Happiness can be expressed through smiles. Happiness can also be expressed through physical displays that without context, would appear to be sadness and anger. These seemingly incongruent displays of happiness, termed dimorphous expressions, we propose, represent and communicate expressers’ motivational orientations. When participants reported their own aggressive expressions in positive or negative contexts, their expressions represented positive or negative emotional experiences respectively, imbued with appetitive orientations. In contrast, reported sad expressions, in positive or negative contexts, represented positive and negative emotional (...) experiences respectively, imbued with consummatory orientations. In six additional experiments, participant observers interpreted that aggression displayed in positive contexts signalled happy-appetitive states, and sadness displayed in positive contexts signalled happy-consummatory states. Implications for the production and interpretation of emotion expressions are discussed. (shrink)

: Claus Oetke, in his "Ancient Indian Logic as a Theory of Non-monotonic Reasoning," presents a sweeping new interpretation of the early history of Indian logic. His main proposal is that Indian logic up until Dharmakirti was nonmonotonic in character-similar to some of the newer logics that have been explored in the field of Artificial Intelligence, such as default logic, which abandon deductive validity as a requirement for formally acceptable arguments; Dharmakirti, he suggests, was the first to consider that a (...) good argument should be one for which it is not possible for the property identified as the "reason" (hetu) to occur without the property to be proved (sadhya)-a requirement akin to deductive validity. Oetke's approach is challenged here, arguing that from the very beginning in India something like monotonic, that is, deductively valid, reasoning was the ideal or norm, but that the conception of that ideal was continually refined, in that the criteria for determining when it is realized were progressively sharpened. (shrink)

At Pliny, Ep. 5. 18 we read that Macer, the recipient of that letter, has a villa which Pliny says must be lovely, because in qua [sc. villa] se composuerat homo felicior, antequam felicissimus fieret. The identity of this homo felicior is undoubtedly of some interest, but the latest commentary on Pliny's Letters has nothing to say on the matter. However, B. Radice in her two translations of the Letters says that the person in question is Nerva, but adds as (...) a second possibility ‘the dictator Sulla’. In this ambivalence she is at one with many of the older commentators on the Letters. Alone among the commentators examined by us, M. Gesner elects to give preference to Sulla over Nerva. We believe Sulla is certainly the owner in question, but since the ambiguity persists in the scholarly tradition, a fresh look should be taken at the problem and the case against Nerva and for Sulla be put more fully than hitherto. In using the phrase homo felicior, antequam felicissimus fieret without actually naming the person, it is clear that Pliny takes it for granted that the individual in question will be immediately recognizable to Macer, the recipient of the letter, by this description. It follows, therefore, that the phrase had become well established as a commonplace, inevitably and unambiguously linked to one person only. All of our evidence suggests that it cannot be applied to Nerva. First of all it is likely that such a phrase would need time to become accepted into the tradition so as to become readily identifiable, whereas Pliny was writing only a relatively short time after Nerva's reign. (shrink)

This is a new release of the original 1946 edition.

This book is written primarily for psychology and education students whose programs include a course in child psychology, child development, or theories of development. The text may also be used to supplement courses on child development organized thematically or chronologically. Instructors of graduate courses in child development may wish to consider this text as a primary synthesis containing more source material and source citations than others of its kind. The primary aim of the book is to describe what developmental theories (...) are, what they can do, where they come from, how they work, and how they can be used to explain human nature. (shrink)

Two putative functions of emotion experience ? its roles in intentional action and in social understanding ? were investigated using a group of individuals (repressors) known to have impaired anxiety experience. Repressors, low-anxious, high-anxious, and defensive high-anxious individuals were asked to give a public presentation, and then given the opportunity to avoid the presentation. Repressors were the group most likely to avoid giving the presentation, but were the least likely to give an emotional explanation for their avoidance. By contrast, they (...) were not less likely than other groups to provide negative emotional explanations of another person?s behaviour in a film clip. We concluded that: (1) repressors are impaired in self- but not in other-explanation using emotion, implying that ?simulation? is not the method used by repressors to ground their folk psychology, (2) the intentional avoidance shown by repressors is indicative of some intact first-order phenomenal anxiety experience but that they lack second-order awareness of this anxiety experience. (shrink)

