This introduction provides an overview of the life, career, and social thought of Gerhard Lenski. Following a preliminary description of Lenski's contributions, this essay is divided into two sections. The first section examines the origins, education, and biographical influences on Lenski as a major social theorist as well as the intellectual foundation of his sociological theories. The second section presents Lenski's work, impact, and legacy and sets the stage for the original essays that are grouped (...) around four of six key areas of Lenski's work, which has had enormous impact on both American and international sociology: (1) teaching sociology; (2) "status crystallization" and "status inconsistency"; (3) sociology of religion and "the religious factor"; (4) social stratification, "power and privilege"; (5) gender stratification in comparative-historical perspective; and (6) ecological-evolutionary theory. While these six areas do not correspond neatly to the progressive phases of Lenski's theory development and sociological career, they are interconnected and reflect Lenski's central concerns in asking the big questions about human societies and in providing explanations for understanding the processes of social change, differentiation, and inequality among and within human societies, across time and space, from hunting and gathering to postindus trial societies. (shrink)

Gerhard Lenski's classical work on stratification, "Power and Privilege", was an effort to reconcile and to synthesize different approaches to inequality incorporated into the grand theories of the day. It anticipated a variety of developments in the theoretical and empirical understanding of inequalities. These include recognition of the multiplicity of inequalities; emphasis on race, class, gender, and other sources and systems of domination and subordination; and the intersection of these factors in complex patterns to create different standpoints and (...) life consequences. The result was ground-breaking work that underscored the multidimensionality of stratification systems, the variability of their influences, and the notion that their intersection in itself has implications beyond the sum of component parts. In these ways his work foreshadowed the possibilities of finding common ground between modern and postmodern perspectives, to make Lenski the last grand theorist of modernity and a forerunner of postmodern theories of inequality. (shrink)

Animals have had a profound influence on human societies, playing a major role in the course of human history. However, their presence and theoretical significance has been overlooked in sociological theory, while being the central concern of the growing field of anthrozoology (the study of the interaction between humans and other animals). To illustrate how a focus on other animal species can improve our understanding of sociocultural evolution, we assess the influential work of Gerhard Lenski and Patrick Nolan (...) and their materialist approach to macrosociology. Animals are largely invisible in Lenski and Nolan’s Ecological-Evolutionary Theory, yet they underlie the key subsistence technologies identified by Lenski and Nolan as crucial for explaining uneven development. By considering the history of domestication, the role animals played in the development of agricultural technology, and the translocation of Eurasian livestock during the colonial era, we show how sociocultural evolution is situated within a larger nexus of socioecological and historical conditions that reciprocally determine technological development and cultural heritage. Our analysis illustrates that anthrozoology, far from being an esoteric field of study, has the potential to contribute to a refined understanding of a wide array of social phenomena. (shrink)

Four decades have passed since the publication of Gerhard Lenski's "The Religious Factor". While generally regarded as a classic in the sociology of religion, the book has had a curious history, largely because of the interest it generated in differences between Protestants and Catholics. In this paper I provide an alternative reading of The Religious Factor's impact on sociology of religion that points to its larger theoretical implications. I argue that the book should be understood in relation to (...) continuing debates about the classification of religious traditions, differentiation among socioreligious groups, intergroup relations among religious traditions, and friendship ties within religious communities. Through understanding these contributions, the book's legacy as well as continuities and new opportunities in the study of religion can be appreciated. (shrink)

Like scientific theories, metaphysical theories can and should be justified by the inference of creative abduction. Two rationality conditions are proposed that distinguish scientific from speculative abductions: achievement of unification and independent testability. Particularly important in science is common cause abduction. The justification of metaphysical realism is structurally similar to scientific abductions: external objects are justified as common causes of perceptual experiences. While the reliability of common cause abduction is entailed by a principle of causality, the latter principle has an (...) abductive justification based on statistical phenomena. (shrink)

It is well known that the process of scientific inquiry, according to Peirce, is drivenby three types of inference, namely abduction, deduction, and induction. What isbehind these labels is, however, not so clear. In particular, the common identificationof “abduction” with “Inference to the Best Explanation” (IBE) begs the question,since IBE appears to be covered by Peirce's concept of induction, not that of abduction.Consequently, abduction ought to be distinguished from IBE, at least on Peirce's account. The main aim of the paper, (...) however, is to show that this distinction is most relevant with respect to current problems in philosophy of science and epistemology (like attempts to supply suitable notions of realism and truth as well as related concepts like coherence and unification). In particular, I also try to show that (and in what way) Peirce's inferential triad can function as a method that ensures both coherence and correspondence. It is in this respect that his careful distinction between abduction and induction (or IBE) ought to be heeded. (shrink)

