Aristotle sets the horizons of our inquiry: What is it when we say we know something? And is the object of knowledge a universal or particular [tode ti] object? Aristotle's critique of Plato's theory of form/Forms in light of his notion of actuality has generated a variety of topics that frame our inquiry: "Understanding Eidos as Form in the Works of Aristotle as Plato's Critical Student"; "Aristotle on Plato's Forms as Causes"; "Notes on the Relationship between Plato's Parmenides and (...) Aristotle's Metaphysics Alpha"; "'Separate' and 'Inactive'? Aristotle's Most Challenging Critique of Plato's 'Forms'"; "Too Much Unity in a City Is Destructive of the City: Aristotle against Plato's Unification Project of the Polis"; "Aristotle on the Soul as Actuality"; "Delphic Piety in the De Anima of Alexander of Aphrodisias"; "Aristotle and Plotinus: Act and Potency and the Two Acts"; and "Al-Fārābīon Habit and Imagination." Here, the Peripatetic readings of form and actuality are parsed from the precipice of historical, analytic, and continental approaches to the mind/language/object problem, with advocacy of the importance of Aristotle's contribution to this inquiry for the present age. (shrink)

Diese Arbeit erlautert und interpretiert Platons Dialog Phaidon. Vor dem Hintergrund der Ausfuhrungen zu Eidos, Psyche und Unsterblichkeit und deren Relationen zueinander stellt diese Untersuchung einen prazisen Kommentar dar, der eine synchrone Lekture des Phaidon stutzt. Die Interpretationen der Dialogaussagen zu den Eide, zur Seelenkonzeption und zur Unsterblichkeitslehre werden erganzt durch den Vergleich mit den grundlegenden philosophischen Todes- und Jenseitsauffassungen der Vorsokratik. Neben der eng am Text entwickelten Uberprufung aller Unsterblichkeitsbeweise, der Einwande des Simmias und des Kebes und der (...) Widerlegungen dieser Einwande durch Sokrates, beschaftigt sich diese Arbeit ferner mit einer detaillierten Explikation des Hypothesisverfahrens.". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Eidos/idea in IsocratesRobert G. SullivanFor modern readers, the career and literary output of the Attic rhetorician Isocrates is uncomfortably situated at the boundary between what we conceive as technical rhetoric and professional philosophy. Much of this confusion may be due to Isocrates' famous description of his program as being a philosophia (Panegyricus 10, 47; Evagoras 8, 81; Panathenaicus 9; Against the Sophists 1, 11-18, 21; Antidosis 30, 42-50, (...) 162, 176, 181-92).1 Over the years, the issue has exercised a large number of scholars who have tried to specify what Isocrates meant by the term and what matters he considered to be within his purview.2 Recently, the idea has been advanced that Isocrates and Plato consciously struggled over the use of the term (Nehamas 1990, 4; Timmerman 1998, 145). In Nehamas's very useful formulation, Isocrates thought philosophy to be "the ability to speak well, which in turn reflects and is the product of thinking well and shrewdly about practical affairs" (1990, 4). Timmerman's review of the relevant literature shows how Isocrates' conflation of philosophia and hê tôn logôn paideia has hurt his reputation among modern disciplinary philosophers: "This confusion and resultant devaluation of Isocrates' philosophy is predicated on a platonically colored view of what constitutes philosophy" (1998, 147). More recently, others have made efforts to recover Isocrates for philosophy by concentrating on those parts of his program that are of interest to philosophers of our era.3As a result, there has been a long-standing critical misapprehension regarding how best to interpret his works. Simply put, a question arises as to whether we should interpret them as bei. (shrink)

Las interpretaciones ascética y vitalista del eidos son incapaces de pensar a fondo su relevancia fenomenológica. Siempre parece que se valora más su perímetro y cerco, al servicio de la clausura y la consolidación de la unidad, que la diversidad intraeidética, infinita o empíricamente abierta. Más allá de lo típico, las rutinas y asentamientos mundanos, la diversidad intraeidética es críticamente eficaz sobre todo en la periferia, al tiempo que propicia la flexibilidad y dilatación interior de cada eidos. Esta (...) problemática es decisiva cuando se trata de pensar la dimensión proteica e hibrida de la cultura humana, así como la posibilidad de diversidad y cordura en un mundo complejo y en expansión.The ascetic and vitalistic interpretations of eidos are unable to think thoroughly its phenomenological relevancy. It always seems that the perimeter and boundary of eidos, at the service of the closure and consolidation of the unity, is more valued than intraeidetic diversity, infinitely or empirically opened. Beyond the typical, mundane routines and settlements, intraeidetic diversity is critically effective especially in the periphery, while enabling the flexibility and inner expansion of each eidos. This problem is crucial when it comes to thinking about the protean and hybrid dimensions of human culture, as well as the possibility of diversity and sanity in a complex and expanding world. (shrink)

paper to be presented at "Religion, Society, and the Science of Life", 2017 IRC-ISSR Conference, 19-22 July, Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion, Oxford University.

