Poppe r e nt i e nde l a r a c i ona l i da d e ntérminos de nuestra actitud intelectual.Nuestra racionalidad no es una facultad ni un don intelectual.No es al go dado a un i ndi vi duo, deacuerdo con él. Es una actitud que hemosadquirido de nuestra relación intelectualcon otros. Popper no usa “racionalismo”como un término filosófico que significaintelectualismo en oposición a empirismo.El artículo muestra claramente que Popperent i ende el r aci onal i (...) smo no como l agr a nde z a de l a r a z ón, s i no c omo l acomprensión de uno del límite de la razón.Sin embargo, surge una pregunta; ¿qué tanbien ha comprendido tal racionalista ellímite de su propio racionalismo? ¿Cómodebemos entender este límite? Popperafi rma que un raci onal i sta ha notadoel límite del racionalismo al prever elcarácter auto-destructivo del racionalismoc ompr e he ns i vo. A f i n de ha c e r má scomprensible su afirmación tenemos queexplicar el racionalismo comprehensiveque Popper aprehendió.Popper understands the rationality interms of our intellectual attitude. Ourrationality is neithera faculty nor an intellectual gift. It isnot something given to an individual,according to him. It is an attitude thatwe have acquired from our intellectualintercourse with others. Popper does notuse “rationalism” as a philosophical termthat means intellectualism in oppositionto empiricism.This paper clearly shows that Popperunde r s t a nds r a t i o na l i s m no t a s t heal mi ght i nes s of r eas on, but as one’ srealization of the limit of reason. However,there arises a question; how has such arationalist realized the limit of his ownrationalism? How we should understandthis limit? Popper asserts that a rationalisthas noticed the limit of rationalism byenvisaging the self-defeating character ofthe comprehensive rationalism. In order tomake more understandable his assertion,we must at first explain the comprehensiverationalism apprehended by Popper. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RESPONSE TO BRUCE MARSHALL GEORGE LINDBECK There is an abundance of il'iches in Bruce Marshalrs essay. He makes me understand hoth myse1f and Aquinas hetter than I biaid done hefore; and, interestingly, it is chiefly hy his exegesis of St. Thomas that he does :bhis. If I had referred more to the Thomistic ideas he elucidates when I wirus writing Natrure of Dootrine1 it would have!been a better hook. (...) What he calls the " somewhat notorious " example of the crusadeT"s Christus est Dominus is a good oase in point. It would ihave helped if I had made dear that I was thinking in medieval [ashion of a an individual rutterance, the product of a pa•riticular :second 1aJct of the intellect, the ·acl of composing and dividing, of judging ·such and such rto ibe rthe ca,se. In Aquinas' intellectual setting, judgments, not sentences in ·abstraiction from 1 acls of affirmation, were propositions capruble of being true or f.a1se. Many of my ·reruders had a more modern or "Platonic " understanding of rpropositions, and therefore missed the force of the e:xJam:ple ·as Marshall so carefully and rightly explains it. Among his contributions, the major one, however, is system- •a1tically to introduce into the disCUJssion the distinction between the " truth " and " justification " of beliefs or pI'oposi- "'" tionS.- Once the point is made, it is evident that " alethiology" and " epistemology " (to mention a cognate, though not ~den­ tical distinction) ·are, 1 at least in some contexts, partially independent variables. There is no one-to-one relation between different meanings or theories of truth and the v:arious views as to how we know such ·and such is true. It was my failure to make this point explicit which confosed Fr. Colman O'Neill, of blessed memory, ias well as a good many other readers (1as Bruce Marshall quite rightly notes, though, with excessive 408 404 GEORGEl LINDBECK kindness to me, he!blames the,readers rather than the 'author for the misunderstanding). Once iclarfiied, as it has lbeen done hy Mr. Marshall, the issue turns on ·whether,a classical " correspondence " theory of truth can be ioombined,with, to empfoy O'Neill's terminology, the use of "coherentist" and " pragmatist " epistemological criteria in justifying rbelieis. I ·am not sure ·that this is possible for those who e:xdude any reference to an idea.I observer or knower (whether real or hypothetical) when defining truth, hut for any theist r.for whom God is prima veritas, as he was for Aquinas, the answer is dearly in the affirmative. In God, and only in God, are knowledge and reality, not only in correspondence, hut directly known to correspond. Only in him do truth·and knowledge of truth, 1 aleth:iofogy and epistemology, ooindde. In 1human knowledge in via, in contrast, there is always a gap. Our ibe1ieTs may correspond to reality, hut we are justified in holding that they do so, not by directly seeing the correspondence, 1but by some other means. That those other means might in part or w:hole be coherentist or pragmatist cannot :be e:xduded a priori. It is true that in the caise of an Aristotelian 1such 1as Aquinas, coherence •and rpmctise 1are not explicitly accorded major roles in the epistemological justification of natural kno·wledge or scientia, yet even here they are not e:xduded. Nothing can quali[y ais 1an item of knowledge unless it coheres with all other scientia, and right pra.ctice (i.e., training in virtue) is indispensible :llor ethical kno,wledge. Nor need one cease fo be an Aris,totelian, 1as far ·as I can see, if one accepts the contempOO 'ary oommonpJaice that sense experience itself is heavily dependent on linguistic and non-linguistic pmctices which are in part ·acquired rthrough variaible forim:s of aicculturation and not simply through the actualization of 1genetically encoded propensities. One could still, despite this increased emphasis on prwctiice.and on coherence 1 with webs of 1belief, ibe 'able to affum in good Aristotelian,fashion tha;t the knowledge naturally accessible to ra:t]onal animals such,as we a.re is primarily justified RESPONCE TO BRUCE MARSHALL 405 iby reference to... (shrink)