Question: Where, when and under what circumstances did the two of you get to know each other?Fischer: It was in the early seventies, in Frankfurt, after the dissolution of the gauche proletarienne and while there were still leftist groups in Germany. It must have been 1972. Question: Was that a private visit?Glucksmann: We had private discussions. We also participated in rallies and demonstrations.Question: That was in the late phase of the student movement.Fischer: We kept in contact through my old room-mate, (...) Daniel Cohn-Bendit. He was our link to France, so to speak.Question: And was this the link between the French and the German Left that existed then? (shrink)

In Sect. 1 it is argued that systems of logic are exceptional, but not a priori necessary. Logics are exceptional because they can neither be demonstrated as valid nor be confirmed by observation without entering a circle, and their motivation based on intuition is unreliable. On the other hand, logics do not express a priori necessities of thinking because alternative non-classical logics have been developed. Section 2 reflects the controversies about four major kinds of non-classical logics—multi-valued, intuitionistic, paraconsistent and quantum (...) logics. Its purpose is to show that there is no particular domain or reason that demands the use of a non-classical logic; the particular reasons given for the non-classical logic can also be handled within classical logic. The result of Sect. 2 is substantiated in Sect. 3, where it is shown (referring to other work) that all four kinds of non-classical logics can be translated into classical logic in a meaning-preserving way. Based on this fact a justification of classical logic is developed in Sect. 4 that is based on its representational optimality. It is pointed out that not many but a few non-classical logics can be likewise representationally optimal. However, the situation is not symmetric: classical logic has ceteris paribus advantages as a unifying metalogic, while non-classical logics can have local simplicity advantages. (shrink)

Statistical mechanics attempts to explain the behaviour of macroscopic physical systems in terms of the mechanical properties of their constituents. Although it is one of the fundamental theories of physics, it has received little attention from philosophers of science. Nevertheless, it raises philosophical questions of fundamental importance on the nature of time, chance and reduction. Most philosophical issues in this domain relate to the question of the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. This book addresses issues inherent in this reduction: (...) the time-asymmetry of thermodynamics and its absence in statistical mechanics; the role and essential nature of chance and probability in this reduction when thermodynamics is non-probabilistic; and how, if at all, the reduction is possible. Compiling contributions on current research by experts in the field, this is an invaluable survey of the philosophy of statistical mechanics for academic researchers and graduate students interested in the foundations of physics. (shrink)

Wer hat sich nicht schon gefragt, was es mit unseren moralischen Überzeugungen auf sich hat: Spiegeln diese die Wahrheit in Sachen Moral wieder? Gibt es eine solche Wahrheit überhaupt? Oder sind moralische Überzeugungen eher das Produkt unserer Interessen und Neigungen, Ausdruck unserer Wünsche oder Mittel der Machtausübung, das bloße Ergebnis unserer Erziehung, unseres sozialen Umfelds oder gar eine List der Evolution? Ist es eine Illusion, wenn man glaubt, echte moralische Erkenntnisse gewinnen zu können? Kurzum: Kann die Moral Objektivität beanspruchen? Die (...) vorliegende Arbeit versucht, eine Antwort auf diese zentrale Frage der Metaethik zu geben. Dazu wird zunächst gezeigt, dass uns der Status der Moral ein Rätsel ist, weil wir dazu neigen, drei Thesen für wahr zu halten, die nicht zugleich wahr sein können. Die drei prinzipiell möglichen Strategien zur Auflösung dieses Trilemmas geraten jedoch in Schwierigkeiten, weil es bisher nicht gelungen ist, ein passendes Vergleichsobjekt für die Moral zu finden. In dieser Arbeit wird dafür argumentiert, dass die Moral in genau der gleichen Weise wie die Wissenschaft Objektivität beanspruchen kann. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the question whether the notion of ownedness or authenticity in Being and Time can serve as a model for social change. To answer this question, I build on the late Dreyfus’s understanding of owned Dasein as a “world transformer”, Butler’s understanding of contingent foundations, and Kyle Stroh’s conception of owned Dasein in the plural, in order to develop a notion of social ownedness. In my reading, ownedness concerns primarily the transparency of ontological structures on the part of (...) the owned self, including a proper understanding of the role of the anyone. The owned self realizes that the anyone remains the foundation of intelligibility, but understands it as a contingent foundation and thereby contests its absolutization and the tendency of conformism. After an interpretation of Heidegger’s remarks on “nullity” and “abyss of ground “ in relation to Butler’s theory of post-foundationalism, and a discussion of “historicality” in relation to Butler’s notion of performativity as iterability, I offer a reinterpretation of the figure of the “world transformer” and end with a proposal on how to understand social ownedness. (shrink)

