La eleuthería tiene una connotación política y cultural para los antiguos griegos. Refiere la condición libre de los ciudadanos griegos frente a los pueblos bárbaros que prefieren el gobierno tiránico. Platón y Aristóteles, además, hablan de la eleuthería en un sentido moral; esto es, como la condición libre del hombre virtuoso. Pero Aristóteles se refiere a una virtud en concreto: la liberalidad. La liberalidad supone el uso prudente de las riquezas, es decir, el justo medio entre la avaricia y la (...) prodigalidad. Pero el ejercicio de esta virtud repercute en el ámbito político. Primero, porque la ciudadanía presupone en sí misma la virtud moral. Segundo, porque en el núcleo de la liberalidad radica la estabilidad de la pólis; la avaricia o la ambición desmedidas son las que ponen en peligro la estabilidad de la pólis. Por lo tanto, eleuthería tiene un sentido unitario, que va del ámbito privado al político. (shrink)

O sentido do termo eleuthería, similarmente a muitos outros conceitos na obra de Platão, não é unívoco. Mesmo se nos restringirmos ao diálogo República, encontraremos nele uma ampla gama de concepções que vão desde a acepção popular de ‘dizer e fazer o que se quer’, até a significação, mais propriamente filosófica do termo; vale dizer também daquela que envolve uma dimensão psicológica e moral, na qual o homem deve buscar agir de acordo consigo mesmo. Esta atividade ética, que Platão (2006) (...) (seguir o modelo de citação indireta) insiste em chamar de política (Rep. IX, 592 a5 – a9), baseada no “cuidado de si” tornar-se-á uma pré-condição que prepara o homem para a vida junto aos outros homens e para outras ações derivadas, como o governo da pólis, a produção de leis e, também, para as atividades investigativas, tais como o diálogo e a dialética. Encontramos, pois, naquele diálogo, um verdadeiro embate entre algumas concepções rivais de eleuthería, por exemplo: Trasímaco acredita que o tirano é o mais livre dos homens (Rep. I, 344 a) enquanto Sócrates, ao final do diálogo, defende que o tirano jamais experimentou a liberdade (Rep. IX, 577 a). Assim, este artigo se propõe, então, investigar e circunscrever, a partir do exame da República, os sentidos da eleuthería, fixando a atenção no seu significado propriamente filosófico. (shrink)

T. H. Macho defended the claim that politics is a system for organizing attention and for arranging relationships of visibility. One way of attracting and holding the attention of others and maintaining one’s visibility is the instrumentalization of indignation. Another way is to instigate and maintain social stress and unrest. The article explores the concepts of indignation and social stress as introduced by P. Sloterdijk. These concepts are part of a model of political dynamics that describes 1) the relationship between (...) indignation and stress in political super-units and 2) the fact that they are compensated for by means of a specific conception of individual freedom (eleuthería, J.-J. Rousseau) and a liberal social order. The article defends the claim that there is a relationship between Macho’s claim about the organization of attention, Sloterdijk’s analyses of the concept of freedom and the method whereby individuals are immunized against generated social stress, which maintains social cohesion. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: This is a little piece directed at the newcomer to Aristotle, making some general remarks about reading Aristotle at the beginning and end, with sandwiched in between, a brief and much simplified discussion of some common misunderstandings of Aristotle's philosophy, concerning spontaneity, causal indeterminism, freedom-to-do-otherwise, free choice, agent causation, logical determinism, teleological determinism, artistic creativity and freedom (eleutheria).