La cuestión de si los lenguajes intensionalesson más expresivos que los lenguajes nointensionalessurge en el marco de unaperspect i va semánt i ca de l as t eorí as.Desde esta perspectiva, la cuestión esesta. ¿Hay clases modelo que se puedencaracterizar mediante teorías que usanconceptos intensionales que no se puedencaracterizar mediante teorías que no usanconceptos intensionales? Se sugiere unaformulación precisa de esta cuestión, perono se ofrece una respuesta.Para aproxi marse a est a cuest i ón, seresume la teoría de modelos de (...) primerorden [II] y se revisa el enfoque semánticode las teorías que emplea incrementost eóri cos, no i nt ensi onal es, de pri merorden [III].Los i nc r e me nt os t e ór i c os de pr i me rorden se bosquejan pero no se definenr i g u r o s a me n t e [ I V] . E s t e l e n g u a j ei n t e n s i o n a l pr o po r c i o n a e l a p a r a t op a r a a t r i b u i r u s o d e l l e n g u a j e yact i t udes i nt ens i onal es a i ndi vi duoscuyo comportami ento es el obj eto deinvestigación. También proporciona elaparato para habl ar sobre traducci óndel lenguaj e atribuido al lenguaj e delinvestigador.La cuestión inicial se convierte entoncesen si hay clases modelo que se puedanc a r a c t e r i z a r me d i a n t e i n c r e me n t o sintencionales de lógica de primer ordenq ue n o pue de n s e r c a pt ur a do s po rincrementos teóricos no-intensionales [V].The ques t i on of whet her i nt ens i onallanguages are more expressive than nonintensional languages is raised within the framework of a semantic view of theories. Fromthis perspective, the question isthis. Are there model classes that can becharacterized by theories using intensionalconcepts that cannot be characterizedby theories that do not use intensionalconcepts? A precise formulation of thisquestion is suggested, but no answer isgiven.To approach this question, model theory offirst order theories is summarized [II] andthe semantic approach to theories usingnon-intensional, theoretical augmentationsof first order theories is reviewed [III].I n t e n s i o n a l a u g me n t a t i o n s o f f i r s torder theories are sketched [IV] but notr i gor ous l y de f i ne d. Thi s i nt e ns i onall anguage provi des t he apparat us f orattributing language use and intensionalattitudes to individuals whose behavioris the object investigation. It also providesapparatus for talking about translationf r om t he at t r i but e d l anguage t o t heinvestigator’s language.T h e i n i t i a l q u e s t i o n t h e n b e c o me swhet her t here are model cl asses t hatc a n be c ha r a c t e r i z e d by i nt e ns i ona laugmentations of first order logic thatcannot be captured by non-intensionaltheoretical augmentations [V]. (shrink)

This paper responds to the issues raised by D. Chalmers by offering a research direction which is quite radical because of the way in which methodological principles are linked to scientific studies of consciousness. Neuro-phenomenology is the name I use here to designate a quest to marry modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to human experience, thereby placing myself in the lineage of the continental tradition of Phenomenology. My claim is that the so-called hard problem that animates these Special (...) Issues can only be addressed productively by gathering a research community armed with new pragmatic tools for the development of a science of consciousness. I will claim that no piecemeal empirical correlates, nor purely theoretical principles, will really help us at this stage. We need to turn to a systematic exploration of the only link between mind and consciousness that seems both obvious and natural: the structure of human experience itself. In what follows I motivate my choice by briefly examining the current debate about consciousness at the light of Chalmer’s hard problem. Next, I outline the phenomenological strategy. Finally I conclude by discussing some of the main difficulties and consequences of this strategy. (shrink)

Extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) is a form of life support for cardiac and/or pulmonary failure with unique ethical challenges compared to other forms of life support. Ethical challenges with ECMO exist when conventional standards of care apply, and are exacerbated during periods of absolute ECMO scarcity when “crisis standards of care” are instituted. When conventional standards of care apply, we propose that it is ethically permissible to withhold placing patients on ECMO for reasons of technical futility or when patients have (...) terminal, short-term prognoses that are untreatable by ECMO. Under crisis standards of care, it is ethically permissible to broaden exclusionary criteria to also withhold ECMO from patients who have a low likelihood of recovery, to maximize the overall number of lives saved. Unilateral withdrawal of ECMO against a patient’s preferences is unethical under conventional standards of care, but is ethical under crisis standards of care to increase access to ECMO to others in society. ECMO should only be rationed when true scarcity exists, and allocation protocols should be transparent to the public. When rationing must occur under crisis standards of care, it is imperative that oversight bodies assess for inequities in the allocation of ECMO and make frequent changes to improve any inequities. (shrink)

The doxastic view (DV) of trust maintains that trust essentially involves belief. In a recent paper, Arnon Keren (Citation2020) gestures toward a new objection to the view, labeled Trust’s Meno Problem (TMP), which calls into question the DV’s ability to explain the widely held intuition that trust has distinct and indispensable value. As of yet, there has been no attempt to take up TMP on behalf of DV. This paper aims to fill precisely this lacuna. I do so in three (...) main stages. In §1 I contextualize and elucidate the problem, to which Keren gestures but does not address in detail. In §2 I disambiguate multiple possible interpretations of TMP, seeking to identify the most philosophically challenging. Finally, in §3, I argue that DV can solve even this interpretation. In order to do so, I make use ofthe highly plausible claim we find in the work of Katherine Hawley (Citation2012, 2019): that trust pays a compliment to the trustee. The payoffs of exploring the doxastic view in the context of Trust’s Meno Problem are twofold: we better understand the nature of the problem itself, and we see that the doxastic view can give a satisfying answer. (shrink)

Robinson argues that by certain threshold criteria, pregnant women qualify for a higher moral status by reason of their pregnancies. While her intention is to make this a status upgrade for women, we worry that it may result in a status downgrade for women as a class, by presupposing and reinforcing women’s value in relation to their reproductive labour. Historically, central to feminist analysis is resistance to reductive accounts of women in relation to their reproductivity. For example, de Beauvoir addressed (...) men’s transcendence and contrasted it with women’s immanence, a status distinction possible because women are mired in expectations that they will marry, produce children and remain in the domestic realm; and for her part, Firestone argued that biological reproduction underlies women’s inferiority to men and that ‘The reproduction of the species by one sex for the benefit of both (should) be replaced by…artificial reproduction’1 2 Her concern was to liberate women from expectations of biological reproduction so their productive value in society is not reduced to their reproductive contributions. A formidable body of analysis in this same vein cautions against collapsing the value of women into their pregnancies, so much so that some commentators even distinguish ‘mothering’ from gestation.3 Robinson’s argument that pregnant women qualify at a higher threshold of personhood emphasises …. (shrink)

For much of 2021, allocating the scarce supply of Covid‐19 vaccines was the world's most pressing bioethical challenge, and similar challenges may recur for novel therapies and future vaccines. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) identified three fundamental ethical principles to guide the process: maximize benefits, promote justice, and mitigate health inequities. We argue that critical components of the recommended protocol were internally inconsistent with these principles. Specifically, the ACIP (...) violated its principles by recommending overly broad health care worker priority in phase 1a, using being at least seventy‐five years of age as the only criterion to identify individuals at high risk of death from Covid‐19 during phase 1b, failing to recommend place‐based vaccine distribution, and implicitly endorsing first‐come, first‐served allocation. More rigorous empirical work and the development of a complete ethical framework that recognizes trade‐offs between principles may have prevented these mistakes and saved lives. (shrink)

This article focusses on the generality of the entities involved in a geometric proof of the kind found in ancient Greek treatises: it shows that the standard modern translation of Greek mathematical propositions falsifies crucial syntactical elements, and employs an incorrect conception of the denotative letters in a Greek geometric proof; epigraphic evidence is adduced to show that these denotative letters are ‘letter-labels’. On this basis, the article explores the consequences of seeing that a Greek mathematical proposition is fully general, (...) and the ontological commitments underlying the stylistic practice. (shrink)

