Prof. Iyengar's biography of Sri Aurobindo, long a standard reference work, is now in its fifth edition. The author's subtitle indicates the depth and breadth of the book, as it links the life of Sri Aurobindo, who played for our age the crucial role of leader of humanity's evolving destiny , with the history of India and the world. It also provides detailed discussions of Sri Aurobindo's writings, from the early poems and plays to the politics of Bande Mataram, from (...) the philosophy and social thought of the Arya to the epic masterpiece of Savitri, as the essential keys to understanding his life and work. This book is available again after a long time. (shrink)

This second volume which is under preparation will contain, in addition to a treatment in the I part of the general priniciples of value such as the ...

The German philosopher Rickert substituted for Hegel's formulation of the dialectic a "Heterological Principle of Thought" where identity and otherness become moments within the pure logical object of thought. The logical object of thought takes precedence over dialectical movement, and otherness takes precedence over negation. Flach expounds and defends Rickert's position against its critics. The discussion is specialized but contains some valuable insights into Hegel. --R. H. K.

A useful edition of some political and strategic writings, together with all the significant philosophical essays of Mao Tse-tung, who is described as the "most influential" contemporary Marxist philosopher. Except for the 1957 "Hundred Flowers" speech, all the translations and footnotes are from International Publishers' four volume Selected Works. Miss Fremantle's forty-one page introduction is largely a paraphrased abridgment of Edgar Snow's well known biography, Red Star over China. For the general reader, this Mentor paperback probably provides the best low (...) priced introduction to the thought of Mao Tse-tung.--K. R. D. (shrink)

This volume in the "World Perspectives" series brings together four chapters from The Concept of Nature and one each from The Principle of Relativity, The Principles of Natural Knowledge, Modes of Thought, and Essays in Science and Philosophy.--K. R. D.

The first part of this long two-part work is a history of the development of the modern theory of the atom from Dalton to the present. The second part offers philosophical reflections on this history beginning with a discussion of epistemological implications and following that with an account of ontological implications. The author deals with familiar questions about the reality of micro-particles, complementarity, indeterminism, the role of the observer and other topics. But he also discusses topics like holism, atomic order, (...) the intelligibility of matter and others which are less commonly discussed by philosophers in connection with modern physical theories. The author, who is trained in physics as well as philosophy, has a flair for metaphysical speculation as well as wide knowledge of contemporary physical theory. He stresses the novelties of the quantum conception of matter, argues against its critics like Bohm, and sees it as presenting a radically new conception of atomic order despite its commitment to indeterminism. The views of Werner Heisenberg, who encouraged the author to write the book and who read it in manuscript, have clearly influenced the author, although they do not dominate his thinking.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This is a systematic and critical account of Berkeley’s philosophy of science. Brook’s intention is to evaluate Berkeley’s analysis of significant scientific concepts, his general theories in optics, physics, and mathematics, and finally Berkeley’s own interpretation and criticism of Newton’s principles. That Berkeley’s writings are pervaded with ambiguities, inconsistencies, and misinterpretations of Newton seems to be the conclusion that Brook reaches, although he does distinguish in the writings the areas in which he feels Berkeley is on target. Berkeley conceived the (...) purpose of science to be the practical mastery of nature, and his philosophy is indicative of a phase in the evolution of a "new" science that had its roots as far back as Galileo who envisioned a universe that could be read off in terms of mathematical relationships. This view entailed the overthrow of traditional physics and its concern with substantial forms and qualitative changes. As Brook points out, the object of physics for Berkeley is a phenomenal order that can at best display only uniformities, efficient causality belongs to the realm of metaphysics. Brook does not go into the metaphysical or historical foundations of Berkeley’s philosophy of science, but his first chapter on the theory of signification presents sufficient background for the more detailed and complex chapters that deal with his theory of vision, philosophy of physics and mathematics. This is not an easy book to read, and the chapter on Berkeley’s mathematics may prove to be especially difficult to those who lack an orientation to this field. Yet Brooks could hardly do better than he does considering the obscurities and obfuscatory trappings that are to be found in the primary sources from which he is working. A good bibliography is included that should serve to facilitate a reading of this book. Brook’s study is the only work to date that takes into account Berkeley’s scientific works as a whole and not just some aspects.—K.R.M. (shrink)

