Just War Theory debates discussing the principle of the Moral Equality of Combatants involve the notion of Invincible Ignorance; the claim that warfi ghters are morally excused for participating in an unjust war because of their epistemic limitations. Conditions of military deployment may indeed lead to genuinely insurmountable epistemic limitations. In other cases, these may be overcome. This paper provides a preliminary sketch of heuristics designed to allow a combatant to judge whether or not his war is just. It delineates (...) the sets of relevant facts uncontroversially accessible and inaccessible to contemporary professional soldiers. Relevant facts outside these two sets should by default be treated as inaccessible until proven otherwise. Even such a rudimentary heuristic created in this way demonstrates that practical recommendations of MEC-renouncing Just War Theory are not too challenging to follow and still signifi cantly impact a compliant combatant’s behavior. (shrink)

In order to clarify whether Rawls is more or less cosmopolitan than Kant, we carry out a comparative analysis between his general proposals for the organization of international relations. Likewise, seeking to clarify the distance between cosmopolitanism, pacifism and ius internationalism, the ius ad bellum proposals of both authors are particularly analyzed in the war-and-peace debate context. On the one hand, as a result of the first analysis, different commonly unnoticed logical coincidences between the postulates of Kant and Rawls (...) are highlighted. On the other hand, after the conclusions of the second analysis and taking as a criterion the causes that both authors admit as just for war, a proposal of an ideal type of cosmopolitan ius ad bellum is also provided. (shrink)

Following an introduction to international law regarding the use of force, the author examines the impact of post-9/11 practice, focusing on the right of self-defence. After critically reviewing operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. National Security Strategy, the ‘Yemen strike’ and the war in Iraq, including the justifications offered for these actions and the international responses to them, as well as developments in NATO and the EU, he concludes that there is a tendency towards a broader interpretation of the right of (...) self-defence, in that this right may be extended to attacks by non-state actors and such attacks may be more easily attributed to states that support such actors. However, the author submits that this interpretation has not yet been sufficiently affirmed to have changed the law, that the rules of the UN Charter still accurately reflect the law and that there is insufficient support for a right of anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defence. Finally, he recommends strengthening the effectiveness of the Security Council and regional organizations such as the EU and NATO to avoid the risk of a true deregulation of the use of force. (shrink)

Background: The risk of surgery in eloquent areas is related to neuropsychological dysfunctions. Maximizing the extent of resection increases the overall survival. The onco-functional balance is mandatory when surgery involves cognitive areas, and maximal information on the cognitive status of patients during awake surgery is needed. This can be achieved using direct cortical stimulation mapping and, in addition to this, a neuropsychological monitoring technique called real-time neuropsychological testing. The RTNT includes testing protocols based on the area where the surgery is (...) performed. We reported on tests used for left temporal lobe surgery and our RTNT decision tree.Case Report: We reported our RTNT experience with a 25-year-old right-handed man with 13 years of schooling. He reported daily partial seizures. MRI revealed the presence of a low-grade glioma involving the temporo-insular cortex. The neuropsychological status presurgery which was within the normal range was combined with functional magnetic resonance imaging and diffusion tensor imaging information. Awake surgery plus RTNT was performed. Direct electrical stimulation during object naming elicited a motor speech arrest. Resection was continuously accompanied by the RTNT. The RTNT provided enriched information to the surgeon. Performance never dropped. A slight decrement in accuracy emerged for pseudoword repetition, short-term memory and working memory, phonological processing, and verbal comprehension. Total resection was performed, and the histological examination confirmed the nature of the lesion. Immediate postsurgery performance was within the normal range as it was the fMRI and DTI assessment.Conclusion: The RTNT provides essential information that can be used online, during surgery, for clinical aims to provide the surgeon with useful feedback on the cognitive status of patients. (shrink)

The idea of “just war” is not alien to Chinese thought. The term “yi zhan” (usually translated as “just war” or “righteous war” in English) is used in Mencius, was renewed by Mao Zedong, and is still being used in China today (zhengyi zhanzheng). The best place to start exploring this Chinese idea is in the enormous Art of War corpus in premodern China, of which the Seven Military Classics is the best representative. This set of treatises served as the (...) military bible in imperial China from 1078 CE. Ideas analogous to ius ad bellum and ius in bello can be found in these texts. These norms are present in these military texts, elaborated in subsequent commentaries, understood as a matter of fact in Chinese political history, and recently and briefly acknowledged by a few Chinese military scholars in the mainland and in Taiwan. This Chinese just war ethics has its distinctiveness vis-à-vis James Turner Johnson's articulation of the Western classic view. It differs from Johnson's claims that military lethal violence is intrinsically morally neutral and that last resort is not a primary consideration in deciding for war. Contemporary Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) military publications show that the PLA understands the general idea of just war, but they acknowledge only the ad bellum part, not the in bello components. (shrink)

This article examines the moral issues of guerrilla, and counter-guerrilla, warfare. Just war theorists who have studied the phenomenon tend to claim that the guerrilla tactic of wearing civilian clothes and hiding among the civilian population is rather difficult, if at all, to reconcile with the ius in bello principle of discrimination (the principle according to which combatants have to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants and may only target the former “directly”). I argue that this ever-repeated assessment is profoundly confused. (...) I also argue, conversely, against the claim that this guerrilla tactic makes it somehow easier for the counter-insurgents to comply with the principle of discrimination, thereby easily allowing them to resort to tactics like area bombardment. Finally, I demonstrate that, contrary to common opinion, guerrilla war does not face greater difficulties in complying with ius ad bellum requirements than conventional or counter-insurgency war does. (shrink)

Ese artículo presenta una síntesis de las teorías normativas de la guerra justa, mostrando los consensos teóricos existentes en las tres categorías de la ius ad bellum (la justicia de la guerra), ius in bello (la justicia en la guerra) y ius postbelum (justicia de la postguerra). Posteriormente, se desarrollan estos conceptos para el caso de una guerra real.

