmed for the simple reason that it does not occupy any (...) well-being level. (shrink)

Much contemporary ontological inquiry takes place within the so-called ‘Quinean tradition’ but, given that some aspects of Quine’s project have been widely abandoned even by those who consider themselves Quineans, it is unclear what this amounts to. Fortunately recent work in metaontology has produced two relevant results here: a clearer characterisation of the metaontology uniting the aforementioned Quineans, most notably undertaken by Peter van Inwagen, and a raft of criticisms of that metaontology. In this paper I critique van Inwagen’s Quinean (...) metaontology, finding that certain challenges, supplemented by pressure to reflect more closely Quine’s work, should drive Quineans to adopt a stronger metaontology incorporating more of Quine’s radical views. I conclude that while van Inwagen’s Quineanism is problematic there are prospects for a viable, more wholeheartedly Quinean, metaontology. (shrink)

THE PAPER IS A FOOTNOTE TO C B MARTIN AND KARL PFEIFER, "INTENTIONALITY AND THE NON-PSYCHOLOGICAL," "PHIL PHENOMENOL RES" 46 (1986) 531-554. A CHARACTERIZATION OF INTENTIONALITY NOT CONSIDERED THEREIN IS SHOWN, NONETHELESS, ALSO TO FAIL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INTENTIONAL STATES AND MERELY PHYSICAL CAUSAL CAPACITIES.

According to the Timing Argument, death is not bad for the individual who dies, because there is no time at which it could be bad for her. Defenders of the badness of death have objected to this influential argument, typically by arguing that there are times at which death is bad for its victim. In this paper, I argue that a number of these writers have been concerned with quite different formulations of the Timing Argument. Further, and more importantly, I (...) show that their objections to the Timing Argument fail as attempts to refute the argument in its most challenging form. (shrink)

Much recent work in metaontology challenges the so-called ‘Quinean tradition’ in metaphysics. Especially prominently, Amie Thomasson argues for a highly permissive ontology over ontologies which eliminate many entities. I am concerned with disputing not her ontological claim, but the methodology behind her rejection of eliminativism – I focus on ordinary objects. Thomasson thinks that by endorsing the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment eliminativism goes wrong; a theory eschewing quantification over a kind may nonetheless be committed to its existence. I argue (...) that, contrary to Thomasson's claims, we should retain the Quinean criterion. Her arguments show that many eliminativist positions are flawed, but their flaws lie elsewhere: the Quinean criterion is innocent. Showing why reveals the importance of pragmatism in ontology. In §1 I compare Thomasson's account and the eliminativist views to which it stands in opposition. In §2 I re-construct Thomasson's reasons for rejecting the Quinean criterion. In §3 I defend the Quinean criterion, showing that the eliminativists’ flaws are not consequences of applying the Quinean criterion, before explaining the criterion's importance when properly understood. I conclude that Thomasson, though right to criticise the methodology of ordinary-object eliminativists, is wrong to identify the Quinean criterion as the source of their mistake. (shrink)

The concept of self-stigmatization is guided by a representational account of selfhood that fails to accommodate for resilience against, and recovery from, stigma. Mainstream research on self-stigma has portrayed it only as a reified self, that is, as collectively shared stereotypes representing individuals’ identity. Self-stigma viewed phenomenologically, however, elucidates what facilitates a stigmatized self. A phenomenological analysis discloses the lived phenomenon of stigma as an act of self-objectification, as related to the experiential self, and therefore an achievement of subjectivity. Following (...) a phenomenological account, the stigmatized self can thus return to a state-of-being, similar to that Jean-Paul Sartre once referred to as bad faith. Regarding your identity as analogous to an inanimate thing is ultimately self-deceptive. Self-stigma is here phenomenologically illuminated as constituted by basic discretion, that is, as a minimal form of agency. The study found that basic discretion can uphold the possibility for emancipation from a stigmatized self. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Anna Christensen raises an ‘Epicurean challenge’ to Don Marquis’ much-discussed argument for the immorality of abortion. According to Marquis’ argument, abortion is pro tanto morally wrong because it deprives the fetus of ‘a future like ours’. Drawing on the Epicurean idea that death cannot harm its victim because there is no subject to be harmed, Christensen argues that neither fetuses nor anyone else can be deprived of a future like ours by dying. Thus, (...) Christensen suggests, the moral wrongness of abortion cannot be grounded in the relevant individual’s being deprived of a future like ours. In this reply, I argue that on no interpretation of Christensen’s Epicurean challenge does it succeed. (shrink)

Saving People From the Harm of Death. Edited by Gamlund Espen, Solberg Carl Tollef.