This is the first of a number of volumes designed to review the philosophical work which has been done in various areas of philosophy between the years 1956 and 1966. It succeeds an earlier three volume publication entitled Philosophy in the Mid-Century which covered the period from 1949 to 1955. This first volume in the series covers the fields of logic, philosophical logic, foundations and philosophy of mathematics. For anyone interested in these fields, the book is an indispensable guide. The (...) procedure is that an expert in a given area writes a summary of the work done in the area in the last ten years and adds a bibliography covering the same period. In all there are thirty-two such essays, most written in English, but a few in French and German. Some representative essays and their authors are the following: On the logical side, Modal Logic, Many Valued Logics, Logic of Practical Discourse, Semantics, Model Theory, Pragmatics, Chronological or Tense Logic, The Logic of Questions, Combinatory Logic and others. There are two general essays on recent developments in philosophical logic and a number of essays on the development of logic in various Eastern and Western European countries and Japan. On the mathematical side are three essays on foundations of set theory and mathematics, essays on Intuitionism in mathematics, and general essays by A. Church, H. Freudenthal and others. The essays are generally of high caliber and the bibliographies in most cases very comprehensive. Occasionally the essays contain not only summary of work done but original suggestions and development of ideas. It would be hard to find a more useful guide for the philosopher overwhelmed by the many developments in these fields in recent years.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This second volume in the series designed to review the work done in various areas of philosophy during the period 1956-1966 is concerned with the philosophy of science. There are forty essays on a variety of topics in the philosophy of science describing the work done in that area in the past decade and a bibliography covering the same period. Most are in English, some in French or German. Some representative topics and their authors are: Laws, Models, Causality, Induction and (...) Probability, Scientific Methodology, Time, Space, Cosmology, Philosophy and Physics, Quantum Theory, Biology and Philosophy. In addition there are several general essays on the influence of various philosophers and scientists on current developments in the philosophy of science, on the ethical and philosophical implications of science, on Cybernetics, Information Theory, Game theory and a number of essays on the development of philosophy of science in different countries of Western and Eastern Europe and Japan. Like the first volume of this series, this book is an indispensable guide to anyone interested in the field, and a place should be made for it on every library shelf---where there is an interest in philosophy of science.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The third volume in a projected library of contemporary Soviet thought called 'Sovietica' is of particular interest because it makes available to non-Russian readers a condensed German translation of the most recent Summa of Soviet thought, Osnovy marksistskoj filosofii. The text, organised under two main headings, Dialectical and Historical Materialism, is a catechism of Soviet dogmata which ranges from questions of space, time and perception to those of scientific socialism, class war and social consciousness. One of the aims of the (...) editor, as stated in the preface, is to demonstrate that the current Soviet version of 'Marxism' fails to express young Marx's overriding concern for the human being, and the phenomenon of estrangement.--K. R. D. (shrink)

Walton offers a sustained and thorough study of Malebranche’s science of ethics. Much has been written about his Search for Truth but little has been said about his Treatise on Ethics which presents another perspective to Malebranche as a philosopher and extricates him from that sphere of philosophical thinking impoverished by sterility and abstraction, a criticism often unjustly leveled at the so-called Rationalists. Walton starts out by presenting an analysis of Malebranche’s theocentric ontology, an understanding of which is essential to (...) his moral thinking. Malebranche attempts in his Treatise to discover a common denominator in man which can serve as the foundation for a science of ethics. He finds reason to be the controlling factor which not only unites men to each other but unites man to God who Himself is Reason and Wisdom. (shrink)

Walton offers a sustained and thorough study of Malebranche’s science of ethics. Much has been written about his Search for Truth but little has been said about his Treatise on Ethics which presents another perspective to Malebranche as a philosopher and extricates him from that sphere of philosophical thinking impoverished by sterility and abstraction, a criticism often unjustly leveled at the so-called Rationalists. Walton starts out by presenting an analysis of Malebranche’s theocentric ontology, an understanding of which is essential to (...) his moral thinking. Malebranche attempts in his Treatise to discover a common denominator in man which can serve as the foundation for a science of ethics. He finds reason to be the controlling factor which not only unites men to each other but unites man to God who Himself is Reason and Wisdom. (shrink)

The fourth volume of the 'Sovietica' series is chiefly composed of a collection in German translation of four papers read at a Moscow conference in 1958. The theme of the conference was 'The Question of Dialectical Contradiction in the Light of Contemporary Science and Practice.' Included are a brief excerpt from the official Soviet textbook, Osnovy marksistkoj filosofii and a noteworthy paper by A. I. Kolman.--K. R. D.