Ese artículo presenta una síntesis de las teorías normativas de la guerra justa, mostrando los consensos teóricos existentes en las tres categorías de la ius ad bellum (la justicia de la guerra), ius in bello (la justicia en la guerra) y ius postbelum (justicia de la postguerra). Posteriormente, se desarrollan estos conceptos para el caso de una guerra real.

The paper examines the justification of warfare. The main thesis is that war is very difficult to justify, and justification by invoking “justice” is not the way to succeed it. Justification and justness are very different venues: while the first attempts to explain the nature of war and offer possible schemes of resolution, the second aims to endorse a specific type of warfare as correct and hence allowed – which is the crucial part of “just war theory.” However, “just war (...) theory,” somewhat Manichean in its nature, has very deep flaws. Its final result is criminalization of war, which reduces warfare to police action, and finally implies a very strange proviso that one side has a right to win. All that endangers the distinction between ius ad bellum and ius in bello, and destroys the collective character of warfare. Justification of war is actually quite different – it starts from the definition of war as a kind of conflict which cannot be solved peacefully, but for which there is mutual understanding that it cannot remain unresolved. The aim of war is not justice, but peace, i.e. either a new articulation of peace, or a restoration of the status quo ante. Additionally, unlike police actions, the result of war cannot be known or assumed in advance, giving war its main feature: the lack of control over the future. Control over the future, predictability, is a feature of peace. This might imply that war is a consequence of failed peace, or inability to maintain peace. The explanation of this inability forms the justification of war. Justice is always an important part of it, but justification cannot be reduced to it. The logic contained here refers to ius ad bellum, while ius in bello is relative to various parameters of sensitivity prevalent in a particular time, with the purpose to make warfare more humane and less expensive. (shrink)

This paper discusses the novel versions of the right intention and proportionality conditions in the ius ad bellum proposed in Chapter 3 of Frances Kamm’s Ethics for Enemies. It argues that Kamm is right to weaken the right intention condition to require, not positively intending a war’s just cause, but only having that cause’s presence be a necessary condition for war, but wrong to place no limits on why one makes a just cause necessary. It then argues that the (...) weakening she proposes of Jeff McMahan’s very strict interpretation of proportionality does not go far enough. She argues that “conditional just aims” such as disarming an aggressor and deterring future aggression can count toward a war’s proportionality only if they will follow from harms needed to achieve the war’s initial just cause but not if they require additional harms. The paper argues that such aims can justify additional harms. (shrink)

Avatar is laden with images and themes of religion and spirituality. Theology also forms the base of “just war theory.” The principles of just war theory were adapted by early Christian thinkers from the natural law theory developed by the Stoics – a group of ancient philosophers who believed that we could look to nature for guidance about what is right and good for human beings. The early Christians turned to just war theory to help resolve a quandary. Just war (...) theory includes two related philosophical doctrines. ius ad bellumis about when it's just to go to war, and ius in bello is about what it's just or unjust to do in the conduct of a war. Ius ad bellum shows us why Selfridge's authorization of force to displace the Omaticaya is wrong, while ius in bello exposes Quaritch's battlefield strategies and tactics as inhumane and indefensible. (shrink)

The paper examines the justification of warfare. The main thesis is that war is very difficult to justify, and justification by invoking “justice” is not the way to succeed it. Justification and justness (“justice”) are very different venues: while the first attempts to explain the nature of war and offer possible schemes of resolution (through adequate definitions), the second aims to endorse a specific type of warfare as correct and hence allowed – which is the crucial part of “just war (...) theory.” However, “just war theory,” somewhat Manichean in its nature, has very deep flaws. Its final result is criminalization of war, which reduces warfare to police action, and finally implies a very strange proviso that one side has a right to win. All that endangers the distinction between ius ad bellum and ius in bello, and destroys the collective character of warfare (reducing it to an incomprehensible individual level, as if a group of people entered a battle in hopes of finding another group of people willing to respond). Justification of war is actually quite different – it starts from the definition of war as a kind of conflict which cannot be solved peacefully, but for which there is mutual understanding that it cannot remain unresolved. The aim of war is not justice, but peace, i.e. either a new articulation of peace, or a restoration of the status quo ante. Additionally, unlike police actions, the result of war cannot be known or assumed in advance, giving war its main feature: the lack of control over the future. Control over the future, predictability (obtained through laws), is a feature of peace. This might imply that war is a consequence of failed peace, or inability to maintain peace. The explanation of this inability (which could simply be incompetence, or because peace, as a specific articulation of distribution of social power, is not tenable anymore) forms the justification of war. Justice is always an important part of it, but justification cannot be reduced to it. The logic contained here refers to ius ad bellum, while ius in bello is relative to various parameters of sensitivity prevalent in a particular time (and expressed in customary and legal rules of warfare), with the purpose to make warfare more humane and less expensive. (shrink)

