The term natural is effective in the marketing of a wide variety of foods. This ambiguous term carries important meaning in Western culture. To challenge an uncritical understanding of natural with respect to food and to explore the ambiguity of the term, the development of Western ideas of nature is first discussed. Personification and hypostasization of nature are given special emphasis. Leo Marx’s idea of the pastoral design in literature is then used to explore the meaning of natural (...) as applied to food, emphasizing Marx’s distinction between a sentimental and a complex pastoral. The latter is applied to natural as a means of collapsing a dichotomy of man and nature to the idea of second nature. From this perspective an understanding of the industrialization of the food system and the importance of local and organic food are considered. The extent to which processed foods might properly be considered natural is raised and discussed for several common foods. Although marketing of natural foods might make us think that we consume nature, I suggest that what is consumed is more appropriately second nature. I suggest that in order to maintain a critical perspective about one’s relationship to the natural world, everyone should make an attempt to experience the complex pastoral with respect to at least something that is consumed as food. When nature is understood as second nature in the context of a complex pastoral, the question of whether a food or ingredient is to be considered natural is replaced by deliberative thought based on our best knowledge and judgment, and the result will be less constrained by ideology. (shrink)

In this chapter, Hankinson discusses Aristotle's conceptions of nature, change, and potentiality; the four causes, spontaneity, and chance; teleology and hypothetical necessity; and also Aristotle's account of action, freedom, and responsibility. The choice facing Greek philosopher‐scientists is simple: show how a structured, regular world could arise out of undirected processes, or pursue a teleological explanation, insisting on the activity of divine intelligence in the cosmos. Aristotle, Hankinson writes, pursues a middle way between these options, although, ultimately, Aristotle takes the (...) whole structure of the cosmos to be teleologically organized. Aristotle rejects Plato's metaphysics of perfect hypostasized forms and divinely directed teleology: relying heavily on his concept of phusis or nature, Aristotle makes teleology an internal principle governing the development of natural objects. Aristotle distinguishes four causes or causal factors in explanation: matter, form, agent, and end, and he distinguishes sharply between regular natural events that can be explained by means of these causes, and chance events, which do not admit full explanation. (shrink)

Alain Grau La double homoousie confessée par le concile de Chalcédoine est sans doute un des concepts parmi les plus difficiles légués par la tradition dogmatique. Que peut signifier que le Christ soit homoousion à nous, et à chacun d’entre nous? Peut-on, sans dommage pour la raison, donc univoquement, passer de la compréhension trinitaire, classique depuis Nicée, à une application anthropologique? Si tel est le cas, il faut donner à la seconde homoousie une intelligibilité située au croisement de la théologie (...) et de l’économie, dont le centre géométrique se trouve en He 5,8. La christologie ne peut donc plus être pensée à partir de deux natures soi-disant connues — ne serait-ce que métaphysiquement — dont il suffirait de comprendre le mode de conjonction dans le Christ, mais uniquement sur le plan hypostatique selon sa double définition. L’hypothèse de l’univocité de la confession chalcédonienne qui est nôtre offre une signification à la divinisation en découvrant son lieu propre, à condition de définir à nouveaux frais la notion d’hypostase, étant entendu que celle-ci est celle du Verbe dans cet homme « parfait » qui est Jésus. (shrink)

Le sujet de cette étude est la manière dont Plotin, dans une perspective qui reste essentiellement platonicienne, interprète la notion de noeîn dans Parménide, surtout à la lumière du bien connu Fr. 3 DK, sur l’identité de l’être et de la pensée, dont Plotin, avec Clément d'Alexandrie, est notre source. Cette interprétation est essentielle pour comprendre la nature et la fonction ontologique-métaphysique de l’hypostase plotinienne du Noûs. La conception parménidienne de noeîn est profondément remaniée par Plotin et intégrée dans (...) une perspective compatible avec l’ontologie platonicienne et la métaphysique néoplatonicienne. (shrink)

