“For what tomorrow will be, no one knows,” writes Victor Hugo. This dialogue, proposed to Jacques Derrida by the historian Elisabeth Roudinesco, brings together two longtime friends who share a common history and an intellectual heritage. While their perspectives are often different, they have many common reference points: psychoanalysis, above all, but also the authors and works that have come to be known outside France as “post-structuralist.” Beginning with a revealing glance back at the French intellectual scene over the (...) past forty years, Derrida and Roudinesco go on to address a number of major social and political issues. Their extraordinarily wide-ranging discussion covers topics such as immigration, hospitality, gender equality, and “political correctness”; the disordering of the traditional family, same-sex unions, and reproductive technologies; the freedom of the “subject” over and against “scientism”; violence against animals; the haunting specter of communism and revolution; the present and future of anti-Semitism (as well as that which marked Derrida’s own history) and the hazardous politics of criticizing the state of Israel; the principled abolition of the death penalty; and, to conclude, a chapter “in praise of psychoanalysis.” These exchanges not only help to situate Derrida's thought within the milieu out of which it grew, they also show more clearly than ever how this thought, impelled by a deep concern for justice, can be brought to bear on the social and political issues of our day. What emerges here above all, far from an abstract, apolitical discourse, is a call to take responsibility—for the inheritance of a past, for the singularities of the present, and for the unforeseeable tasks of the future. (shrink)

Few philosophers held greater fascination for Jacques Derrida than Martin Heidegger, and in this book we get an extended look at Derrida’s first real encounters with him. Delivered over nine sessions in 1964 and 1965 at the École Normale Supérieure, these lectures offer a glimpse of the young Derrida first coming to terms with the German philosopher and his magnum opus, Being and Time. They provide not only crucial insight into the gestation of some of Derrida’s primary conceptual concerns—indeed, (...) it is here that he first uses, with some hesitation, the word “deconstruction”—but an analysis of Being and Time that is of extraordinary value to readers of Heidegger or anyone interested in modern philosophy. Derrida performs an almost surgical reading of the notoriously difficult text, marrying pedagogical clarity with patient rigor and acting as a lucid guide through the thickets of Heidegger’s prose. At this time in intellectual history, Heidegger was still somewhat unfamiliar to French readers, and Being and Time had only been partially translated into French. Here Derrida mostly uses his own translations, giving his own reading of Heidegger that directly challenges the French existential reception initiated earlier by Sartre. He focuses especially on Heidegger’s Destruktion of the history of ontology, and indeed of ontology as such, concentrating on passages that call for a rethinking of the place of history in the question of being, and developing a radical account of the place of metaphoricity in Heidegger’s thinking. This is a rare window onto Derrida’s formative years, and in it we can already see the philosopher we’ve come to recognize—one characterized by a bravura of exegesis and an inventiveness of thought that are particularly and singularly his. (shrink)

"I shall speak of ghost, of flame, and of ashes." These are the first words of Jacques Derrida's lecture on Heidegger. It is again a question of Nazism--of what remains to be thought through of Nazism in general and of Heidegger's Nazism in particular. It is also "politics of spirit" which at the time people thought--they still want to today--to oppose to the inhuman. "Derrida's ruminations should intrigue anyone interested in Post-Structuralism. . . . . This study of Heidegger (...) is a fine example of how Derrida can make readers of philosophical texts notice difficult problems in almost imperceptible details of those texts."--David Hoy, London Review of Books "Will a more important book on Heidegger appear in our time? No, not unless Derrida continues to think and write in his spirit. . . . Let there be no mistake: this is not merely a brilliant book on Heidegger, it is thinking in the grand style."--David Farrell Krell, Research in Phenomenology "The analysis of Heidegger is brilliant, provocative, elusive."--Peter C. Hodgson, Religious Studies Review. (shrink)

I shall speak of ghost [revenant], of flame and of ashes.And of what, for Heidegger, avoiding means.What is avoiding? Heidegger on several occasions uses the common word Vermeiden: to avoid, to flee, to dodge. What might he have meant when it comes to “spirit” or the “spiritual”? I specify immediately: not spirit or the spiritual but Geist, geistig, geistlich, for this question will be, through and through, that of language. Do these German words allow themselves to be translated? In another (...) sense: are they avoidable?Sein und Zeit : what does Heidegger say at that time? He announces and he prescribes. He warns [avertit]: a certain number of terms will have to be avoided . Among them, spirit . In 1953, more than twenty-five years later—and this was not just any quarter-century—in the great text devoted to Georg Trakl, Heidegger notes that Trakl always took care to avoid the word geistig. And, visibly, Heidegger approves him in this; he thinks the same. But this time, it is not Geist nor even geistlich that is to be avoided, but geistig.How are we to delimit the difference, and what has happened? What of this meantime? How are we to explain that in twenty-five years, between these two warning signals , Heidegger made a frequent, regular, marked use of all this vocabulary, including the adjective geistig? And that he often spoke not only of the word “spirit” but, sometimes yielding to the emphatic mode, in the name of spirit? Jacques Derrida is Directeur d’Études at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales and also teaches at the University of California, Irvine. His most recent contribution to Critical Inquiry is “Like the Sound of the Sea Deep within a Shell: Paul de Man’s War” . An English translation of De l’espirit: Heidegger et la question is forthcoming from the University of Chicago Press. Geoff Bennington, author of Lyotard: Writing the Event, is a lecturer in French at the University of Sussex. Rachel Bowlby, author of Virginia Woolf: Feminist Destinations, is a lecturer in English at the University of Sussex. (shrink)

Unable to respond to the questions, to all the questions, I will ask myself instead whether responding is possible and what that would mean in such a situation. And I will risk in turn several questions prior to the definition of a responsibility. But is it not an act to assume in theory the concept of a responsibility? Is that not already to take a responsibility? One’s own as well as the responsibility to which one believes one ought to summon (...) others?The title names a war. Which war?Do not think only of the war that broke out several months ago around some articles signed by a certain Paul de Man, in Belgium between 1940 and 1942. Later you will understand why it is important to situate the beginning of things public, that is the publications, early in 1940 at the latest, during the war but before the occupation of Belgium by the Nazis, and not in December 1940, the date of the first article that appeared in Le Soir, the major Brussels newspaper that was then controlled, more or less strictly, by the occupiers. For several months, in the United States, the phenomena of this war “around” Pula de Man have been limited to newspaper articles. War, a public act, is by rights something declared. So we will not count in the category of war the private phenomena—meetings, discussions, correspondences, or telephonic conclaves—however intense they may have been in recent days, and already well beyond the American academic milieu. Jacques Derrida is Directeur d’Études at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales and also teaches at the University of California, Irvine. A teacher at Yale for ten years, he is the author of Mémoires: for Paul de Man .Peggy Kamuf is associate professor of French at Miami University. She is the author of Fictions of Feminism Desire: Disclosures of Heloise and Signature Pieces: On the Institution of Authorship . Her article “Pieces of Resistance” is forthcoming in Reading de Man Reading. (shrink)