The article considers the modern meaning of Kant’s doctrine of war. The author examines the context and content of the key provisions of Kant’s concept of perpetual peace. The author also reviews the ideological affinity between Kant and previous authors who proposed to build alliances of states as a means of preventing wars. It is noted that the French revolution and the wars caused by it, the peace treaty between France and Prussia served as the historical background for the conceptualization (...) of Kant’s project. In the second half of the 20th century, there is a growing attention to Kant’s ethical and political philosophy. Theorists of a wide variety of political and ethical schools, pay attention to Kant’s legacy and relate their own concepts to it. Kant’s idea of war is reconsidered by Michael Doyle, Jürgen Habermas, Ulrich Beck, Mary Kaldor, Brian Orend. Thus, Doyle tracks democratic peace theory back to Kant’s idea of the spread of republicanism. According to democratic peace theory, liberal democracies do not solve conflict among themselves by non-military methods. Habermas, Beck, Kaldor appreciate Kant as a key proponent of cosmopolitanism. For them, Kant’s project is important due to notion of supranational forms of cooperation. They share an understanding that peace will be promoted by an allied authority, which will be “governing without government” and will take responsibility for the functioning of the principles of pacification of international relations. Orend’s proves that Kant should be considered as a proponent of the just war theory. In addition, Orend develops a new area in just war theory – the concept of ius post bellum – and justifies regime change as the goal of just war. (shrink)

The purpose of the present study is the understanding of Gentili's position on the law of the sea as expressed in his classic De iure belli . The key constitutive elements turn out to be: 1) the idea of the sea as 'res communis' to all mankind, which amounts to the concept of 'freedom of the sea'; 2) 'jurisdiction' of the coastal state on the adjacent sea, even on the high seas, in order to police crime and prevent/punish piracy. As (...) such these two key elements, if taken in isolation, are rooted in the civil law tradition, but their true meaning can only be captured by placing them in the intellectual framework of which they constitute an integral part. Firstly, the epistemic structure of discourse hinges on the new science of natural jurisprudence, as applied to the subject of 'ius gentium bellicum'; secondly, the constituent theoretical languages emanate from a distinctive combination of civil law, scholastic-theological and humanist traditions. This procedure enables us to highlight the strikingly original and distinctly modern traits of Gentili's perspective on the law of the sea, which emerges as a corollary of his project of international/global order. A project that is based on the crucial notion of 'respublica magna' of mankind, a notion encompassing the two notions of 'freedom' and 'jurisdiction' that constitute and define the legal regime of the sea.The Stoic humanist notion of universal human society as 'corpus unum' implies, first of all, 'freedom of intercourse', or 'ius communicationis', to start from 'free passage' and 'freedom of commerce'. It is in the context of his argument about these basic freedoms that Gentili is finally led to discuss the subject of the 'law of the sea'. But, not only the concept of 'res communis', or 'freedom of use', but also the concept of 'jurisdiction', or 'protection', are strictly related to the same foundational concept of 'respublica magna'. This is a crucial characteristic of Gentili's approach to world order that is proved by reference to two cardinal points of his new 'cosmopolitan justice': 1) the 'international right to punish', as exemplified by the legitimacy of the wars of 'humanitarian intervention' and of the wars in support of the 'common law of mankind'; 2) the 'occupation of vacant land', which again underlines the relevance of the principle of 'jurisdiction' by striking a balance between the principle of 'free use' of nature and the 'jurisdiction' of the local ruler.Such a reconstruction definitely rejects the traditional image of Gentili as a supporter of 'maritime protectionism', on the ground of his Advocatio Hispanica published posthumously in 1613 and containing his pleadings as Spanish advocate before the Court of Admiralty. The guiding assumption here is that the book is strictly of a forensic character and as such devoid of any coherent theoretical substance. To the contrary, in his De iure belli, far from anticipating the English position in favour of 'mare clausum', Gentili tends to anticipate the essentials of Grotius' position, especially at the level of the ethic of the 'modern cosmopolis' and the related theme of colonial empire. On this very plane of discourse, Gentili's thinking transcends the so-called battle of the books and emerges as especially significant in illuminating the wider and deeper intellectual currents that contributed to the development of what were to become basic standard positions of modern international theory. (shrink)