Focused on the dynamic of the relations between truth and acknowledgement, this study brings forward the following series of hypotheses: 1) between “the essence of truth”, as revelation and referential experience, cognitive and moral supreme resort and the various embodiments of partial, temporary and relative truths, there is an operational space of thinking and acting, favorable to the comprehensive truths, as we call them; 2) within the unceasing aspiration of overcoming the partial truths and asymptotical closeness to “the essence of (...) truth”, the comprehensive truth is the wide-awakeness of the self-conscience haunted by worries and doubts and which, through the quests for faith and reason, becomes capable of acknowledgement; 3) from an extensional point of view, the comprehensive truth is the acknowledgement in the informational-cognitive area, and from the intentional point of view, the comprehensive truth is the acknowledgement in the axiological and moral areas; 4) if by means of comprehension we acknowledge something or someone, then comprehension and acknowledgement interact with each other, and the path towards a culture of acknowledgement can be realized by living the comprehensive truth as a truth of acknowledgement oriented to understanding and communication; 5) the path towards a culture of acknowledgement implies the establishment and implementation of a human model, a real challenge for each of us. The anthropological model that this study suggests starts from the dynamic of the hypostases of the human being. According to this model, the human nature, as the natural essence of what human means and the human condition of moral and spiritual fulfillment, meet in the human essence synthesized in what Pope John Paul II called “the acting person”. By shaping the real human being, a fallible and creative being, through the dynamic of his hypostasis, we come to a comprehensive truth regarding the human being, a truth on which the culture of acknowledgement is founded. Moreover, the main idea of our demarche is that between acknowledgement and comprehension there is a deep, organic connection for the comprehensive truth that lies at the basis of the culture of acknowledgement. (shrink)

Le sujet de cette étude est la manière dont Plotin, dans une perspective qui reste essentiellement platonicienne, interprète la notion de noeîn dans Parménide, surtout à la lumière du bien connu Fr. 3 DK, sur l’identité de l’être et de la pensée, dont Plotin, avec Clément d'Alexandrie, est notre source. Cette interprétation est essentielle pour comprendre la nature et la fonction ontologique-métaphysique de l’hypostase plotinienne du Noûs. La conception parménidienne de noeîn est profondément remaniée par Plotin et intégrée dans (...) une perspective compatible avec l’ontologie platonicienne et la métaphysique néoplatonicienne. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive account of logic that addresses fundamental issues concerning the nature and foundations of the discipline. The authors claim that these foundations can not only be established without the need for strong metaphysical assumptions, but also without hypostasizing logical forms as specific entities. They present a systematic argument that the primary subject matter of logic is our linguistic interaction rather than our private reasoning and it is thus misleading to see logic as revealing "the laws (...) of thought". In this sense, fundamental logical laws are implicit to our "language games" and are thus more similar to social norms than to the laws of nature. Peregrin and Svoboda also show that logical theories, despite the fact that they rely on rules implicit to our actual linguistic practice, firm up these rules and make them explicit. By carefully scrutinizing the project of logical analysis, the authors demonstrate that logical rules can be best seen as products of the so called reflective equilibrium. They suggest that we can profit from viewing languages as "inferential landscapes" and logicians as "geographers" who map them and try to pave safe routes through them. This book is an essential resource for scholars and researchers engaged with the foundations of logical theories and the philosophy of language. (shrink)

I argue that Goethe’s philosophy of nature can be presented in a vertical order of stages. By reading his natural philosophy as a system of hypostases, Goethe’s accentuation of a divine ground can be taken seriously. Related to the Neoplatonic hypostasis models, for Goethe the living organisms rest on a divine and metaphysical entity. It is a guiding argument of this article that the enigmatic and inexhaustible ‘Bildungstrieb’ (nisus formativus) of all-nature expresses itself in the respective primordial phenomena (...) (Urphänomene). For this purpose, the ‘Bildungstrieb’ uses the two authoritative laws of polarity (Polarität) and increase (Steigerung). These laws form the second level of the graduaded order. The sphere of the diverse Urphänomene can thus be marked as the third level. They are themselves dependent on the Bildungstrieb and the principles of increase and polarity. (shrink)