From unemployment to Brexit to climate change, capitalism is in trouble and ill-prepared to cope with the challenges of the coming decades. How did we get here? While contemporary economists and policymakers tend to ignore the political and social dimensions of capitalism, some of the great economists of the past - Adam Smith, Friedrich List, John Maynard Keynes, Joseph Schumpeter, Karl Polanyi and Albert Hirschman - did not make the same mistake. Leveraging their insights, sociologists John L. Campbell (...) and John A. Hall trace the historical development of capitalism as a social, political, and economic system throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. They draw comparisons across eras and around the globe to show that there is no inevitable logic of capitalism. Rather, capitalism's performance depends on the strength of nation-states, the social cohesion of capitalist societies, and the stability of the international system - three things that are in short supply today. (shrink)

Today, capitalism is in question, as the 2013 Academy of Management conference theme claimed. Many view business skeptically because they see capitalism as incompatible with ethics. The same problem pervades the business ethics education classroom. Business ethics can be taught in a way that demonstrates that economics and ethics are compatible and are integrated most directly in the function of management. This essay provides an overview of Ayn Rand’s philosophy as an alternative to current conventions but largely consistent with approaches (...) such as virtue ethics and conscious capitalism. The essay concludes with challenges to teaching Objectivism in business schools. (shrink)

Pursuing the Forms: Equality and Excellence in Plato's Republic and Symposium -- Equality and Excellence in the Education of Cyrus -- Splendid Equality in the Nicomachean Ethics: Munificence -- How Excellence Bows to Equality in Aristotle's Politics -- First Among Equals: Philosophers, Statesmen, and Citizens in Spinoza's Democracy -- Excellence and Equality in Fénelon's Telemachus -- The Seductive Danger of Equality and Excellence: The Moderating Wisdom of Montesquieu's Science of Ovidian Metamorphosis -- Equality and Excellence in Rousseau's Emile, Book III (...) -- Hegel's Evaluation of Liberalism: Equality of Rights without Human Excellence -- Democracy, Nobility, and Freedom: The Political and Moral Aesthetics of Tocqueville -- Does Kierkegaard Have a Concept of Excellence? -- Nietzsche: The Indignity of Equality -- The Good and the Excellent: John Rawls's Egalitarian Liberalism. (shrink)

Although Paul Churchland and Jerry Fodor both subscribe to the so-called theory-theory– the theory that folk psychology (FP) is an empirical theory of behavior – they disagree strongly about FP’s fate. Churchland contends that FP is a fundamentally flawed view analogous to folk biology, and he argues that recent advances in computational neuroscience and connectionist AI point toward development of a scientifically respectable replacement theory that will give rise to a new common-sense psychology. Fodor, however, wagers that FP will be (...) largely preserved and vindicated by scientific investigations of behavior. Recent findings by developmental psychologists, I argue, will push both Churchlandians and Fodorians toward the pessimistic view that FP is a misguided theory that will never be displaced, because it is, so to speak, built into our cognitive systems. I explore the possibility of preserving optimism by rejecting the theory-theory and adopting the simulation theory, a competing view developed by Robert Gordon, Alvin Goldman, and Jane Heal. According to simulationists, common-sense interpretation of behavior is accomplished by means of pretense-like operations that deploy the cognitive system’s own reasoning capabilities in a disengaged manner. Since on this view no theory-like set of principles would be needed, the simulation theory seems to enjoy a simplicity advantage over the theory-theory. Steven Stich and Shawn Nichols, however, contend that as the cognitive system would require special mechanisms for disengaged operation, the simplicity question cannot be resolved until suitable computational models are developed. I describe a set of models I have constructed to meet this need, and I discuss the contribution such models can make to determining FP’s fate. (shrink)

By stipulating the existence of a system 1 and a system 2, dual-process theories raise questions about how these systems function. De Neys identifies several such questions for which no plausible answers have ever been offered. What makes the nature of systems 1 and 2 so difficult to ascertain? The answer is simple: The systems do not exist.

Reasoning about mental states and processes is important in various subareas of the legal domain. A trial lawyer might need to reason and the beliefs, reasoning and other mental states and processes of members of a jury; a police officer might need to reason about the conjectured beliefs and reasoning of perpetrators; a judge may need to consider a defendant's mental states and processes for the purposes of sentencing and so on. Further, the mental states in question may themselves be (...) about the mental states and processes of other people. Therefore, if AI systems are to assist with reasoning tasks in law, they may need to be able to reason about mental states and processes. Such reasoning is riddled with uncertainty, and this is true in particular in the legal domain. The article discusses how various different types of uncertainty arise, and shows how they greatly complicate the task of reasoning about mental states and processes. The article concentrates on the special case of states of belief and processes of reasoning, and sketches an implemented, prototype computer program (ATT-Meta) that copes with the various types of uncertainty in reasoning about beliefs and reasoning. In particular, the article outlines the system's facilities for handling conflict between different lines of argument, especially when these lie within the reasoning of different people. The system's approach is illustrated by application to a real-life mugging example. [NB: The date on the archived preprint avail via this Phil* page has an incorrect date, 2011, on it. The correct date is 2001.]. (shrink)