Jeff McMahan, one of the leading contemporary writers on ‘just war thinking’, argues in the book under review, Killing in War, that one of the central tenets of the ‘ius in bello’, namely the moral equality of combatants, is both conceptually and morally untenable. This results from a reflection upon and a departure from two basic assumptions in Walzer’s work, namely the idea that war itself isn’t a relation between persons, but between political entities and their human instruments and the (...) idea that the ‘ius ad bellum’ and ‘ius in bello’ are and should be kept distinct. This book merits serious reflection. However, the disadvantages of McMahan’s position are obvious. If the rights of combatants during war depend on the justice of their cause, the immunity of the civilians on the side of the supposed ‘unjust’ enemy is seriously endangered. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Prophecy without Contempt: Religious Discourse in the Public Square by Cathleen KavenyKyle LambeletProphecy without Contempt: Religious Discourse in the Public Square Cathleen Kaveny CAMBRIDGE, MA: HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2016. 464 PP. $49.95"The American public square is not a seminar room" (419). This being the case, Cathleen Kaveny's Prophecy without Contempt challenges ethicists, among others, to reconsider the rhetoric of moral address. Rather than a narrow focus on deliberation, (...) Kaveny commends attention to the genre of indictment, and particularly the American jeremiad, as a significant mode of moral address that deserves normative analysis. Kaveny is no partisan of prophecy. But she offers moral and rhetorical criteria of prophetic speech that allow the genre to do its indispensable work.Kaveny's book proceeds in four parts. In the first part she sets the stage for her argument by surveying three prominent accounts of the status of public moral discourse, critiquing each yet drafting them all into a more global [End Page 195] critique of the failure to take into account the central significance of the rhetoric of prophetic indictment. Correcting this neglect in the second part, Kaveny executes a historical retrieval of the American jeremiad, beginning with early Puritan preachers of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. The point of her at times plodding historical reconstruction is that the jeremiad was not originally socially divisive but rather served to build up the community by calling listeners back to a commonly agreed-on covenant. This uniting function of the jeremiad fails in later generations. Some readers will worry that Kaveny's retrieval risks nostalgia insofar as it conforms to a MacIntyrian declension narrative in which golden origins were irreplaceably fractured.This risk, however, is mitigated by the third and fourth parts of the book, in which Kaveny turns to constructive ethics. She argues that the forensic rhetoric of prophetic indictment should be understood as a chemotherapy. It should not be confused with deliberation, the normal form of moral address. Yet, like chemotherapy, used in the right amount it can restore an ailing patient to health. As we have come to expect, Kaveny is especially adept at taking the moral frameworks developed in one sphere and applying them to another. Trading medical analogies for military, Kaveny argues that best practices of ius bellum verborum can be developed from just war criteria. She adds to these rhetorical constraints that prophetic critique be offered against one's own people with whom one identifies through lamentation and hope. Kaveny concludes with advocacy of prophetic humility and irony as necessary elements of prophetic speech in our pluralistic contemporary context.Although written in accessible prose, Kaveny's book deserves rigorous scholarly engagement. She constructs her argument with the gracious interdisciplinarity of a leading scholar of law and theology at the height of her powers. She is methodologically promiscuous but never shallow, drawing on scholarly fields of moral philosophy, biblical studies, American religious history, in-depth case analysis of contemporary arguments about abortion and torture, and historical paradigms of prophetic virtue (and vice). While scholars in each of these fields will find claims worth engaging in Kaveny's text, ethicists will be particularly interested in her argument for a constrained, continuing need for prophetic indictment.My one critique is that her account of prophetic rhetoric is too conservative. Based on her historical retrieval, Kaveny argues that indictment should serve only to call listeners back to an already agreed-on covenant. It is undoubtedly the case, however, that Kaveny's exemplars of indictment such as Jonah, Lincoln, and King innovated and developed the covenant, even as they invoked it. This complaint aside, Kaveny's book is a major contribution to contemporary conceptualizations of the public square, and stands poised to open new directions for moral analysis of religious actors in pluralistic publics. [End Page 196]Kyle LambeletNotre Dame UniversityCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

It is still underestimated to what extent in his main works Hugo Grotius not only sketched and developed a system of private, state and international law; but also outlined a general philosophy or theory of law. By asking questions concerning the law of property, the law of prize and booty, the law of peace and war or the legal status of sovereignty he did not only refer to the 'right side', i.e. to actions that can be labelled as rightful and (...) legal. He also dealt with many aspects of what is not right and unlawful, not limiting himself to just give mere examples of crossing the border to the 'non right side'. It was a part of Grotius's methodological approach to systematically reflect on the law from the perspective of its violations. One example of such a violation is the act of piracy and the figure of the pirate. To outline this is the aim of the following article. By showing that the pirate and his 'legal twin', the privateer, were belong together as two sides of the same coin, they come to symbolise in an exemplary way the differentiation between 'right' and 'non right' as the unity of law in the legal philosophy of Grotius. (shrink)

Wars have been entered into as a means of gaining property, taking slaves and dominating and controlling peoples. The pacifist claims that no form of war can ever be justified. By contrast, just war theory holds that it is possible for a war to be morally justified, an idea that underlies much international law, as can be seen in the Geneva Conventions. Teichman introduces us to such thinkers as Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, Aquinas, Hugo Grotius, John Rawls and Elizabeth Anscombe on (...) the very idea of a just war. (shrink)

In his Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-geleerdheid, Hugo Grotius wrote an accessible introductory overview of Hollandic law, in which he combined insights from the learned law (ius commune) with the particular law of Holland. The Inleidinge was read by generations of Dutch law students, and would thus become very influential in the Roman-Dutch tradition. This contribution studies how the topic of representation, especially in a business context, was treated in Grotius’s Inleidinge. On the basis of an analysis of the Justinianic (...) Corpus iuris, the medieval ius commune tradition and – especially – early modern scholarship from the Low Countries, it is argued that Grotius’s Inleidinge by and large followed the communis opinio among the learned scholars, although on one important point – namely the acquisition by a third party of a claim on the basis of a stipulatio alteri – Grotius went beyond that communis opinio and, thus, opened the way for a gradual wider legal acceptance of active direct representation. (shrink)