In an attempt to discover that which makes man distinctively human Wilson takes as his starting point two opposing accounts of what distinguishes man from inanimate objects and indicates why both of them are invalid. The Cartesian concept maintains that man is distinct from the inanimate by virtue of his consciousness, the neo-Wittgensteinian views the distinction as one of behavior and interaction explicable in terms of reason and motives. Wilson agrees that emotion and behavior constitute the primary difference between man (...) and the inanimate but that this human type of activity is analyzable in causal terms. He refutes certain anti-causal arguments that posit a non-contingent connection between an emotion and its object. Wilson rightly points out that a necessary proposition is one that is necessarily true, but a relation cannot be true or false, and therefore cannot be necessarily or contingently true or false. In order to prove his thesis that the emotion-object relationship is one of causality the term "object" is restricted to that which has existential status. Emotions referable to non-existent objects are malfounded emotions and not causally connected. Wilson proposes that the problem does not lend itself to a logico-grammatical analysis of statements that assign objects to emotions, but that the approach requires a study in the philosophy of mind. Such an inquiry discloses that emotion is caused by a mental state, i.e., attention to the object in which a thought or belief about the object causes a certain feeling or reaction. After a rather complicated analysis of the emotion-object relationship in which he considers the questions of materialism, free will intentionality, and rationality, Wilson returns to his original concern and concludes that "a person’s action and his end of action make sense and form a coherent whole because they are rooted in a complex network of feelings and attitudes." This is what makes man distinctively human.—K. R. M. (shrink)

In this phenomenological approach to meaning, the author defines his task as one of taking account of the kinds of relations the logical order can have to the preconceptual order. This preconceptual order is represented by a pre-logical activity which is called "experiencing." There is experiencing of meaning as well as of things. This "experienced or felt meaning" is said to be as important a dimension of meaning as the traditional modes distinguished by philosophers, e.g., denotation, connotation. Apparent throughout is (...) the author's concern as a psychotherapist to find theoretical foundations for clinical methods.--R. H. K. (shrink)

This is the first comprehensive study of Schrödinger's scientific and philosophical writings. The task requires a person trained thoroughly in physical science and yet capable of appreciating the sometimes puzzling philosophical ideas Schrödinger put forward. Professor Scott, a physicist, is remarkably successful at communicating both the physical and the philosophical ideas. After a brief summary of Schrödinger's diverse writings, he divides the writings into four groups which are treated in separate chapters. The first group, including very early papers, deals with (...) Schrödinger's work on Statistical Mechanics, and statistical theories in general. The second covers the crucial development of Wave Mechanics. The third concerns Schrödinger's interpretation of quantum mechanics and the important departures from the prevailing views of the Copenhagen school. Finally the fourth group contains Schrödinger's views on life and the self. The author shows that Schrödinger was led to his doctrine of identity by reflecting on the paradox of freedom and determinism. His study "What is Life?" convinced him that living systems are governed by the law of causality but he also believed that men were free. The doctrine of identity was his solution to the paradox. Scott is critical of this solution and a number of other doctrines of Schrödinger. The book is clearly written throughout and is a good introduction to Schrödinger's thought.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The first systematic study printed in the recently inaugurated "Sovietica" series, edited by J. M. Bochenski. In this volume, the author examines the basic theses of dialectical materialism and reviews the efforts of Soviet philosophers and physicists to accomodate their official philosophical framework to the challenge of Einstein's special relativity theory. The excellent handling of this subject owes much to the author's masterly grasp of physics, philosophy, and Russian.--K. R. D.

As Max Jammer has rightly said, contemporary discussion of the metrical properties of space have been dominated in recent years by the work of Adolf Grünbaum. One of Grünbaum's most important essays in this area, "Geometry, Chronometry and Empiricism" is reprinted in its entirety as the first chapter of this work. The third and final chapter is a lengthy reply to Hilary Putnam who published a critique of Grünbaum's original essay in 1963. Putnam's criticisms have not led Grünbaum to substantially (...) change his views but they have provided the means for some clarification and extension of those views, e.g., with respect to the notions of congruence and conventionality and in relation to Zeno's paradoxes, color attributes, and other topics. Between the original essay and the lengthy reply to Putnam there is a shorter chapter which deals with, among other things, the hypothesis that everything has doubled overnight, a related topic to which Grünbaum has given some attention in journal articles. It is safe to say that persons concerned with the problem of conventionalism and other philosophical problems about space will have to work their way through this important book.--R. H. K. (shrink)

A new journal issued in connection with the Hegel-Kommission der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, which is preparing a new critical-historical collection of Hegel's works. The first volume contains critical editions of certain Hegel fragments, essays on Hegel, and reviews of Hegel literature.--K. R. D.