In this important new book, Jacques Derrida talks with Bernard Stiegler about the effect of teletechnologies on our philosophical and political moment. Improvising before a camera, the two philosophers are confronted by the very technologies they discuss and so are forced to address all the more directly the urgent questions that they raise. What does it mean to speak of the present in a situation of "live" recording? How can we respond, responsibly, to a question when we know that (...) the so-called "natural" conditions of expression, discussion, reflection, and deliberation have been breached? As Derrida and Stiegler discuss the role of teletechnologies in modern society, the political implications of Derrida's thought become apparent. Drawing on recent events in Europe, Derrida and Stiegler explore the impact of television and the internet on our understanding of the state, its borders and citizenship. Their discussion examines the relationship between the juridical and the technical, and it shows how new technologies for manipulating and transmitting images have influenced our notions of democracy, history and the body. The book opens with a shorter interview with Derrida on the news media, and closes with a provocative essay by Stiegler on the epistemology of digital photography. In Echographies of Television, Derrida and Stiegler open up questions that are of key social and political importance. Their book will be of great interest to all those already familiar with Derrida's work, as well as to students and scholars of philosophy, literature, sociology and media studies. (shrink)

Jacques Derrida argues that the feminist and intellectual Hélène Cixous is the most important writer working within the French idiom today. To prove this, he elucidates the epistemological and historical interconnectedness of four terms: genesis, genealogy, genre, and genius, and how they pertain to or are implicated in Cixous's work. Derrida explores Cixous's genius (a masculine term in French, he is quick to point out) and the inspiration that guides and informs her writing. He marvels at her skillful working (...) within multiple genres. He focuses on a number of her works, including her extraordinary novel _Manhattan_ and her lyrical and evocative _Dream I Tell You_, a book addressed to Derrida himself and one in which Cixous presents a series of her dreams. Derrida also delves into the nature of the literary archive, the production of literature, and the importance of the poetic and sexual difference to the entirety of his own work. For forty years, Derrida had a close personal and intellectual relationship with Hélène Cixous. Clever, playful, and eloquent, _Geneses, Genealogies, Genres, and Genius_ charts the influence these two critical giants had on each other and is the most vital work to address Cixous's contribution to French thought. (shrink)

The book's two essays, 'Limited Inc.' and 'Signature Event Context, ' constitute key statements of the Derridean theory of deconstruction. They are perhaps the clearest exposition to be found of Derrida's most controversial idea.

Les installations de musiciens, souvent acousmatiques, semblent encore marginales au sein de la musique savante. S’y attachent un ludisme régressif, art relationnel interactif, ainsi qu’un néo-futurisme encore validé par les laboratoires de création musicale, surtout autour de l’an 2000, en soi paradigme science-fictionnel de l’imaginaire collectif. Des installations rappellent des vaisseaux spatiaux. D’autres engendrent des onirismes cristallins de verres usinés. Phénoménologie naïve, ou narcissique et postmoderne découverte des sens, certaines installations, enfin, délocalisent l’écoute sur diverses parties du corps. Art-thérapie écologique, (...) l’archétype du « jardin sonore » en naît logiquement. The installations by musicians, often acousmatic, still seem marginal to sholarly music. They carry a regressive playfulness, an interactive relational art, as well as a neo-futurism still validated by the laboratories of musical creation, especially around the year 2000, in itself science-fictional paradigm of the collective imagination. Some installations evoke spaceships. Others engender crystalline fantasies of machined glass. Like naive phenomenology, or narcissistic and postmodern discovery of the senses, some installations, finally, relocate listening on various parts of the body. Ecological art therapy, the archetype of “sound garden” is logically born. (shrink)

The XIIIth meeting of the Symposium Aristotelicum, which took place in 1993 on the De Interpretatione, had a very strange and very sad history. True enough, it took place in the enchanting decor of the Certosa di Pontignano, near Siena ; and, as usual, it offered contributions and discussions of the highest order. But this time the publication of the papers met with insurmountable obstacles. It had been initially entrusted to Mario Mignucci and Michael Frede, two of the most faithful (...) and devoted participants in the Symposium. Most infortunately, however, they were both wrenched from our admiration and affection, Mario Mignucci in 2004, after a protracted and merciless disease, Michael Frede in 2007, owing to an unpredictable, sudden accident. The inevitable ensuing delay for the publication of the XIIIth Symposium has not been caught up with so far and those members of the Organization Committee whom I have been able to contact told me that, in their opinion, it ran a strong risk of never being caught up at all, alas. By a moving coincidence (at least for me), no more than three weeks before Michael’s death, my colleague and friend, Professor Thomas De Koninck, had asked me if I would agree to publish the present paper in the Laval théologique et philosophique. Thomas and his collaborators Paul Asselin and Martin Achard helped me to finally overcome my scruples ; I am deeply grateful to them. As for this long paper itself, it would be difficult to summarize it : it is, or tries to be, exactly what it looks like, namely a detailed reading of Ammonius’ commentary to the famous Chapter One of the De Interpretatione. If this reading has any dose of originality, it will be due not so much to the lights the ancient commentary may shed (or not shed) on the letter and the interpretation of the Aristotelician text as to what it may teach concerning the methods, selections, and intellectual behaviour of its author himself, as well as with regard to his own philosophical and pedagogical reactions before such a text as Aristotle’s own. (shrink)