The subject of this article is the Orthodox Christianity’s approach to war. Christians of other denomination have developed an elaborate theory of war, so-called “Just War Theory” (JWT), which has also been accepted by non-Christians and even secular thinkers regarding the nature and justification of war. A vast literature has been produced in a dire attempt to render perfect the world by insisting on the claim that war is the act of punishment for breaking the law. The result is an (...) epistemological ease from which everything seems evident in advance including who is right and who at fault, who is and who is not favored by God. By removing from war an essential feature – that it is a form of conflict – JWT takes away the concept of reciprocity and introduces an in advance declared inequality which enables removal of uncertainty about the war’s outcome. In Orthodox Christianity, the situation is different. With still live debate whether to persevere or abandon original Christian pacifism, for Orthodox Christianity, war is always a combination of cataclysm and temptation and far less Manichean than anything present in JWT. The aim of war is peace; but, however necessary, justice is an insufficient condition for justification. The difference between “justness” and “justification” is preserved through the uncertainty whom God, at war’s end, loves more, because both victors and vanquished remain and continue to be in His grace. Losing a war, as such, does not turn the vanquished into criminals, nor does victory give the vanquisher the right of revenge for defending oneself. The latter approach to war has significant potentialities: preserving the distinction of ius ad bellum and ius in bello, preserving reciprocity, mutual respect and trust, impossibility of incrimination of war per se, the possibility of honorable defeat, etc. (shrink)

In the 17th and 18th centuries, the doctrine of just war was one of the most popular theories in international law. According to this doctrine, the right to war is an integral part of natural law and, under specific circumstances, morally justified. To my mind, Kant was a fervent critic of the theory of just war. He critically reformulates the rational and normative principles of right in a way that leaves no place for war as a legitimate procedure to resolve (...) a conflict between states. In section, I shall analyze the fundamental principles of ius gentium, in particular, the duty to leave the state of nature at the international level and the juridical form that the association between states must adopt. The exit of the state of nature between nations must generate an international legal framework that not only protects human rights but also safeguards the sovereignty of the peoples. In section, I shall examine Kant’s critique of the doctrine of just war in Zum ewigen Frieden and in the Rechtslehre, exploring why the idea of an ius ad bellum is incompatible with the critical reformulation of the right of nations proposed there. (shrink)

Zu den bedeutendsten Leistungen der Friedensschrift Kants für die Entwicklung der Völkerrechtsidee gehört die Zurückweisung der bisherigen Leitvorstellung eines ius ad bellum. Unmißverständlich formuliert er: „Bei dem Begriffe des Völkerrechts, als eines Rechts zum Kriege, läßt sich eigentlich gar nichts denken“ . Eine internationale Rechtsordnung müsse dem Ziele dauerhafter Friedenssicherung dienen, und in einem Bund freier Völker soll dieser zwischenstaatliche Konsens institutionalisiert werden.

A comparison between the Prolegomena of Chapter II of De iure praedae and the Prolegomena of De iure belli ac pacis leads to the conclusion that the ideas of Grotius on legal systematization have changed considerably between 1604 and 1625. Whereas Grotius starts in IPC with general principles with a rather unclear distinction between leges and regulae, in IBP he gives first the philosophical and theological basis of international law, intertwined by a concise set of general legal rules, mostly derived (...) from Roman law after its reception in Western Europe. The general outlines of legal systematization in the early-modern period are expounded. In the attempts of legal systematization the concept of subjective rights is essential. These subjective rights are not, as is sometimes assumed, a medieval renewal of legal technique, but can be found essentially already in classical Roman law of the first centuries AD.The institutional system is not yet visible in De iure praedae, it might be different for De iure belli ac pacis. Significant here are possibly the expressions ius ad bellum and ius in bello. (shrink)

Since its early origins, just war discourse has had two contrasting functions: it has sought to speak law and morals to power, and thus to restrain the use of force, but it has also served to authorize and legitimize the use of force. Critical voices have recently alerted to the increasing use of authorization and legitimization in a broader context of hegemonic and unilateral appropriations of just war discourse. In this article, I show that such critiques of just war have (...) a long history, and reconstruct the powerful challenge that two of the foremost international jurists of the Enlightenment—Christian Wolff and Emer de Vattel—mounted against early modern accounts of just war. Their neglected theory of “regular war” helps us to recover a sense of what a truly pluralist and anti-hegemonic doctrine of ius ad bellum may look like, and reveals a deep tension in the just war tradition between the criteria of political authority and just cause. (shrink)

Agresja putinowskiej Rosji na Ukrainę postawiła wobec dramatycznego wyzwania nobliwą doktrynę non‑violence. Zgodnie ze sformułowanym w latach 80. XX wieku wywodem antysowieckiego dysydenta rosyjskiego Władimira Bukowskiego to nie wojna jest przeciwieństwem pokoju, lecz przemoc, a do jej powstrzymania niekiedy konieczny jest zbrojny opór, czyli prowadzenie wojny. Według Clausewitza do wywołania stanu wojny nie wystarczy militarna agresja, lecz konieczne jest przeciwstawienie się jej, czyli aktywna obrona ze strony napadniętego, chcąc zatem uniknąć wojny, nie należy stawiać oporu agresorowi. Agresja na Ukrainę złamała (...) dwie zasady prowadzenia wojen: ius ad bellum i ius in bello. Według typologii Michaela Walzera jest to zatem niesprawiedliwa wojna prowadzona niesprawiedliwymi metodami, więc przeciwstawianie się jej, także militarne, jest prowadzeniem wojny sprawiedliwej. Zgodnie z analizą Slavoja Žižka tworzy to klarowną z etycznego punktu widzenia sytuację, zło jest łatwo identyfikowalne, a przeciwstawienie się mu stanowi etyczny obowiązek. Według filozofa Étienne’a Balibara w tej sytuacji pacyfizm nie jest żadną opcją. Helplessness as Acquiescence to Evil The aggression of Putin’s Russia towards Ukraine has posed a dramatic challenge to the noble doctrine of non-violence. In line with an argument made in the 1980s by anti-Soviet Russian dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, war is not the opposite of peace; instead, violence is. Armed resistance, or warfare, is sometimes necessary to stop violence. According to Clausewitz, military aggression is insufficient to evoke a state of war; in its place, it is necessary to oppose aggression, i.e., actively mount a defense by the attacked party, thereby avoiding war requires not resisting the aggressor. However, the aggression against Ukraine broke two tenets of warfare: ius ad bellum and ius in bello. According to Michael Walzer’s typology, it is an unjust war waged by unjust methods, so resisting it, including militarily, amounts to waging a just war. According to Slavoj Žižek’s analysis, this establishes an ethically clear situation: evil is easily identifiable, and opposing it is an ethical duty. According to the philosopher Étienne Balibar, pacifism is not an option in such a situation. (shrink)

