The strongly innovative theory of whole-parts relations outlined by Husserl in his Third logical Investigation—to which he attributed a basic value for his entire phenomenology—has recently attracted a renewed interest. Although many important issues have been clarified (especially by Kit Fine) the subject seems still worth being revisited. To this aim Husserlian universes are introduced. These are lower bounded distributive lattices endowed with a unary operation of defect and a binary relation of isogeneity. Husserl's contents are identified with nonzero elements (...) of a Husserlian universe and the dependence relations among contents are defined and studied starting from the idea that the defect of xis what x needs in order to ‘exist’ i.e., in order to be ‘closed’ with respect to the closure operation defined as the sup of x and its defect. It turns out that there are (at least) eight dependence relations which are worth to be considered. Many other questions concerning the world of contents (among them the proofs of the famous Husserl's Sätze) may now be discussed and clarified. Then the theory of species and genera is developed. Ultimate species (for short: species) are identified with equivalence classes of contents modulo isogeneity, and species in general (for short: genera) are identified with arbitrary unions of species. On the basis of the relation obtaining among two contents when they are isogeneous to two contents the first of which is a part of the second it becomes possible to develop a rather satisfying interpretation of Husserl's theory of the dependencies among species and genera and of the material a priori laws. By strengthening the notion of Husserlian universe into the notion of rigid Husserlian universe, the theory of species and genera obtains a stronger version. Three models of the theory are exhibited. The first one, suggested by combinatorial-topological considerations, identifies contents with finite non-empty sets of natural numbers; the second one identifies contents with non-empty sets of formulas of a formal language; the third one (not totally ‘rigid’) identifies contents with positive integers. (shrink)

This paper gives two complete and elementary proofs that if the speed of light over closed paths has a universal value c, then it is possible to synchronize clocks in such a way that the one-way speed of light is c. The first proof is an elementary version of a recent proof. The second provides high precision experimental evidence that it is possible to synchronize clocks in such a way that the one-way speed of light has a universal value. We (...) also discuss an old incomplete proof by Weyl which is important from an historical perspective. (shrink)

This special issue re-evaluates the 1950s as a period of transnationalism in ideas and political practices, offering innovative insights into political history and political ideas. Without setting the national and transnational spheres against each other, the issue argues that the dialectics between the two was a defining element of Europe in this period. The articles explore transnational cooperation and exchanges among intellectuals, politicians and trade unionists, showing how they were changing in their interaction. The editorial sets out from the research (...) on the postwar configuration of Europe based on the retake of the nation state, combining it with new research of transnational history and putting out some methodological innovations. The editorial also highlights some significant themes across the articles: the central role of translation and localisation, the interaction with local interests and disputes, the Cold War, the acceleration of European integration, the rise of the Third World, the tensions between hope and fear or between nihilism and rebirth of Europe, the centrality of science. (shrink)

Catholic Philosophy has long acknowledged the primary place of Metaphysics, and a primary question of metaphysicians is “what is Metaphysics about?” This paper engages this primary metaphysical question through the lens of Scholastic dispute over the adequate subject matter of Metaphysics. Chrysostom Iavelli defended the position that the subject of Metaphysics is real being common to God and creatures against the position of his predecessor Dominic Flandrensis who had argued that it is categorical being to the exclusion of uncreated being. (...) I find Flandrensis’s position represented in the writings of notable contemporary Thomists, but not Iavelli’s. This paper, offers a sixteenth-century Thomist’s position on the subject matter of Metaphysics as a challenge to current Thomist consensus. It attempts to prompt a re-investigation of the reasons behind the current consensus both as a philosophical position and as an interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)

La logique cartésienne est introuvable parce qu’on a cherché une logique qui n’existe pas, c’est-à-dire une logique classique sur le modèle des manuels de la tradition réformée. La puissance transgressive de Descartes, même dans ce domaine, a été radicale : il a bafoué l’Arbre de Porphyre, vidé de sens la théorie des catégories, montré l’inutilité du syllogisme pour la recherche scientifique. Sans efficacité, à son avis, fut le renouveau d’une logique fondée sur des normes préconstituées. Il se « limite » (...) pourtant à suggérer, sur le modèle des procédés mathématiques, une attitude de pensée centrée sur l’intuitus et dont les relations sont garanties par les notions de « série » et de respectus. La transgression cartésienne a été si bouleversante que « Descartes logicien » devient un auteur maudit et l’attitude qu’il aurait voulu inspirer n’a connu aucune fortune, à telle enseigne que même la Logique de Port-Royal qu’on voudrait cartésienne consacre un grand espace à la syllogistique.Undiscoverable is the Cartesian logic, because scholars looked for a logic that does not exist, i.e. a classical logic after the model of traditional, more or less reformed, manuals. Descartes’ transgressive power was radical even in this domain : he scorned Phorphyrius Tree, voided the theory of categories of all meaning, showed the uselessness of syllogism for scientific research. Just as totally ineffective was, in his view, the renewal of a logic founded on preconstituted norms. He therefore « limits » himself to suggest, after the model of mathematical procedures, an attitude of thought centered on intuitus and whose relationships are guaranteed by the notions of « series » and respectus. The Cartesian transgression turned out to be so upsetting that « Descartes the logician » became a wicked author and the attitude he had meant to inspire had no fortune whatsoever, to such a point that even the Logic of Port-Royal – purportedly Cartesian – leaves much room to syllogistics. (shrink)