What, for Galen, are powers, and how are they to be properly individuated? The notion of a power or capacity does a great deal of work in Galen. As in Aristotle, the concept of a dunamis is tightly linked with that of an energeia, but these are not simply logical abstractions. Rather the natural energeiai are the basic functional activities of the animal body and its parts, and just as health consists in proper functioning, so disease is defined as ‘damage (...) to one of the natural energeiai of the body’, and these activities are damaged when something interferes with its related dunamis. Here I try to make sense of the apparently very different things Galen says regarding dunameis. For example, he says that they do not inhabit our bodies as we do our houses; that is, presumably, they are not substantial or hypostasized; rather they are properties of us. Equally, he is perfectly clear that they are relational items: a power is a power for affecting something determinate in some determinate way. They. (shrink)

The theology of Pier Damiani († 1072) is still an understudied theme in his scholarship, in particular, for what it concerns his Trinitarian and Christological doctrines. The aim of this study is to reconstruct and discuss especially Damiani’s Christological views as formulated in Letter 81, better known as his De fide catholica. It is argued that Damiani’s approach is mostly exegetical, as he mainly points to and comments on Biblical passages in support of Catholic doctrines. Still, he assumes a peculiar (...) method of investigation, as he devotes the main body of the Letter to the question of the correct understanding (recta intelligentia) of the Catholic interpretation of Christology, and reserves only the final summary to a discussion of Biblical authorities. Eventually, it is argued that despite Damiani’s attempts at clarifying the matter, he acknowledges an inherent difficulty in explaining how it is possible that God became man without truly assuming the person of man, and, if He did so, how this did not give rise to two, however indistinct, persons or hypostases. The concept of ‘co-union’ of human and divine natures, introduced by Damiani, makes the simultaneous unity and distinction of the two natures intuitively clear, but it remains a concept that is not clarified in all its details and implications. (shrink)

Levinas' ethical metaphysics opens up a nexus of relationships, in the midst of which God becomes accessible as the counterpart of the justice I render to others. Although Levinas refuses a theorising theology which does violence to God, we attempt in this article nonetheless to glimpse the possibility of a divine threesome which can be articulated in the language of ethical metaphysics. We seek to trace a Trinity, not in Levinas, but with Levinas. We seek to ‘leash God with Levinas.’Thus, (...) we argue the liturgical nature of God. God is utterly ‘for‐the‐other.’ The Father, as utterly self‐diffusive, is ‘for‐the‐Son’, and the Son, as utterly responsive, is ‘for‐the‐Father.’ The divine nature is the ethical reality of ‘for‐the‐other.’ Secondly, this one nature has three distinct hypostases, which need to be understood ethically. The relationship between Father and Son is not the same as the relationship between the Son and the Father. The Father and the Son are the same in that they are essentially ‘for‐the‐other,’ bound by a bond or a Spirit of responsibility. Yet, the Son's relation to the Father is responsive, whereas the Father's relation to the Son is initiative or originary. Thus, there is both an identity yet a non‐identification of Father and Son. Again, since responsibility is the ethical hypostasis of ‘the‐other‐person‐in me,’ we might say that the Father is in the Son and the Son is in the Father , in a non‐identical way, and that it is precisely this perichoresis of the one in the Other which constitutes the hypostasis of each. (shrink)

This study endeavours to demonstrate the dynamic “tolerance-recognition” in view of a comprehensive paradigm. Tolerance is presumed to be a „modus vivendi” – that is, the recognition of multiple ways of finding the good and happiness by human communities. In this context, the author proposes, as a heuristic device, a model of humanity based upon correlations between nature, condition, and essence as hypostases of humanity. In this way the study attempts to contribute to the planning of a necessary politics (...) and culture of recognition. (shrink)

The Tritheism of the sixth century has not been widely studied. John Philoponus, the greatest exponent of the theory, developed the idea by applying Aristotelian realism to the doctrine of the Trinity and concluded that in the Trinity there are three hypostases and three natures, whence comes the name for those who hold this position: “Tri-theists,” since they divide the one nature and substance of God into three. This article sheds light on the earliest stage of the development of (...) Tritheism beginning in the year 557, when we can date the first appearance of John Askotzanges in the sources, and goes up until the first Syndocticon, the agreement reached between the Tritheists and the Theodosians at Constantinople in the beginning of the year 567. After the death of Theodosius in 566, Tritheism no longer remained merely a local reality in Constantinople but spilled over the confines of the Imperial capital and spread throughout the East, especially in Egypt. (shrink)