Several recent discussions of metaphysics disavow existence-questions, claiming that they are metaphysically uninteresting because trivially settled in the affirmative by Moorean facts. This is often given as a reason to focus metaphysical debate instead on questions of grounding. I argue that the strategy employed to undermine existence-questions fails against its usual target: Quineanism. The Quinean can protest that the formulation given of their position is a straw man: properly understood, as a project of explication, Quinean metaphysics does not counsel us (...) to choose between obvious ordinary-language claims and absurd revisionist claims, even if appeal to Moorean facts is permitted. (shrink)

Einleitung : Zur Entstehung der Schrift ; Zum Kontext der Schrift ; Zur Wirkung der Schrift ; Die zentralen Themen der Schrift -- Hinweise zur Edition -- Siglen und Kurztitel -- Bibliographische Angaben -- Karl Leonhard Reinhold : Ueber das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens nebst einigen Erläuterungen über die Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögens. Vorrede -- Uever das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens -- Die in 26sten Stück der A.L.Z. von 1791 enthaltene Beurtheilung der Reinholdschen Elementarphilosophie -- Des Herrn Hofrath und Professor (...) Schwab Gedanken über die Reinholdsche Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögens. Im 2ten St. des 3ten Bandes des Eberhardschen Magazins. Geprüft von M.F.C. Forberg -- Anhang : Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung 26/27. 28. Januar 1791, 201-208; 209-214 [Rezensent A. W. Rehberg] (Beyträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger Misverständnisse der Philosophen. Erster Band) ; Philosophisches Magazin. Hg. von Johann August Eberhard. Dritten Bandes zweytes Stück. Halle 1790, 125-147 (Ueber den Reinholdischen Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens, non J. C. Schwab). (shrink)

Alongside the direct parallels and contrasts between traditional narrative fiction and games, there lie certain partial analogies that provide their own insights. This article begins by examining a direct parallel between narrative fiction and games—the role of fictional reliefs and reality checks in shaping aesthetic engagement—before arguing that from this a partial analogy can be developed stemming from a feature that distinguishes most games from most traditional fictions: the presence of rules. The relation between rules and fiction in games has (...) heretofore been acknowledged but not examined in detail, giving an impression of a tension that is constant. However, the paired concepts of formal reliefs and representation checks, once introduced, allow us to explain how rules and fiction interact to alter the ways in which players engage with games in a dynamic but limited way. (shrink)

Duncan Purves has recently argued that death is harmful for the person who dies insofar as her life as a whole would have been more valuable for her if her death had not occurred. In response to the much-debated challenge of locating the harmfulness of death in time, Purves suggests a new approach to the challenge, which leads him to locate the harmfulness of death at times after death. In this reply, I show that his attempt to address the challenge (...) does not succeed. (shrink)

Duncan Purves has recently argued that death is harmful for the person who dies insofar as her life as a whole would have been more valuable for her if her death had not occurred. In response to the much-debated challenge of locating the harmfulness of death in time, Purves suggests a new approach to the challenge, which leads him to locate the harmfulness of death at times after death. In this reply, I show that his attempt to address the challenge (...) does not succeed. (shrink)

This paper uses two techniques to build a socially responsible portfolio of U.S. equities and examines prospective performance using publicly available data. The first technique eliminates stocks from consideration using categorical exclusions with a restrictive Environment, Social and Governance screen. The paper shows that stocks surviving the screen have a significantly higher average projected Value Line alpha and are more likely to have a Morningstar 5-star rating. Using categorical exclusions, however, introduces a sector bias in that the ESG screen is (...) more likely to restrict stocks from the manufacturing sector than the service sector. The second technique does not introduce a sector bias because it uses a best-in-class optimization approach in place of screening. The paper introduces a linear programming model called Data Envelopment Analysis to the application of SRI portfolio development to find the best financially and socially performing companies within each industry sector. When compared to a categorical exclusions portfolio, a DEA portfolio is rated significantly higher by Morningstar and Value Line. Depending on the specific needs of a socially responsible investor, the DEA technique could be a better tool in developing a financially and socially balanced equity portfolio. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Der aesthetische Genuss" verfügbar.

W. V. Quine stands out as one of the foremost figures of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. This chapter aims to show that a significant part of his work’s enduring value lies in its contribution to metametaphysics, which will include showing how some more contentious aspects of Quine’s thought can be seen as indispensable to it; we will problematise the widespread belief that one can isolate basic elements of Quine’s metametaphysics without eroding their warrant. -/- §1 introduces the broad context. §2 examines (...) Quine’s most clearly metametaphysical work (and the desired backdrop for many analytic philosophers): ‘On what there is’. Finding the story incomplete here, we explore other elements of Quine’s corpus in turn. §3 analyses the nascent naturalism evident in ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’, §4 explores how the principle of charity becomes significant in Word & Object, and §5 shows how the eponymous principle of ‘Ontological relativity’ aims to defuse the puzzles of indeterminacy. In the process we will see how Quine’s concerns stemming from naturalism in general, and from the problems of indeterminacy in particular, make it hard to separate the basic picture from his more controversial fullblown approach – hard, that is, to avoid ontological relativity. This is bad news for those wishing to use Quine as a neutral backdrop to analytic metaphysical debate, but good news for those who value the distinctive philosophical tradition within which Quine’s work is a key development. (shrink)