This is a fresh and stimulating analysis of the esthetic experience in terms of the import it gives to the role of "affective hazard" in the constitution of the esthetic form. The author, who comes with a background in English literature, proposes that all esthetic experiences have one common feature, their form as felt unity which endows the object with a value that distinguishes it from other objects. The experiencer as one of the terms of the relationship is confronted with (...) a manifold of elements one of which stands out in a hazardous way as an impediment to the union of the terms. Its very hazardousness, however, impregnates the whole structure, and in spite of an apparent obstruction to the order it actually bestows a balance and symmetry that would otherwise be lacking. There is a bending, but no breaking; the fragility itself is a necessary precondition for the form that constitutes the esthetic experience marking the object as a potentiality for some form yet unactualized but implicitly determined. The scholastic notion of being is evident in Slattery’s analysis of form as the principle of "unity," "intelligibility," and "determination." Rather than emphasize the static quality of things she chooses to focus on the object as both open and closed; open to receive many forms but closed in that it is only actualized as one form by a mind who at will chooses it from a manifold of other possible forms which it rejects. Unlike the Aristotelian form which inheres in the thing independent of the experiencer the form in the esthetic object is constituted by an experiencer who is an active participant in the relationship. This active term also confers upon the object its value which defines it as an object of esthetic quality. Interspersed throughout the book are descriptive analyses of various esthetic forms that illustrate what Slattery means by the decisive role of "affective hazard," and it is here that she is at her best. So well does she capture the essence of the dynamic richness peculiar to the esthetic object that she evokes in the reader an affective excitement and an awareness of a felt unity. This in itself verifies her thesis, and we could only have wished that she furnished us with more of the heightening experiences.—K. R. M. (shrink)

This is a fine work that purports to serve as an introduction to philosophic problems surveyed from the historical perspective. Hartnack chooses to focus on a single work or theme of those philosophers who have significantly contributed to the development of philosophy starting with Heraclitus and ending with Wittgenstein. He renders concise and uncomplicated accounts that capture the nucleus of the problems. What makes this book stand out among so many other similar endeavors is that the expositions are not only (...) true to the problem but, refreshingly, they say neither too little nor too much. Rather they afford the reader a taste of the author’s wares whetting the appetite to further sample the original sources in hopes of finding the solutions to the problematics offered. For the freshman with little or no previous encounter with philosophy this can be an immeasurable bonus since too often he is victimized by arid and tedious readings. Hartnack makes good use of cross referencing providing the work with a thread of continuity, and it is only in his chapter on Kant’s epistemology that we note a deficiency in this area. Had he spelled out the influence of Hume’s skepticism on Kant’s Critique he might have approached the chapter in terms of the question which seems to be most central to Kant’s project, i.e., "Is metaphysics as a science possible?" rather than start out with an analysis of the antinomies that only indirectly point to this problem. However, if there is a deficiency in this chapter, it is offset by an excellent account of Kant’s moral philosophy. Notwithstanding this negative criticism plus the fact that there are several typographical errors, this is a scholarly accomplishment and deserves to be on the bookshelf of not only the beginning philosophy student who wishes to have a viable resource but also for those who have passed beyond this stage and wish to possess a valuable reference tool. Included at the end is a short but worthwhile bibliography.—K.R.M. (shrink)

In this work R. M. Martin carries his semiotical studies into the fields of intensional semantics and pragmatics, dealing with such philosophically important concepts as meaning, preference, reasonableness and indifference. The crucial notion is that of the meaning or intension of an expression. Two major categories are distinguished, objective intensions and subjective intensions. To deal with objective intensions an intensional semantics is developed as an extension of denotational semantics in the tradition of Tarski, Carnap and Martin's earlier Truth and Denotation. (...) In the treatment of subjective intensions Martin makes an advance over his earlier study of pragmatics by utilizing the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern in their Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.—R. H. K. (shrink)