On close reading of the Enneads, the work written by Plotinus, we can see that the One, the ultimate factor in his system of hypostases, can be examined on the base of many concepts that are interwoven, creating many paths for approaching the divine level. Of course, since all the hypostases, Matter — Nature — Soul — Intelligence, are dependent on the infinite power of the One, theoretically and practically everything can be related to the One or the God (...) or the Good. But there are some modes of existence most related to the One, thus illuminating the Plotinian mystical empiricism. The One, on the one hand, is related to empiricism as It presupposes the immediate approach of It, being immanent and transcendent at the same time, and on the other hand, It is related to mysticism as It cannot be perfectly conceived and experienced otherwise than through the mystical union. (shrink)

The Latin Trinity (LT) and the Social Trinity (ST) represent the two dominant approaches for interpreting the doctrine of the Trinity in contemporary philosophical theology. Both approaches have consequences for Christian theology, however, and I believe that neither sufficiently overcomes the charges of modalism or tritheism, respectively. Moreover, the charge of the overall logical incoherency of the doctrine of the Trinity remains a viable criticism. In order to defend the doctrine of the Trinity against charges of incoherency, while avoiding the (...) modalistic and tritheistic leanings of the LT and ST models, I argue that the unitary nature of God‐as‐three‐hypostases is best understood in terms of a relationship of supervenience between the revelation of (1) Deut. 6:4 and (2) the Gospel of John. The Hypostases of the Trinity supervene on the unitary identity of God insofar as to be ‘God’ is to entail the perichoretic relationship of unbegottenness, begottenness, and spiratation (procession). The Supervenient Trinity (SvT), as an analogical model, provides a way to understand God as (1) and (2) that better avoids the modalist and tritheistic difficulties raised by the LT and the ST approaches. (shrink)

The paper analyzes the problem of Trinitarian theology in the light of the communication paradigm and clarifying the outlines of a new ontology of personality that grows from the phenomenon of communication. The author of the article argues that communication event lays the foundation for a hypostatic being of the Divine Persons of the Trinity, providing its ontological unity. This dynamism of the divine hypostasis, implemented in their dialogue, shifts the focus from the fact who is the Divine Trinity, to (...) the space "between", in which their conversation is heard. The relation of each Hypostases of the Trinity - their relativity lays the foundation of the divine ontological being. The beginning of the Communion becomes a meeting of a man with God, which is made possible thanks to the special disposition of the first to hear the appeal of the Second - that is through the openness. Relationship with God is a ground for dialogue with neighbors and the rest of creation. For personal progress must keep the most perfect specimen to which to aspire. It is tempting to think of the approach of the Creator through attachment to the community of the faithful, the mystical body of Christ, and thus leads to ecclesiology. Ecclesiology, in turn, is the basis for the doctrine of the Divine Trinity. Proper understanding of form and essence of communion with God Everlasting between Trinity incarnation sets a benchmark that a person must take a sample to communicate as others. So Christian theology insists on the importance of internal communication as an opportunity to experience God in himself. Instead, God instead throwing its nature, is to do the opposite: passing over in silence the depths of the Godhead and give Him reveal to us the true personality. However, just before, standing, meeting and dialogue between man and man by God and is a prerequisite of full disclosure of the human person, its constitution and approach the transcendent source. (shrink)

The quantum information introduced by quantum mechanics is equivalent to that generalization of the classical information from finite to infinite series or collections. The quantity of information is the quantity of choices measured in the units of elementary choice. The qubit can be interpreted as that generalization of bit, which is a choice among a continuum of alternatives. The axiom of choice is necessary for quantum information. The coherent state is transformed into a well-ordered series of results in time after (...) measurement. The quantity of quantum information is the ordinal corresponding to the infinity series in question. Number and being (by the meditation of time), the natural and artificial turn out to be not more than different hypostases of a single common essence. This implies some kind of neo-Pythagorean ontology making related mathematics, physics, and technics immediately, by an explicit mathematical structure. (shrink)