In this contribution, I defend the standard list of jus ad bellum principles. In The Ethics of War and the Force of Law: A Modern Just War Theory, Uwe Steinhoff endorses only three principles of jus ad bellum (right intention, just cause, and proportionality) and claims that the others are redundant. I argue that, although fundamentally all jus ad bellum principles can be reduced to proportionality, in practice it is vital to retain the main jus ad (...) class='Hi'>bellum criteria as separate principles. (shrink)

Dieser Essay möchte Kants Recht nach dem Krieg kritisch analysieren und untersuchen, welchen Beitrag es für die gegenwärtige Debatte um das ius post bellum leisten kann. Es wird dabei davon ausgegangen, dass Kants Konzeption des Naturzustands den Schlüssel zum Verständnis von Kants Kriegsrecht insgesamt darstellt. Zunächst wird die Struktur des ius post bellum durch seine systematische Stellung in Kants Völkerrecht rekonstruiert. Die einzelnen Bestimmungen des Rechts nach dem Krieg werden in zwei Gruppen geteilt und für sich erläutert. Dabei (...) wird gelegentlich auf Begrenzungen von Kants Perspektive hingewiesen. Die identifizierten Grundsätze von Kants Kriegsrecht werden schließlich dazu verwendet, weitere, nicht im Recht nach dem Krieg genannte Bestimmungen zu diskutieren, die die Nachkonfliktphase betreffen.This essay tries to critically analyze Kant’s right after war. It examines the contribution of Kant’s right after war to the contemporary debate about jus post bellum. It starts with the assumption that the key to the understanding of Kant’s law of war is his conception of the state of nature. The structure of the right after war will be reconstructed by analyzing the place of the right within Kant’s law of peoples. The features of the right after war will be divided into two groups and examined. Certain limitations of Kant’s perspective will be identified. The underlying principles of Kant’s law of war will be used to discuss other, not in the right after war included features, which are related to the post bellum phase. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Handbook of Roman Catholic Moral Terms by James T. Bretzke, SJJohn J. FitzgeraldHandbook of Roman Catholic Moral Terms James T. Bretzke, SJ washington, dc: georgetown university press, 2013. 260 pp. $24.95The Handbook of Roman Catholic Moral Terms continues the recent sequence of concise dictionaries published by Georgetown University Press, including the Key Words volumes for various religions and A Handbook of Bioethics Terms. James Bretzke’s contribution is especially (...) welcome as it is the first such English-language reference work in Catholic moral theology since the Second Vatican Council. The author covers fundamental, social, medical, and sexual issues while providing frequent cross-references and further readings. Special attention is also given to scripture and ethics, the history of moral theology, the nature and authority of the Magisterium, canon law, Protestant thought, and moral philosophy. The longest entries are those on dissent (67–70), Humanae vitae (111–16), infallibility (122–24), and the Pontifical Commission on Births (180–82), which in advance of Humanae vitae produced the well-known Majority Report favorable to the use of contraception. The sections on these vexed issues delve into some of the relevant arguments from different sides.Given its space constraints as a portable paperback, the Handbook covers an impressive amount of historical and contemporary ground. The eight-hundred-plus entries are generally clear and irenic, and often illuminating. Consider the page-long entry on just war theory (131–32), which succinctly summarizes its development from Augustine to the present-day Catechism, calls attention to the importance of ius post bellum alongside the traditional categories of ius ad bellum and ius in bello, and outlines four possible critiques of the theory. Particularly helpful throughout are the various examples the author provides. For instance, in the course of explaining that moral norms and human laws may not bind at all times, he suggests that it is justifiable to forgo the duty to sustain life when this can only be done through extraordinary means (140), or to exceed the speed limit in case of a medical emergency (15, 81; see also 183 and 239–40 for other relevant examples).On the other hand, a few key topics are either overlooked or not fully dealt with. This book rightly highlights ecumenical ethics (77–78 and passim), but there is essentially no coverage of Eastern Orthodoxy and very little on pre-twentieth-century Protestant thought. In addition, considering the prevalence of a “morality-of-happiness” perspective in historical and modern-day Catholic thought, and given Bretzke’s own thorough attention to law, the book might have incorporated separate entries on happiness and grace, law’s complement. [End Page 221] (To his credit, he does mention grace several times—a fact that the preface points out—and includes the beatific vision, Gloria Dei vivens homo, and Summum Bonum among his definitions.) And speaking of law, the author’s treatment of the divine law is slightly confusing; he appears to alternately conflate it with and differentiate it from both the eternal law and the law of the Old and New Testaments (70–71, 136, 138).In the end, despite Bretzke’s best efforts to remain above the ideological frays of moral theology, one’s overall evaluation of his book may depend somewhat on one’s place within them. Some will chafe at his suggestions that contraception (116), certain forms of assisted reproduction (198–99), and artificial nutrition and hydration that sustain those in a persistent vegetative state (10, 224–25) remain open questions to an extent. Others will point out, as Bretzke does, that Church doctrine has previously undergone substantial development on other issues, such as religious freedom (65–66, 151, 193, 229) and the charging of interest (107, 241). What most should be able to agree upon is that in many respects the Handbook is a valuable resource, one that will help professionals and students alike come to a much better understanding of the key terms and debates within the field. [End Page 222]John J. FitzgeraldSt. John’s University (New York)Copyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Bellum civile 6,564-569 describes how the witch Erictho disrupts a funeral. In its context the expression cognato in funere refers not to any putative relatives of Erictho (not mentioned elsewhere) or to relatives of some anonymous deceased person (so Korenjak), but to the only group of people Erictho shares some kind of bond with, namely her ‚sisters‘ the Thessalian witches.