We maximally extend the quantum‐mechanical results of Muller and Saunders ( 2008 ) establishing the ‘weak discernibility’ of an arbitrary number of similar fermions in finite‐dimensional Hilbert spaces. This confutes the currently dominant view that ( A ) the quantum‐mechanical description of similar particles conflicts with Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII); and that ( B ) the only way to save PII is by adopting some heavy metaphysical notion such as Scotusian haecceitas or Adamsian primitive thisness. We (...) take sides with Muller and Saunders ( 2008 ) against this currently dominant view, which has been expounded and defended by many. *Received July 2008; revised May 2009. †To contact the authors, please write to: F. A. Muller, Faculty of Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Burg. Oudlaan 50, H5–16, 3062 PA Rotterdam, The Netherlands; e‐mail: [email protected] , and Institute for the History and Foundations of Science, Utrecht University, Budapestlaan 6, IGG–3.08, 3584 CD Utrecht, The Netherlands; e‐mail: [email protected] . M. P. Seevinck, Institute for the History and Foundations of Science, Utrecht University, Budapestlaan 6, IGG–3.08, 3584 CD Utrecht, The Netherlands; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the main contribution of Hegel's philosophy of right to the contemporary political debate is that it opens a window on the idea that liberalism and individual freedom are incompatible. My main thesis is that the liberal conception of the State and law, structured from a nonrelational account of singularity, ends up denying the individual freedom that it claims to defend. I begin by reconstructing the Hegelian concept of freedom from its most general lines, showing (...) that being free consists in wanting to become someone and not so much in wanting to do something. After showing that the purpose of becoming someone can only be fulfilled in a social medium, I focus on Hegel's critique of the liberal state (as expounded in the section on “civil society”). I argue that civil society structurally impedes individuals from realizing their purpose of becoming someone: the economical interactions of civil society give rise to impersonal and inscrutable mechanisms, which take the social conditions of people's individuation beyond their control. Finally, I claim that (rational) individual freedom consists in being able to thematize and democratically control the very social conditions of individuation through the State and law. (shrink)

In a lengthy article E. Scerri and J. Worrall put forward the case for a novel ‘accommodationist’ version of the events surrounding the development of Mendeleef's Periodic Table 1869–1899. However these authors lay undue stress on the fact that President of the Royal Society of London Spottiswoode made absolutely no mention of Mendeleef's famous predictions in the Davy Medal eulogy in 1883 and undue stress on the fact that Cleve's classic 1879 Scandium paper contained an acknowledgement of Mendeleef's prior prediction (...) of eka-boron.They also fail to analyse in any detail the so-called ‘rare earth problem’ which, in the opinion of this author, causes problems for their account but not for a predictivist account. (shrink)

My discussion addresses the differences between analytic and continental philosophy concerning the use of logic and exact reasoning in philosophical practice. These differences are mainly examined in the light of the controversial dominance of Hegel's concept of logic (and theory of concept) in twentieth-century continental philosophy. The inquiry is developed in two parts. In the first (Sections 1-2), I indicate some aspects of the analytic-continental divide, pointing to the role that the topic 'logic and philosophy' plays in it. In the (...) second part (Sections 3-6), I give a short account of the views of logic which are typical of the three main trends of continental philosophy (see Table 1). I also suggest how, with the aid of some typical analytical devices, some continental 'anti-logical' attitudes may be corrected, on their own terms. (shrink)

The editors introduce the core areas of current debate within historical theory, bringing the reader as up to date with continuing debates and current developments as is possible. This important handbook brings together in one volume discussions of the role of modernity, empiricism, realism, post-modernity and deconstruction in the historian’s craft. Chapters are written by leading writers from around the world and cover a wide spread of historical sub-disciplines, such as social history, intellectual history, narrative, gender, memory, psycho-analysis and cultural (...) studies, taking in, along the way, the work of thinkers such as Paul Ricouer, Michel Foucault and Hayden White. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Über den Stand der indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahaviras und Buddhas" verfügbar.