Plotinus' Treatise V.1 comes closer than any other to providing an outline of his entire spiritual and metaphysical system, and as such it may serve to some degree as an introduction to his philosophy. It addresses in condensed form a great many topics to which Plotinus elsewhere devotes extended discussion, including the problem of the multiple self; eternity and time; the unity-in-duality of intellect and the intelligible; and the derivation of intelligible being from the One. Above all, it shows that (...) the so-called "three hypostases"--soul, intellect, and the One--are best understood not as a sequence of three things additional to one another, but as three levels of possession of the same content, so that each lower level--soul in relation to intellect and intellect in relation to the One--is an "image" and "expression" of its superior. Plotinus exhorts the human soul to overcome its alienation from its own true nature and its divine origin by first recognizing itself as superior to the body and the same in kind as the animating principle of the entire cosmos, and then discovering within itself the still higher levels of reality from which it derives: intellect and, ultimately, the One or Good, the supreme first principle of all things. To do so the soul must redirect its attention inward and upward to become aware of the divinity which is always within it but from which it is distracted by the clamor of the senses. (shrink)

This article will attempt to show that from the beginning of the letter of Eusebius of Nicodemia to Paulinus of Tyre, the meaning of ὁμοούσιος should be sought in the opposition on the part of the Council of Nicea to the divisive doctrine of hypostases by Arius and his followers. The assertion of the similarity or identity of nature or ousia between the Father and the Son that ὁμοούσιος suggests is traceable to the teaching of Alexander of Alexandria, but (...) also of Eusthatius of Antioch, so that it could be thought that in Nicea a convergence between the two major opponents of Arius could have taken place, in the same way in which it had occurred over the Antiochene formula of 325. Analysis of the doctrine of ὁμοούσιος by Athanasius confirms that the term was opposed to the divisive interpretation of the hypostases within Arianism. The second part of the article, takes into consideration the study on the interpretation of the Nicene ὁμοούσιος proposed by P. F. Beatrice. The Author argues that Beatrice’s thesis, which attempts to trace the introduction of the term in the Nicene Creed back exclusively to Constantine, with the agreement of Eusebius of Caesarea, is not backed by the documentation at our disposal. (shrink)

This article challenges the widespread view that the Byzantine theological discourse was averse to innovation and confined to restating official doctrine. It makes the case that the mystic Symeon the New Theologian constructed an alternative Trinity where the Spirit as the third hypostasis besides the Father and the Son is equated not with the product of the Father, which is suppressed, but with the common divine nature, and where this new third hypostasis is placed before the other two hypostases, (...) which it is said to engender. (shrink)