Those who have read me, in particular those who have read “Paul de Man’s War,” know very well that I would have quite easily accepted a genuine critique, the expression of an argued disagreement with my reading of de Man, with my evaluation of these articles from 1940-42, and so on. After all, what I wrote on this subject was complicated enough, divided, tormented, most often hazarded as hypothesis, open enough to discussion, itself discussing itself enough in advance for me (...) to be able to welcome questions, suggestions, and objections. Provided this was done so as to demonstrate and not to intimidate or inflict wounds, to help the analysis progress and not to score points, to read and to reason and not to pronounce massive, magical, and immediately executor verdicts. Five of the six “responses” that I reread last night are written, as one used to say, with a pen dipped in venom. Less against the de Man of 1940-42, perhaps, then against me . Less against me, in truth, than against “Deconstruction” . How can the reader tell that these five “critical responses” are not “responses,” critical texts or discussions, but rather the documents of a blinded compulsion? First of all, the fact that they are all monolithic. They take into account none of the complications of which my text, this is the very least one can say, is not at all sparing. They never seek to measure the possibility, the degree, or the form, as always happens in an honest discussion, of a partial agreement on this or that point. No, everything is rejected as a block; everything is a block and a block of hatred. Even when, here or there, someone makes a show of being moved by my sadness or my friendship for de Man, it is in order to get the better of me and suggest that I am inspired only by friendship, which will appear ridiculous to all those who have read me. Inspired by friendship means for those people misled by friendship. How foreign this experience must be to them! Jacques Derrida is Directeur d’Études at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales as well as professor at the University of California, Irvine, and visiting professor at the Graduate School of the City University of New York. His most recent publication in English is the collection Limited Inc , which includes a new afterword, “Toward an Ethic of Discussion.” Peggy Kamuf is professor of French at the University of Southern California. Her most recent book is Signature Pieces: On the Institution of Authorship . She has also contributed essays to Reading de Man Reading and Responses: On Paul de Man’s Wartime Journalism , and is currently editing A Derrida Reader. (shrink)

The anthropologist Marcel Mauss, in his famous exploration of the gift in "primitive" and archaic societies, showed that the essential aspect of the exchange of presents involved the establishment of a social tie that bound the parties together above and beyond any material value of the objects exchanged. He argued that these intangible mutual "debts" constituted the social fabric. Godbout and Caillé show that, contrary to the modern assumption that societies function on the basis of market exchange and the pursuit (...) of self-interest, the gift still constitutes the foundation of our social fabric. The authors describe the gift not as an object but as a social connection, perhaps the most important social connection because it creates a sense of obligation to respond in kind. They examine the gift in a broad range of cases such as blood and organ donation; volunteer work; the bonds between friends, couples, and family; Santa Claus; the interaction between performers and their audience; and the relation of the artist to society. Written in an engaging manner, The World of the Gift will appeal to anyone who is interested in how the world really operates. (shrink)

____Specters of Marx__ is a major new book from the renowned French philosopher Jacques Derrida. It represents his first important statement on Marx and his definitive entry into social and political philosophy. "Specter" is the first noun one reads in _The Manifesto of_ _the Communist Party._ But that's just the beginning. Once you start to notice them, there is no counting all the ghosts, spirits, specters and spooks that crowd Marx's text. If they are to count for something, however, (...) one must question the spectropoetics that Marx allowed to invade his discourse. In ____Specters of Marx,__ Derrida undertakes this task within the context of a critique of the new dogmatism and "new world order" that have proclaimed the death of Marxism and of Marx. (shrink)

The end of the hope for a magic-socialist solution to the French crisis leads into the age of torment. This is an unexpected effect of the French socialists' coming to power. The international crisis which the socialist alternative previously conjured away magically takes on its full scope. Previous political certainties — those of the “first” and those of the “second” Left — are swept up in this typhon and cast about in a new space in which they have lost their (...) anchor. In its typical partisan style, the political Left is seeking a new identity without being really willing to shake off the scars of the past. (shrink)

Linguists are becoming more and more interested in the genealogy of linguistics. And in reconstituting the history or prehistory of their science, they are discovering numerous ancestors, sometimes with a certain astonished recognition. Interest in the origin of linguistics is awakened when the problems of the origin of language cease to be proscribed and when a certain geneticism—or a certain generativism—comes back into its own. One could show that this is not a chance encounter. This historical activity is no longer (...) elaborated solely at the margins of scientific practice, and its results are already being felt. In particular, we are no longer at the stage of the prejudice according to which linguistics as a science was born of a single "epistemological break"—a concept, called Bachelardian, much used or abused today—and of a break occurring in our immediate vicinity. We no longer think, as does Maurice Grammont, that "everything prior to the nineteenth century, which is not yet linguistics, can be expedited in several lines."1 Noam Chomsky, in an article announcing his Cartesian Linguistics, which presents in its major lines the concept of "generative grammar," states: "My aim here is not to justify the interest of this investigation, nor to describe summarily its procedure, but instead to underline that by a curious detour it takes us back to a tradition of ancient thought, rather than constituting a new departure or a radical innovation in the domain of linguistics and psychology."2If we are to set ourselves down in the space of this "curious detour," we could not help encountering the "linguistics" of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. We would have to ask ourselves, then, in what ways Rousseau's reflections on the sign, on language, on the origin of languages, on the relations between speech and writing, and so on announce what we are so often tempted to consider as the very modernity of linguistic science, that is, modernity as linguistic science, since so many other "human sciences" refer to linguistics as their particular model. And we are all the more encouraged to practice this detour in that Chomsky's major references, in Cartesian Linguistics, are to the Logi cand General and Reasoned Grammar of Port-Royal, works that Rousseau knew well and held in high esteem.3 For example, on several occasions Rousseau cites Duclos' commentary on the General and Reasoned Grammar. The Essay on the Origin of Languages even closes with one of these citations. Thus Rousseau acknowledges his debt.1. Maurice Grammont, cited by Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics , p. 1.2. Chomsky, "De quelques constantes de la théory linguistique," Diogène, no. 51 ; my italics. See also Chomsky, Current Issues in Linguistic Theory , p.15 ff. There is an analogous gesture in Jakobson, who refers not only to Peirce and, as does Chomsky, to Humboldt but also to John of Salisbury, to the Stoics, and to Plato's Cratylus: see Jakobson, "A la recherche de l'essence du langage," Diogène, no. 51 .3. "I began with some book of philosophy, like the Port-Royal Logic, Locke's Essay, Malebranch, Leibniz, Descartes, etc." .Jacques Derrida, professor of the history of philosophy at the Ècole Normale Supérieure in Paris, is the author of, among other works, Writing and Difference, Of Grammatology, and Marges de la philosophie, from which the present essay is taken. His previous contribution to Critical Inquiry, "The Law of Genre," appeared in the Autumn 1980 issue. Alan Bass, a psychoanalyst, has published essays on deconstruction and psychoanalytic theory and practice. (shrink)