This article attempts to develop the abandoned occasionalist model of causation into a credible present-day theory. If objects can never exhaust one another through their relations, it is hard to know how they can ever interact at all. This article handles the problem by dividing objects into two kinds: the real objects that emerge from Heidegger’s tool-analysis and the intentional objects of Husserl’s phenomenology. Each of these objects turns out to be split by an additional rift between the object as (...) an enduring unit and its plurality of traits. This explains Heidegger’s notorious ‘fourfold’ model of the thing. This article shows that Heidegger’s Geviert must be reinterpreted as a system of four tensions that can be identified as time, space, essence, and eidos. Time and space can no longer be left as peerless dimensions of the cosmos. Instead, they are shown to arise from the tensions between things and their qualities. And for this reason they are joined by essence (in the classical sense of the term) and eidos (in Husserl’s sense, not Plato’s) as two out of four basic features of the fabric of the world. (shrink)

The principle of identitas indiscernibilium can be thoroughly expressed in a quantum context, overcoming the debate about the possibility of distinction among identical entities according to space-time parameters: the symmetry defined by the exchange of the wave function without overlapping describes the behavior of particles as if they were alike. That nature of the wave function is depicted along the essay as a relational property of observation, not of the quantum object itself, making the principle take an epistemological turn, dissociated (...) from the object ontic drive. (shrink)

In this paper we will be discussing the “Platonism” of two former Göttingen students of Husserl, notably Jean Héring and Roman Ingarden. By “Platonism” we mean not simply an account of the diff erence between individuals and Forms. We mean a peculiar insight into what Ingarden explicitly designates as “the content of Ideas”. Our primary concern is to emphasize a major shift in Plato’s treatment of Forms: we will see Plato switching the focus of his investigation from the difference between (...) the visible world of bodies and the invisible realm of Forms to the internal structure of the Forms themselves. We will then discuss Héring’s Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee and Ingarden’s Essentiale Fragen in order to explain the diff erence between the notions of individual essence, morphe, essentiality and Idea. (shrink)

As Baudelaire’s poetics are founded in an understanding of inspiration as an expression of reflexion, they coin the fundamentals of modern aesthetics. In another perspective, these poetics are linked to an epistemological tradition, in which ›enthousiasmos‹ as the subjective capacity of mind does not only intend to assimilate itself to the idea, but claims to give form to the idea by its own creativity. The preforms of this thought might be found in Neo-Platonism, respectively in its early modern remodelling in (...) Bruno’s ›Eroici Furori‹ that award metaphysical qualities to the intellect as an ›infinite movement‹, taking in account that this movement does no longer target the cognition of intelligibility, but produces intelligibility by itself. (shrink)

This article presents the notions of ethos and eidos as field level concepts for the sociology of morality and the anthropology of ethics. This is accomplished in the context of Bourdieuan social theory and, therefore, from the broad standpoint of practice theory. In the first instance these terms are used to refer to the normative structures of social fields and are conceived so as to represent the way in which such structures fall between two planes, that of the implicit (...) and the explicit. Subsequently, they are used to further understand a distinction between morality—roughly, the implicit moral order of a social field—and ethics—the more explicit and often codified elements of a social field’s normative structure. When presented in relation to academic philosophical inquiries into the ethical issues in healthcare and the life sciences—meaning the disciplines of applied ethics in general and applied ethics in particular—the analytic perspective these terms facilitate enables us to represent the fundamental conditions required for academic enquiry; taken together the ethos and eidos of an intellectual field constitute the requisite background of its normative epistemic and methodological commitments, thereby providing the structures of disciplined intellectual practices. Seen in this light it not only becomes possible to grasp applied ethics as a socially structured practice but to understand it in terms that can also be used to frame our everyday moral practices. In this way applied ethics can be acknowledged as a relatively unique part of our contemporary moral culture. (shrink)

The phenomenological notion of person is presented and settled between facticity and eidetic dimension. Through this critical assessment the analysis responds to the classical criticism raised against the alleged abstractness of phenomenology and opens the possibility of a fruitful dialog with ethics and psychology. The enquiry about the idea of person sheds new light on the correlated notions of phenomenological idealism, eidos and constitution that are brought in closer connection with the lived experience of perception and motivation.

No detailed description available for "Logos and Eidos".

Había tiempos en los que como fenomenólogo uno era visto de forma muy crítica y también compasiva cuando le atribuía a imágenes y signos algo así como una presencia encarnada. Ahora nos encontramos más bien con un exceso de oferta de presencia, inmediatez, contacto y cercanía. Sin embargo, algo de esto parece ser una reversión con la que se intenta sobrecompensar deficiencias anteriores. También en la filosofía, de cuando en cuando, se da un afán excesivo, como se encuentra en los (...) recién convertidos. Pero dejemos hablar a las cosas mismas. Con este fin me limito a señalar en forma de resumen algunos puntos tanto relevantes como controvertidos que conciernen en su conjunto al lugar de las imágenes en la experiencia y que adquieren un tono particular a través del contraste entre eidos y pathos2. (shrink)

English translates ‘genos’ as kind and ‘eidos’ as form, which differ in meaning as much as ‘herd’ and ‘brand’ do. But there are hard passages where ‘genos’ and ‘eidos’ have appeared to be synonyms, usually given the new meaning class. We show that, although ‘genos’ and ‘eidos’ are never synonyms and continue to mean kind and form, the word ‘eidos’ can be used figuratively, as a metonym, for a genos.