Il est question de l'analogie et de la comparaison selon la démarche dialectique platonicienne, ainsi que des topoi empruntés aux textes anciens: la chasse, le labyrinthe, le vase, la statue intérieure que l'on doit polir, le Soleil pour désigner de manière visible le Bien, ou la caverne pour rappeler la parabole de laconnaissance, mais aussi pour évoquer le lieu de transit de l'âme. Les principaux textes utilisés sont extraits des Discours théologiques de Grégoire de Nazianze. Un passage du Traité sur (...) le Saint Esprit (149 B-C) de Basile de Césarée, cité à la fin, illustre dans un contexte un peu différent le même procédé que celui utilisé par Grégoire. Dans tous ces passages il est question de travailler le langage sous le double aspect ontologique et sémantique, afin de trouver les modalités discursives les plus appropriées à la définition de la substance divine, à la nature de l'unité divine et à la détermination du caractère spécifique des hypostases. La théologie chrétienne se sert donc des moyens de la philosophie et emprunte des figures à la rhétorique, mais se défend de toute confusion avec ces disciplines. Invente-t-elle alors un genre nouveau, le «discours théologique», sur le modèle fourni par les Cappadociens? Encore faut-il savoir si le discours pouvait être perçu au IVᵉ siècle comme un genre approprié à la théologie, ou seulement comme un contrepoint à l'exégèse et au traité: un contrepoint par lequel les Pères ne rechignent pas à faire concurrence aux Sophistes pour les besoins politiques, et subsidiairement polémiques, de l'institution nouvellement créée. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dominus Deus Noster Deus Unus Est:Aquinas on Divine UnityArchbishop Rowan Williams"The Lord our God is one LORD," says the Shema (Deut 6:4), echoed by Christians and Muslims alike. "We believe in one God," the Nicene Creed announces; and the Shahada's "There is no deity but God" affirms the same. But at first sight, Christian theology looks like the outlier here, as St. Thomas obliquely acknowledges when, early in his (...) discussion of the Trinity (Summa theologiae [ST] I, q. 30, a. 1, obj. 1 and ad 1), he quotes Boethius: "That [alone] is truly one in which there is no numeration" (obj. 3). If there is a plurality of relation in God, there is something that can be enumerated, says Thomas. This objection is duly met by distinguishing between "absolute" plurality and the mutually definitory relations of the Trinitarian life which rule out any "composition" in God. But, for this fully to make sense, we must return to Thomas's explicit discussion of divine unity (ST I, q. 11). The present essay attempts a brief examination of how divine unity is understood in this quaestio, in the hope of clarifying an aspect of Aquinas's Trinitarian thought, and also of suggesting ways of developing an implicit theme of some significance for contemporary theology.It is still a textbook commonplace that "Western" Trinitarian theology begins from the divine unity and treats the distinction of the divine persons only in the light of this prior reality. The eloquent polemic of Orthodox theologians like Vladimir Lossky has played a major role in canonizing this supposed opposition. He writes, for example, that Western Trinitarianism treats the relationships of the divine hypostases as "a system of relationships within the one essence: something logically posterior to the essence," with [End Page 555] the distinguishing "relations of origin" (originary fatherhood, generatedness, procession) as "more or less swallowed up in the nature or essence."1 Examples could be multiplied, from Lossky and many others, and from Western theologians influenced by this characterization.2 The very structure of Aquinas's Summa theologiae, with the quaestiones de Deo uno preceding those de Trinitate, is sometimes adduced in support of this analysis of the ambiguities and inadequacies of Thomist Trinitarianism, and of a general Western resistance to the radical personalism of authentic patristic theology.But, polemic apart, what is Aquinas actually saying in his treatment of divine unity, primarily in ST I, q. 11? The four articles of the quaestio deal with whether saying that something is "one" actually tells us anything beyond the postulation of something as a coherent subject/substance; with whether unity and plurality are simply opposed and incompatible notions; with whether it is right to say that God is one, and if so, whether he is maxime unus, one in a unique and unsurpassable sense. Basic to his argument, as we shall see, is something touched on briefly in ST I, q. 30, a. 1, where his response (ad 3) to the Boethian formulation associates divine unity with simplicity—that is, with non-composition:3 affirming the divine unity is, crucially, denying the applicability of certain kinds of discourse in theology. But, as we shall see, part of the abiding importance of Aquinas's discussion is, perhaps unexpectedly, to open the door to a new ontological perspective in which laying out the difference between different senses of "unity" allows for the development of a more systematically relational metaphysics. Related to this is the distinction drawn (especially in ad 2 of [End Page 556] a. 3) between "mathematical" and "metaphysical" unity; one of the problems with a good deal of modern criticism of Western Trinitarianism is a failure to reckon with the diversity of ways in which "unus est" might be used, and St. Thomas is in fact abundantly clear about the senses that must be ruled out in theology—including any sense that would oppose an "individual" essence to "multiple" hypostases, as if the divine essence were itself a sort of numerically identified individual.The ground for this is laid in the first article. If we say that something is "one," we are surely offering a determination of it, specifying one way of... (shrink)

Résumé L’équilibre des forces (le pape, l’empereur, le corps épiscopal) fut plus apparent que réel à Chalcédoine. Sa définition n’en a pas moins sa validité permanente : empêcher d’occulter la réalité humaine du Christ, tout en tenant qu’il est « un seul et le même » avec le Verbe. Deux christologies savantes, celle d’Antioche et celle d’Occident résumée par Léon, se sont ici heurtées et combinées avec la vision de la personne du Christ se constituant à Alexandrie, formulée non sans (...) imprécision par Cyrille. Refus par certains orientaux des « deux natures après l’union » pour « une seule nature incarnée du Verbe ». « Jacobites » et « melkites ». Éclaircissement de Constantinople II (553) relativement à la notion d’hypostase. Situation actuelle de la christologie chalcédonienne. (shrink)