Les hommes sont-ils sujets ou assujettis à la structure objective du monde naturel et social ? Est-ce l’idéologie ou la critique de l’idéologie qui les fait sujets ? Les deux, selon Marx, car les hommes ne sont pas libres mais le deviennent à travers l’histoire, dialectiquement, en se libérant de la nécessité qui les conditionne. Depuis, le marxisme s’est scindé, un matérialisme objectif y affrontant un idéalisme subjectif, et aujourd’hui Althusser retourne le socialisme scientifique contre l’utopie communiste, à l’inverse d’Habermas. (...) Une critique scientiste de l’humanisme idéologique s’oppose alors à une critique humaniste de l’idéologie scientiste. Et s’il fallait plutôt critiquer ensemble humanisme et scientisme comme les deux versants contraires mais complémentaires d’un même rationalisme métaphysique et idéologique ?Are men subjects or are they subjected to objective structure of natural and social world ? Is it ideology or criticism of ideology which makes them subjects ? Both, according to Marx, because men aren’t but become free throught history, dialectically, being liberated from necessity which determines them. Since, marxism has been splitting up into an objective materialism fronting a subjective idealism, and today Althusser, at the opposite of Habermas, returns scientific socialism against communist Utopia. Then, a scienticist criticism of ideological humanism is opposed to a humanist criticism of scienticist ideology. So, shouldn’t we criticize both humanism and scienticism as two contrary but complementary sides of a single metaphysical - and ideological - rationalism ? (shrink)

In their debate here Jacques Bidet, Gérard Duménil and Urs Lindner confront their interpretations of Marx’s Capital, discussing the usages to be made of it today. Questions addressed here include the place of the philosophy, economics, and social sciences, in the critique of political economy. They examine the points where Marx’s analysis has been reformulated or completed, to what extent it has been rendered obsolete by historical evolutions, and in what respect it still retains its pertinence. These are the (...) principal questions addressed in the discussion. (shrink)

Spiritual life and community engagement animation services have existed since 2001. These services replaced pastoral animation in schools and are intended to promote the spiritual development and community engagement of all students, whether or not they are affiliated with a religion. This article presents the historical background that led to development of this service, as well as the professional concerns of its stakeholders. The concerns raised are based on awareness of great diversity among those who provide this service - diversity (...) in both their training and their understanding of the meanings of the terms that define their work. Presently working towards the professionalization that they deem essential to their very survival, they are using professional strategies that are largely not aligned with their reality nor their abilities. This article hopes to demonstrate the relevance of changing perspectives so that this profession would not be understood through functionalist or conflictualist paradigms, nor limited only to community engagement, but would rather adopt an interactionist point of view, focused on the spiritual aspect of this role. (shrink)

According to a widely discussed view, knowledge plays a significant normative role in action: It is epistemically rational to treat p as your reason for action if and only if you know that p. As many philosophers have observed, however, this view clashes with the claim that knowledge is moderate and stable. For, granting that claim, there will be high stakes cases in which knowledge seems insufficient. To deal with such cases, some philosophers embracing the knowledge norm combine three independently (...) plausible claims. First, they say that no non-trivial condition is luminous; second, they say that doing something while not being in a position to know that that is appropriate is bad (in high stakes cases); third, they say that in the high stakes cases in question, the subject knows but fails to be in a position to know that she knows (Williamson Philos Q 55:213–235, 2005). This paper argues that this account can overcome the main objections already raised in the literature, but that it still faces the apparently insurmountable challenge of providing a natural and helpful way of substantiating the second claim. (shrink)

For Strasbourg consists of a series of essays and interviews about the city of Strasbourg and the philosophical friendships Jacques Derrida developed there over a period of some forty years. Written just months before his death, the opening essay, “The Place Name: Strasbourg,” recounts in detail, and in very moving terms, Derrida’s deep attachment to this French city on the border between France and Germany. More than just a personal narrative, however, the essay is a profound interrogation of the (...) relationship between philosophy and place, philosophy and language, and philosophy and friendship. As such, it raises a series of philosophical, political, and ethical questions that might all be placed under the aegis of what Derrida once called “philosophical nationalities and nationalism.” The other three texts included in the book are long interviews/conversations between Derrida and his two principal interlocutors in Strasbourg, Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. These interviews are significant both for the themes they focus on and for what they reveal about Derrida’s relationships to Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe. Filled with sharp insights into one anothers’ work and peppered with personal anecdotes and humor, the interviews bear witness to the decades-long intellectual friendships of these three important contemporary thinkers. This collection thus stands as a reminder of and testimony to Derrida’s unique relationship to Strasbourg and to the two thinkers most closely associated with that city. (shrink)

The environmental crisis, ecological injustice and climate change are some of the biggest challenges to humanity and sustainable development worldwide. The youth are at the centre of the ecological justice, environmental consciousness and climate change discourse. For the youth to participate and influence development with regard to the climate crisis in a favourable way, they must understand their role and the issues and challenges that they face in this regard.Contribution: The aim of this explorative article is twofold. It highlights the (...) involvement of the South African youth in ecological matters. It also offers insights on why the youth can be regarded as game-changing role-players with regard to the climate crisis and being environmentally conscious. (shrink)

The expression 'platonism in mathematics' or 'mathematical platonism' is familiar in the philosophy of mathematics at least since the use Paul Bernays made of it in his paper of 1934, 'Sur le Platonisme dans les Mathématiques'. But he was not the first to point out the similarities between the conception of the defenders of mathematical realism and the ideas of Plato. Poincaré had already stressed the 'platonistic' orientation of the mathematicians he called'Cantorian', as opposed to those who (like himself) were (...) 'pragmatist' ones. I examine in this paper some very perplexing aspects of the use which is made at that time of a number of concepts, particularly 'idealism' (which generally designates what we would call 'mathematical realism') and 'empiricism' (which can designate almost any form of antirealism, even if, like for example intuitionism, it is not empiricist at all). There are, of course, historical reasons that may explain why it was for a time so easy and natural to use the words and the concepts in a way that may seem now very strange and to treat as if they were equivalent the two oppositions: realism/antirealism and idealism/empiricism. (shrink)

A certain number of cases suggest that our willingness to ascribe “knowledge” can be influenced by practical factors. For revisionary proposals, they indicate that the truth‐values of “knowledge” ascriptions vary with practical factors. For conservative proposals, on the contrary, nothing surprising is happening. Standard pragmatic approaches appeal to pragmatic implicatures and psychological approaches to the idea that belief formation is influenced by practical factors. Conservative proposals have not yet offered a fully satisfactory explanation, though. In this article, I introduce and (...) defend a third conservative proposal which I call “Refined Invariantism”. The two main claims of this proposal are that (1) we should distinguish between high stakes cases in which the subject does not believe (that he knows) the target proposition and those in which he believes (that he knows) the target proposition and that (2) we should adopt a psychological treatment for the first kind of case and a pragmatic treatment based on the epistemic standards for appropriate assertion and action for the second kind of case. I argue that this new combined approach avoids the main pitfalls of its two conservative rivals and that it gives new life to the generality objection levelled against revisionary views. (shrink)