This small volume successfully captures the essential in Kant’s philosophy, his insight and understanding of the a priori as the universal and necessary condition in epistemology and ethics. Knowledge and morality, if they are to qualify as knowledge and morality, must be subjected to principles of universalizability, and it is Kant’s contribution to philosophy that he argues for the non-empirical conditions that make these possible. The author approaches Kant’s theory of knowledge from an untraditional perspective. Rather than start his inquiry (...) with a study of the Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic, Hartnack focuses in on the Transcendental Dialectic giving Kant’s arguments for the first two antinomies and presenting a cursory account of the paralogisms and Transcendental Idea. Hartnack defends his procedure by calling our attention to the fact that it was not primarily Hume’s attack on the necessary connexion of cause and effect that influenced Kant to undertake his transcendental criticism as many scholars believe. By Kant’s own admission which he makes clear in a letter to Christian Garve in 1798 it was the antinomy of pure reason that "first aroused me from my dogmatic slumber and drew me to the Critique of Pure Reason itself in order to resolve the scandal of ostensible contradiction of reason with itself." It was the illegitimate use of reason that prompted Kant to search out the bounds and limits to which reason could legitimately make claim to. Bearing this in mind the present study centers on the dialectical illusion of reason which necessarily implies that it has another side to it, the legitimate and regulative use of reason. Hartnack strongly emphasizes the relationship between the Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic and the relationship of the Critique as a whole to the Critique of Practical Reason where the a priori finds its expression in the categorical imperative. The Transcendental Dialectic are as two sides of the same coin. Reason on the one side legitimately applies its categories to the empirical, conditioned, phenomenal object of sense experience. But by nature reason seeks the unempirical, unconditioned, noumenal object which by definition cannot be given, and reason by applying the categories falls prey to the antinomies, paralogisms, and transcendental Idea. Hartnack’s critical account reveals the intimate and dynamic unity within the first Critique and its unity with the Critique of Practical Reason, a synthesis of Kant’s theory of knowledge and theory of morality. Much of what is obscure and obfuscatory in the primary sources is clarified and simplified for us in this work and yet the author has sacrificed none of the depth and dimension that characterize Kant’s writings. Rather in a few pages he has managed to target in on a significant aspect that sheds light and puts into proper perspective Kant’s project as a whole. Here is a case where less is better than more.—K.R.M. (shrink)

A translation of an early work by Aron which has become- almost a classic. First published in 1938, it is one of the best discussions of the limitations of objective historical knowledge. Analyzing man as both the subject and object of historical knowledge, Aron argues against the reduction of human history to natural history. There are also some brilliant chapters on the epistemological and sociological problems of historical knowledge.--K. R. D.

This compact book provides a much needed study of Leibniz’ moral philosophy which, unfortunately, has not been given the attention that his metaphysics and logic have received. It is Hostler’s contention that this neglect is an indication that the moral system of Leibniz has been incorrectly viewed as tangential to his other systems which are supposed to be Leibniz’ primary concerns. On the contrary, as Hostler points out, Leibniz’ moral philosophy was largely completed before his metaphysical works which were intended (...) to provide the principles for his ethical system. As Leibniz himself says in the New Essays, "you are more in the tradition of metaphysical thought, whereas I am more interested in ethics." Hostler embarks on his task by orienting us to Leibniz’s general metaphysics and proceeds throughout the study to show the interconnection between his morals and metaphysics. Leibniz’ ethics is traditionally grounded in that he acknowledges the essential relationship between the will, reason, and desire. At the same time he breaks with tradition by introducing two apparently contradictory motives for voluntary action. On one hand he proposes an egoism which aims at one’s own welfare, and on the other hand he proposes an altruism that demands that one should seek the welfare of the other. Hostler’s analysis of the concepts of the good, pleasure, happiness, and perfection shows that the contradiction is only apparent, and that egoism and altruism are reconcilable in Leibniz’ system. The good that I seek for myself is achieved when I do good for others, because in doing good to others I realize a perfection to some degree, and my awareness of that perfection is a source of pleasure which identifies itself as the consciousness of an increase in perfection. Hostler discusses the substantive part of Leibniz’ ethics wherein we find that love tempered by prudence produces justice, the demands of which are binding on all beings possessing reason and free will. Consequently, even God is subject to the moral imperative. As the ens perfectissimum God displays both perfect benevolence and wisdom in all his activities, hence he must create the best of all possible worlds, an act that Leibniz describes as "universal justice." Ultimately it can be seen that the reconciliation between egoism and altruism is explained through the principle of pre-established harmony for what affects one affects the others and every act has infinite consequences. It is only our finite intellect that prevents us from seeing the perfection in every object and thereby choosing it. The choice of the lesser good is a manifestation of that radical finitude. Hostler has presented us with a well organized study of Leibniz’ moral philosophy and has managed to situate it in terms of his philosophy as a whole. The brevity of the volume does not diminish its worth as a fine treatment of the subject.—K.R.M. (shrink)