We are living in a time of unprecedented challenges: human activity is now the primary driver shaping the planet and we are perilously close to breaching a variety of critical planetary boundaries—a prelude to the possible extinction of our species. How should we be thinking and acting—as persons, communities, institutions and societies—so as to best understand and respond to these challenges? What contribution can the field of science and religion make to develop the knowledge needed to negotiate the civilizational transition (...) we face? Such questions were addressed through a series of dialogues at the 62nd annual conference of the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science in June of 2016—“How Can We Know? Co-Creating Knowledge in Perilous Times.” This essay sets the background to these challenges and introduces the set of articles in this themed section. (shrink)

Searle's Chinese Room argument is a general argument that proves that machines do not have mental states in virtue of their programming. I claim that the argument expresses powerful but mistaken intuitions about understanding and the first person point of view. A distinction is drawn between a competence sense and a performance sense of ‘understanding texts’. It is argued that the Chinese Room intuition looks for a special experience (performance) of comprehension, whereas artificial intelligence is attempting to explain the knowledge (...) (competence) required to understand texts. Moreover, a dilemma is sketched for the argument: either Searle hasn't identified the appropriate subject of understanding or he may understand after all. Finally, I question the underlying assumption that the general definition of mental states requires a projectable‐by‐us first person point of view. (shrink)

In this article we present a notion of “logical perfection”. We first describe through examples a notion of logical perfection extracted from the contemporary logical concept of categoricity. Categoricity (in power) has become in the past half century a main driver of ideas in model theory, both mathematically (stability theory may be regarded as a way of approximating categoricity) and philosophically. In the past two decades, categoricity notions have started to overlap with more classical notions of robustness and smoothness. These (...) have been crucial in various parts of mathematics since the nineteenth century. We postulate and present the category of logical perfection. We draw on various notions of perfection from mathematics of the 19th and 20th centuries and then trace the relation to the concept of categoricity in power as a logical notion of what a “mathematically perfect” structure is. (shrink)

The constructs of behavioral mass in research on the momentum of operant behavior and associative strength in Pavlovian conditioning have some interesting parallels, as suggested by Savastano & Miller. Some recent findings challenge the strict separation of operant and Pavlovian determiners of response rate and resistance to change in behavioral momentum, renewing the need for research on the interaction of processes that have traditionally been studied separately. Relatedly, Furedy notes that some autonomic responses may be refractory to conditioning, but a (...) combination of operant contingencies and enriched Pavlovian stimulus-reinforcer relations may prove effective. (shrink)

Neste artigo revisa-se a literatura sobre paradoxos matemático-físicos gregos antigos. Trata-se de paradoxo de números irracionais, o dilema de Democritus, a antinomia de mudança, bem como os seguintes paradoxos de Zenon: a dicotomia, o Aquiles, os blocos móveis, o argumento contra a pluralidade, o dilema e a semente de painço.

Dictionary of Paradox is a fascinating reference work for scholars, students, and the general public. It describes those paradoxes that are either especially interesting today or that have a continuing interest from the historical point of view.

Os mais importantes paradoxos de decisáo social, ou seja, de votaçáo sáo apresentados. A apresentaçáo indica tanto a origem dos paradoxos discutidos quanto uma breve discussáo das mais importantes tentativas de os resolver. Sáo considerados paradoxos em que a regra de votaçáo preve ruma igualdade de peso entre os eleitores, bem como paradoxos com regras altemativas de votaçáo. A democracia tem se firmado entre a grande maioria dos povos como a maneira mais justa de organizaçáo social e , especialmente em (...) se tratando da esco lha das autoridades de uma democracia representativa, em quase axiomático 0 uso da regra da igualdade de peso de cada eleitor, embora outras regras tambem sejam usadas em clubes, instituições finançeiras e outros bastante conhecido, porem que tanto o proprio conceito de democracia quanto a referida a regra de escolh sáo isentas de problemas e, em especial, geram certos paradoxos. Assim passa-se em revista aqui alguns dos mais importantesparadoxos eleitorais, sem a pretensáo de resoIve-los", mas com o intuito de ampliar a discussao critica e portanto, fortalecer praticas politicas desejaveis. (shrink)