Central passages: Plutarch, Aud. Poet. 33d, Epictetus, Enchiridion 53.1, Seneca Letters 107.10; Hippolytus, Refutation of all Heresies 1.21.2 Eleutheria was an indispensable philosophical concept in early Stoic ethics, and became central in the moral philosophy of the Roman Stoa. The Stoic notion of eleutheria has been a source of modern misinterpretation and mis‐assessment of the early Stoic theory of fate and of Chrysippus’ compatibilism. In particular, it has been illegitimately confounded with Chrysippus’ notion of that which depends on us. There (...) is no evidence that the Stoic concept of eleutheria and the question of that which depends on us were connected in any way before the Roman Stoa. This chapter contains first an analysis of Epictetus’ concept of that which depends on us and how it relates to the early Stoic concept; then an outline of the Stoic notion of eleutheria, its role in early Stoic philosophy and in Epictetus, and its connection with the concept of that which depends on us, and the specific philosophical contexts in which the two concepts belong. Finally, the chapter provides a discussion of a couple of passages, including the famous dog and cart simile, which are shown to be often wrongly associated with Chrysippus’ compatibilism, to belong rather in the wider context of Epictetan ethics, and to have had their origin in Cleanthes’ philosophy. (shrink)

Exeinai bedeutet, dass es jemandem offensteht, eine bestimmte Handlung zu tun. Damit verbinden sich die Vorstellungen des Handlungsspielraums, des Anders-Könnens und des Anders-gekonnt-Habens wie auch die Vorstellung, selbst über sein Tun und Lassen bestimmen zu können. Exousia ist eng verknüpft mit eleutheria, Freiheit, und seit Aristoteles ist exeinai auch mit dem Begriff ep’ autō(i): etwas liegt bei einem, verbunden. Der Aufsatz bietet die erste detaillierte Untersuchung der Verwendung, der begrifflichen Verbindungen und der Signifikanz von exeinai und exousia. Damit fällt neues (...) Licht auf eine frühe Phase in der Geschichte der Freiheitsidee. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel on Self-Consciousness: Desire and Death in the Phenomenology of SpiritAndy R. GermanRobert B. Pippin. Hegel on Self-Consciousness: Desire and Death in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Princeton-Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011. Pp. viii + 103. Cloth, $29.95.If Hegel's system cannot be understood without the Phenomenology of Spirit, it is certainly impossible to understand the Phenomenology without understanding its famous transition, in chapter 4, to self-consciousness and the (perhaps (...) all-too-famous) master-slave dialectic. In these published lectures, then, Robert Pippin has compelling reasons for seeking the heart of the Phenomenology in two of its crucial assertions: that "Self-Consciousness is desire itself" and that "Self-Consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness" (¶¶167 and 175 in Miller's translation).Pippin's Hegel is essentially Kantian, concerned with the apperceptive nature of self-consciousness, i.e. not as mere receptivity to sensory or intellectual form, but as an activity, a judging or "taking" the world to be such and so. For Kant, this activity is transcendental or purely formal, the unification of the spatio-temporal manifold by a continuous, apperceptive "I" (31). Pippin argues that Hegel jettisons Kantian formality in favor of a broader question: how, rather than being subject to my desires, am I the subject of my desires? (32). An answer is possible only if self-consciousness is neither observational nor an immediate self-presence but instead (i) a practical achievement (15) that (ii) requires other self-conscious subjects (19). Unlike Platonic erōs, then, which points away from human life, self-conscious desire is constant self-examination of the reasons for our actions or beliefs. This is Hegel's version of Kant's insight that reason is the desire for justification, ultimately before "all others" (56–57).Thus we pivot to the claim that the successful or "satisfying" achievement of self-consciousness involves recognition by others. "Our answerability to the world," as Pippin writes, "is inextricably bound up with... our answerability to each other" (61). Unlike John McDowell's interpretation of the master-slave dialectic as an analogy for the struggle between the passive and active elements within one mind (42), Pippin argues that self-consciousness is social all the way down. It is "something like having a position," i.e. avowing a practical commitment or making a normative claim (65), which implies the presence of another self-conscious subject who recognizes my right to such claims, or challenges that right, even to the outermost—a struggle to the death over recognition and authority. Self-consciousness, then, is "not... a reflection of some substantive or metaphysical nature but... a social achievement... bound up with... social conflict" (75). On the decisive point, Pippin agrees with Brandom's neo-pragmatism: "[S]elf-conscious beings do not have natures, they have histories" (68), specifically, the history of struggle and reconciliation among rational, mutually recognizing subjects.But what, then, does recognition mean and how does it "satisfy"? And in what does our "answerability to others" consist if there is no "non-question begging... standard" (83) by which to judge our answers? Hegel, Pippin writes, "has a ‘pragmatic' or a ‘historicized' or ‘dialogical' view of what counts as the appeal to reasons.... He understands practical reason as a kind of interchange of attempts at justification among persons... " (84). Justification, however, cannot mean an appeal to nature. Indeed, in the struggle for recognition, self-conscious freedom means indifference to mere natural life or desire. Nature no longer points to philosophical wholeness, as our love of seeing does in Aristotle's Metaphysics. To paraphrase Pippin's titles, he shows with superior clarity that Hegel's idealism really is modernism: i.e. the most thoroughgoing rejection of the Greek link between eleutheria and eudaimonia.But when Hegel writes of "the point where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself... where Concept corresponds to object and object to Concept" as the necessary "goal" of knowledge (¶80), this suggests that the "interchange of justifications" reaches an end. Even if this end is the socio-political order of mutual recognition among rational persons, it is surely not the mere fact of recognition that satisfies us... (shrink)

