Aliando a própria experiência perceptiva à arqueologia visual dos mestres da escola de Warburg, à prática indiciária dos connaisseurs e, principalmente, do mais conhecido deles, o médico italiano do século XIX, Giovanni Morelli - junto com um pouco de psicanálise e a técnica dos romances policiais -, Gilda de Mello e Souxa desenvolveu um "método" crítico inteiramente livre e original, que rendeu enormes frutos. Entre outras tantas coisas, foi ela a primeira a compreender o "caipirismo imanente" ou, mais (...) exatamente, "a verdade dos gestos da nossa gente". (shrink)

Carta escrita por Gilda de Mello e Souza, remetida ao colega Oswaldo Porchat, que se encontrava em Berkeley, quando a ditadura civil-militar brasileira, recrudescida desde a implantação, em agosto de 1968, do AI-5, representava uma verdadeira ameaça a estudantes e docentes da Universidade de São Paulo, especialmente se lhe fizessem qualquer tipo de oposição. Porchat trocou uma sequência de cartas com Gilda nessa época, nas quais relata sua desilusão com a Faculdade de Filosofia, e com os acontecimentos políticos (...) no Brasil. Ao mesmo tempo, confessa estar encantado com a descoberta de novos elementos da Lógica, e com a atmosfera mais amena dos Estados Unidos. Porchat sabe que Gilda enfrenta momentos difíceis, tendo de assumir a Presidência do curso em meio à tentativa do reitor Miguel Reale de submetê-lo a um interventor. Enfrentando a dúvida sobre se valeria a pena retornar ao Brasil naquele momento, Porchat escreve à amiga. A carta a seguir expressa, dentro do que era possível na época, quando as correspondências eram vigiadas, o parecer de Gilda sobre as indagações do amigo, sobre os rumos da ditadura, e sobre o que ela pensava de sua própria atitude de resistência naquele contexto. A carta original, assim como a sequência de correspondências da qual faz parte, está depositada no Fundo Gilda de Mello e Souza, no Instituto de Estudos Brasileiros (IEB/USP). Agradeço à família de Gilda, especialmente a Ana Luisa Escorel e a Laura Escorel, pela disponibilização desse documento para a presente publicação. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to offer a view of the current status of women in medical physics and biomedical engineering, while focusing on solutions towards gender balance and providing examples of current activities carried out at national and international levels. The International Union of Physical and Engineering Scientists in Medicine is committed to advancing women in science and health and has several initiatives overseen by the Women in Medical Physics and Biomedical Engineering Task Group. Some of the main (...) strategies proposed by the Task Group to attain gender balance are: (a) identify and promote female role models that achieve successful work-life balance, (b) establish programs to develop female leaders, (c) create opportunities for females to increase the international visibility within the scientific community, and (d) establish archives and databases of women in STEM. (shrink)

Within a general approach that implies the closely related survey of neurosciences and philosophical thought, the essays collected in the volume develop two main lines of research. The first one, thanks to the contributions of scientists and psychologists , psychoanalysists and bioengineers , allows to fix the attention on the neurobiological, psychological, psychoanalytical and physical remembering. The second one, more specifically philosophical, is declined in three different approaches. the first - with essays by Stefania Achella, Giuseppe D'Anna and Rosario Diana (...) - points to the anlysis of the role played by the rememberance and the prefiguration in the processes of identity construction. The second - with contributions from Fiorella Battaglia, Anna Donise, Sabine Marienberg and Sara Fortuna - focuses on the role of remembering in anthropology and linguistics, as well as the identification of certain diseases of memory. The third, finally - with contributions from Gabriella Baptist, Chiara de Luzenberger and Marco Boninu - tends to define the regulatory function of memory. (shrink)

