Intension and Decision [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 18 (1):180-180 (1964)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this work R. M. Martin carries his semiotical studies into the fields of intensional semantics and pragmatics, dealing with such philosophically important concepts as meaning, preference, reasonableness and indifference. The crucial notion is that of the meaning or intension of an expression. Two major categories are distinguished, objective intensions and subjective intensions. To deal with objective intensions an intensional semantics is developed as an extension of denotational semantics in the tradition of Tarski, Carnap and Martin's earlier Truth and Denotation. In the treatment of subjective intensions Martin makes an advance over his earlier study of pragmatics by utilizing the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern in their Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.—R. H. K.

Other Versions

original R., H. K. (1964) "Intension and Decision". Review of Metaphysics 18(1):180-180

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 99,322

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

R. M. Martin's "Intension and Decision". [REVIEW]A. B. Levison - 1964 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (2):294.
Intension and Decision: A Philosophical Study.G. B. Keene - 1966 - Philosophical Quarterly 16 (62):83.
Intension and Decision.R. M. Martin - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (6):193-200.
Intension and Decision. [REVIEW]John M. Vickers - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (6):193-200.
Intension and Decision: A Philosophical Study.H. E. Kyburg - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (3):386.
Intension and Decision. A Philosophy Study.Richard M. Martin - 1966 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 31 (1):98-102.
Intension and Decision: A Philosophical Study.A. B. Levison - 1964 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (2):294-295.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-03-18

Downloads
21 (#881,796)

6 months
3 (#1,441,862)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references