Il est question de l'analogie et de la comparaison selon la démarche dialectique platonicienne, ainsi que des topoi empruntés aux textes anciens: la chasse, le labyrinthe, le vase, la statue intérieure que l'on doit polir, le Soleil pour désigner de manière visible le Bien, ou la caverne pour rappeler la parabole de laconnaissance, mais aussi pour évoquer le lieu de transit de l'âme. Les principaux textes utilisés sont extraits des Discours théologiques de Grégoire de Nazianze. Un passage du Traité sur (...) le Saint Esprit (149 B-C) de Basile de Césarée, cité à la fin, illustre dans un contexte un peu différent le même procédé que celui utilisé par Grégoire. Dans tous ces passages il est question de travailler le langage sous le double aspect ontologique et sémantique, afin de trouver les modalités discursives les plus appropriées à la définition de la substance divine, à la nature de l'unité divine et à la détermination du caractère spécifique des hypostases. La théologie chrétienne se sert donc des moyens de la philosophie et emprunte des figures à la rhétorique, mais se défend de toute confusion avec ces disciplines. Invente-t-elle alors un genre nouveau, le «discours théologique», sur le modèle fourni par les Cappadociens? Encore faut-il savoir si le discours pouvait être perçu au IVᵉ siècle comme un genre approprié à la théologie, ou seulement comme un contrepoint à l'exégèse et au traité: un contrepoint par lequel les Pères ne rechignent pas à faire concurrence aux Sophistes pour les besoins politiques, et subsidiairement polémiques, de l'institution nouvellement créée. (shrink)

The Latin Trinity and the Social Trinity represent the two dominant approaches for interpreting the doctrine of the Trinity in contemporary philosophical theology. Both approaches have consequences for Christian theology, however, and I believe that neither sufficiently overcomes the charges of modalism or tritheism, respectively. Moreover, the charge of the overall logical incoherency of the doctrine of the Trinity remains a viable criticism. In order to defend the doctrine of the Trinity against charges of incoherency, while avoiding the modalistic and (...) tritheistic leanings of the LT and ST models, I argue that the unitary nature of God-as-three-hypostases is best understood in terms of a relationship of supervenience between the revelation of Deut. 6:4 and the Gospel of John. The Hypostases of the Trinity supervene on the unitary identity of God insofar as to be ‘God’ is to entail the perichoretic relationship of unbegottenness, begottenness, and spiratation. The Supervenient Trinity, as an analogical model, provides a way to understand God as and that better avoids the modalist and tritheistic difficulties raised by the LT and the ST approaches. (shrink)

As is well known, Plotinus's philosophy served as the starting point for the development of all Neoplatonism. It created the basic schema that set the framework for the thought of all later representatives of this tendency from Porphyry to Damascius. The doctrine of the transcendence of the One, of the three original hypostases, the application of the categories of Plato's Parmenides in the construction of ontology—all this and much else besides became the property of the Neoplatonic schools, which were scattered (...) throughout the Roman empire, and was incorporated partly into the Christian theology, which was then in the process of formation. Naturally, as a result of its wide dissemination and the change in its cultural and social environment, Plotinus's legacy appeared in a different light and took on new forms; through these changes in form we can try to understand the difference in content. For this purpose Plotinus's treatise on the virtues is of special interest. The point is that Porphyry relies precisely on this treatise and at times even literally borrows large fragments from it in setting out the doctrine concerning the virtues in the thirty-second maxim . The same treatise serves as a basis for Marinus in his biography of Proclus. The aim of my lecture is to analyze the content of the treatise and its interpretations. (shrink)