Les multiples histoires des idées qui retracent la constitution, relativement récente, de la discipline appelée «esthétique», mentionnent souvent le nom d�Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762) en lui attribuant l�«invention» du néologisme «æsthetica». Très rapidement, ce terme latin, traduit en allemand, entre dans l�usage courant. De nos jours, il désigne un ensemble de discours souvent très hétérogènes sur les beaux-arts. Mais le sens originaire d�æsthetica, c�est-à-dire le contenu de l�ouvrage éponyme de 1750, demeure largement méconnu. Le présent article souhaite contribuer à souligner (...) l�importance du geste inaugural de Baumgarten, dont l�intérêt n�est pas seulement historiographique. Car ce philosophe instaure de manière durable un nouveau rapport à l��uvre d�art. Nous insisterons tout particulièrement sur l�inscription métaphysique de son projet. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como objetivo analizar la ansiedad en adultos de Quito, Ecuador; la muestra estuvo conformada por 135 hombres y mujeres de 18 a 73 años quienes no han presentado un diagnóstico previo de ansiedad. Se aplicó el Inventario de Ansiedad de Beck (BAI) y se identificó que el 14% de los participantes presentan ansiedad grave, 17% moderada, 36% mínima y el 33% leve, siendo los jóvenes quienes presentan mayor nivel de ansiedad de tipo grave en comparación con (...) los adultos. En relación con la sintomatología física y emocional se considera la preocupación, miedo y dificultades del sueño. (shrink)

Résumé — En assignant la notion de création ex nihilo à la « représentation » , Hegel affirme son caractère non pleinement rationnel : en user, c’est selon lui voir des substances là où il faut discerner des moments. Figeant et isolant les termes en jeu, la représentation déboucherait sur le dialectique , sans permettre de passer au spéculatif . Ainsi, posant créateur et créature comme des substances distinctes, elle donnerait lieu à une « dialectique du fini et de l’infini (...) », où chaque terme « passerait en son opposé ». Mais Hegel omet de distinguer le couple fini/infini du couple esprit fini / esprit infini, ce qui le conduit à traiter ce dernier comme un couple de contraires ; et c’est ce qui ne semble pas tenable. Autant la stricte séparation des termes du premier couple débouche bien sur une dialectique ruineuse , autant la nette distinction des termes du second couple est la condition d’authentiques relations spirituelles, de personne à personne. En fait, la notion de création est, telle quelle, pleinement adéquate à la désignation d’un originer dont le fruit est un être à part entière,libre – et non un simple moment.— In assigning the notion of creation ex nihilo to « representation » , Hegel asserts its character not fully rational. According to him, in using this notion, one sees substances where one should discern moments. By fixing and isolating the terms at stake, representation leads to a dialectic type of reasoning , without allowing speculative reasoning . Hence, establishing creator and creature as distinct entities, it produces a « dialectic of the finite and the infinite » in which each term « would be interchangeable ». Yet, Hegel fails to distinguish the pair of concepts finite/infinite from the pair finite spirit / infinite spirit, which leads him to consider the two terms of the latter as opposite ; and that is precisely what is questionable. Although the strict separation of the terms of the first pair of notions leads to a self-annihilating dialectic , making a clear-cut distinction between the terms of the second couple is the necessary condition to deal with authentic relations from person to person. Actually, the notion of creation as such perfectly matches the designation of a gesture giving birth to a free and independent being instead of a simple moment. (shrink)

Si Vernant est célèbre pour avoir appliqué aux mythes grecs la méthode structurale élaborée par Lévi-Strauss, on essaiera ici de montrer que l’absence de la notion de transformation dans ses travaux révèle la distance qui sépare sa psychologie historique de l’anthropologie structurale. Au lieu d’analyser les relations qui unissent les variantes d’un mythe, Vernant cherche à appréhender la cohérence interne d’une œuvre, afin de reconstituer la mentalité qu’elle exprime. Cette démarche s’oppose profondément à celle de Lévi-Strauss, qui soutient pour sa (...) part que le fonctionnement de la pensée sauvage n’apparaît qu’à travers les opérations qui permettent de traduire les uns dans les autres des mythes issus de cultures différentes. (shrink)

Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference (...) effect provides direct evidence for the influence of controlled cognitive processes in moral judgment, and utilitarian moral judgment more specifically. (shrink)

Lonergan is commonly read, sometimes favorably and sometimes unfavorably, through a Thomist lens. But the evidence suggests that Lonergan was interested in Hegel before he undertook his studies of Aquinas and that his interest in Hegel persisted throughout his intellectual career. Lonergan regarded Hegel’s absolute idealism as “the halfway house” on the way to his own critical realist position. His effort to establish his critical realism was informed and guided by a struggle with Hegel’s absolute idealist response to Kant’s Critical (...) Philosophy. Lonergan scholars who hope to understand adequately Lonergan’s critical realist position would do well to give more serious attention to his early and perduring relationship to Hegel. (shrink)

We show that there is a purely proof-theoretic proof of the Rasiowa–Harrop disjunction property for the full intuitionistic propositional calculus ), via natural deduction, in which commuting conversions are not needed. Such proof is based on a sound and faithful embedding of \ into an atomic polymorphic system. This result strengthens a homologous result for the disjunction property of \ and answers a question then posed by Pierluigi Minari.

