Uncertain reasoning about agents' beliefs and reasoning

Artificial Intelligence and Law 9 (2-3):115-152 (2001)
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Abstract

Reasoning about mental states and processes is important in various subareas of the legal domain. A trial lawyer might need to reason and the beliefs, reasoning and other mental states and processes of members of a jury; a police officer might need to reason about the conjectured beliefs and reasoning of perpetrators; a judge may need to consider a defendant's mental states and processes for the purposes of sentencing and so on. Further, the mental states in question may themselves be about the mental states and processes of other people. Therefore, if AI systems are to assist with reasoning tasks in law, they may need to be able to reason about mental states and processes. Such reasoning is riddled with uncertainty, and this is true in particular in the legal domain. The article discusses how various different types of uncertainty arise, and shows how they greatly complicate the task of reasoning about mental states and processes. The article concentrates on the special case of states of belief and processes of reasoning, and sketches an implemented, prototype computer program (ATT-Meta) that copes with the various types of uncertainty in reasoning about beliefs and reasoning. In particular, the article outlines the system's facilities for handling conflict between different lines of argument, especially when these lie within the reasoning of different people. The system's approach is illustrated by application to a real-life mugging example. [NB: The date on the archived preprint avail via this Phil* page has an incorrect date, 2011, on it. The correct date is 2001.]

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Author's Profile

John A Barnden
University of Birmingham

References found in this work

Folk psychology as simulation.Robert M. Gordon - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (2):158-71.
In defense of the simulation theory.Alvin I. Goldman - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (1-2):104-119.
A deduction model of belief.Kurt Konolige - 1986 - Los Atlos, Calif.: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers.
Theories of Theories of Mind.Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.) - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Theories of Theories of Mind.Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (194):115-119.

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