This dissertation seeks to demonstrate that Proclus articulates a metaphysics not merely compatible with his polytheism, but to which in fact polytheism is integral. For Proclus the One Itself, which according to the First Hypothesis of the Parmenides neither is, nor is one, is instead as each henad, that is, as each God. The henads or Gods thus form a multiplicity unlike any other. Ontic multiplicities always exhibit mediation, in accord with a logic subordinating the many to the one. Correlatively, (...) ontic unity is formal unity, structured by a logic of wholes and parts. These are the dominant characteristics of the realm of Being. The huperousios, or "supra-essential" domain of the Gods, by contrast, is that of a multiplicity of absolute individuals with no totalizing principle over them and no reciprocal relations between them, insofar as either of these would diminish that quality which they pre-eminently possess, namely unity. The supreme form of unity in Proclus' universe, therefore, is the individuality possessed by each absolutely unique God. Chapters 1--4 are concerned with elucidating the nature of the Gods as such. ;The last three chapters provide a close reading of the third, fourth and fifth books of Proclus' Platonic Theology, which I read as an account of the emergence of ontic unity out of henadic unity through the Gods' progressive self-diremption by which a space of mediation is constituted through which they come ultimately to be conceivable as a multiplicity like any other. The key stages in this process are the ontic hypostases of Being, Life and Intellect. The first represents the analysis of the "elements" of each God as such; the second represents the positing of the Gods in co-emergent groupings or pantheons; the third the emergence of fully reciprocal relations in the actions of mythic narrative. At the end of this cosmogonic process, the basic intellectual structures have been constituted which allow the formulation of the philosophical system. The relationship between the Gods and Being is thus embodied in that between myth and dialectic, theology and philosophy. (shrink)

Anyone interested in Greek philosophy or in contemporary theories of hierarchy will profit from reading this book. It is a model of correct methodology since O’Meara carefully studies the relevant Greek texts in a chronological order, which he constantly illumines through references to secondary literature. As a result, it offers helpful insights into Plotinus, as these examples indicate. Although the Greek word for "hierarchy" does not itself occur in the history of thought prior to Pseudo-Dionysius, the conception of hierarchic structures (...) is found clearly in Plotinus’ view of existents related to one another as higher/lower, prior/posterior, causally independent/dependent, and so on. His presentation of those structures varies, though. At times he utilizes the Platonic contrast between the sensible and intelligible realms, which, however, are linked through participation. On other occasions he speaks of the One, the Intellect and the Soul. The second of these is occasionally linked with intelligibility, being, and number. The third with reference to the visible universe is described as Nature and Logos. But the hierarchical ordering which remains constant from beginning to end of the Enneads is that of the three hypostases: the One, Intellect, and Soul. These Plotinus often presents from different perspectives and with varying emphases, with the result that one realizes his hierarchical arrangements are not an a priori source of his philosophizing but emerge from it. (shrink)

Centering on the early Platonic dialogues, this paper delineates the importance of considering Plato’s Lysis’ as rightful inclusion to Jan Szaif’s proposal of “core group” of aporetic dialogue. This paper highlights a synoptic presentation of the development of Lysis’s reception by modern scholars of Plato (Platonic scholars) at the beginning of this discourse to establish a compelling argument for its aporetic nature. It then proceeds with a revisit to Szaif’s article Socrates and the Benefits of Puzzlement. The first section, (...) considering its importance, emphasizes the evident possibility of opening his list of ‘core group’ of aporetic dialogue to Lysis benefitting the said dialogue. This exposition concludes with the philosophical nature of friendship, even love, must neither begin in Plato’s Phaedrus and Symposium nor in Aristotle’s conception of friendship in Nicomachean Ethics. Alternatively, cognizant of the aporetic tradition followed and practiced by Plato, all studies on the said topics may begin with Lysis. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The Nature of Selection is a straightforward, self-contained introduction to philosophical and biological problems in evolutionary theory. It presents a powerful analysis of the evolutionary concepts of natural selection, fitness, and adaptation and clarifies controversial issues concerning altruism, group selection, and the idea that organisms are survival machines built for the good of the genes that inhabit them. "Sober's is the answering philosophical voice, the voice of a first-rate philosopher and a knowledgeable student of contemporary evolutionary theory. His book (...) merits broad attention among both communities. It should also inspire others to continue the conversation."-Philip Kitcher, Nature "Elliott Sober has made extraordinarily important contributions to our understanding of biological problems in evolutionary biology and causality. The Nature of Selection is a major contribution to understanding epistemological problems in evolutionary theory. I predict that it will have a long lasting place in the literature."-Richard C. Lewontin. (shrink)