The author sets out to explore the implications of the concept of "expression" with the intent of extricating it from its dependency on an external world which negates it as the "radical originality and irreducible internality of the mind" that it is. To be expressive is to "do something," and this calls for a spontaneity and creativity that emanate from a unique and autonomous self. This thesis is prefaced by an analysis into the varieties of expression found in works of (...) art, history, philosophy, science, and anything else using language as an expression of subjective factors that include not only external natural signs but emotions, attitudes, and states of mind. Any expression is ultimately an expression of the self as agent, and this affords Sircello an opportunity to provide us with some original reflections on causation in expression. "What do we mean when we think of expressions as causal?" The answer is developed in terms of an analogy with the Platonic Forms as participated universals causing their instantiations in particulars. The characteristic F of x’s is a particular in respect of a universal F, but the expression G is a particular in relation to x’s F. Because F is always x’s F, F unlike the Platonic Form enjoys no absolutely universal disembodied existence, and G is possible only because F is x’s F. Self expression as an activity by which the self discovers itself cannot be thought apart from the possibilities that the varieties of work afford. (shrink)

A significant advance toward a more objective understanding of western philosophy in Soviet philosophical circles. Unlike the off-hand condemnations of western philosophers which so often fill the pages of Voprosy Filosofii, this Georgian philosopher presents a well documented historical development of twentieth century analytic philosophy from Russell's atomism, through Wittgenstein's Tractatus, logical positivism, and recent trends in English analysis. The "moral" of the story is that western thinkers are gradually coming to see the poverty of their philosophical perspective; linguistic analysis (...) must give way to the "precise vision of historical materialism."--K. R. D. (shrink)

The thrust of Hannay’s work is to investigate certain arguments that support a denial that mental images are objects. His choice of thinkers is eclectic and he devotes much of the book to a detailed treatment of Ryle, Shorter, Sartre and Wittgenstein with briefer notes on Hume, Berkeley and Hobbes. Ryle’s and Shorter’s analytical approach is negatively constructed and we are only told that imagining is not a way of "seeing," and hence commands no object. This inability to render a (...) positive account of imagining as Hannay demonstrates makes their arguments vulnerable. Nor can Wittgenstein offer any positive analysis of imagination since he concerns himself with a grammatical investigation of the term "imagination" with its usual language game implications. Sartre, however, does furnish a thorough descriptive analysis of the experience of imagination and affords Hannay an opportunity to offer a viable reconstruction of Sartre’s arguments. (shrink)

A selection of articles originally written in English for the New York Tribune and here edited with an eye to proving the tantalizing thesis "that for Karl Marx antagonism between capital and labor took second place to the eternal duel between East and West, in which his sympathies... lay unequivocally with the West." Although these articles, dealing mainly with the Crimean War, merit greater attention than they have thus far received, this edition is misleading in two critical aspects: 1) Many (...) of the articles signed by Marx in the New York Tribune, especially those dealing with military affairs, were actually written by Engels. The crucial document for distinguishing them, a notebook kept by Marx's wife, is acknowledged to be in Moscow, but the editor makes no mention of this. 2) The editor also gives no hint of Marx's many other statements on Russia, especially in his preface to the second edition of Capital and in his correspondence with Vera Zasulich.--K. R. D. (shrink)

If there is an age in which philosophy seemed to experience a demise it is the nineteenth century, and yet this was not due to a lack of philosophy nor to the fact that there prevailed an attitude of estrangement from philosophy. Rather, what appeared to be a de-emphasis was merely a replacement of writings by "philosophers" with those by the natural scientist and the humanist. Tatarkiewicz divides his period into three phases distinguishing the era with their peculiar disciplines: 1830-60 (...) marked by positivism, empiricism, naturalism, and dialectical materialism; 1860-80 in which the minimalistic philosophy of positivism reached full bloom; 1880-1900 dominated by minimalism, positivism, scientism and in addition the appearance of opposing doctrines. Although such familiar names as Comte, Mill, Marx, Engels, Spencer, Brentano and Nietzsche find their way into Tatarkiewicz’ book, of greater significance is the manifold of less familiar figures who play a determining role in this period of philosophy. Yet it is not the author’s intent to expound individual doctrines in reference to anything but philosophical currents of the day. Tatarkiewicz focuses on times not men. A very good summary is presented at the end of the book mapping out the social, economic, political, geographic, and religious climate prevalent in the nineteenth century, thus concluding a helpful survey of a period that has been somewhat neglected in the history of philosophy.—K.R.M. (shrink)