Limit cycles, because they are constituted of a periodic succession of states (discrete or continuous) constitute a good manner to store information. From any points of the state space reached after a perturbation or stimulation of the cognitive system storing this information, one can aim to join through a more or less long return trajectory a precise neighbourhood of the asymptotic trajectory at a specific moment (or a specific place) on the limit cycle, i.e. where the information of interest stands. (...) We propose that the isochronal fibration, initially imagined and described by A. T. Winfree may be an excellent way to connect directly those two locations. Each isochron is indeed the set of points in temporal phase with one single point of the attractor. The characterisation of the isochronal fibration of various dynamical systems is not easy and until now has principally only been done numerically but not analytically. By integrating the homogeneous solutions of the dynamical system we can solve this fibration in the case of the well known anharmonic pendulum. Other isochronal fibration on classical examples such as the van der Pol system and the non-symmetrical PFK limit cycle are obtained numerically and we also provide the first numerical study on 3-dimentional systems like the anharmonic pendulum with a linear relaxation on its third variable and the Lorenz attractor. The empirical approach seems us useful for dealing with the isochronal fibration which could constitute a powerful tool for understanding and controlling the dynamics of biological or biological-inspired systems. (shrink)

This paper provides a systematic exposition of what Wittgenstein took to be the fundamental error committed by James George Frazer, author of the classic anthropological work The Golden Bough, in his account of ritual practices. By construing those rituals in scientific or rationalistic terms, as aimed at the production of certain effects, Frazer ignores, according to Wittgenstein, their expressive and symbolic dimension. It is, moreover, an error to try to explain the powerful emotions evoked even today by traditions such as (...) fire festivals (which may once have involved human sacrifice) by searching for their causal origins in history or prehistory; the disquieting nature of such practices needs to be understood by attending to the inner meaning they already have in our human lives. Certain important general lessons are drawn about the necessarily limited power of scientific and causal explanations when it comes to alleviating many of our fundamental perplexities not just in the area of anthropology but in philosophy as well.1. (shrink)

Among the main reactions to scepticism, fallibilism is certainly the most popular nowadays. However, fallibilism faces a very strong and well-known objection. It has to grant that concessive knowledge attributions—assertions of the form “I know that p but it might be that not p”—can be true. Yet, these assertions plainly sound incoherent. Fallibilists have proposed to explain this incoherence pragmatically. The main proponents of this approach appeal to Gricean implicatures (Rysiew in Noûs 35(4):477514, 2001; Dougherty and Rysiew in Philos Phenomenol (...) Res 78(1):123132, 2009; Dougherty and Rysiew in Synthese 181(3):395403, 2011). Very recently, some philosophers have observed that fallibilists can also explain this apparent incoherence pragmatically if they embrace a (context-sensitive) certainty norm for assertion (Petersen in Synthese 196(11):4691–4710, 2019; Beddor in Philos Impr 20(8), 2020; Vollet in Dialectica 74:3, 2020). In this paper, I argue for the superiority of this latter explanation over its older rivals. (shrink)

The traditional view in epistemology has it that knowledge is insensitive to the practical stakes. More recently, some philosophers have argued that knowledge is sufficient for rational action: if you know p, then p is a reason you have (epistemically speaking). Many epistemologists contend that these two claims stand in tension with one another. In support of this, they ask us to start with a low stakes case where, intuitively, a subject knows that p and appropriately acts on p. Then, (...) they ask us to consider a high stakes version of the case where, intuitively, this subject does not know that p and could not appropriately act on p without double-checking. Finally, they suggest that the best explanation for our shifty intuitions is that p is a reason the subject has in the low stakes case but not in the high stakes case. In short, according to this explanation, having a reason (in the epistemic sense) is sensitive to the stakes. If so, either knowledge is sensitive to the stakes or else you can know that p even if p is not a reason you have (in the epistemic sense). In this paper, I consider more closely the relation between having a reason (in the epistemic sense) and having a reason to check. I argue that the supposition that if one has p as a reason (in the epistemic sense) then one has a reason not to check whether p, or no reason to check whether p, is highly doubtful. On the contrary, I suggest, it is plausible that, given our fallibility, one always has an epistemic reason to check whether p, whether or not p is a reason one has (in the epistemic sense). On the basis of this observation, I show that one can offer a new way of explaining the cases in question, allowing us to reconcile the traditional view about knowledge and the sufficiency of knowledge for rational action. (shrink)

Before I even begin, before even a preface or an epigraph, allow me to make two confessions or concessions. Both of them have to do with the fable and the phantasm, that is to say, with the spectral. The fabulous and the phantasmatic have a feature in common: stricto sensu and in the classical sense of these terms, they do not pertain to either the true or the false, the veracious or the mendacious. They are related, rather, to an irreducible (...) species of the simulacrum or of virtuality. To be sure, they are not truths or true statements as such, but neither are they errors or deceptions, false witnesses or perjuries. (shrink)

According to the subjective Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics, the instruments used to measure quantum systems are to be regarded as an extension of the senses of the agent who is using them, and quantum states describe the agent’s expectations for what they will experience through these extended senses. How can QBism then account for the fact that instruments must be calibrated before they can be used to ‘sense’ anything; some instruments are more precise than others; more precise instruments can (...) lead to discovery of new systems? Furthermore, is the agent ‘incoherent’ if they prefer to use a less precise instrument? Here we provide answers to these questions. (shrink)

It has become a commonplace that "images" were central to the twentieth century and that their role will be even more powerful in the twenty-first. But what is an image and what can an image be? _Releasing the Image_ understands images as something beyond mere representations of things. Releasing images from that function, it shows them to be self-referential and self-generative, and in this way capable of producing forms of engagement beyond spectatorship and subjectivity. This understanding of images owes much (...) to phenomenology—the work of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty—and to Gilles Deleuze's post-phenomenological work. The essays included here cover historical periods from the Romantic era to the present and address a range of topics, from Cézanne's painting, to images in poetry, to contemporary audiovisual art. They reveal the aesthetic, ethical, and political stakes of the project of releasing images and provoke new ways of engaging with embodiment, agency, history, and technology. (shrink)