Traditional just war theory maintains that the two types of rules that govern justice in times of war, jus ad bellum (justice of war) and jus in bello (justice in war), are logically independent of one another. Call this the independence thesis. According to this thesis, a war that satisfies the ad bellum rules does not guarantee that the in bello rules will be satisfied; and a war that violates the ad bellum rules does not guarantee that (...) the in bello rules will be violated. A controversial implication of this is that it’s possible for soldiers to undergo acts that are instrumental in bringing about victory in an unjust war and yet do nothing morally wrong. Some authors – call them purists – claim that this cannot be correct. Participating in an unjust war is by itself morally wrong. Yitzhak Benbaji has given what is to my mind the strongest defense of the independence thesis. In this paper I critically examine Benbaji’s argument and conclude that it is not persuasive. My argument against Benbaji incorporates the concept of honor in the military. I seek to show, in part, that if the recent literature is correct concerning both the nature of honor and the importance of instilling it in soldiers, then Benbaji hasn’t given the purist a compelling reason to give up her view. (shrink)

Taking hints from the Italian writer and comedian Paolo Villaggio’s works having the unlucky-to-the-utmost accountant Fantozzi as their hero, the essay tackles the issue of the role, and the possible foundations, of the law in the theoretical scenario of a perfectly deterministic world, where everything is determined by pre-set nexuses of cause-and-effect. Fantozzi is condemned by such an inescapable law of causation (Fate) to meet constant failure, in a social context structured along stiff hierarchies which are completely independent from individual (...) merits, where law enforcement always sides with the lucky ones. Within such a context, the law cannot be grounded on rational foundations-thinking, since the only possible rational conclusion is that the law is completely useless. At the same time, the law cannot be considered an outcome of power, since any power different from that of Fate is mere illusion. The essay wonders whether, in such a theoretical setting, there is the possibility of finding an alternative foundation for the law on non-objectifying thinking, starting from imagination and the idea of justice. Is it possible to imagine reliable rules based on imagination? (shrink)

In the article, I examine the relevance of Just War Doctrine to contemporary conflicts. Just War Doctrine, which grew out of Western Christian thinking, presupposes that evil might be confronted with force, if there is no alternative way to restore a just order. But modern trends call into question the certainty and universality of this doctrine. On the one hand, ideas of moral relativism and comparative justice have become more widespread, potentially undermining the use of the notions “just” and “justified” (...) in relation to military conflicts. On the other hand, the nature of war is changing, as warfare is no longer only kinetic in character. I offer examples of how the evolving character of warfare challenges the traditional understanding of Just War Doctrine. For example, there is the growing threat of cyber warfare, but the ethical criteria for its use are not defined. In relation to Just War Doctrine, questions of whether and when pre-emptive cyber attack is permissible arise, what should constitute legitimate targets of cyber warfare and to what degree collateral damage could be acceptable. Another challenge to the traditional understanding of Just of War Doctrine was the putative doctrine of humanitarian intervention.Prima facie,humanitarian interventions do not comply withius ad bellumcriteria of Just War Doctrine, because of the absence of a direct military threat to the intervening state. The justification of humanitarian intervention is based on the assertion of an intolerable violation of accepted values. The weakness of such approach, as discussed in the article, is that it implicitly assumes that one protagonist’s values are superior to others. A further example of emerging challenges to Just War Doctrine is the phenomenon of hybrid war, a term used to describe a type of conflict that is multi-faceted and in which kinetic warfare is not dominant. The orchestration of several strands of conflict, each designed to be below the threshold to provoke a military response, exploits the absence of legal and ethical norms regulating such activity. I conclude the article by suggesting that, firstly, for Just War Doctrine to remain relevant, it should be expanded to include harms caused by non-kinetic actions, and, secondly, the distinctions between the states of war and peace should be redefined to reflect the changing character of war more accurately. (shrink)