Sebastian Franck hat Teile von Agrippas De Vanitate Scientiarum übersetzt und kommentiert. Von daher ist der Einfluss der Philosophie von Agrippa auf Franck bekannt. Es gab allerdings bisher keine ausführlichen Untersuchungen zu den Einflüssen von Agrippa auf Franck. Diese Lücke versucht dieser Aufsatz zu schließen. Beim Vergleich der metaphysischen Systeme von Franck und Agrippa stellt sich heraus, dass es bedeutende Einflüsse im Bereich der Seelenlehre und der Christologie gab. Sowohl Agrippa als auch Franck sind Anhänger der platonischen Lehre der drei (...) Seelenteile. Die Seele besteht nach dieser Lehre aus Geist, Seele und Körper. Der Geist ist der unsterbliche göttliche Teil im Menschen. Der Hauptunterschied zwischen Agrippa und Franck kann darin gesehen werden, dass Agrippas Synkretismus stärker den Neuplatonismus betont und Franck`s Synkretismus die Gnosis. Die Weltseele ergibt im Konzept von Franck nur wenig Sinn, während diese bei Agrippa ganz zentral ist. Franck lehnt den Gedanken ab, die Welt werde durch eine Vernunft geleitet. Sein pessimistisches Bild von der Welt und vom Menschen verträgt sich nicht mit diesem Gedanken. Da es keine Vernunft gibt, ist auch die Astrologie, die Mantik oder die Kabbalistik nicht wichtig für Franck. Daher ist es nicht verwunderlich, dass Franck nirgends die Occulta philosophia zitiert, sondern immer nur De Vantitate Scientiarum Der Synkretismus von Agrippa beinhaltet Astrologie, Mantik, Kabbala und Neuplatonismus. Am ehesten spielt bei Franck noch die Hermetik eine Rolle. Franck meint, Christus habe im Pimander mit Hermes Trismegistos kommuniziert. Diesen Gedanken findet man nicht nur bei Franck, sondern auch bei Agrippa. Die für Franck so wichtige Lehre des inneren Christus ist ebenfalls Teil der Seelenlehre von Agrippa. Wenn der Mensch seinen Geist oder seinen inneren Christus erkennt, dann erkennt er Gott. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass Franck nur diejenigen Dinge von dem „weisen Agrippa“ übernommen hat, die in sein Konzept passen. (shrink)

Im Zentrum der Hauptform des metaethischen Relativismus steht eine kontextualistische Analyse der Bedeutung moralischer Aussagen. Gegen diese Analyse lassen sich jedoch bestimmte sprachliche Beobachtungen anführen, die der Relativist erklären muss, wenn er an seiner Theorie festhalten möchte. In diesem Aufsatz argumentiere ich für die These, dass keiner dieser Erklärungsversuche gelingt. Wir betrachten, wie sich zeigt, moralische Aussagen als weder in offensichtlicher noch in versteckter Weise kontextsensitiv. Damit gerät aber der Relativismus als metaethische Position überhaupt in ernsthafte Bedrängnis.

In this article, I explore how the emancipatory potential of the human capacity to desire and be desired can contribute to more inclusive, sustainable, and convivial futures. I differentiate four m...

In the first section, five major attempts to solve the problem of induction and their failures are discussed. In the second section, an account of meta-induction is introduced. It offers a novel solution to the problem of induction, based on mathematical theorems about the predictive optimality of attractivity-weighted meta-induction. In the third section, how the a priori justification of meta-induction provides a non-circular a posteriori justification of object-induction, based on its superior track record, is explained. In the fourth section, four (...) important extensions and refinements of the method of meta-induction are presented. The final section, summarizes the major impacts of the program of meta-induction for epistemology, the philosophy of science and cognitive science. (shrink)