Resumen Ante el dilema de si la Lógica de Hegel debe entenderse como una ontología o como una continuación del proyecto kantiano de la lógica trascendental, el artículo sostiene que no es propiamente una ontología, ni un análisis de conceptos y categorías subjetivas. Su vocación metafísica se basa en el postulado según el cual la reflexión del pensamiento sobre sí mismo tiene consecuencias para la comprensión del ser de lo que no es pensamiento, de modo que resulta ser un proyecto (...) novedoso de ontología mediada por la autorreflexión del pensar.This text faces the dilemma whether Hegel’s Logic must be understood as ontology or as continuation of the Kantian project of transcendental logics. It upholds the thesis that Hegel’s Logic is not properly an Ontology -a direct and immediate description of object’s immanent way of being- nor an analysis of merely subjective concepts and categories. The metaphysical vocation of Hegel’s Logic draws rather on the claim that thought’s self-reflection has necessarily consequences for the comprehension of the being of all that is not thought. Hence, we are facing a groundbreaking project of an ontology that is mediated by thought’s self-reflection. (shrink)

We propose 4 equity-advancing operational improvements to eligibility and sign-up processes at mass vaccination sites: (1) preregistration using existing information, (2) eligibility rules that recognize the greater burden of COVID-19 in underserved neighborhoods, (3) appointment assignment that prioritizes those with disadvantage, and (4) socioculturally informed outreach to lottery selectees.

This chapter contains sections titled: Socrates Café Café Philosophique Philosophy for Everyone Sophistry The Examined Life Oblivion Conclusion (Who is Ben's Mom?).

Ghanaian fertility decline may not be associated with women's having greater control over reproduction. Focus groups of young Ghanaian men and women indicate that attitudes supporting men's dominance in fertility decisions characterize even the highly educated. Young women with high fertility desires anticipate being able to stop childbearing when they want to, but they do not expect to be able to continue if their husband wants to stop. Those with low fertility desires do not anticipate being able to stop without (...) husband consent, but they envision support for continuing childbearing. Women's expected influence appears limited to situations where their fertility desires conform to normative expectations. (shrink)

An illustrated introduction to the major subjects of Western philosophy, guided by Heraclitus.

The influence of physician judgment on the disclosure, competency, understanding, voluntariness, and decision aspects of informed consent for bone marrow transplantation are described. Ethical conflicts which arise from the amount and complexity of the information to be disclosed and from the barriers of limited time, patient anxiety and lack of prior relationship between patient and physician are discussed. The role of the referring physician in the decision-making is considered. Special ethical issues which arise with use of healthy related bone marrow (...) donors are discussed, as is the physician's discretion in raising questions of competency. It is concluded that in this setting, regardless of the theoretical goals of the physician, patients appear to utilize informed consent discussions to assess their capacity to trust the physician rather than as a time to weigh the large amount of relevant data. The conscientious physician best serves the patient with recommendation of the best medical alternative rather than with attempts to remain neutral. (shrink)

Desde o Problema XXX, atribuído a Aristóteles, uma longa tradição de filósofos, artistas e escritores vê a melancolia como afeto positivo ligado ao “homem de gênio” e à criação intelectual em geral. Do ponto de vista da teoria dos afetos de Espinosa, o problema da melancolia coloca um outro: como é possível que de uma tristeza profunda possa nascer a atividade intectual, artística, literária? Toda atividade é uma produção, uma alegria, aumento da potência de agir e pensar: como ela poderia (...) nascer da melancolia? Nossa hipótese é que o problema se explica pela “alegria eufórica”, a outra face da melancolia, que nasce como reação do desejo contra a própria tristeza. Por ser alegria, afasta a tristeza profunda; mas por ser eufórica, mantém o “melancólico” preso à sua própria doença. Assim, a reação não cura o “doente” de seu “mal”, o mantém num círculo interminável de euforia e estado melancólico. (shrink)

In a paper entitled "Revolution in Permanence", published in the collection "Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems", John Worrall severely criticised several aspects of Karl Popper's work before commenting that "I have no doubt that, given sufficient motivation, a case could be constructed on the basis of such remarks that Popper had a more sophisticated version of theory production......". Part of Worrall's criticism is directed at a "strawpopper": in his "Darwinian Model" emphasising the similarities and differences between genetic mutation, variation in (...) animal behaviour and the gestation of scientific theories, Popper never stated that tentative scientific conjectures "while more or less random, are not completely blind." He was referring to variation in animal species behaviour, and about tentative scientific conjectures he said nothing, although common sense would indicate that presumably he regarded them as being less blind and less random. In Popper, giving a summary of his "Darwinian Model", he repaired this omission about tentative scientific conjectures by inserting the sentence "On a level of World 3 theory formation they are of the character of planned gropings into the unknown." Recent developments in the field of genetics, Lewis, Korn ) indicate that Popper's intuitions were along the modern lines while Worrall's intuitions are old fashioned. Therefore Popper's "Darwinian Model" remains both viable and fruitful. (shrink)

" -- F. Bradford Wallack The twentieth century has seen the greatest innovations in philosophical cosmology since Newton and Descartes, and Alfred North Whitehead was the first and greatest of the philosophers to work out these innovations ...