The recognition of the similarities between Roman epic poetry and historiography have led to valuable studies such as Joseph’s analysis of the relationship between Lucan’s Bellum Civile and Tacitus’ Histories. Traces of Lucan’s Bellum Civile can also be observed in Tacitus’ Annals 1 and 2, causing the beginning of Tiberius’ reign to look like a civil war in the making. The charismatic Germanicus sits with a supportive army on the northern frontier, much like Caesar, causing fear for Tiberius (...) at Rome. Germanicus denies his chance to become the next Caesar and march on the city, but he exhibits other similarities with Lucan’s Caesar, including an association with Alexander the Great. Although at some points Germanicus seems to be repeating the past and reliving episodes experienced by Caesar in Bellum Civile, he prevents himself from fully realizing a Caesarian fate and becoming Lucan’s bad tyrant. The similar images, events, and themes presented by both authors create messages that reflect experiences from the authors’ own lives during dangerous times. (shrink)

Pazifisten und deren Gegner streiten sich meist nicht bloss über moralische, sondern auch über faktisch-deskriptive Fragen. Zum Beispiel sind beide Seiten bei der Kosovo-Krise (1998/9) zu völlig entgegengesetzten Beschreibungen gekommen. Laut meiner Rekonstruktion des Pazifismus ist das keine Überraschung, weil der Pazifist die Fakten legitimerweise im Lichte seines Systems von Werten betrachtet. Seine Gegnerin betrachtet die Fakten dagegen im Lichte eines alternativen Wertsystems, und der Streit zwischen den beiden Parteien, der sich angeblich auf wertfrei deskriptivem Boden bewegt, kommt zu keinem (...) Ende, weil es keine objektiven Tatsachen aus dem betreffenden Krieg gibt, die den Streit für die eine oder die andere Seite eindeutig entscheiden könnten. Wenn ich recht habe, lässt sich die wertbeladene Weltsicht des Pazifisten als eine Befolgung dreier epistemischer Imperative verstehen: Erstens befolgt er den epistemischen Imperativ zur Natur des Menschen ("Wehre Dich gegen Dämonisierungen der Gegenseite; versuche immer, den Fall aus der Sicht der Gegenseite zu verstehen"). Zweitens befolgt er den epistemischen Imperativ zugunsten friedfertiger Alternativen ("Suche immer nach friedfertigen Alternativen zum geplanten Militäreinsatz"). Und drittens befolgt er den epistemischen Imperativ bezüglich unkontrollierbarer Eskalation ("Schärfe deinen Blick für unkontrollierbare, irreversible Nebenfolgen des militärischen Einsatzes, und achte besonders auf die Gefahr, dass ein weiterer Weltkrieg ausbrechen könnte"). Nicht die objektive Realität entscheidet darüber, wie weit man bei der Befolgung dieser Imperative gehen sollte. Die Entscheidung hängt vielmehr von uns selbst ab – so ähnlich wie im Fall einer Naturwissenschaftlerin, die sich dafür entscheidet, hinter dem Chaos des Mannigfaltigen noch nach einer gemeinsamen Tiefenstruktur zu suchen. Diese Parallele hat eine überraschende Konsequenz. Die epistemischen Imperative des Pazifisten können mit Kants regulativen Prinzipien verglichen werden, die laut Kant notwendig sind, um unseren naturwissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen eine Orientierung zu geben. Und wenn sich also die Erkenntnismethode des Pazifisten in entscheidender Hinsicht nicht von der naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnismethode unterscheidet, dann verdienen die Pazifisten einen Vorwurf ganz sicher nicht: den Vorwurf, auf irrationale Weise blind zu sein für die harten Wirklichkeiten. Selbst wer den Pazifismus ablehnt, sollte ihm nicht den intellektuellen Respekt verweigern. Dass der Pazifismus in der Tat eine attraktive Position darstellt, werde ich am Ende meiner Überlegungen plausibel zu machen versuchen. (shrink)

Christians look to Scripture to inform their ethical decision-making, believing that God speaks through it. However, disagreement as to what the Bible requires us to do can often lead to acrimonious splits within the church. So long as sharp divisions amongst Christians over ethical issues remain, injustices continue, and the reputation of the church is undermined. This article suggests that lessons may be learned from the story of the use of the Bible in the American Abolitionism debate which can help (...) the contemporary church to discuss and perhaps even resolve some enduring ethical questions which are dividing Christians today. (shrink)

Caesar's description of the Germans' social organization andmoresin the sixth book of hisBellum Gallicum(BG6.21–8) has long been the subject of multiple scholarly controversies. Its focus on various seemingly random ethnographical details – above all the description of the Hercynian forest and its fantastical beasts – has so surprised readers that the very authenticity of the passage has been questioned. It has been convincingly argued that interpolation is not likely. However, the internal excursus describing the Hercynian forest, and the final section (...) concerning its fauna in particular, remains a subject of intrigue, as a result of the extraordinary, semi-mythical nature of its contents. It is the latter portion of the excursus, concerning the beasts of the Hercynian forest, and the place and role of their portrayal within the ethnography as a whole, that I wish to elucidate in the present article. While it undeniably possesses great entertainment value, its presence cannot be justified merely on such grounds. (shrink)

The relation between peace-oriented politics and theology will be discussed from a philosophical point of view by approaching the problem in five steps. In a first step, I will focus on logic as one of the most powerful and simultaneously misleading forces in our thinking. Utilising the results of this step will, secondly, enable a clarification of the misunderstanding implied in an idea such as eternal peace. Thirdly, the article will unveil the paradoxical character of violence inherent in the notion (...) of political power as well as the antinomy of war and peace. This will open the space for accepting second-best solutions. In so doing at least some of the problems implied in any philosophical contribution to a political theology of pacifism may be solved. (shrink)