This collection of essays and interviews, some previously unpublished and almost all of which appear in English for the first time, encompasses the political and ethical thinking of Jacques Derrida over thirty years. Passionate, rigorous, beautifully argued, wide-ranging, the texts shed an entirely new light on his work and will be welcomed by scholars in many disciplines--politics, philosophy, history, cultural studies, literature, and a range of interdisciplinary programs. Derrida's arguments vary in their responsiveness to given political questions--sometimes they are (...) vivid polemics on behalf of a position or figure, sometimes they are reflective analyses of a philosophical problem. They are united by the recurrent question of political decision or responsibility and the insistence that the apparent simplicity or programmatic character of political decision is in fact a profound avoidance of the political. This volume testifies to the possibility and the necessity of a philosophical politics. Negotiations assembles some of the most telling examples of the intrinsic relationship, so often affirmed by Derrida in more abstract philosophical terms, between deconstructive reading practices and what is called the "political"--more precisely, politics in an almost down-to-earth, pragmatic, and commonsense use of the word. Among the many subjects covered in the book are: the death penalty in the United States, the civil war in Algeria, globalization and cosmopolitanism, the American Declaration of Independence, Jean-Paul Sartre, the value of objectivity, politics and friendship, and the relationship between deconstruction and actuality. (shrink)

With a clear presentation, Ethics: Theory and Practice educates readers about ethical theory and has them apply what they learn to specific classic and contemporary moral problems (lying, cheating, establishing ethical business practices, honoring ethical obligations in medicine, etc.). Jacques P. Thiroux first wrote this text 1977 in order to educate readers about ethical theory and its applications in a way that beginning students could understand. The result was an accessible text that isn't too technical and doesn't plunge into (...) complex readings without sufficient background. The text is fully updated with global issues and non-Western ethical views. Keith W. Krasemann now continues Thiroux's efforts of making Ethical Ideas accesible to students. Besides updating the foundations of the text, Krasemann incoporates new and relevant material, most of which is often unique only to this text. (shrink)

A certain number of philosophers are attracted to the idea that knowledge is the epistemic norm of practical reasoning in the sense that it is epistemically appropriate to rely on p in one’s practical reasoning if and only if one knows that p. A well-known objection to the sufficiency direction of that claim is that there are cases in which a subject supposedly knows that p and yet should not rely on p. In light of the distinction between sufficient and (...) insufficient reasons, some philosophers contend that these cases are inconclusive. In this paper, I argue that this insufficient reason manoeuvre is defective because it either misconstrues the relevant cases or is at odds with strong intuitions about how we (should) reason. I then put forward further considerations relative to the instability of some pieces of reasoning and show how they can be explained by a certainty norm for practical reasoning. (shrink)

This two-volume work examines far-reaching debates on the concept of courage from Greek antiquity to the Christian and mediaeval periods, as well as the modern era. Volume 1 explains how competing accounts of epistêmê, rational wisdom, and truth dominated classical antiquity. Early Christian and mediaeval thinkers, in contrast, favoured fortitude founded on faith and fear of God over philosophical reasoning left to its own devices. Volume 2 turns to theories of courage from the early modern period to the present. It (...) shows how the twin laws of polis and physis are at the heart of post-medieval thought. Courage is found at the crossroads of love and dread, freedom and fate, happiness and suffering, as well as power and submission to the ruling order. The later influence of evolutionism, existentialism, and the social and natural sciences on moral philosophy is also addressed at some length. The protection of people's best interests, the passions and powers of the human will, and the rule of active energy in all aspects of life supplant courage formerly viewed through the lens of reason or faith, or a combination of the two. These new ideas, paradoxically, herald the end of the ethics of courage. They also undermine the courage of ethical thinking. Courage is no longer an end in itself, nor is it a means to happiness "at the end." Regardless of what Gandhi, Tillich, and Foucault have to say about the topic, late modernity and the global age witness a marked loss of interest in courage as an idea worthy of conceptual investigation. Debates about the moral implications of courage give way to the value-free science of resilience, which studies how people can recover from past trauma and find wellness, primarily in the realm of physis. (shrink)

This two-volume work examines far-reaching debates on the concept of courage from Greek antiquity to the Christian and mediaeval periods, as well as the modern era. Volume 1 begins with Homeric poetry and the politics of fearless demi-gods thriving on war. The tales of lion-hearted Heracles, Achilles, and Ulysses, and their tragic fall at the hands of fate, eventually give way to classical views of courage based on competing theories of rational wisdom and truth. Fears of the enemy and anxieties (...) about suffering and death are addressed through the lenses and teachings of medicine, geography, military history, moral philosophy, and metaphysics. For early Christian thinkers, the ethics of fear, fate, and fealty to the Almighty supplant the voice of reason and the wisdom of virtue. Much of Christian doctrine's history is a long journey towards bridging the gap between Greek philosophy and devotion to God and spirits in heaven. Some Church Fathers attempt to dispel the fear of suffering through a joyful craving for martyrdom and the eternal blessings that follow. Others show openness to one or more of the following principles: the abstractions of moral philosophy, the metaphysics of Gnostic enlightenment, the gift of free will and intentionality, the growth of church authority and hegemony, and the intrinsic worth of life on Earth. Augustine, Ambrose, Cassian, and Chrysostom play a central role in revisiting the foundations of Christian fortitude along some or all of these lines. They lay the groundwork for the scholastic adaptations of faith-based rationalism proposed by Peter Lombard, Philip the Chancellor, Albert the Great, and Thomas of Aquinas. The mediaeval period ends with church dissidents and Protestant Reform leaders condemning Rome’s corruption and calling for a return to early Christian faith and the courage of godly fear, submission, suffering, and fate. (shrink)

Many philosophers agree that there is an epistemic norm governing action. However, they disagree on what this norm is. It has been observed that the word ‘know’ is prominent in ordinary epistemic evaluations of actions. Any opponent of the knowledge norm must provide an explanation of this fact. Gerken has recently proposed the most developed explanation. It invokes the hypothesis that, in normal contexts, knowledge-level warrant is frequently necessary and very frequently sufficient (Normal Coincidence), so that knowledge-based assessments would be (...) a good heuristic for practical reasoning and epistemic evaluations of action. In this paper, I raise three problems for this approach. First, I argue that Normal Coincidence is ad hoc: it relies on an unsupported frequency hypothesis that we should expect to be false given the warrant account that Gerken also endorses. Second, I argue that, in any case, Normal Coincidence is insufficient to support the hypothesis that knowledge-based evaluation of action constitutes a good heuristic. Third, I consider three other hypotheses close to Normal Coincidence apparently more likely to support the heuristic hypothesis, but I argue that they seem even more ad hoc than Normal Coincidence. (shrink)

On Marx et Marxisms. In response to the questions addressed by Jacques Bidet and Bruno Tinel, Gérard Duménil, Michael Löwy and Emmanuel Renault here outline the approach they adopted in their two recently published books on Marx, and on Marxisms . The questions raised here mainly hinge on the articulation between the political, the philosophical and the economic dimension of Marx’s writings, and the way these can be mobilised within contemporary debates.