O objetivo desta contribuição é comparar a leitura que Platão e Pseudo-Xenofonte fazem da liberdade da democracia. Para este fim se apresentarão uma série de ocorrências do termo eleutheria e de seus cognatos para mostrar a raiz comum e as diferenças entre estes dois autores sobre o que significa “homem livre” e qual é a dinâmica entre liberdade e escravidão a partir de uma fenomenologia cujo objeto são os desejos.

Through a detailed analysis of ancient philosophical doctrines of liberty and careful examination of the ethymology of the term "eleutheria", the text gives its reader rich material for consideration which must eventually lead to a conclusion that Greek understanding of freedom as a specifically human entity, is the root of all modern views concerning liberty.

Chippides kai Kynikoi -- Kanete erōta, ochi taphous: hē kainouria thrēskeia -- Hē eleutheria kai ho touristas philosophos --Zōntanē philosophia -- Ho exovelismos tou hyperphysikou -- Hē autoktonia: Stōikē therapeia -- Aphērēmenē agapē, aphērēmeno atomo, "d̲rop aout" -- Hē leitourgikotēta kai to noēma tōn onomatōn.

Although Roland Barthes never wrote a play, ‘theatre’ or related terms such as ‘scenario’ or ‘theatricality’ recur throughout his oeuvre from the 1950s to the late 1970s. He wrote many reviews of theatre, but theatre and performance also became integral to much of the theoretical concerns of his later work. During this same period, Samuel Beckett’s dramaturgy was evolving from his first full-length play, Eleutheria, to the later ‘dramaticules’ such as Not I, which premiered in 1973. Barthes did comment on (...) Beckett a few times in his theatre criticism, mainly in relation to En attendant Godot or avant-garde theatre, but there is little overt interchange between them. However, this essay creates a series of ‘dialogues’ by juxtaposing selected plays from different moments in Beckett’s dramaturgical evolution with different moments in Barthes’s writings about theatre: firstly, the reaction against and deconstruction of post-war mainstream French theatre; secondly, theatre’s engagement with history; and thirdly, performance as a paradigm and site for staging multiple versions of the self. (shrink)

Reflection on free agency has largely been motivated by perceived threats to its very existence, which, in turn, has driven the philosophical conversation to focus on the question of whether we have the freedom required for moral responsibility. The Stoics were early participants in this conversation, but they were also concerned about an ideal of inner moral freedom, a freedom over and above that required for responsibility, and one to which we might aspire over the course of our lives. Though (...) some details of the Stoic ideal would be difficult for many of us to accept, I argue that it merits our attention for the way it focuses on the removal of inner obstacles to virtue, leading to improved moral vision and the willingness to follow that vision. I then show how we can harness resources from contemporary theorizing on responsible agency to capture the structure and scalar nature of such an ideal, thereby helpfully situating ideal moral freedom in relation to the freedom relevant to moral responsibility. I outline three possible contemporary versions of such an ideal, noting how each will be sensitive to related commitments in metaphysics, moral psychology, and normative theory. (shrink)