It has been known for six years that the restriction of Girard's polymorphic system $\text{\bfseries\upshape F}$ to atomic universal instantiations interprets the full fragment of the intuitionistic propositional calculus. We firstly observe that Tait's method of “convertibility” applies quite naturally to the proof of strong normalization of the restricted Girard system. We then show that each $\beta$-reduction step of the full intuitionistic propositional calculus translates into one or more $\beta\eta$-reduction steps in the restricted Girard system. As a consequence, we obtain (...) a novel and perspicuous proof of the strong normalization property for the full intuitionistic propositional calculus. It is noticed that this novel proof bestows a crucial role to $\eta$-conversions. (shrink)

Frederick E. Crowe claims that Lonergan’s thought underwent a radical transformation after the publication of Insight. In several recent articles he argues that inthe course of dealing with a problem of insight into insight and a problem of the subject as subject, Lonergan was on the verge of articulating a problem of the heteromorphism of subjectivity. I argue that Crowe’s claims depend on an uncritically selective and hermeneutically insensitive use of sources and a nest of ambiguities. By distinguishing the various (...) senses in which Lonergan uses the terms insight into and image in Insight, I show that Lonergan’s thought did not undergo the development that Crowe claims it did. A dialectical reflection on Crowe’s arguments reveals that their ambiguity arises from Crowe’s implicit adoptionof a form of cognitional atomism. (shrink)

In today's global marketplace, the Philippines provide a unique example of an Asian culture with established economic ties to the West. In this study, Philippine and United States undergraduate business students responded to 13 vignettes describing questionable ethical actions in business situations. Results reveal significant differences between groups for 9 of the 13 vignettes. For 4 vignettes, Philippine participants were more disapproving of the actions, and for another 5, United States participants were more disapproving. The study suggests that cultural differences (...) continue and the implications of these differences should be considered in today's global economy. (shrink)

We show that the number-theoretic functions definable in the atomic polymorphic system are exactly the extended polynomials. Two proofs of the above result are presented: one, reducing the functions’ definability problem in ${\mathbf{F}}_{\mathbf{at}}$ to definability in the simply typed lambda calculus and the other, directly adapting Helmut Schwichtenberg’s strategy for definability in $\lambda ^{\rightarrow }$ to the atomic polymorphic setting. The uniformity granted in the polymorphic system, when compared with the simply typed lambda calculus, is emphasized.

Lonergan's account of human consciousness as polymorphic self-presence differs significantly from both the variety of contemporary reductionistic accounts and phenomenological treatments still influenced strongly by Cartesian suppositions and/or Kantian restrictions. It is argued that Lonergan's account grounds not only a critical meta-philosophy, but also provides a heuristic structure for a nuanced genetic account of philosophic differences. In this regard, Lonergan's account is claimed to be an adequate grounding for a thorough contemporary response to the Hegelian requirement that philosophers account not (...) only for their own views but for the existence of contrary and differing philosophic convictions. (shrink)

We present a refinement ofthe bounded modified realizability which provides both upper and lower bounds for witnesses. Our interpretation is based on a generalisation of Howard/Bezem's notion of strong majorizability. We show how the bounded modified realizability coincides with our interpretation in the case when least elements exist . The new interpretation, however, permits the extraction of more accurate bounds, and provides an ideal setting for dealing directly with data types whose natural ordering is not well-founded.

An advanced introduction to the new philosophical anthropology and an understanding of the most contemporary developments in it.

Realizability notions in mathematical logic have a long history, which can be traced back to the work of Stephen Kleene in the 1940s, aimed at exploring the foundations of intuitionistic logic. Kleene’s initial realizability laid the ground for more sophisticated notions such as Kreisel’s modified realizability and various modern approaches. In this context, our work aligns with the lineage of realizability strategies that emphasize the accumulation, rather than the propagation of precise witnesses. In this paper, we introduce a new notion (...) of realizability, namely herbrandized modified realizability. This novel form of (cumulative) realizability, presented within the framework of semi-intuitionistic logic is based on a recently developed star combinatory calculus, which enables the gathering of witnesses into nonempty finite sets. We also show that the previous analysis can be extended from logic to (Heyting) arithmetic. (shrink)