This paper is intended as a contribution to a recent vigorous debate inThe Times, between the distinguished journalist Bernard Levin, the eminent Oxford economist Wilfred Beckerman and the Archbishop of York, John Habgood, among others. The debate concerns morality, ‘free will’ and determinism. As a former German Jew, who lost close relatives at Auschwitz and who suffered personally severely in my youth under daily virulent Nazi persecution, I obviously cannot remain strictly detached and neutral. Yet, I shall attempt to retain (...) as much neutrality as possible, since I think that the main rivals in this debate have all some very relevant, interesting and valid things to say. Let me also state other, probably very relevant, biases. I am an ardent Zionist. In addition, I am a diehard mechanistic materialist as regards basic philosophy, although I am tolerant of other people's religious feelings, because I realize that my materialism is as metaphysical as their religious views. With this as background let me return to the technical issues. Obviously, in a philosophical journal one can write at a level above that ofThe Times, where there is, perhaps, insufficient room to debate philosophical, biological, physical and other niceties in some depth. (shrink)

This paper deals with the “magic” of the Carpocratians, who, according to Irenaeus of Lyon, believed in the Platonic tripartite nature of the soul. The Carpocratian approach to philosophical magic is probably derived from Neoplatonic ideas popular during the first centuries of the Common Era. The Carpocrations, a second-century Christian Gnostic group, believed Yeshua was a soul personality like all other people, but because of his “spiritualization,” he reached the state of the “philosophical magician.” He did not lose his memory (...) while “staying with his Father” (while he was in the eternal sphere before his next incarnation) and, according to Irenaeus, despised the creators (angels) of the world during the ascension of the soul, a Hermetic and Neoplatonic notion. In addition, as the Christ, Yeshua overcame all emotions and passions. That is, according to the Neoplatonic tripartite nature of the soul, he overcame the emotional part of himself in favor of the spirit. This ascent gave him magical abilities such as healing and prophecy. The Carpocratians believed that each soul can achieve what Christ achieved. Ceremonial and heavenly magic was practiced by the Carpocratians, but their main goal was to achieve the complete spiritualization of the soul or the attainment of Christ Consciousness. To analyze Carpocratian magic, it is useful to use the theories of other magicians like Agrippa von Nettesheim or Iamblichus, because their ideas improve our limited understanding of the text by the Early Church Writer Irenaeus whose basic interest in the Carpocratians was heresiology. Finally, this analysis of how magic was applied by the Carpocratians could contribute to a better understanding of their philosophy. (shrink)

La sous-spécification peut être, et est généralement, appréhendée à l’heure actuelle comme relevant d’une classe d’emplois de certains noms. On peut également aborder la sous-spécification, non plus comme fondant un type d’emploi, mais comme une propriété sémantique intrinsèque de certains noms ou types de noms et éprouver, d’une part, que cette sous-spécification est présente quels que soient les emplois du nom qui la manifeste, et d’autre part, qu’elle a partie liée avec d’autres propriétés sémantiques comme la généralité, l’abstraction et la (...) non-autonomie référentielle notamment. Cet article vise à traiter la sous-spécification dans cette dernière perspective avec pour illustration le comportement du nom général élément. (shrink)

Gperhard Heinzmann, Rédacteur en chef La philosophie est la mère des sciences. Il faut avoir une bonne mémoire pour se le rappeler. Quel bonheur lorsque ce rappel vient d’une collègue qui ne l’a pas appris, mais qui éprouve la nécessité de questionner sa pratique scientifique et actualise ainsi l’ancienne métaphore! C’était le cas de Catherine Dufour. On se connaissait vaguement depuis l’école maternelle des Trois Maisons que fréquentaient nos enfants. Je fus donc très heureux de découvrir,...

Pascal Engel distingue globalement deux tendances de concevoir la vérité : les uns défendent une théorie substantialiste selon laquelle la vérité exprime une « caractéristique réelle », les autres, déflationnistes, soutiennent que la vérité n’est pas une propriété authentique des porteurs de vérités. Prenant le réalisme comme option par défaut, Engel cherche une position médiane stable, telle que la vérité est un concept plus substantiel que le déflationnisme ne le prétend et moins substantiel que les théories réalistes ne disent qu’elle (...) est. Dans cet article on développe une solution médiane alternative à la position proposée par Engel en se basant sur une option anti-réaliste et pragmatique. On montre, plus exactement, dans quelle mesure la conception dialogique de la vérité, avancée par Kuno Lorenz, s’oppose aux thèses défendues par Engel tout en poursuivant le même but que lui. (shrink)