Les vers 11-21 de la Théogonie d’Hésiode soulèvent de nombreux problèmes d’interprétation. Le catalogue qu’ils proposent prend cependant un sens très cohérent si on le rapproche des deux autres catalogues du prélude de ce poème. Loin d’annoncer un contenu et de servir de sommaire, il énonce l’ordre établi par Zeus, dont le poète se propose ensuite de chanter la toute-puissance en racontant la geste qui l’a conduit à régner sur le monde.Hesiod’s Theogony . From Catalogue to Genealogy. Verses 11-21 in (...) Hesiod’s Theogony are very problematic. However their meaning appears clear if connected with the two other catalogues contained in the prelude to this poem. They are not a summary, but rather the glorification of the cosmic order established by Zeus, whose power the poet sings afterwards, telling how this god definitively conquered the kingdom to rule the world. (shrink)

The expression 'platonism in mathematics' or 'mathematical platonism' is familiar in the philosophy of mathematics at least since the use Paul Bernays made of it in his paper of 1934, 'Sur le Platonisme dans les Math?matiques'. But he was not the first to point out the similarities between the conception of the defenders of mathematical realism and the ideas of Plato. Poincar? had already stressed the 'platonistic' orientation of the mathematicians he called 'Cantorian', as opposed to those who (like himself) (...) were 'pragmatist' ones. I examine in this paper some very perplexing aspects of the use which is made at that time of a number of concepts, particularly 'idealism' (which generally designates what we would call 'mathematical realism') and 'empiricism' (which can designate almost any form of antirealism, even if, like for example intuitionism, it is not empiricist at all). There are, of course, historical reasons that may explain why it was for a time so easy and natural to use the words and the concepts in a way that may seem now very strange and to treat as if they were equivalent the two oppositions: realism/antirealism and idealism/empiricism. (shrink)

L’entre-deux nous le rencontrons, c’est l’autre. Pour nous, il fut présent dans les formations-recherches interculturelles des Offices des jeunesses : franco-allemand, germano-polonais, franco-québécois. L’autre, les ennemis ou les alliés? Ceux d’hier ou les nouveaux, alors, l’Est et l’Ouest. Leur rivalité pour l’espace nous référait à l’entre-deux du cosmos et de l’humain ; le cosmos, repère d’entre-deux. En microphysique, à chaque particule, son antiparticule. Le proton en noyau, les électrons alentour mais aussi le neutron. En cosmologie : rayonnement centrifuge des étoiles (...) ; gravitation centripète jusqu’au trou noir. Le monde du vivant n’est pas en reste. De la cellule à l’être pluricellulaire. De la scissiparité à la reproduction sexuée. Entre-deux du monde végétal et du monde animal ; de l’humain ouvert à l’infini et de l’univers plein. Mais s’ils se sentent vides, les humains tombent dans des absolus qui les opposent parfois jusqu’au meurtre de l’autre. L’antidote : vivre, penser, inventer les entre-deux de l’histoire et des civilisations. The in-between, we meet it: it is my neighbour. For me, it was present in the intercultural trainings-searches for the Services of the youths: French-German, German-Polish, French-from Quebec. The others: enemies or allies? Those of yesterday or the new, then, the East and the West. Their rivalry for space referred to us in the in-between of the cosmos and the human being; the cosmos, the mark of the in-between. In microphysics, in every particle, its antiparticle. The proton in core, electrons surrounding but also the neutron. In cosmology: brilliance of spin-dries stars; centripetal gravitation up to the black hole. Le Monde of the alive is not outdone. From the cell to the being pluricellulaire. From the fissiparity to the sexual reproduction. In-between of the vegetable world and of the animal kingdom; of the human being, open to the infinity, and of the full universe. But if they feel empty, the human beings fall in absolutes, which sometimes bring them to the murder others. The antidote: living, thinking, inventing the in-between of history and of the civilizations. (shrink)

Bourdieu’s thought is disturbing. Provocative. Scandalous even, at least for those who do not easily tolerate the unmitigated truth about the social. Nonetheless his ideas, among the most important and innovative of our time, are here to stay. This thought has taken form in the course of a career and through works on diverse subjects that have constructed a far-reaching analytical model of social life, which the author calls more readily an anthropology rather than a sociology. In their totality, they (...) constitute today an original and powerful proposal to explain human practices. In the face of criticisms commonly leveled at Bourdieu’s thought (notably the charge that it reduces everything to a single schematic model), it is important to identify the spirit of his enterprise. Early on, it is true, his thought drew on a few fundamental concepts—the trilogy habitus, field (champ), practice (pratique)—to which it constantly returned, and followed a clearly defined trajectory. At the same time, however, he continually reformulated, adapted, and refined his analytical model, depending on the operations to which he subjected new objects of inquiry. The regenerative and transformative force of his thought was supported by two convictions. First, that there being nothing more vain than theory for theory’s sake, it is preferable that theoretical production originate in the study of concrete and occasionally very specific cases. Second, that in order to escape stereotypical classifications, boundaries separating disciplines are best transgressed, thereby favoring new constructions of the object of inquiry. (shrink)

Many philosophers agree that there is an epistemic norm governing action. However, they disagree on what this norm is. It has been observed that the word ‘know’ is prominent in ordinary epistemic evaluations of actions. Any opponent of the knowledge norm must provide an explanation of this fact. Gerken has recently proposed the most developed explanation. It invokes the hypothesis that, in normal contexts, knowledge-level warrant is frequently necessary and very frequently sufficient (Normal Coincidence), so that knowledge-based assessments would be (...) a good heuristic for practical reasoning and epistemic evaluations of action. In this paper, I raise three problems for this approach. First, I argue that Normal Coincidence is ad hoc: it relies on an unsupported frequency hypothesis that we should expect to be false given the warrant account that Gerken also endorses. Second, I argue that, in any case, Normal Coincidence is insufficient to support the hypothesis that knowledge-based evaluation of action constitutes a good heuristic. Third, I consider three other hypotheses close to Normal Coincidence apparently more likely to support the heuristic hypothesis, but I argue that they seem even more ad hoc than Normal Coincidence. (shrink)