The mental representation of one’s own body does not necessarily correspond to the physical body. For instance, a dissociation between perceived and actual reach-ability has been shown, that is, individuals perceive that they can reach objects that are out of grasp. We presented participants with 3D pictures of objects located at four different distances, namely near-reaching space, actual-reaching space, perceived-reaching space and non-reaching space. Immediately after they were presented with function, manipulation, observation or pointing verbs and were required to judge (...) if the verb was compatible with the object.Participants were faster with function and manipulation verbs than with observation and pointing verbs. Strikingly, with both function and manipulation verbs participants were faster when objects were presented in actual than the perceived reaching space. These findings suggest that our knowledge of the world is implicitly built online through behaviour, and is not necessarily reflected in explicit estimates or conscious representations. (shrink)

This article considers the attempt by a prominent fifteenth-century follower of Thomas Aquinas, Dominic of Flanders, to address John Duns Scotus’ most famous argument for the univocity of being. According to Scotus, the intellect must have a concept of being that is univocal to substantial and accidental being, and to finite and infinite being, on the grounds that an intellect cannot be both certain and doubtful through the same concept, but an intellect can be certain that something is a being (...) while doubting whether it is a substance or accident, finite or infinite. The article shows how Flandrensis’ reply in defence of analogy of being hinges on a more fundamental disagreement with Scotus over the division of the logically one. It also shows how Flandrensis’ answer to this question commits him to a position on the unity of the concept of being that lies between the positions of Scotus and of Flandrensis’ earlier Thomistic sources. (shrink)

Per uscire dalle aporie delle proprie conseguenze, la scienza deve vedere riconosciuto l'atto come uno dei propri principi fondamentali (accanto all'ente e alla parola). Scienza è, infatti, mettere in relazione le cose (la "natura") con delle leggi matematiche (vale a dire con dei simboli e dei concetti). Ma mettere in relazione è un atto. Sicché, la scienza si fonda su tre principi (ente, parola, atto) e sui corrispettivi campi filosofici (ontologia, logica, etica). Tenere conto di quest'ambito triadico serve a mostrare (...) che l'epistemologia non è un sapere neutro e descrittivo, ma è un prendere partito: al tempo stesso dal punto di vista etico, politico, morale e giuridico. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:Aristotle identifies four modes of unity: numerical, specific, generic, and proportional or analogous. Recent scholarship has renewed the Renaissance and early Modern Thomist critique that John Duns Scotus's (d. 1308) doctrine of the univocity of being is based on a failure to appreciate proportional unity. This paper attempts to fill a gap in the copious literature on Scotus's doctrine of the univocity of being by presenting and offering an analysis of the texts where Scotus addresses the topic of proportional or (...) analogous unity. The paper argues that Scotus's early and mature works consistently reject the notion that an analogous or proportional unity can serve as the foundation for greater than equivocal unity between concepts, and that Scotus's developed position represents an alternative to Aristotle's division of unity into the modes of numerical, specific, generic, and analogous. Nonetheless, Scotus's early remarks on an analogous unity that is mind-independent provide both an internal justification for the dispute that ensues between Thomists and Scotists over whether a single concept can signify analogously—a dispute that features such distinguished participants as Thomas de Vio Cajetan (1469–1534) and Bartolomaeus Mastrius (1602–73)—and an avenue for further investigation into the thought of the Subtle Doctor. (shrink)

Since the first decade of the 14th Century, Thomas Aquinas’s disciples have struggled to explain and defend his doctrine of analogy. Analogy after Aquinas: Logical Problems, Thomistic Answers relates a history of prominent Medieval and Renaissance Thomists’ efforts to solve three distinct but interrelated problems arising from their reading both of Aquinas’s own texts on analogy, and from John Duns Scotus’s arguments against analogy and in favor of univocity in Metaphysics and Natural Theology. The first of these three problems concerns (...) Aquinas’s at least apparently disparate statements on whether a name is said by analogy through a single concept or through diverse concepts. The second problem concerns the model of analogy suited for predicating names analogously across the categories of being or about God and creatures. Is “being” said analogously about God and creatures, or substance and accidents, on the model of how “healthy” is said of medicine and an animal, or on the model of how “principle” is said of a point and a line? The third problem comes from outside challenges to Aquinas’s thought, in particular Scotus’ claims that univocal names alone can mediate valid demonstrations, and any demonstration that failed to use its mediating terms univocally would fail by the fallacy of equivocation. Analogy after Aquinas makes a unique contribution to the study of philosophical theology in the tradition of Thomas Aquinas by showing the historical and philosophical connection between these three problems, as well as the variety of solutions proposed by leading representatives of this tradition. Thomists considered in the book include: Hervaeus Natalis (1250-1323), Thomas Sutton (1250-1315), John Capreolus (1380-1444), Dominic of Flanders (1425-1479), Paul Soncinas (d. 1494), Thomas dio vio Cajetan (1469-1534), Francis Silvestri of Ferrara (1474-1528), and Chrysostom Javelli (1470-1538). (shrink)

This book is focused on the first three parts of Bolzano's Theory of Science and introduces a more systematic reconsideration of Bolzano's logical thought. In undertaking this task, the book is intended as an exploration, not so much of the more specifically discursive aspects of Bolzano's logical thought - already amply studied - as much as on identifying the singularly coherent and systematic nature of the logic presented in Bolzano's work.