Pascal Engel distingue globalement deux tendances de concevoir la vérité : les uns défendent une théorie substantialiste selon laquelle la vérité exprime une « caractéristique réelle », les autres, déflationnistes, soutiennent que la vérité n’est pas une propriété authentique des porteurs de vérités. Prenant le réalisme comme option par défaut, Engel cherche une position médiane stable, telle que la vérité est un concept plus substantiel que le déflationnisme ne le prétend et moins substantiel que les théories réalistes ne disent qu’elle (...) est. Dans cet article on développe une solution médiane alternative à la position proposée par Engel en se basant sur une option anti-réaliste et pragmatique (mais non utilitariste). On montre, plus exactement, dans quelle mesure la conception dialogique de la vérité, avancée par Kuno Lorenz, s’oppose aux thèses défendues par Engel tout en poursuivant le même but que lui. (shrink)

This volume focuses on constructivism, which is here intended as a general philosophical attitude arising from reflection upon mathematics. We are concerned with the ways in which this idea is applied in science and with the theoretical reflections these applications give rise to. For this purpose this volume presents different sides of the general idea of constructivity, with the intention of getting a broader, and hopefully insightful, understanding of questions such as ‘what is a construct...

RésuméSelon un pragmatiste, la réflexion du philosophe porte sur le lien entre la construction et la description des objets mathématiques. Grâce à sa conception?un raisonnement dit ≫theorematique≪, Peirce a réussi à etablir ľesquisse?une interprétation pragmatique?une structure mathématique. Cette dernière reste néanmoins vague quant à la catégoricité de la structure. – lci, il est utile de recourir à Gonseth et & dcar;analyser sa reconstruction?un système axiomatique: la genèse logique?une structure selon les principes de ľidonéisme correspond en effet au programme de Peirce, (...) à savoir àľexplication de la signification?un concept àľaide?une séquence cumulative? interprétants.SummaryAccording to a pragmatist, philosophical thought bears on the link between the construction and the description of mathematical objects. Thanks to his development of ≫theorematic reasoning)), Peirce succeeded in bringing forward a pragmatic interpretation of a mathematical structure, exhibiting however an inherent vagueness with regard to the categoricalness of the structure. ‐ In this matter, Gonseth's model of reconstruction of an axiomatic system can be resorted to: the logical genesis of a structure considered in his ≫ldoneism≪ corresponds to Peirce's program of explaining the meaning of a concept by means of a cumulative sequence of interpretants. (shrink)

English summary: This ambitious study proposes an analysis of intuition that will allow us to understand it cognitive role in the justification of our beliefs and philosophical and mathematical reasoning. The book first demonstrates that the cognitive function of intuition passes through a semiotic system before situating the semantic treatment of intuition in the context of classic problems in philosophy, logic, and mathematics. French description: Proposer une symptomatique de l'intuition nous permettant de comprendre son fonctionnement cognitif dans la justification de (...) nos croyances et de nos raisonnements philosophiques et mathematiques, tel est le defi releve dans ce livre. La premiere partie montre que la fonction cognitive de l'intuition dans la comprehension et la justification passe par l'utilisation d'un systeme semiotique. Un tel systeme est utilise intuitivement si, dans une action situee, les aspects significatifs et representatifs sont interdependants. Une demande de legitimation de ce qui est represente ne se place pas au meme niveau de reflexion que celui de l'intuition. Qu'elle puisse etre a la fois evidente et faillible n'a des lors rien de paradoxal. La deuxieme partie montre qu'envisager l'intuition dans une symptomatologie ne nous eloigne pas de la tradition philosophique. Au contraire, le traitement semantique de la question de l'intuition eclaire certains problemes classiques en philosophie, en logique et en mathematiques; et il permet de relire a nouveaux frais aussi bien Aristote, Descartes ou Kant, que Helmholtz, Poincare, Brouwer, Weyl, Beth et Cavailles. (shrink)

Note du rédacteur en chef Après l’édition de 26 fascicules de Philosophia Scientiœ, produits grâce au volontariat de différents membres des Archives Henri Poincaré, nous sommes très heureux que le CNRS et, en particulier, la Délégation Nord-Est nous ait affecté, en la personne de Monsieur Prosper Doh, un éditeur technique compétent. Ainsi, on évitera dorénavant certaines difficultés et malentendus regrettables. Dans ce numéro, nous continuons notre programme de traduction de l’allemand entrep...