The text is divided into two parts. In the first part, the author describes the eternalists’ and presentists’ positions as the two basic possible statements of the ontology of time . The eternalist position and the emphasis it puts on the actual existence of past and future events are thoroughlly analysed in order to show that in fact, they end up making strings of symbols that are not correct statements. It is therefore necessary to step beyond these clumsy statements and (...) try to understand more exactly the eternalist intuitions on a deeper, metaphysical level. That is the main concern of the second part of the text, in which the metaphysical implications of both positions are compared. At the end of the linguistical analysis in the first part, we got to a point where it may seem that presentism and eternalism are only different attempts at expressing what is in fact the same understanding of the nature of time, but in the metaphysical analysis that follows, it will turn out that they are not. Presentism and eternalism are shown to be two different ontological approaches of time in relation to space . The author then focuses on the consequences these two positions have especially on the concept of the present and of its flow through time. In the end, presentism and eternalism turn out to be completely different positions that – in parallel with the famous McTaggart’s argument – claim a very strong reality of time on the one hand or, on the other hand, its utter unreality. (shrink)

“All men naturally desire to know” : this is the celebrated assertion with which Aristotle begins the first book of his Metaphysics. According to him, human beings’ desire to know is as natural to them as their desires for food, rest, or amusement. These latter “natural” urges are responses to certain deficiencies—hunger, tiredness, and boredom; similarly, the desire to know is a response to a deficiency of knowledge. As Thomas Aquinas puts it, the urge to know (libido sciendi) is as (...) much a characteristic of human beings as the urge to feel or to dominate (libido sentiendi and libido dominandi), and all three, essential though they may be to human nature, must be kept under control. My purpose here is to examine the limits of the desire to know: in what way may our desire to know go beyond the bounds of the “knowable”? (shrink)

The time of the landscape is not the time when people started describing landscapes in poems or representing gardens in works of art: it is the time when the landscape imposed itself as a specific object of thought. This object of thought was constituted through quarrels about how gardens were to be arranged, through accounts of travels to solitary lakes and remote mountains, or through evocations of mythological or rustic paintings. Jacques Rancière retraces these narratives and quarrels, showing how (...) they gave rise to a form of sensibility capable of modifying the existing configuration of modes of perception and objects of thought. The time of the landscape is the time when both the harmony of arranged gardens and the disharmony of wild nature contributed to a revolution in the criteria of the beautiful and the meaning of the word ‘art’. It coincided with the birth of aesthetics, understood as a regime for the perception of and thinking about art, and also with the French Revolution, understood as a revolution in the very idea of what binds a human community. The time of the landscape was the time when the conjunction of these two upheavals brought into focus, however hazily, a common horizon: that of a revolution that no longer concerns only state laws or artistic norms, but the very forms of sensible experience. This brilliant and wide-ranging book will be of interest to students and scholars in philosophy, literature, the visual arts and the humanities generally, and it will appeal to anyone interested in critical theory and philosophy. (shrink)

From Almanac of Fall to The Turin Horse, renowned Hungarian filmmaker Béla Tarr has followed the collapse of the communist promise. The “time after” is the time when we are less interested in histories and their successes or failures than we are in the delicate fabric of time from which they are carved.

Far more telling than mere biography, this collection of the extant letters exchanged between philosopher Jacques Maritain and social activist Saul Alinsky reveals a deep and intimate friendship, however unexpected and unlikely. Indeed, to all who knew or knew of them the dignified, prominent philosopher and the earthy, truculent genius of social reform seemed antithetical to one another in almost every way. The Maritain-Alinsky correspondence began in 1945, shortly after they met, and continued until Alinsky's death in 1972. The (...) tone and content of the letters vary widely, ranging from expressions of mutual admiration and friendship, to details of the triumphs and tragedies of their personal lives, to anguished considerations of death and immortality. In their letters Maritain and Alinsky offer each other personal expressions of strong mutual support - as well as judicious warnings and slightly apprehensive distancing - for the different works each had undertaken at various times in his respective careers. They also discuss the Catholic church, taking ironic jibes at clerical pomposity and exchanging praise of the socially aware. Though it is difficult to tell whether either man had a significant influence on the thought and work of the other, their correspondence attests that the philosopher and the provocateur, so different in personality, educational backgrounds, demeanor, and intellectual affinities, enjoyed a surprisingly intimate and extraordinary friendship. With context and interpretation of the letters provided by the editor, this intriguing collection of lively, moving letters not only reveals the depths of a most improbable friendship, it also goes far in exposing thehumanity behind the personas. (shrink)

Résumé En liant le mal et l’incompréhension, l’identité du sujet et l’éthique, nous voulons montrer les limites de l’autonomie pure. L’humain baigne dans des influences extérieures de sorte qu’il est toujours pris dans un dialogue soit transcendant, soit immanent ou encore extérieur. L’humain est l’être qui est témoin de ces forces. Il est un être attentif, un être ouvert à l’altérité, un être à l’écoute de ce qui le porte : la créativité.By linking evil and misunderstanding, the identity of the (...) subject and ethics, we intend to bring out the limits of pure autonomy. Human beings are affected by external influences on all sides, so much so that they are invariably involved in dialogues which are either transcendent, internal or external. Humans are aware of those forces. They are awake, open to otherness, all attentive to what carries them through : creativity. (shrink)

With this new volume of the _Collected Works of Jacques Maritain_, the University of Notre Dame Press is publishing the first English edition of a remarkable group of essays which Maritain prepared for publication in the year before his death. He brings together various writings which had previously not appeared in print or had circulated privately. The heart of the book is to be found in two series of articles. The first consists of ten philosophical essays. There are essays (...) which deal with truth, with philosophy at the time of Vatican II, and with the divine aseity; two on philosophy of nature dealing with evolution and with animal instinct; and three in moral philosophy. A second series is made up of mainly theological articles. Four are contributions to what Maritain calls an existential epistemology. They are followed by a moving meditation on the Mass and the Church triumphant. When he lay dying at Fossanova, Thomas Aquinas, in deference to the wishess of the Cistercians, with whom he had found refuge, wrote a commentary on the Song of Songs. How better could a lifelong Thomist round off his lifetime of writing than with his own essay on the Song of Songs? This is what Maritian does in the serenely profound meditation that closes the volume. (shrink)

This comunication is based on a preliminary work which emphasized a topological model of biomembranes from Thom's Catastrophe Theory. In this model called swallowtail bifurcation set, the structural state of a biomembrane was within the control of two structural attractors. Then, the physiological act of this biomembrane resulted in a sudden transfer of weight from the hydrophilic attractor to the hydrophobic attractor.In this consecutive work, the physiological act appears to be one of the four stages which permit to describe the (...) larger notion of cyclic membrane function. Two of these stages unfold in the structural axis of the swallowtail model. They prepare the two others (physiological act and refractory stages) which expand in the functional direction. (shrink)