Perceptual systems that integrate different principles and/or a different architecture at large may produce substantially varied outputs from the same scene. I call this thesis perceptual pluralism and I bring related empirical evidence to bear on the epistemological debate on perception. I argue that perceptual pluralism, coupled with the position that at least some different kinds of perception are equally successful in guiding interaction with the world, serve to undermine the thesis that the typical human perception is uniquely veridical. Last, (...) I consider perspectival realism as the epistemological stance that is prospectively best suited to this state of affairs, and provide a method for evaluating whether this prospect holds up. (shrink)

Recent years have seen enticing empirical approaches to solving the epistemological problem of the theory-ladenness of observation. I group these approaches in two categories according to their method of choice: testing and refereeing. I argue that none deliver what friends of theory-neutrality want them to. Testing does not work because both evidence from cognitive neuroscience and perceptual pluralism independently invalidate the existence of a common observation core. Refereeing does not work because it treats theory-ladenness as a kind of superficial, removable (...) bias. Even if such treatment is plausible, there is likely no method to ascertain that effects of this bias are not present. More importantly, evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that a deeper, likely irremovable kind of theory-ladenness lies within the perceptual modules. (shrink)

Against claims that Origen causes History to evaporate into barren idealism, his theology is shown to have no other source and aim than historical occurences.

Hoi philosophoi kai hē hēdonē --Hoi philosophoi kai hē ischys -- Outopia kai historikē praxē.